Halakhic Agency (Sheliḥut) and Artificial Intelligence

If the agent subtracted ten from the denominator and separated one-fortieth or added ten to the denominator and separated one-sixtieth, thereby giving more or less than the owner intended, his teruma is teruma. From where do we derive that one can appoint an agent to separate teruma? And if you would say that it is derived from divorce, one could argue: What is an aspect unique to divorce is that it is considered a non-sacred matter in relation to teruma and will have different halakhot, so one cannot learn from divorce that one can appoint an agent to separate teruma. The Gemara answers: The verse states with regard to teruma: “So you also shall set apart a gift unto the Lord of all your tithes” (Numbers 18:28). Once the verse states “you,” the addition of the word “also” in the term “you also” serves to include an agent.The Gemara asks: And let the Merciful One write in the passage concerning teruma that one can appoint an agent, and the halakha that one can appoint an agent to act on his behalf in these other matters, i.e., divorce and betrothal, can come and be derived from it. The Gemara answers: Agency in these matters cannot be derived in this manner because the derivation can be refuted: Separating teruma is different, in that it is able to be separated by mere thought. It is enough for one to decide that a certain portion of his produce shall be teruma to have that status take effect. Just as there is this leniency unique to separating teruma, perhaps the leniency that enables one to appoint an agent is also unique to separating teruma. The Gemara further clarifies the source for agency: Generally, the Paschal offering was brought by a group of people together. But there is that which we learned in a mishna (Pesaḥim 98b): In the case of a group whose Paschal offering was lost before it was sacrificed, and they said to one member of the group: Go and search for our Paschal offering, and when you find it, slaughter it on our behalf; and this person went and found the lost animal and slaughtered it on behalf of the entire group, but meanwhile, despairing of his return, they took a different animal and slaughtered it as a Paschal offering, the halakha is as follows: If his Paschal offering was slaughtered first, he eats from his offering, and they eat and drink with him. This demonstrates that one can act as an agent to slaughter the Paschal offering. From where do we derive this halakha, that one can appoint an agent to slaughter an offering? And if you would say that it is derived from these other instances of agency, i.e., divorce and teruma, one could refute this derivation by saying: What is unique about these is that they are considered non-sacred matters relative to offerings, and perhaps offerings have their own set of halakhot. The Gemara answers: He derives it from that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says, as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: From where is it derived that the legal status of a person’s agent is like that of himself? As it is stated with regard to the Paschal offering: “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon” (Exodus 12:6). Is it so that the whole assembly slaughters the offering? But only one person from each group slaughters it. Rather, it can be derived from here that the legal status of a person’s agent is like that of himself.In light of that exposition, the Gemara asks: Let the Merciful One write in the Torah the halakha of an agent with regard to offerings, and these, i.e., agency in the cases of betrothal, divorce, and teruma, can come and be derived from it. The Gemara answers: Agency in these matters cannot be derived in this manner because the derivation can be refuted: What is unique about offerings is that the majority of their actions are performed by means of an agent. Since most of the sacrificial service is performed by priests, who serve as the agents of those bringing the offerings, the general halakha of agency cannot be derived from there. The Gemara continues to ask: For the reasons stated, the halakha of agency cannot be derived for any one of these from any other one of them. Still, derive one of these from the other two. The Gemara clarifies: Which of them will be derived from the others? If you say: Let the Merciful One not write the halakha of agency with regard to offerings and derive agency with regard to offerings from these, i.e., divorce and teruma, that derivation can be refuted: What is unique about these is that they are considered non-sacred matters relative to offerings, as even teruma is not sacred compared to offerings, and sacred procedures such as offerings may have their own halakhot. If you say: Let the Merciful One not write the halakha of agency with regard to divorce, and derive agency with regard to divorce from these, i.e., teruma and offerings, this too can be refuted: What is unique about these is they can be designated by means of thought, and therefore may be easier to effect than divorce. Rather, it is the third derivation that is possible: Let the Merciful One not write the halakha of agency with regard to teruma, and derive agency from these, i.e., offerings and divorce. Although teruma is sacred, offerings are more sacred, and yet the halakha of agency applies to them. Although the separating of teruma can be accomplished by means of thought, as opposed to divorce, offerings can also be designated by means of thought. The Gemara answers: It is indeed so; this is the derivation for the applicability of agency to teruma. The Gemara asks: But then why do I need the derivation that once the verse states “you,” the addition of the word “also” in the term “you also” serves to include an agent? The Gemara answers: It is necessary to function as the source of the statement of Rabbi Yannai, as Rabbi Yannai says that from the term “you also,” the following is derived: Just as you, those who appoint agents, are members of the covenant, i.e., Jews, so too, your agents must be members of the covenant. A gentile cannot separate teruma even if appointed as an agent by a Jew. The Gemara asks: Why do I need a verse to teach thishalakha? It is derived from that which Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: A slave cannot become an agent to receive a bill of divorce from the hand of a woman’s husband on her behalf because he is not included in the laws of bills of divorce and betrothal. This indicates that there is a principle that if certain matters do not apply to a person, he cannot act as an agent with regard to those matters. Therefore, since gentiles are not commanded to separate teruma, they cannot be agents for its separation. The Gemara answers: It was nevertheless necessary to derive this halakha for the case of teruma, because it cannot be derived from the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan. This is as it might enter your mind to say: It is a slave who cannot serve as an agent to receive a bill of divorce, since he cannot release a woman by divorce at all; but a gentile, since he is included in his own teruma, as we learned in a mishna (Terumot 3:9): A gentile or a Samaritan who separated teruma from their own produce, their teruma is considered teruma, despite the fact that they are not obligated to do so, I will say that he can also be appointed as an agent. To counter this argument, the term “you also” teaches us that only members of the covenant can act as agents for separating teruma; gentiles cannot. The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Shimon, who exempts one from paying an additional penalty for the teruma of a gentile, this explanation cannot be stated. As we learned in a mishna (Terumot 3:9): If the teruma of a gentile gets mixed with regular produce, it is considered to be a mixture ofterumaand non-sacred produce, and if a non-priest eats this mixture unwittingly he is liable to pay for it an additional one-fifth beyond its value, just as is the halakha with regard to one who unwittingly eats teruma. But Rabbi Shimon exempts him from paying the additional one-fifth, as he holds that the teruma of a gentile possesses no sanctity and is considered a mere gift to a priest. If so, if there is no need to learn the additional halakha that a gentile cannot act as an agent with regard to the separating of teruma, why do I need the derivation from “you” and “you also”?The Gemara answers: It was necessary to state this additional term, as it might enter your mind to say: Since the Master says that the word “you” is interpreted as a limitation, it means that “you,” but not sharecroppers, can separate teruma, as a sharecropper cannot separate teruma from the produce of the owner of the field; “you” can separate terumabut not partners from shared property without the consent of the other; “you” can separate terumabut not a steward [apotropos] from the estate that he is administering; and “you” can separate terumabut not one who separatesterumafrom produce that is not his, you might also say: “You” can separate terumaand not your agents. The verse therefore teaches us that “you also” indicates that one can appoint an agent to separate teruma. The Gemara poses a question with regard to the basic derivation of the halakha of agency: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, who explains that the verse: “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon” (Exodus 12:6), teaches the halakha of agency with regard to offerings. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan, who derives a different exposition from this verse, from where do we derive the halakha of agency with regard to offerings? As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yonatan says: From where do we derive that all of the Jews can fulfill their obligations

but in a Jewish court, once his verdict to be executed has emerged, they execute him.Abaye said to him: In a Jewish court as well, it is possible that the court will see fit to acquit him afterward and he will be released. Rav Yosef said: When the court sees fit to acquit him, it is before the verdict; after the verdict the court will not further see fit to acquit him, as it is uncommon for the court to find a reason to acquit him after his verdict has been delivered. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that a mishna (Makkot 7a) supportsRav Yosef’s opinion: Concerning one who fled from the court after his verdict was issued, the mishna states: Any place where two witnesses arise and say: We testify about so-and-so that his verdict was finalized in the court of so-and-so, and so-and-so and so-and-so were his witnesses, the halakha is that this person should be killed. It is evident from the mishna in tractate Makkot that there is no concern that the court might later have found a reason to release him. The Gemara answers: Perhaps one who flees is different, as the court will not reconsider his verdict once he has fled. The Gemara suggests another proof: Come and hear: If one heard from a Jewish court that they were saying: The man so-and-so died, or: The man so-and-so was killed, then the court allows his wife to marry. If he heard from a gentile judicial registrar: The man so-and-so died, or: The man so-and-so was killed, then the court does not allow his wife to marry.The Gemara clarifies: What does it mean when it says: Died, and what does it mean when it says: Was killed? If we say that it means that he actually died, and that he actually was killed, such that the case concerning the gentiles is stated in a similar manner, i.e., that he heard from the gentile registrar that the person was actually dead, why may the court not allow his wife to marry? Don’t we maintain that with regard to any gentile who speaks offhandedly, the Sages deemed him credible? Therefore, the gentile should be deemed credible when he says that someone died or was killed. Rather, is it not necessary to explain that when it says: Died, it means that he is going out to die, and when it says: Was killed, it means that he is going out to be executed. And it teaches: If one heard in a Jewish court then the court allows his wife to marry, as it is assumed that he was already executed, in support of the statement of Rav Yosef. The Gemara answers: Actually, it can be explained that he actually died, and was actually killed; and with regard to that which you said: Such that the case concerning the gentiles is stated in a similar manner, why may the court not allow his wife to marry? Don’t we maintain that with regard to any gentile who speaks offhandedly, the Sages deemed him credible? The answer is that this credibility applies only in a matter that is not relevant to the gentiles; but in a matter that is relevant to the gentiles, such as here, where they desire to publicize that they carried out their verdict, it is common for them to reinforce their false verdict. MISHNA: With regard to an agent who brings a bill of divorce in Eretz Yisrael, where his only responsibility is to transmit the bill of divorce to the wife, and the agent became sick, this agent may send it in the possession of another agent. But if the husband said to the agent: When you transmit the bill of divorce to my wife, take for me such and such an item from her that I left with her as a deposit, then he may not send it in the possession of another agent. This is because it is assumed that it is not the desire of the husband that his deposit be in the possession of another person whom he did not appoint as his agent. GEMARA:Rav Kahana said: We learned in the mishna that the agent became sick; otherwise, he may not appoint a second agent. The Gemara asks: This is obvious, as the mishna teaches explicitly that the agent became sick. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that the same is true, i.e., that he may transfer the bill of divorce to another agent, even though the agent did not become sick, and the reason that the mishna teaches specifically that he became sick is that the mishna teaches the matter in the manner in which it typically occurs, as an agent typically fulfills his agency, barring unavoidable circumstances, therefore, Rav Kahanateaches us that an agent may appoint another agent only when he becomes sick. The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances of his appointment as an agent? If this is a case where the husband said to the agent: Deliver this bill of divorce to my wife, then even though the agent did not become sick, he may also appoint an agent in his place, as the husband did not state that he must be the one to deliver the bill of divorce. And if this is a case where he said to the agent: You, deliver this bill of divorce to my wife, then even if he became sick, he also may not appoint a second agent in his place, as the husband specified that he must be the one to deliver the bill of divorce. And if the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, then even if he became sick he also may not appoint a second agent, no matter what the husband said. The Gemara explains: As it is taught in a baraita in the Tosefta (2:13): If the husband said to an agent: Deliver this bill of divorce to my wife, then this agent may send it in the possession of another agent. However, if the husband said: You, deliver this bill of divorce to my wife, then this agent may not send it in the possession of another agent. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Whether the husband said it like this or whether the husband said it like that, the agent may not designate another agent. Therefore, Rav Kahana’s statement is difficult. The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that the mishna is referring to a case where the husband said to his agent: Deliver the bill of divorce, without specifying that he must be the one to do so, and Rav Kahana understood the baraita as follows: And thishalakha, that he may send it in the possession of another agent, applies only when the agent became sick. And if you wish, say that the mishna is referring to a case where the husband said: You deliver, but one who became sick is different, and it is assumed that under those circumstances the husband would allow him to designate another agent. And if you wish, say that the mishna is even in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that an agent is ordinarily not permitted to designate another agent. But a case where the agent became sick is different, and the agent may designate another agent. We learned in the mishna: With regard to an agent who brings a bill of divorce in Eretz Yisrael, and the agent became sick, this agent may send it in the possession of another agent. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (66a): If the husband said to two people: Give a bill of divorce to my wife, or if he said to three people: Write a bill of divorce and give it to my wife, then these people should write it and give it. The Gemara infers from the mishna: They themselves, yes, they should do so, but one whom they appoint as an agent may not do so. Abaye said: There, what is the reason that an agent may not be appointed? It is due to degradation of the husband, who does not want the matter to become known, and therefore they may not designate another agent. However, here, after he has already sent the bill of divorce, the husband is not particular that word not spread, and therefore the agent may designate another agent in his place. Rava said: There is a different reason that in the case of the mishna (66a) the agent may not appoint another to write the bill of divorce; it is because of the fact that in the case there, the husband’s instructions are mere words, and verbal directives cannot be delegated to an agent, i.e., an agent cannot be deputized to give instructions on behalf of another. Therefore, they cannot take their oral instructions and transfer them to another. In the case of the mishna here, the agent is able to give the physical bill of divorce to another agent and thereby transfer his agency. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the explanations offered by Abaye and Rava? The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them in the case of an agent appointed to write a deed of a gift, and their disagreement is parallel to the dispute of Rav and Shmuel. Rav says: A deed of gift is not like a bill of divorce, as the gift giver does not care who writes the deed. Since it is not degrading to him if another agent writes the deed of gift instead of the agent that he appointed, the agent may appoint another agent. And Shmuel says: A deed of gift is like a bill of divorce, as the mere words instructing the agent to write the deed cannot be transferred to another agent. § The mishna teaches: But if the husband said to the agent: When you transmit the bill of divorce to my wife, take for me such and such an item from her, then the agent may not appoint a second agent, as it is not the desire of the husband that his deposit be in the possession of another. Reish Lakish says: Here, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasitaught that a borrower is not allowed to lend the item that he borrowed to someone else, and a renter is not allowed to rent out the item that he rented to someone else. In those cases, the same reasoning applies, i.e., that it is not the desire of the owner that his item be in the possession of another. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Even schoolchildren know thishalakha, and this is not the novel idea expressed in the mishna. The novel idea expressed in the mishna is as follows: Not only is it not permitted for an agent to appoint another agent in this case, as it violates the desire of the husband, but sometimes it happens that the bill of divorce is also not valid if a second agent is appointed. This is because the first agent becomes as one that it was said to him: Divorce her only in the house, and he divorced her in the attic; or the husband said: Divorce her only with your right hand, and he divorced her with his left hand. Here as well, since the agent violated the instructions the divorce will not be valid. The Gemara elaborates: Everyone agrees that when it happens that the wife went out to greet him and gave him the item that the husband requested, and then she took the bill of divorce from him, in this case everyone agrees that the bill of divorce is a proper bill of divorce. When they disagree is in a case when the husband said to the agent: Take an item from her and then give her the bill of divorce, and he went and gave her the bill of divorce and then took the item from her. Rabbi Yoḥanan invalidates the bill of divorce even when given by the first agent, as he deviated from the husband’s instructions, and his agency is canceled, and all the more so does Rabbi Yoḥanan invalidate the bill of divorce when delivered by the first agent’s agent. And Reish Lakish deems the bill of divorce valid when it is delivered by the first agent’s agent, and all the more so when it is delivered by the first agent himself.MISHNA: With regard to an agent who is bringing a bill of divorce from a country overseas, who must attest to the fact that he witnessed the writing and signing of the bill of divorce, and he became sick and cannot complete his agency, he appoints another agent in court and sends him. And the first agent says before the court: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence, and on the basis of this the court deems the bill of divorce to be valid. And the final agent does not need to say: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence. Rather, it is sufficient that he says: I am an agent of the court.GEMARA:The Sages said to Avimei, son of Rabbi Abbahu: Raise the following dilemma before your father, Rabbi Abbahu: Can an agent of the first agent also appoint another agent, or not? He said to them: You should not raise this dilemma. From the fact that the mishna teaches: The final agent does not need to say, as opposed to: The second agent does not need to say, it can be seen by inference that the second agent can appoint an agent, resulting in the existence of a final agent, not just a second agent. Rather, when you raise the dilemma, this is what you should ask: When the second agent appoints another agent, does he need to appoint him specifically in court, or can he do so even while not in court? They said to him: We do not raise this dilemma, as from the fact that it teaches: Rather, he says: I am an agent of the court, it is clear that any agent in this role must be appointed in court. The Gemara cites another version of the discussion. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak would teach like this: The Sages said to Avimei, son of Rabbi Abbahu: Raise the following dilemma before your father, Rabbi Abbahu: When the agent of the first agent appoints another agent, does he need to appoint him specifically in court, or can he do so even while not in court?He said to them: And you should raise the dilemma as to whether generally the agent of the first agent can appoint another agent. They said to him: We do not raise this dilemma, as we learned in the mishna: The final agent does not need to say, and by inference it can be seen that the second agent can appoint an agent. Rather, when the dilemma was raised to us, it was with respect to whether this must take place in court, or if it can take place while not in court. He said to them: You should also not raise this dilemma, as the mishna teaches: Rather, he says: I am an agent of the court, which shows that the subsequent appointments must take place in court. § Rabba says: An agent in Eretz Yisrael can appoint several agents, i.e., he can appoint an agent, and the second agent can appoint another agent in his place. All of this can take place outside of court, because when a bill of divorce is sent within Eretz Yisrael there is no need to testify that it was written and signed in the agent’s presence. Rav Ashi says: If the first agent died, then they are all canceled, as all the agents act on the basis of the first agent. With his death, the agency is canceled. Mar bar Rav Ashi said: This statement of my father is from the time of his youth, and it is not correct, as, if the husband dies, even if all of the agents are alive, is there is any significance to any of them? All of them, from whose authority do they come to deliver the bill of divorce? They come from the husband’s authority. Therefore, if the husband is alive, then they are all able to act as agents; if the husband is not alive, then they are all not agents. The status of the agents is dependent on the husband, not on the first agent. § The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain man who sent a bill of divorce to his wife with an agent. The agent said: I do not know her. The husband said to him: Go give the bill of divorce to Abba bar Minyumi, as he knows her, and he will go and give it to her. The agent came and did not find Abba bar Minyumi, and he did not know what to do. He found Rabbi Abbahu and Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa and Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa, and Rav Safra was sitting among them. The agent asked them what he should do. The first three Sages said to him: Transfer your words, i.e., your agency, before us, as when Abba bar Minyumi comes, we will give the bill of divorce to him, and he will go and give it to her.Rav Safra said to them: But isn’t he an agent who is not granted the ability to effect divorce, as he was given only the authority to transfer the bill of divorce to Abba bar Minyumi? Therefore, he cannot transfer the agency to another person. These Sages were embarrassed that they ruled improperly. Rava said: Rav Safra struck [kappeḥinhu] a blow to three ordained Sages, as although he was from Babylonia and not ordained, he was correct. Rav Ashi said: With what did he strike them? He did not conclusively refute their opinion, as, did the husband say to the agent: Abba bar Minyumi should deliver the bill of divorce and not you? Rather, he appointed this agent to deliver the bill of divorce, and added that if he cannot find the wife, then he can transfer the bill of divorce to Abba bar Minyumi. The Gemara cites another version of the discussion: There are those who say that Rava said: Rav Safra struck three ordained Sages mistakenly. Rav Ashi questioned Rava and said: What was the mistake? After all, what did the husband say to the agent? He said that Abba bar Minyumi should give his wife the bill of divorce, meaning that he and not you should give it, and Rav Safra’s ruling was correct. The Gemara relates a similar incident: There was an incident involving a certain man who sent a bill of divorce to his wife with an agent. He said to the agent: Do not give the bill of divorce to her until thirty days have passed. Circumstances occurred within the thirty days that were beyond the agent’s control, and he saw that he would not be able to wait and give the wife the bill of divorce after thirty days, as per the husband’s instructions. The agent came before Rava and asked what he should do. Rava said: What is the reason that the mishna permits an agent who became sick to appoint another agent in his place? It is because he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control, and in the case of this one as well, he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control.Ravasaid to the agent: Transfer your words, i.e., your agency, before us and we will serve as a court, so that after thirty days we will appoint an agent and he will give the bill of divorce to her. The Sages said to Rava: But isn’t he an agent who is not granted the ability to effect divorce, as within the thirty days he does not have the authority to divorce her? He said to them: Since it is so that after thirty days he is able to divorce her, he is considered an agent who is granted the ability to effect divorce.The Sages challenged Rava again: But in any case where an agent does not deliver a bill of divorce immediately, let there be a concern that perhaps the husband was mollified and decided not to divorce his wife, thereby canceling the bill of divorce. Didn’t we learn in a mishna (76b): If, before traveling, a husband gives his wife a bill of divorce and says that it takes effect from now if I do not arrive from now until twelve months have passed, and he died within the twelve months, then this is a valid bill of divorce?And we discussed this halakha: And let there be a concern that perhaps the husband was mollified and decided not to divorce his wife, and canceled the bill of divorce. And Rabba bar Rav Huna said: This is what my father, my master, Rav Huna, said in the name of Rav: The mishna is referring to a case where the husband says: My wife is deemed credible to say that I did not arrive. Since the husband abrogated his right to contest the validity of the divorce by granting absolute credibility to his wife, there is no concern that he may have canceled the bill of divorce, as even if he were to claim that he had done so, his claim would not be accepted. By contrast, in this incident, where the wife was never granted such credibility, there is a concern that perhaps he canceled the bill of divorce. Ravawas embarrassed that he ruled incorrectly. Ultimately, the matter was revealed that this woman was the husband’s betrothed and that they had not married. Rava said: If they said that there is a concern with regard to a married woman that perhaps he was mollified, would they say the same with regard to a betrothed woman, whom he does not know well? Therefore, my ruling was correct. Rava said: We certainly raise this dilemma:

(9) When a servant steals, he is not liable for the double payment. Similarly, his owner is not liable. For a person is not liable for the damages caused by his servants although they are his property. The rationale is that the servants are mentally competent, and their owner is incapable of guarding them. Were the owner to be held liable for the damages his servants cause, if he angered a servant, the servant could desire to seek revenge and go and ignite a grain heap worth a thousand dinar or precipitate other similar damage to cause his owner to be liable.
If the servant is freed by his owner, he is obligated to pay the double payment.