"על שם סופו": מיון והסללה בחינוך

And God heard the voice of the lad; and the angel of God called to Hagar out of heaven, and said unto her: ‘What aileth thee, Hagar? fear not; for God hath heard the voice of the lad where he is.

The reason is that all are found frequently with her in sin, and in the end she will be a sinner and cause others to sin. But it is a Torah edict that the penalty for rebelliousness is imposed only upon a son, and not upon a daughter. MISHNA: From when is a stubborn and rebel-lious son liable? From when he eats a tarteimar of meat and drinks a half-log of Italian wine. Rabbi Yosei says: From when he eats a maneh of meat and drinks a log of wine. The mishna now lists a series of conditions concerning his eating and drinking. If he ate these items with a group assembled for the performance of a mitzva, or he ate them at a meal celebrating the intercalation of a month, or he ate the items when they had second tithe status, in Jerusalem, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son because each of these circumstances involves some aspect of a mitzva. If he ate the meat of unslaughtered animal carcasses or animals that had wounds that would have caused them to die within twelve months [tereifot] or repugnant creatures or creeping animals, or he ate untithed produce from which tithes and terumot were not separated, or first tithe from which its teruma was not separated, or second tithe outside Jerusalem or consecrated food that was not redeemed, each of which involves a transgression, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son. The mishna summarizes: If he ate an item that involves performing a mitzva or an item that involves committing a transgression, or if he ate any food in the world but did not eat meat, or if he drank any beverage but did not drink wine, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son, unless he actually eats meat and actually drinks wine, as it is stated: “This son of ours is stubborn and rebellious; he does not listen to our voice; he…is a glutton [zolel] and a drunkard [vesovei]” (Deuteronomy 21:20). One is not called a glutton and a drunkard unless he eats meat and drinks wine. And although there is no explicit proof to the matter that the reference in the Torah is to meat and wine, there is an allusion to the matter in another verse, as it is stated: “Be not among wine drinkers [besovei], among gluttonous eaters [bezolelei] of meat” (Proverbs 23:20). GEMARA: Rabbi Zeira says: Concerning this tarteimar that is mentioned in the mishna, I do not know what its measure is. But since Rabbi Yosei is found to have doubled the measure of the wine, as the unattributed opinion in the mishna speaks of a half-log whereas Rabbi Yosei requires a log, he presumably is found to have doubled the measure of the meat as well. Therefore, it turns out that a tarteimar is equivalent to one-half of a maneh. Rav Ḥanan bar Molada says that Rav Huna says: A stubborn and rebellious son is not liable unless he purchases inexpen-sive [bezol] meat and eats it, and he buys inexpensive wine and drinks it, as it is written: “He is a glutton [zolel] and a drunkard.” And Rav Ḥanan bar Molada says that Rav Huna says: A stubborn and rebellious son is not liable unless he eats raw meat and drinks undiluted wine. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Is that so? But don’t Rabba and Rav Yosef both say: If he ate raw meat or drank undiluted wine he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son? Ravina said: The two conflicting statements can be reconciled. If he ate totally raw meat or drank totally undiluted wine, he is in fact exempt. The undiluted wine for which he is liable is wine that is diluted but not diluted properly. And the raw meat for which he is liable is meat that is cooked but not cooked properly, like the scorched meat that thieves are wont to eat, due to the hasty manner in which they must prepare their food. Rabba and Rav Yosef both say: If he ate heavily salted meat or drank wine from his winepress, i.e., wine that has not finished fermenting, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son. And on a related topic we learned in a mishna elsewhere (Ta’anit 26b): On the eve of the Ninth of Av, a person may not eat two cooked dishes in one meal. And furthermore, he may neither eat meat nor drink wine. And a tanna taught in a baraita: But one may eat heavily salted meat, as it is not considered meat, and one many drink wine from his winepress before it has properly fermented. The Gemara asks: With regard to salted meat on the eve of the Ninth of Av, how long must this meat remain in salt before it is permitted? Rabbi Ḥanina bar Kahana says: As long as it is like a peace-offering, which could be eaten for two days and one night after it was sacrificed. After this time has passed, it is no longer the type of meat that one may not eat during that meal. Therefore, if it was salted for longer than this, it may be eaten on the eve of the Ninth of Av. The Gemara inquires further: And with regard to wine from his press before it has properly fermented, until when is wine considered in this category? As long as it is still fermenting. And it is taught in a baraita: Fermenting wine is not subject to the prohibition of exposed liquids, as there is no concern that a snake will leave its venom in that wine. And how long is its initial fermenting period? Three days from the time the grapes were pressed. The Gemara clarifies: These definitions of salty meat and wine from his winepress were stated with regard to the prohibitions applying on the eve of the Ninth of Av. Here, concerning a stubborn and rebellious son, what is considered salty meat and wine from his press? The Gemara answers: There, with regard to the eve of the Ninth of Av, the prohibition is due to joy; as long as the meat is like a peace-offering, there is still joy. But here, with regard to a stubborn and rebellious son, it is due to the son becoming drawn to it, and if the taste of the meat is flawed only slightly he will not be drawn to it. And with regard to wine, there is no concern that he will be drawn to it until it is forty days old. § The Gemara’s discussion turns to wine in general. Rav Ḥanan says: Wine was created in the world only to comfort mourners in their distress, and to reward the wicked in this world so that they will have no reward left in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “Give strong drink to him that is ready to perish, and wine to the bitter of soul” (Proverbs 31:6). “Him that is ready to perish” is referring to the wicked, who will perish from this world, while “the bitter of soul” denotes mourners. Rabbi Yitzḥak says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Look not upon wine when it is red” (Proverbs 23:31)? Look not upon wine that reddens the faces of the wicked in this world when they drink it, and whitens their faces, i.e., embarrasses them, in the World-to-Come. Rava says that this is how the verse should be understood: “Look not upon wine that reddens [yitaddam]” means: Look not upon wine, as it leads to bloodshed [dam], indicating that one who drinks wine will end up committing an act of killing or will be killed because of it. Rav Kahana raises a contradiction: The verse states: “Therefore, they shall come and sing in the height of Zion, and shall flow to the bounty of the Lord, for wheat, and for wine, and for oil, and for the young of the flock and of the herd” (Jeremiah 31:11). The word for wine is written tirash, without the letter vav, but we read it as tirosh, with the letter vav. The matter can explained as follows: If one merits and drinks a moderate amount he becomes a leader [rosh], whereas if he does not merit and drinks excessively he becomes poor [rash]. Rava raises a similar contradiction: It is written: “And wine that gladdens the heart of man” (Psalms 104:15). The word for gladdens could be read as yeshamaḥ, meaning that wine makes one crazy, but we read it as yesamaḥ, gladdens the heart. The matter can be explained as follows: If one merits and drinks a moderate amount the wine gladdens him [mesameḥo], whereas if he does not merit and drinks excessively it makes him crazy [meshamemehu]. And that is what Rava meant when he said: Wine and fragrant spices have made me wise; that is to say, the controlled drinking of wine is beneficial to the drinker. Rav Amram, son of Rabbi Shimon bar Abba, says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Who cries, Woe? Who cries, Alas? Who has quarrels? Who has complaints? Who has causeless injuries? Who has redness of eyes? They who tarry long at the wine, they who go to seek mixed wine” (Proverbs 23:29–30)? When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that they say in the West, Eretz Yisrael, that one who interprets this verse from the beginning to the end interprets it in a way that has meaning and significance. And also one who interprets it from the end to the beginning interprets it in a meaningful manner. It is possible to interpret these verses from the beginning to the end and say: Woe and alas to one who drinks wine; and it is also possible to interpret them from the end to the beginning: Who drinks wine? He who has quarrels, complaints, and injuries. A visitor from the Galilee expounded: The conversive vav is stated thirteen times in the passage concerning wine, as it is stated: “And Noah began [vayyaḥel] to be a farmer, and he planted [vayyita] a vineyard, and he drank [vayyesht] of the wine, and was drunk [vayyishkar]; and he was uncovered [vayyitgal] within his tent. And Ham, the father of Canaan, saw [vayyar] the nakedness of his father, and told [vayyagged] his two brothers outside. And Shem and Japheth took [vayyikaḥ] the garment, and laid it [vayyasimu] upon both their shoulders, and went [vayyelekhu] backward, and covered [vaykhassu] the nakedness of their father; and their faces were backward, and they did not see their father’s nakedness. And Noah awoke [vayyiketz] from his wine, and knew [vayyeda] what his younger son had done to him” (Genesis 9:20–24). All thirteen instances of the conversive vav here are followed by the letter yod. Together they form the word vay, meaning woe, and allude to the suffering and misfortune caused by uncontrolled drinking. Having cited the passage discussing Noah, the Gemara enters into a discussion about what was actually done to him by his younger son, Ham. Rav and Shmuel disagreed: One says that Ham castrated Noah and one says that Ham sodomized him. The Gemara explains: The one who says that Ham castrated Noah adduces the following proof: Since he injured Noah with respect to the possibility of conceiving a fourth son, which Noah wanted but could no longer have, therefore Noah cursed him by means of Ham’s fourth son. Ham’s sons were Cush, Mizraim, Put, and Canaan (see Genesis 10:6), and of all of these, it was Canaan whom Noah cursed (see Genesis 9:25–28). And the one who says that Ham sodomized Noah learned this from a verbal analogy between the words “and he saw” and “and he saw.” Here it is written: “And Ham, the father of Canaan, saw the nakedness of his father”; and there it is written: “And Shechem, son of Hamor the Hivite, prince of the country, saw her, and he took her, and lay with her, and afflicted her” (Genesis 34:2). This indicates that the term “saw” alludes to sexual intercourse. The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who says that Ham castrated Noah, it is due to that reason that Noah cursed Ham by means of Ham’s fourth son. But according to the one who says that Ham sodomized him, what is different about his fourth son? He should have cursed Ham directly. The Gemara answers: This Sage holds that both this offense and that offense were committed. All agree that Ham castrated Noah, and some say that Ham also sodomized him. The Gemara continues to analyze the passage relating to Noah. The verse states: “And Noah began to be a farmer, and he planted a vineyard.” In explanation of this matter, Rav Ḥisda says that Rav Ukva says, and some say that Mar Ukva says that Rabbi Zakkai says: The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Noah: Noah, shouldn’t you have learned from Adam the first man, whose banishment from the Garden of Eden was caused only by wine? The Gemara notes: This is in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that the tree from which Adam the first man ate was a grapevine. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Meir says: The tree from which Adam the first man ate was a grapevine,

GEMARA: It is taught in a baraita that further elaborates upon the words of the mishna: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: Is it simply due to the fact that the boy ate a tarteimar of meat and drank a half-log of Italian wine that the Torah states that he shall be taken out to court to be stoned? Rather, the Torah penetrated the ultimate mind-set of the stubborn and rebellious son and the inevitable results of his actions, and it is understood that he will continue on this path, and in the end he will squander his father’s property, and then, seeking the pleasures to which he had become accustomed but not finding them, he will go out to the crossroads and rob people. The Torah said that it is better that he should die now when he is still innocent, and he should not die later when he is guilty. This is because the death of the wicked is beneficial to them and also beneficial to the world, while the death of the righteous is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world. The sleep and wine of the wicked is beneficial to them and beneficial to the world, while that of the righteous is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world. The tranquility of the wicked is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world, while the tranquility of the righteous is beneficial to them and beneficial to the world. The dispersal of the wicked is beneficial to them and beneficial to the world, while the dispersal of the righteous is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world. MISHNA: A burglar who is found breaking into a house may be killed by the owner of the house with impunity (see Exodus 22:1). He too is sentenced on account of his ultimate end, as it is presumed that if the owner of the house would resist the burglar, the burglar would kill the owner of the house. If the burglar was breaking into a house, and in the course of doing so he broke a barrel, if there is blood-guiltiness for killing him, i.e., if the homeowner would be liable for killing him, the burglar is liable to pay for the value of the barrel. An example of this is if a father broke into his son’s house, in which case it is presumed that even if the son resists his father, his father would never kill him, and therefore the son may not kill his father, and if he does so he is liable. If there is no blood-guiltiness for killing him, i.e., if the homeowner would be exempt from punishment for killing him, the burglar is exempt from paying for the barrel. GEMARA: Rava says: What is the reason for this halakha concerning a burglar who breaks into a house? He explains: There is a presumption that a person does not restrain himself when faced with losing his money, and therefore this burglar must have said to himself: If I go in and the owner sees me, he will rise against me and not allow me to steal from him, and if he rises against me, I will kill him. And the Torah stated a principle: If someone comes to kill you, rise and kill him first. Rav says: If a burglar broke into a house and took certain vessels, and he then left and was caught only afterward, he is exempt from the obligation to pay restitution for the vessels. What is the reason? He acquired the vessels with his blood. When he broke into the house, he risked his life, as the owner could have killed him. This grave risk that he took exempts him from any other more lenient punishments that could otherwise have been imposed upon him, including the obligation to pay restitution. Rava says: Rav’s statement is reasonable in a case where he broke the vessels in the course of robbing, so that they no longer exist, and the issue is only whether he has to pay for them. But if he took the vessels and they are still extant, Rav’s ruling does not apply. The Gemara comments: But by God! Rav states his ruling even with regard to a case where the burglar took the vessels and they are still extant. That is to say, Rav himself does not distinguish between the two cases, as in a case where there is blood-guiltiness for killing him, e.g., in a case where a father came to steal from his son, if an accident occurred to the vessels, the burglar is liable to pay for them. Apparently, the vessels are established in the burglar’s possession, and he must pay for any damage that occurs to them. Here also, then, where there is no blood-guiltiness, the vessels are established as being in the burglar’s possession and they are his. Rava explains: But this is not so, i.e., there is no proof from that case that can be applied to this one. One can claim that when the Merciful One established the vessels in the burglar’s possession, that was only concerning accidents, so he should be liable to pay for any damage that occurs to them. But as for ownership, they remain in the possession of their owner, just as it is in the case of a borrower. Even though a borrower is liable to pay for all the accidental damage caused to the item he borrowed, nevertheless the borrowed item does not become his property. The Gemara raises an objection against Rav: We learned in the mishna that if the burglar was breaking into a house, and in the course of doing so he broke a barrel, if there is blood-guiltiness for killing him, the burglar is liable to pay the value of the barrel. If there is no blood-guiltiness for killing him, he is exempt from paying for the barrel. A precise reading of the mishna indicates that the reason he is exempt is that he broke the barrel, so where there is no blood-guiltiness for killing him, he is exempt from paying for it. But if he took the barrel, he would not be exempt; rather, he would be liable, counter to the ruling of Rav. The Gemara explains: The same is true, i.e., that the burglar would be exempt, even if he took the barrel. And that which was taught in the mishna: He broke the barrel, serves to teach us that when there is blood-guiltiness for killing him, then even though he broke the barrel and it is no longer extant, he is also liable to pay for it. The Gemara raises an objection: Isn’t it obvious that he is liable? This burglar is like any other person who causes damage and is liable to pay for it. The Gemara answers: This mishna teaches us that he is liable even if he broke the barrel unintentionally. The Gemara objects once again: What is the mishna teaching us with this ruling? Does it teach that the legal status of a person is always that of one forewarned, and therefore he is liable even for unintentional damage? But we already learn this in a baraita: The legal status of a person is always that of one forewarned, whether the damage was done unintentionally or intentionally, whether by unavoidable accident or whether it was done willingly. The Gemara comments: Indeed, this presents a difficulty for Rav. Rav Beivai bar Abaye raises an objection to the ruling of Rava from a baraita: One who steals a purse on Shabbat and takes it out into a public domain is liable to pay for what he stole even though he also desecrated Shabbat, which is a transgression for which one is executed by stoning. Ordinarily, one who is liable to receive two punishments for the same offense is administered only the more severe punishment and exempt from the other one. Here, however, he is liable to pay for the purse and is executed, because he was already liable to pay for the theft as soon as he lifted the purse, and this took place before he came to violate the prohibition of performing prohibited labor on Shabbat by carrying the purse into the public domain. The baraita continues: If he did not lift the purse, but rather was dragging it on the ground and exiting the private domain, he is exempt from paying for what he stole, as in this case, since he did not lift the purse, he would become liable to pay for the stolen item only when he drags it out of its owner’s property into the public domain. Accordingly, the prohibition of theft and the prohibition of performing prohibited labor on Shabbat, which is punishable with death by stoning, are violated simultaneously, and one who is liable to receive the death penalty is exempt from monetary liability that he incurred with the selfsame act. This poses a difficulty to Rava, who ruled that if the stolen item is extant the burglar must return it, whereas this baraita indicates that if one commits a transgression for which he is liable to receive the death penalty, he is exempt from all payments. The Gemara answers: And the halakha is that the baraita must be understood as referring to a case where the burglar threw the purse into a river. Since the purse is no longer extant, he is exempt from having to pay for it even though he caused the damage intentionally. But if the purse is extant, he is in fact required to return it. It is related that rams were once stolen from Rava by burglars who broke into his house. The burglars came to return the animals to him, but Rava did not accept them. Rava said: Since a ruling issued from Rav’s mouth that a burglar who may be killed acquires the items he stole, I no longer agree to take them. § Apropos a burglar who breaks into a house, the Sages taught in a baraita: The verses state: “If a burglar is found breaking in, and is smitten and dies, there shall not be blood shed on his account. If the sun is risen upon him, there shall be blood shed on his account” (Exodus 22:1–2). A question may be raised: But did the sun rise only upon him? Rather, these words must be understood in a metaphoric sense: If the matter is as clear to you as the sun that the burglar is not coming to you in peace, but rather his intention is to kill you, arise and kill him first. But if you are not sure about his intentions, do not kill him. It is taught in another baraita: The verse states: “If the sun is risen upon him, there shall be blood shed on his account.” A question may be raised: But did the sun rise only upon him? Rather, these words must be understood as follows: If the matter is as clear to you as the sun that the burglar is coming to you in peace, do not kill him. But if you are not sure about his intentions, arise and kill him. The Gemara notes a difficulty: The halakha in the undetermined case as stated in the first baraita contradicts the halakha in the undetermined case as stated in the second baraita. The first baraita indicates that if the homeowner is unsure about the burglar’s intentions, he is prohibited from killing the burglar, whereas the second baraita indicates that in such a case, he is permitted to kill the burglar. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult.