Autonomous Vehicles and the Trolley Problem

(1) A scoundrel named Sheba son of Bichri, a Benjaminite, happened to be there. He sounded the horn and proclaimed:
“We have no portion in David,No share in Jesse’s son!Back to your homes, O Israel!”(2) Israel’s entire contingent left David and followed Sheba son of Bichri; but Judah’s contingent accompanied their king from the Jordan to Jerusalem. (3) David went to his palace in Jerusalem, and the king took the ten concubines he had left to mind the palace and put them in a guarded place; he provided for them, but he did not cohabit with them. They remained in seclusion until the day they died, in living widowhood. (4) The king said to Amasa, “Call up Judah’s force to my standard, and report here three days from now.” (5) Amasa went to call up Judah, but he took longer than the time set for him. (6) And David said to Abishai, “Now Sheba son of Bichri will cause us more trouble than Absalom. So take your lord’s servants and pursue him, before he finds fortified towns and eludes us.” (7) Joab’s men, the Cherethites and Pelethites, and all the warriors marched out behind him. They left Jerusalem in pursuit of Sheba son of Bichri. (8) They were near the great stone in Gibeon when Amasa appeared before them. Joab was wearing his military dress, with his sword girded over it and fastened around his waist in its sheath; and, as he stepped forward, it fell out.

(12) Similarly, if gentiles say to women, “Give us one of you that we may defile her, and if not, we will defile you all”, then let them all be defiled rather than hand over to them one soul from Israel.

(6) If a woman is having trouble giving birth, they cut up the child in her womb and brings it forth limb by limb, because her life comes before the life of [the child]. But if the greater part has come out, one may not touch it, for one may not set aside one person's life for that of another.

(5)How does the court intimidate the witnesses in giving testimony for cases of capital law? They would bring the witnesses in and intimidate them by saying to them: Perhaps what you say in your testimony is based on conjecture, or perhaps it is based on a rumor, perhaps it is testimony based on hearsay, e.g., you heard a witness testify to this in a different court, or perhaps it is based on the statement of a trusted person. Perhaps you do not know that ultimately we examine you with inquiry and interrogation, and if you are lying, your lie will be discovered. The court tells them: You should know that cases of capital law are not like cases of monetary law. In cases of monetary law, a person who testifies falsely, causing money to be given to the wrong party, can give the money to the proper owner and his sin is atoned for. In cases of capital law, if one testifies falsely, the blood of the accused and the blood of his offspring that he did not merit to produce are ascribed to the witness’s testimony until eternity. The proof for this is as we found with Cain, who killed his brother, as it is stated concerning him: “The voice of your brother’s blood [demei] cries out to Me from the ground” (Genesis 4:10). The verse does not state: Your brother’s blood [dam], in the singular, but rather: “Your brother’s blood [demei],” in the plural. This serves to teach that the loss of both his brother’s blood and the blood of his brother’s offspring are ascribed to Cain. The mishna notes: Alternatively, the phrase “your brother’s blood [demei],” written in the plural, teaches that that his blood was not gathered in one place but was splattered on the trees and on the stones. The court tells the witnesses: Therefore, Adam the first manwas created alone, to teach you that with regard to anyone who destroys one soul from the Jewish people, i.e., kills one Jew, the verse ascribes him blame as if he destroyed an entire world, as Adam was one person, from whom the population of an entire world came forth. And conversely, anyone who sustains one soul from the Jewish people, the verse ascribes him credit as if he sustained an entire world. The mishna cites another reason Adam the first man was created alone: And this was done due to the importance of maintaining peace among people, so that one person will not say to another: My father, i.e., progenitor, is greater than your father. And it was also so that the heretics who believe in multiple gods will not say: There are many authorities in Heaven, and each created a different person. And this serves to tell of the greatness of the Holy One, Blessed be He, as when a person stamps several coins with one seal, they are all similar to each other. But the supreme King of kings, the Holy One, Blessed be He, stamped all people with the seal of Adam the first man, as all of them are his offspring, and not one of them is similar to another. Therefore, since all humanity descends from one person, each and every person is obligated to say: The world was created for me, as one person can be the source of all humanity, and recognize the significance of his actions. The court says to the witnesses: And perhaps you will say:Why would we want this trouble? Perhaps it would be better not to testify at all. But be aware, as is it not already stated: “And he being a witness, whether he has seen or known, if he does not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1)? It is a transgression not to testify when one can do so. And perhaps you will say: Why would we want to be responsible for the blood of this person? But be aware, as is it not already stated: “When the wicked perish, there is song” (Proverbs 11:10)?

(10) This mishna continues to discuss the matter of testimony in the case of one who is liable to be executed. Concerning one whose verdict was delivered and he was sentenced to death and he fled, and he then came before the same court that sentenced him, they do not overturn his verdict and retry him. Rather, the court administers the previous verdict. Consequently, in any place where two witnesses will stand and say: We testify with regard to a man called so-and-so that his verdict was delivered and he was sentenced to death in the court of so-and-so, and so-and-so and so-and-so were his witnesses, that person shall be executed on the basis of that testimony. The mishna continues: The mitzva to establish a Sanhedrin with the authority to administer capital punishments is in effect both in Eretz Yisraeland outside Eretz Yisrael. A Sanhedrin that executes a transgressor once in seven years is characterized as a destructive tribunal. Since the Sanhedrin would subject the testimony to exacting scrutiny, it was extremely rare for a defendant to be executed. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: This categorization applies to a Sanhedrin that executes a transgressor once in seventy years. Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva say: If we had been members of the Sanhedrin, we would have conducted trials in a manner whereby no person would have ever been executed. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In adopting that approach, they too would increase the number of murderers among the Jewish people. The death penalty would lose its deterrent value, as all potential murderers would know that no one is ever executed.

(6)Any mitzva that is more frequent than another mitzva precedes that other mitzva if the opportunity to fulfill one of them coincides with an opportunity to fulfill the other. And anyone who is more sanctified than another precedes that other person. If the bull of the anointed priest and the bull of the congregation, which are brought for absence of awareness of the matter, are pending, the bull of the anointed priest precedes the bull of the congregation in all its actions, i.e., its sacrificial rites.

(7)The man precedes the woman when there is uncertainty with regard to which of them to rescue or to return a lost item to first. And the woman precedes the man with regard to which of them to provide with a garment first, because her humiliation is great, or to release from captivity first, due to the concern that she will be raped. When they are both subject to degradation, i.e., there is also concern that the man will be raped in captivity, the release of the man precedes the release of the woman.

(8)A priest precedes a Levite. A Levite precedes an Israelite. An Israelite precedes a son born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [mamzer], and a mamzer precedes a Gibeonite, and a Gibeonite precedes a convert, and a convert precedes an emancipated slave. When do these halakhot of precedence take effect? In circumstances when they are all equal in terms of wisdom. But if there were a mamzer who is a Torah scholar and a High Priest who is an ignoramus, a mamzer who is a Torah scholar precedes a High Priest who is an ignoramus, as Torah wisdom surpasses all else.

(4)Which type of ox is deemed innocuous and which is deemed forewarned? An ox is deemed forewarned in any case where witnesses testified about it that it gored on three different days. And it reverts back to its previous innocuous status from when it reverses its behavior and refrains from goring for three consecutive days; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: It is deemed forewarned in any case where witnesses testified that it gored three times, regardless of the number of days on which this behavior occurred. And it reverts back to its previous innocuous status in any case where children pet it and play with it and it does not gore them.

(7) The Sadducees say: we complain against you, Pharisees, that you declare an uninterrupted flow of a liquid to be clean. The Pharisees say: we complain against you, Sadducees, that you declare a stream of water which flows from a burial-ground to be clean? The Sadducees say: we complain against you, Pharisees, that you say, my ox or donkey which has done injury is liable, yet my male or female slave who has done injury is not liable. Now if in the case of my ox or my donkey for which I am not responsible if they do not fulfill religious duties, yet I am responsible for their damages, in the case of my male or female slave for whom I am responsible to see that they fulfill mitzvot, how much more so that I should be responsible for their damages? They said to them: No, if you argue about my ox or my donkey which have no understanding, can you deduce from there anything concerning a male or female slave who do have understanding? So that if I were to anger either of them and they would go and burn another person's stack, should I be liable to make restitution?

(23) A group of [Jews] to whom gentiles say, “Give us one of you and we shall kill him, and if not, behold, we will kill all of them”; they should let themselves be killed and not deliver them one soul from Israel. But if they designated [the person] to them – for example, Sheva ben Bichri – they should give him to them and not let themselves be killed. Rabbi Yehuda said, “When do these words apply? In a case when he is [inside and they are] outside [a fortified city]; but in a case when he is inside and they are inside, since he will be killed and the [other Jews] will be killed, they should give him to them and not let themselves all be killed. And so did it state (II Samuel 20:22), ‘And the woman came to all of the people in her wisdom, etc.’ – she said to them, ‘Since he will be killed and you will be killed, give him to them and do not kill all of you.’” Rabbi Shimon says, “So did she say [to them], ‘Anyone who rebels against the monarchy [of the House of David] is liable to [receive] the death penalty.’”

MISHNAH: An amphora of heave about which a doubt of impurity arose. Rebbi Eliezer says, if it was at a vulnerable place, he should move it to a hidden place. If it was uncovered, he should cover it. Rebbi Joshua said, if it was at a hidden place, he should move it to a vulnerable place. If it was covered, he should uncover it. Rabban Gamliel said, he should not change anything.
If an amphora broke in the upper part of the wine press whose lower part was impure, Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Joshua agree that if one can save a revi‘it from it, he shall save that in purity. Otherwise, Rebbi Eliezer said, let it descend and become impure; he should not make it impure with his hands.
And so if an amphora of oil broke, Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Joshua agree that if one can save a revi‘it from it, he shall save that in purity. Otherwise, Rebbi Eliezer said, let it descend and be absorbed [in the ground]; he should not cause it to be absorbed by his hands’ [action].
About both of these cases, Rebbi Joshua said, this is not heave for which I have been warned not to make it impure; only not to eat it and not to [intentionally] make it impure.
If somebody was on the road with loaves of heave and a Gentile said to him, give me one of them that I may defile it, otherwise I shall defile all of them, Rebbi Eliezer says, he shall defile all of them but one should not hand over any to him. Rebbi Joshua said, he should put it on a rock before him. Similarly, women to whom Gentiles said, give us one of you that we may defile her, otherwise we shall defile all of you, they should defile all of them but no Jewish person should be handed over. HALAKHAH:Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, from the opinions of all three of them: It is forbidden to burn suspended [heave]. The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The first amphora following Rebbi Yose, the second following Rebbi Meïr. The colleagues say, the first amphora following Rebbi Yose but Rebbi Meïr will not agree; the second following Rebbi Meïr but Rebbi Yose will not agree. Rebbi Yose told them, be careful what you teach. The first amphora following Rebbi Yose; therefore, following Rebbi Meïr one burns and following Rebbi Simeon one burns. Then Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon should form a majority against Rebbi Yose and one should burn. In addition, we see that the rabbis, in cases which come before them, say, go and consider it suspended. We find that Rebbi Simeon says one burns, as we have stated: “Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Joshua agree that one burns each one separately.” On this, Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon taught that. And if you want to say that Rebbi Meïr does not recognize suspension, have we not stated: “Suspended heave and impure heave are burned on Sabbath eve when it gets dark, the words of Rebbi Meïr; but the Sages say, at its appointed time.” Rebbi Zeïra said before Rebbi Mana, explain it if it is suspended because he intends to ask about it. He said to him, so said my teacher Rebbi Assi: All suspended [heave] we are dealing with here is suspended [heave] about which he has no intention of asking. But if he intends to ask about it, it has to be treated as pure. As we have stated: “If he said, it is pure or impure, then it is impure. But if he said, I am keeping it in order to ask about the situation, it is pure.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it if the doubt arose at sundown. Then you cannot infer anything. You say, the first amphora following Rebbi Yose, and Rebbi Meїr will not agree. But did we not state: “When has this been said? Regarding a vat which contains enough to lift it. But for a vat which does not contain enough to lift it, it is forbidden to make any amount impure.” And if it follows Rebbi Meїr, whether it contains enough to lift it or does not contain enough to lift it, is it forbidden to make any amount impure? In addition, from what we have stated: “Rebbi Yose said, this is not the implication.” A person says “this is not the implication” only if he agrees with the premise. How is that? There, the Torah cares about the money of the Jews, here what can you say? Does he not here also cayse him to lose money since he needs fire wood to burn each lot separately? They worried about a big loss, they did not worry about a small loss. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, explain it following him who said, from the words of Rebbi Aqiba and the words of Rebbi Ḥananiah, the Second of the Cohanim. Rebbi Ila and Rebbi Zeїra, both in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The first amphora follows Rebbi Yose, the second both Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Zeїra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does it not disagree with Rebbi Meїr? He said to him, we may say it follows neither Rebbi Meїr nor Rebbi Yose since we find that Rebbi Meїr burns suspended [heave] in all cases. Rebbi Mana said, I went to Caesarea and heard Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Zeїri: Rebbi Meїr burns suspended [heave] in all cases. I said to him, because he considers suspended [heave] from the words of the Torah. He said to me, do I not explain that it became impure in Gentiles’ dwellings? For we have stated: “From Gentiles’ dwellings one suspends; Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, one burns.” Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: Rebbi Meїr burns suspended [heave] any day of the year, as we have stated: “Suspended heave and impure heave are burned on Sabbath eve when it gets dark, the words of Rebbi Meїr; but the Sages say, at its appointed time.” Should he not burn it during the morning hours? Explain it if he was lazy and did not burn it [then]. Know that this is so, for he did not state “during the morning hours.” Is that not because he was lazy and did not burn [then]? Rebbi Abba Mari, the brother of Rebbi Yose said, explain it if impurity was created at that time, and you cannot infer anything. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Joshua and Rebbi Simeon both said the same thing. Rebbi Ilaї said: Rebbi Simeon in Bekhorot and Rebbi Joshua in Terumot, neither of them will agree with the other. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Zeїra: Is it not reasonable that Rebbi Simeon agrees with Rebbi Joshua but Rebbi Joshua will not agree with Rebbi Simeon? Did we not state: “Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Joshua agree that each batch should be burned separately.” Could one not burn the two together? He said to him, there [the heave] is pure; by Torah law the heave is still in existence; you are the person who decided to burn it. In any case, would it not become unusable by being left unattended? Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, leaving unattended is from the Torah? The second amphora for Rebbi Meїr follows the Torah, coughing blood for Rebbi Simeon follows the Torah! He said to him, one still watches it so it should not come in contact with other pure [heave]. Rebbi Isaac, the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya the scribe: Think about it, if it was put on coals? He said to him, after if was put there. Rebbi Mana said to Rebbi Shammai: You who say that Rebbi Simeon agrees with Rebbi Joshua! Even Rebbi Joshua does not agree with Rebbi Joshua! He said to him, these are Tannaïm. There, Rebbi Meїr in the name of Rebbi Joshua, but here Rebbi Simeon in the name of Rebbi Joshua. There, we stated: “A firstling afflicted by blood, even if it is going to die, cannot be bled, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. But the Sages say, it should be bled even if this causes a blemish. If it did cause a blemish, it should not be slaughtered because of it. Rebbi Simeon says, he should bleed it even if he makes a blemish.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Rebbi Jehudah parallels Rabban Gamliel, the Rabbis parallel Rebbi Eliezer, Rebbi Simeon parallels Rebbi Joshua. But we have stated: “Rebbi Simeon says, he should bleed it even if he knows he will cause a blemish.” This parallels the later opinion of Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah (Deut. 12:24): “You shall not eat it; spill it onto the ground like water.” I permitted you its blood only to spill it. Rebbi Abba Mari, the brother of Rebbi Yose, objected: That is written about [blood of] invalid sacrifices: “You shall not eat it; spill it onto the ground like water.” Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, you get from it for preparation. Just as water prepares, so blood prepares. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Both of them explained the same verse (Lev. 22:21): “Perfect it shall be for goodwill; any blemish shall not be on it.” Rebbi Simeon explains: As long as it is for goodwill, you may not induce a blemish. If it is no longer for goodwill, you may induce a blemish. But the Sages say, even if it is all blemishes, you may not add a blemish. Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina: With a vessel which inside is pure but impure outside one does not defile a small amount even to save a large amount. But did we not state: “Let it descend and become impure; he should not make it impure with his hands?” Rebbi Samuel bar Berekhiah said, explain for two vessels, one pure inside and impure outside, the other impure inside and pure outside. But that Mishnah speaks of one impure vessel! Rebbi Mana said, explain it if the vat is pure; the Mishnah deals with an impure vat. Did we not state: “Let it descend and be absorbed [into the ground]; he should not cause it to be absorbed by his hands’ [action].” Explain it if it rolled onto to a bet happĕrās. In the opinion of the colleagues, first and second amphoras. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, an amphora of wine and one of oil. It is not reasonable if one already was impure. It is not reasonable if one was a slave girl. It was stated: “A group of people on the road were met by Gentiles who said to them, give us one of you that we may kill him, otherwise we shall kill all of you; even if all of them are killed they should not hand over a Jewish person. If they designated one, like Sheba ben Bikhri, they should hand him over so as not to be killed.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, on condition that he be guilty of a capital crime like Sheba ben Bikhri; but Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he is not guilty of a capital crime like Sheba ben Bikhri. Ulla bar Qoshav was proscribed by the government. He fled and went to Lydda to Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. They came and surrounded the city. They said to them, if you do not hand him over to us, we shall destroy the city. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi went to him and talked him into being handed over to them. Elijah, may be be remembered for good things, used to appear to him; he stopped appearing. He fasted many fasts; he appeared to him and said, do I appear to informers? He said to him, did I not act according to a baraita? He said to him, is that a statement for the pious? Rebbi Issi was captured in Safsufa. Rebbi Jonathan said, may the dead be wrapped in his shroud. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if I should kill or be killed, I shall go and save him by force. He went and negotiated; they handed him over to him. He said to them, come to our old man, he shall pray for you. They came to Rebbi Joḥanan. He said to them, what was in your mind to do to him shall be done to these people. They did not reach אפיפסרוס when all of them were gone. Zeir bar Ḥinena was captured at Safsufa. Rebbi Ammi and Rebbi Samuel went to negotiate for him. Queen Zenobia said to them, your Creator usually does wonders for you; put Him under pressure! There came a Saracen carrying a sabre. He said to them, with this sabre did Odenathus kill his brother. Zeїr bar Ḥinena was saved. Rebbi Joḥanan said, I was robbed by the people of Qanah. He went to the assembly hall where Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish was asking him repeatedly but he did not answer. He said, what happened? He said, what can you do? He said, all limbs depend on the heart and the heart depends on the wallet. He said, I was robbed by the people of Qanah. He said, what do you have? He said to him, show me their corner. He went out to show him. They saw him from afar and started to chirp. They said, if that is Rebbi Joḥanan, may he take half of it. He said to them, by your life I am taking all of it; he took all. The boys of Rebbi Jehudah Neśia hit Diodes the swine-herd. He became king and descended to Paneas. He sent letters to the rabbis that they should be at his place immediately after the end of the Sabbath. He said to his courier, do not deliver the letters before the evening, near sundown. The courier came to them in he evening, near sundown. Rebbi Jehudah Neśia and Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman had gone to bathe in the public baths of Tiberias. An אנגיטרוס came to them; Rebbi Jehudah Neśia wanted to scold him. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, let him; he appears for wonders. He said to them, how are the rabbis? They told him about their problem. He said to them, go and bathe; your Creator will perform a miracle for you at Sabbath’s end. He carried them and brought them up. They said to him, the rabbis are outside. There was that bathhouse, he let it be heated for seven days and seven nights. He went out and cooled it before them. They went in and then appeared before him. He said to them: Because your Creator performs miracles for you, you insult the majesty! They said, we insulted Diocles the swine-herd; we do not insult Diocletianus the king. Even so, one should never vex a little Roman or a little Gueber.

or bloodshed.That one may not heal oneself with idolatry even when his life is in danger is learned from that which we just said, based on the verse: “With all your soul and with all your might.” From where is this halakha derived with regard to forbidden sexual relations and murder? As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasisays: The verse says about one who rapes a betrothed woman: “But you shall do nothing to the young woman; the young woman has committed no sin worthy of death; for as when a man rises against his neighbor, and slays him, so too with this matter” (Deuteronomy 22:26). What does a murderer have to do with a betrothed young woman who was raped? Why would the verse mention murder in this context? Rather, the mention of murder comes in order to teach a halakha about the betrothed young woman, and it turns out that, in addition, it derives a halakha from that case. The Torah juxtaposes a murderer to a betrothed young woman to indicate that just as in the case of a betrothed young woman one may save her by taking the rapist’s life, so too, one may save a potential murder victim by taking the pursuer’s life. Conversely, it is possible to learn about the case of a young betrothed woman from the case of a murderer. Just as with regard to a potential murderer the halakha is that if one is being forced to murder someone else, he should allow himself to be killed and not transgress that prohibition, so too, with regard to a betrothed young woman the halakha is that she should allow herself to be killed and not transgress the prohibition of forbidden relations. The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive thishalakha with regard to murder itself? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning that one life is not preferable to another. The Gemara relates an incident to demonstrate this: This is similar to a certain man who came before Rava and said to him: A local official said to me: Go kill so-and-so, and if not I will kill you.Ravasaid to him: It is preferable that he should kill you and you should not kill. What did you think, that your blood is redder and more precious than his? Perhaps that man’s blood is redder. Apparently, one may not save his own life by taking someone else’s. The Gemara relates: Mar bar Rav Ashi found Ravina rubbing his daughter with unripe olives [guharkei] of orla for medicinal purposes. Mar bar Rav Ashisaid to him: Say that the Sages said that one may derive benefit from such a prohibited item at a time of danger; however, who says that one is permitted to do so when it is not a time of danger?Ravinasaid to him: A high fever is also deemed a time of danger, and one may derive benefit from a prohibited item it such a situation. Some say that Ravinasaid to him as follows: Am I deriving benefit in a usual manner? The usual way to derive benefit from these olives is to use them after they have become ripe, so that their oil can be drawn out. Since Ravina was not deriving benefit in the usual manner, he was permitted to do so, although his daughter’s life was not in danger. The Gemara continues to discuss various halakhot that apply to prohibited items. It was stated: With regard to deriving benefit from a prohibited item that comes to a person against his will, i.e., one’s circumstance results in his deriving benefit although he did not place himself in that circumstance in order to derive benefit, Abaye said: Deriving benefit in this manner is permitted, and Rava said: It is prohibited.The Gemara explains: In a case where it is possible to avoid deriving benefit and he intends to derive benefit from the prohibited object, or where it is not possible to avoid it and he intends to derive benefit, everyone agrees that it is prohibited, because he intended to derive benefit that was prohibited. And when it is not possible to avoid it and he does not intend to derive benefit, everyone agrees that it is permitted, as one had no choice in the matter. Where they disagree is in a case where it is possible for him to avoid the prohibition, and he does not intend to derive benefit from it. The Gemara limits the dispute further: And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who said that an unintentional prohibited act is prohibited, everyone agrees that it is prohibited, as Rabbi Yehuda maintains that one’s action is more significant than his intent. Where they disagree is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that an unintentional prohibited act is permitted. Apparently, Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. And Rava would say: Rabbi Shimon stated his opinion only with regard to a case where it is not possible to avoid the prohibition. However, in a case where it is possible to avoid the prohibition, no, he did not permit one to derive benefit from such a prohibition even unintentionally. This is one version of the dispute. Some say that the dispute should be understood as follows: In a case where it is possible to avoid deriving benefit and he does not intend to derive benefit, this is the case of dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon. Where it is not possible to avoid it and he does not intend to derive benefit from the prohibited item, everyone agrees that it is permitted to do so. Where they disagree is in a case where it is not possible to avoid deriving benefit and he intends to derive benefit from it. The Gemara limits the dispute further: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who follows one’s intent, everyone agrees that it is prohibited. Where they disagree is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: There is no difference whether one intends or does not intend; the issue is whether he can avoid it or not. Therefore, if it is possible to avoid deriving benefit, it is prohibited.Based on this understanding of the dispute, Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. In other words, in a case where it is not possible to avoid the situation completely, even if one has intent it is permitted.

Here, where the baraita teaches that if one is unsure about the burglar’s intentions it is prohibited for him to kill him, it is referring to a father who comes to rob his son. A father has great compassion for his son, and therefore it may be presumed that he will not kill his son if he resists. Accordingly, the son is prohibited from killing his father unless he knows for certain that his father has the intention of killing him. There, where the baraita teaches that if one is unsure about the burglar’s intentions it is permitted for him to kill him, it is referring to a son who comes to rob his father. Since a son has less compassion for his father, it may be presumed that he would be ready to kill his father if he resists. Therefore, the father is permitted to kill his son unless he knows for certain that his son would never kill him. Rav says: With regard to anyone who breaks into my house, I would kill him, as I would presume that he is ready to kill me, except for Rav Ḥanina bar Sheila, whom I would not kill. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Rav excludes Rabbi Ḥanina bar Sheila? If we say that Rav trusts him because he is a righteous person, this is difficult, as the case is one where he broke into his house, which indicates that he is not a righteous person. Rather, it is because he would say: I am certain that he would have mercy upon me just like a father would have mercy on a son.§ The Sages taught in a baraita: “If the sun is risen upon him, there shall be blood shed on his account” (Exodus 22:2), both during the week and on Shabbat. “If a burglar is found breaking in…there shall not be blood shed on his account” (Exodus 22:1), both during the week and on Shabbat.The Gemara clarifies this baraita: Granted that with regard to “there shall not be blood shed on his account,” it was necessary to say that this applies both during the week and on Shabbat, as it might enter your mind to say that this is just as it is in the case of those who are executed by the court, who are not executed on Shabbat. Therefore, the baraitateaches us that the burglar may be slain in self-defense even on Shabbat. But with regard to “there shall be blood shed on his account,” the statement that this applies both during the week and on Shabbat is puzzling. Now, if on a weekday he may not be slain, is it necessary to say that he may not be slain on Shabbat?Rav Sheshet says: This ruling is necessary only to teach that if a building collapsed on the burglar on Shabbat, one is obligated to clear the pile of stones from on top of him and perform any action necessary to rescue him, even if it involves the desecration of Shabbat; one does not say that while he is not permitted to actively kill him, he is also not obligated to save him. § Concerning the verse that states: “If a burglar is found breaking in, and is smitten and dies, there shall not be blood shed on his account” (Exodus 22:1), the Sages taught a baraita: “And is smitten,” by any person who strikes him; “and dies,” by any means of death by which you can put him to death. The Gemara clarifies this baraita: Granted, with regard to the words “and is smitten,” it was necessary to say that he may be struck by any person, as it might enter your mind to say that it is only the owner of the house whom the burglar is certain will resist him, because there is a presumption that a person does not restrain himself when faced with losing his money, and therefore it is only the homeowner’s life that is in danger from the burglar. But as for another person, the burglar is not sure that he will try to stop him, and therefore that other person may not kill him, since the burglar did not come with the intention of killing him. Therefore, the baraitateaches us that this burglar is considered a pursuer, and he is subject to the same halakha as anyone who pursues another in order to kill him, namely, that anyone may kill the pursuer in order to rescue the one being pursued. Therefore, even another person is permitted to kill the burglar in order to save the homeowner. But that which the baraita teaches, that the words “and dies” teach that he may be slain by any means of death by which you can put him to death, why do I need this? The Gemara clarifies the difficulty: This can be derived from the halakha governing a murderer, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse with regard to a murderer states: “He that smote him shall be put to death, for he is a murderer” (Numbers 35:21). I have derived only that the murderer is put to death with the mode of execution stated concerning him, namely, killing by decapitation. From where do I derive that if you cannot put him to death with the mode of execution written concerning him, e.g., if he is escaping, that you can put him to death with any mode of execution with which you can put him to death? The verse states: “He that smote him shall be put to death [mot yumat],” the doubled verb teaching that he is put to death in any case, by any mode of execution. Why not derive the halakha of a burglar from the halakha of a murderer? The Gemara rejects this reasoning: There it is different, as the verse explicitly states: “Mot yumat,” which serves to include all modes of execution. The Gemara asks: But why not learn from it a principle that can be applied to all people who may be put to death? The Gemara rejects this reasoning: This case does not serve as a source for a principle, because the halakhot of a murderer and of a blood redeemer, i.e., a relative of one who was killed who is allowed to kill his relative’s killer (see Makkot 11b), are two verses that come as one, and two verses that come as one do not teach a principle. In other words, if a halakha is stated with regard to two specific cases in the Torah, the halakha is understood to apply only to those cases. Had the halakha applied to all other relevant cases as well, it would not have been necessary for the Torah to teach it twice. Therefore, the baraita had to teach us that this halakha also applies to a burglar who breaks into a person’s house. § The Sages taught in a baraita: From the words: “If a burglar is found breaking in” (Exodus 22:1), I have derived only that this halakha applies to a burglar who came breaking in through a wall. But from where do I derive that the same halakha applies if he was found on his roof, in his yard, or in the enclosed area behind his house? Therefore, the verse states: “If a burglar is found,” which teaches that the halakha applies in any case. If that is so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “Breaking in”? Because the Torah speaks of a common case, and most thieves are found breaking in.It is taught in anotherbaraita: From the words: “If a burglar is found breaking in,” I have derived only that this halakha applies to a burglar who came breaking in through a wall. But from where do I derive that the same halakha applies if he was found on his roof, in his yard, or in the enclosed area behind his house? Therefore, the verse states: “If a burglar is found,” which teaches that the halakha applies in any case. If that is so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “Breaking in”? This teaches that his breaking in is his forewarning. If a burglar is found breaking into a house, the owner need not formally forewarn him before killing him. If he is found elsewhere, such a forewarning is necessary. § Rav Huna says: If a minor was pursuing another person in order to kill him, the pursued party may be saved with the pursuer’s life. That is to say, one is permitted to save the pursued party by killing the minor who is pursuing him, and one does not say that since the minor lacks halakhic competence, he is not subject to punishment. The Gemara explains: Rav Hunamaintains that a pursuer, in general, does not require forewarning, and there is no difference with regard to this matter between an adult and a minor. The essence of the matter is rescuing the pursued party from death, and therefore the pursuer’s liability to receive the death penalty is irrelevant. Rav Ḥisda raised an objection to Rav Huna from a baraita: If a woman was giving birth and her life was being endangered by the fetus, the life of the fetus may be sacrificed in order to save the mother. But once his head has emerged during the birthing process, he may not be harmed in order to save the mother, because one life may not be pushed aside to save another life. If one is permitted to save the pursued party by killing the minor who is pursuing him, why is this so? The fetus is a pursuer who is endangering his mother’s life. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as it is different there, with regard to the woman giving birth, since she is being pursued by Heaven. Since the fetus is not acting of his own volition and endangering his mother of his own will, his life may not be taken in order to save his mother. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that a baraitasupports the ruling of Rav Huna, who said that a pursuer does not require a forewarning: If a pursuer was pursuing another person in order to kill him, a third party says to the pursuer: See that he whom you are pursuing to kill is a Jew, and a loyal member of the covenant, and the Torah stated: “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed” (Genesis 9:6). The Torah stated: Save the blood of this person who is being pursued with the blood of that person who is pursuing him. The fact that there is no indication here that the pursuer must say that he heard the forewarning suggests that forewarning is not required, as stated by Rav Huna. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Perhaps thisbaraita was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: A ḥaver, who is thoroughly knowledgeable in halakha, does not need to be issued a forewarning by witnesses in order to become liable to be punished, because forewarning is given only to distinguish between unintentional sin and intentional sin, and a ḥaver is certainly aware of the halakha. The same may be said about a pursuer: Since his malice is clear, he does not require a forewarning; his sin is obviously intentional. Those who disagree with Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, and say that even a ḥaver needs to be issued a forewarning would say that a pursuer must be forewarned as well. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof that a pursuer must be forewarned, and therefore one may not save a pursued party by killing a minor who is pursuing him, from a baraita: If a pursuer was pursuing another person in order to kill him, and a third party said to him: See that he whom you are pursuing to kill is a Jew, and a loyal member of the covenant, and the Torah stated: “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed” (Genesis 9:6), in this case, if the pursuer said: I know this to be so, he is exempt from being killed, but if he said: I am doing it on this condition, i.e., knowing that I am liable to be killed for this, he is liable to be slain. This indicates that even a pursuer must be issued a forewarning. The Gemara rejects this proof: This forewarning is not necessary except in a case where the pursuer and the person issuing the warning are standing on two opposite sides of a river, so that the latter cannot save the party being pursued by killing the pursuer. What is there for him to do? Unable to save the pursued party, he wants at least to bring the pursuer to court, so that he will be convicted and have the death penalty administered to him. But in order to administer punishment, the court requires that the offender receive proper forewarning. It is for this reason that the baraita speaks of forewarning, but a pursuer may be killed by a bystander even without having been forewarned. If you wish, say instead that Rav Huna could have said to you: I stated my opinion that it is permitted to kill a minor pursuer in accordance with the tanna who spoke of the issue of a burglar who breaks into a house. As this tannasays that his breaking in is his forewarning, that is, a burglar who breaks into a house needs no further forewarning. Here, too, anyone who is pursuing another in order to kill him does not require forewarning since his pursuit is his forewarning.

Abaye says: The ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to a young woman who was raped in a case where one was able to save her by injuring the pursuer in one of his limbs, so that it was not necessary to kill him in order to achieve her rescue, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul says: If a pursuer was pursuing another to kill him, and one was able to save the pursued party without killing the pursuer, but instead by injuring him in one of his limbs, but he did not save him in this manner and rather chose to kill him, he is executed on his account as a murderer. The Gemara explains: What is the reason of Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul? As it is written: “If men strive and strike a woman with child, so that her fruit departs, and yet no further harm ensues, he shall be punished, according to the demands that the woman’s husband makes on him; and he shall pay it as the judges determine” (Exodus 21:22). And concerning this Rabbi Elazar says: The verse is speaking of striving to kill, where each man was trying to kill the other. The proof is that it is written: “But if any harm ensues, then you shall give life for life” (Exodus 21:23), and if there was no intention to kill, why should he be executed? And even so, the Merciful One states: “And yet no further harm ensues, he shall be punished,” teaching that he must pay the monetary value of the fetus to the woman’s husband. Granted, if you say that in a case where one is able to save the pursued party by injuring the pursuer in one of his limbs, he may not save the pursued party at the cost of the pursuer’s life, and if he killed the pursuer rather than injure him he is liable to receive the death penalty, that is how you find the possibility that the one who ultimately struck the woman would be punished. This would be in a case where it was possible to save the man under attack, i.e., one of the men who were fighting, by injuring the pursuer, i.e., the other man, who ultimately struck the woman, in one of his limbs. In this case, the one who ultimately struck the woman was not subject to being killed. Therefore, he is subject to pay a fine. But if you say that even if one is able to save the pursued party by injuring the pursuer in one of his limbs, he can also save him at the cost of the pursuer’s life, how can you find the possibility that the one who ultimately struck the woman would be punished? When he was going to strike the other man, he was at risk of being killed, as anybody could have killed him at that time, and the halakha is that anybody who commits an act warranting death exempts himself from any monetary obligation ensuing from that act. The Gemara tries to refute this reasoning: Perhaps it is different here because his two liabilities are not on account of the same person; rather, his liability to be put to death is on account of this person, the man with whom he fought, while his liability to give payment is on account of that person, the woman he ultimately struck. Consequently, he is liable to receive both punishments. The Gemara rejects this distinction: There is no difference. As Rava says: If a pursuer was pursuing another to kill him, and during the course of the chase the pursuer broke vessels belonging either to the person being pursued or to anyone else, he is exempt from paying for the broken vessels. What is the reason for this? The reason is that he is liable to be killed, since everyone is entitled to kill him in order to save the victim’s life, and one who commits an act rendering himself liable to be killed is exempt from any monetary obligation arising from that act, even if the payment were to be made to a person not connected to the act for which he is liable to be killed. Rava continues: And if the pursued party broke vessels while fleeing from the pursuer, if those vessels belonged to the pursuer, the pursued party is exempt. But if they belonged to anyone else, he is liable to pay for them. The Gemara explains: If the vessels belonged to the pursuer, he is exempt. The reason for this is so that the pursuer’s property should not be more precious to the pursuer than his own body. Were the one being pursued to cause the pursuer bodily harm, he would be exempt; all the more so when the pursued one breaks the pursuer’s vessels. And if the vessels belonged to anyone else, he is liable, as he saved himself at the expense of another’s property, and that other person should not have to suffer a loss on his account. Rava continues: But if one pursuer was pursuing another pursuer in order to save him, i.e., if he was trying to save the person being pursued by killing the pursuer, and while doing so he broke vessels belonging either to the pursuer or to the one being pursued, or to anyone else, he is exempt from paying for them. The Gemara comments: This is not by strict law, as if one who saves himself at another’s expense is liable to pay for the damage, certainly one who saves another at the expense of a third party should bear similar liability. Rather, it is an ordinance instituted by the Sages. This is because if you do not say that he is exempt, it will be found that no person will save another from a pursuer, as everyone will be afraid of becoming liable to pay for damage caused in the course of saving the pursued party.

From where is it derived that one must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress the prohibition of forbidden sexual relations and the prohibition of bloodshed? This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasisays: With regard to the rape of a betrothed young woman it is written: “But you shall do nothing to the young woman; the young woman has committed no sin worthy of death; for as when a man rises against his neighbor, and slays him, so too with this matter” (Deuteronomy 22:26). But why would the verse mention murder in this context? But what do we learn here from a murderer?Now, the mention of murder came in order to teach a halakha about the betrothed young woman, and it turns out that, in addition, it derives a halakha from that case. The Torah juxtaposes the case of a murderer to the case of a betrothed young woman to indicate that just as in the case of a betrothed young woman one may save her at the cost of the rapist’s life, so too, in the case of a murderer, one may save the potential victim at the cost of the murderer’s life.And conversely, the Torah juxtaposes a betrothed young woman to a murderer to indicate that just as with regard to a potential murderer, the halakha is that if one was ordered to murder another, he must be killed and not transgress the prohibition of bloodshed, so too, with regard to a betrothed young woman, if she is faced with rape, she must be killed and not transgress the prohibition of forbidden sexual relations. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha with regard to a murderer himself, that one must allow himself to be killed rather than commit murder? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning that one life is not preferable to another, and therefore there is no need for a verse to teach this halakha. The Gemara relates an incident to demonstrate this: As when a certain person came before Rabba and said to him: The lord of my place, a local official, said to me: Go kill so-and-so, and if not I will kill you, what shall I do? Rabbasaid to him: It is preferable that he should kill you and you should not kill. Who is to say that your blood is redder than his, that your life is worth more than the one he wants you to kill? Perhaps that man’s blood is redder. This logical reasoning is the basis for the halakha that one may not save his own life by killing another.

“And your brother shall live with you” (Leviticus 25:36), from which it is derived: Return the interest to him so that he may live.The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yoḥanan, what does he do with this verse: “And your brother shall live with you”? The Gemara answers: He requires the verse for that which is taught in a baraita: If two people were walking on a desolate path and there was a jug [kiton] of water in the possession of one of them, and the situation was such that if both drink from the jug, both will die, as there is not enough water, but if only one of them drinks, he will reach a settled area, there is a dispute as to the halakha. Ben Petora taught: It is preferable that both of them drink and die, and let neither one of them see the death of the other. This was the accepted opinion until Rabbi Akiva came and taught that the verse states: “And your brother shall live with you,” indicating that your life takes precedence over the life of the other.

What is the origin of Trajan’s Day? They said in explanation: When Trajan sought to kill the important leaders Luleyanus and his brother Pappas in Laodicea, he said to them: If you are from the nation of Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, let your God come and save you from my hand, just as He saved Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah from the hand of Nebuchadnezzar.Luleyanus and Pappassaid to him: Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah were full-fledged righteous people, and they were worthy that a miracle should be performed for them, and Nebuchadnezzar was a legitimate king who rose to power through his merit, and it is fitting that a miracle be performed through him.But this wicked man, Trajan, is a commoner, not a real king, and it is not fitting that a miracle be performed through him.Luleyanus and Pappas continued: And we are not wholly righteous, and have been condemned to destruction by the Omnipresent for our sins. And if you do not kill us, the Omnipresent has many other executioners. And if men do not kill us, the Omnipresent has many bears and lions in His world that can hurt us and kill us. Instead, the Holy One, Blessed be He, placed us into your hands only so that He will avenge our blood in the future.Even so, Trajan remained unmoved by their response and killed them immediately. It is said that they had not moved from the place of execution when two officials [diyoflei] arrived from Rome with permission to remove Trajan from power, and they split his skull with clubs. This was viewed as an act of divine retribution and was established as a commemorative day.

Yosef added: And I heard that they were saying in that world: Happy is the one who arrives with his studies in hand. And I also heard that they were saying: Those executed by the government enjoy such exalted status that no one can stand in their section. The Gemara asks: Who are these martyrs to whom Yosef was referring? If we say that he was referring to Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues, who were killed by the Romans, this cannot be: Is their elevated status due only to the fact that they were martyred by the Roman government and nothing more? These men were exceptional in their piety and sanctity during their lives as well. Therefore it is obvious that even without their martyrdom they would be greater than other people. Rather, it is referring to those like the martyrs of Lod, who died for the sanctification of God’s name but were not Torah scholars.

(5) If gentiles tell [a group of] women: "Give us one of you to defile. If not, we will defile all of you," they should allow themselves all to be defiled rather than give over a single Jewish soul to [the gentiles].
Similarly, if gentiles told [a group of Jews]: "Give us one of you to kill. If not, we will kill all of you," they should allow themselves all to be killed rather than give over a single soul to [the gentiles].
However, if [the gentiles] single out [a specific individual] and say: "Give us so and so or we will kill all of you," [different rules apply]: If the person is obligated to die like Sheva ben Bichri, they may give him over to them. Initially, however, this instruction is not conveyed to them. If he is not obligated to die, they should allow themselves all to be killed rather than give over a single soul to [the gentiles].

(6) The matter of murder, they, may their memory be blessed, learned by way of reasoning (Sanhedrin 74a); and they said by way of a metaphor, “What do you see that your blood is redder? Perhaps the blood of that man is redder.” [That is] meaning, the murdered might be fitting to perform more commandments than the one that killed him. And therefore it is not right that anyone kill his fellow, even if he will be killed for [not doing so]. And they may their memory be blessed, said further (Yerushalmi Terumot 8:4) that even if there were several thousand Israelites and the coercers said to them, “Give us one of you; and if not, we will kill all of you” — they should all be killed and not give over one soul of Israel. And [that is] only when they say “one,” unspecifically. But if they specified him explicitly, such that they said, “Give us x; and if not, we will kill all of you,” they are permitted to give him over — like the well-known matter of Sheva ben Bichri. This is also the law with women — if the gentiles say to them, “Give us one of you [to rape], etc.,” as it is [found] in Tractate Terumot, the eighth chapter (Mishnah Terumot 8:12).