(1) And now, O Israel, give heed to the laws and rules that I am instructing you to observe, so that you may live to enter and occupy the land that יהוה, the God of your fathers, is giving you.

(5) See, I have imparted to you laws and rules, as my God יהוה has commanded me, for you to abide by in the land that you are about to enter and occupy.

(29) Be careful, then, to do as your God יהוה has commanded you. Do not turn aside to the right or to the left:

(17) Be sure to keep the commandments, decrees, and laws that your God יהוה has enjoined upon you. (18) Do what is right and good in the sight of יהוה, that it may go well with you and that you may be able to possess the good land that your God יהוה promised on oath to your fathers,

הישר והטוב [AND THOU SHALT DO] THAT WHICH IS RIGHT AND GOOD [IN THE EYES OF THE LORD] — This refers to a compromise, acting beyond the strict demands of the law (cf. Rashi on Bava Metzia 108a).

AND THOU SHALT DO THAT WHICH IS RIGHT AND GOOD IN THE SIGHT OF THE ETERNAL. In line with the plain meaning of Scripture the verse says, “Keep the commandments of G-d, His testimonies, and His statutes, and, in observing them, intend to do what is right and good in His sight only.” And [the expression in the verse before us] that it may be well with thee is a promise, stating that, when you will do that which is good in His eyes, it will be well with you, for G-d does good unto the good, and to them that are upright in their hearts. Our Rabbis have a beautiful Midrash on this verse. They have said: “[That which is right and good] refers to a compromise and going beyond the requirement of the letter of the law.” The intent of this is as follows: At first he [Moses] stated that you are to keep His statutes and His testimonies which He commanded you, and now he is stating that even where He has not commanded you, give thought, as well, to do what is good and right in His eyes, for He loves the good and the right. Now this is a great principle, for it is impossible to mention in the Torah all aspects of man’s conduct with his neighbors and friends, and all his various transactions, and the ordinances of all societies and countries. But since He mentioned many of them — such as, Thou shalt not go up and down as a talebearer;Thou shalt not take vengeance, nor bear any grudge;neither shalt thou stand idly by the blood of thy neighbor;Thou shalt not curse the deaf;Thou shalt rise up before the hoary head and the like — he reverted to state in a general way that, in all matters, one should do what is good and right, including even compromise and, going beyond the requirements of the law. Other examples are the Rabbis’ ordinances concerning the prerogative of a neighbor, and even what they said [concerning the desirability] that one’s youthful reputation be unblemished, and that one’s conversation with people be pleasant. Thus [a person must seek to refine his behavior] in every form of activity, until he is worthy of being called “good and upright.”

(2) Speak to the whole Israelite community and say to them: You shall be holy, for I, your God יהוה, am holy.

YE SHALL BE HOLY. “Abstain from the forbidden sexual relationships [mentioned in the preceding section] and from [other] sin, because wherever you find [in the Torah] a warning to guard against immorality, you find the mention of ‘holiness.’” This is Rashi’s language. But in the Torath Kohanim I have seen it mentioned without any qualification [i.e., without any particular reference to immorality, as Rashi expressed it], saying: “Be self-restraining.” Similarly, the Rabbis taught there: “And ye shall sanctify yourselves, and be ye holy, for I am Holy. Just as I am Holy, so be you holy. Just as I am Pure, so be you pure.” And in my opinion, this abstinence does not refer only to restraint from acts of immorality, as the Rabbi [Rashi] wrote, but it is rather the self-control mentioned throughout the Talmud, which confers upon those who practice it the name of P’rushim (Pharisees), [literally: “those who are separated” from self-indulgence, as will be explained, or those who practice self-restraint]. The meaning thereof is as follows: The Torah has admonished us against immorality and forbidden foods, but permitted sexual intercourse between man and his wife, and the eating of [certain] meat and wine. If so, a man of desire could consider this to be a permission to be passionately addicted to sexual intercourse with his wife or many wives, and be among winebibbers, among gluttonous eaters of flesh, and speak freely all profanities, since this prohibition has not been [expressly] mentioned in the Torah, and thus he will become a sordid person within the permissible realm of the Torah! Therefore, after having listed the matters which He prohibited altogether, Scripture followed them up by a general command that we practice moderation even in matters which are permitted, [such as in the following]: One should minimize sexual intercourse, similar to that which the Rabbis have said, “So that the disciples of the Sages should not be found together with their wives as often as the hens,” and he should not engage in it except as required in fulfillment of the commandment thereof. He should also sanctify himself [to self-restraint] by using wine in small amounts, just as Scripture calls a Nazirite “holy” [for abstaining from wine and strong drink], and he should remember the evils which the Torah mentioned as following from [drinking wine] in the cases of Noah and Lot. Similarly, he should keep himself away from impurity [in his ordinary daily activity], even though we have not been admonished against it in the Torah, similar to that which the Rabbis have said: “For the P’rushim (Pharisees), the clothes of the unlearned are considered as if trodden upon by a zav” [or zavah — a man or woman having suffered a flux], and just as the Nazirite is called “holy” because of guarding himself from the impurity of the dead. Likewise he should guard his mouth and tongue from being defiled by excessive food and by lewd talk, similar to what Scripture states, and every mouth speaketh wantonness, and he should purify himself in this respect until he reaches the degree known as [complete] “self-restraint,” as the Rabbis said concerning Rabbi Chiya, that never in his life did he engage in unnecessary talk. It is with reference to these and similar matters that this general commandment [Ye shall be holy] is concerned, after He had enumerated all individual deeds which are strictly forbidden, so that cleanliness of hands and body, are also included in this precept, just like the Rabbis have said: “And ye shall sanctify yourselves. This refers to the washing of hands before meals. And be ye holy. This refers to the washing of hands after meals [before the reciting of grace]. For I am holy — this alludes to the spiced oil” [with which they used to rub their hands after a meal]. For although these [washings and perfuming of the hands] are commandments of Rabbinic origin, yet Scripture’s main intention is to warn us of such matters, that we should be [physically] clean and [ritually] pure, and separated from the common people who soil themselves with luxuries and unseemly things. And such is the way of the Torah, that after it lists certain specific prohibitions, it includes them all in a general precept. Thus after warning with detailed laws regarding all business dealings between people, such as not to steal or rob or to wrong one another, and other similar prohibitions, He said in general, And thou shalt do that which is right and good, thus including under a positive commandment the duty of doing that which is right and of agreeing to a compromise [when not to do so would be inequitable]; as well as all requirements to act “beyond” the line of justice [i.e., to be generous in not insisting upon one’s rights as defined by the strict letter of the law, but to agree to act “beyond” that line of the strict law] for the sake of pleasing one’s fellowman, as I will explain when I reach there [that verse], with the will of the Holy One, blessed be He. Similarly in the case of the Sabbath, He prohibited doing certain classes of work by means of a negative commandment, and painstaking labors [not categorized as “work,” such as transferring heavy loads in one’s yard from one place to another, etc.] He included under a general positive commandment, as it is said, but on the seventh day thou shalt rest. I will yet explain this with the help of G-d.

And even on an inclined plane, this works out well where there is no evidence, i.e., in a case without witnesses. But where there is evidence, let him bring evidence and be exempt. Why then is he forced to take an oath? As it is taught in a baraita: Isi ben Yehuda says, with regard to the verse: “And it died or was hurt or driven away without an eyewitness, an oath of the Lord shall be between them” (Exodus 22:9–10), that one can infer from here that if there is an eyewitness, let him bring evidence and be exempt.The Gemara previously cited Rabbi Elazar’s answer to the apparent contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Meir, which was followed by an analysis of the various opinions of the tanna’im. The Gemara presents a different interpretation. And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: There is no difficulty with the oath proposed by Rabbi Meir, as this oath is a decree of the Sages for the betterment of the world. The reason for this oath is that if you do not say so, that an unpaid bailee who broke the barrel in transport can exempt himself by means of an oath, you will have no person who will be willing to transport a barrel for another from one place to another, due to the fear that it might break and he will have to pay. The Gemara asks: How exactly does he take an oath? Rava said that the phrasing is: I take an oath that I broke it unintentionally. And Rabbi Yehuda came to say: An unpaid bailee takes an oath, while a paid bailee pays, this one in accordance with his law and that one in accordance with his law. And Rabbi Elazar came to say: Yes, there is a tradition in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. But I wonder whether both this one and that one can take an oath.Granted, an unpaid bailee takes an oath that he was not negligent with regard to the barrel, but why does a paid bailee take an oath? Even if he was not negligent, he is still required to pay. And even with regard to an unpaid bailee, this works out well if the barrel was broken on an inclined plane, but if it broke not on an inclined plane but under different circumstances, how can he take an oath that he was not negligent with it?And even on an inclined plane, this works out well where there is no evidence. But where there is evidence, let him bring evidence and be exempt. As it is taught in a baraita: Isi ben Yehuda says, with regard to the verse: “And it died or was hurt or driven away without an eyewitness, an oath of the Lord shall be between them” (Exodus 22:9–10), that one can infer from here that if there is an eyewitness, let him bring evidence and be exempt.The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who transported a barrel of wine in the market [beristeka] of Meḥoza and broke it on one of the protrusions of a wall in Meḥoza. The case came before Rava, who said to him: With regard to the market of Meḥoza, people are generally found there. Go and bring evidence in your favor and you will be exempt. Rav Yosef,Rava’s son, said to him: In accordance with whose opinion did you issue this ruling? In accordance with the opinion of Isi ben Yehuda? Ravasaid to him: Yes, I ruled in accordance with the ruling of Isi, and we hold in accordance with his opinion. The Gemara relates a similar incident. There was a certain man who said to another: Go and buy for me four hundred pitchers of wine. The second man went and bought them for him. Ultimately, he came before the first man and said to him: I bought four hundred pitchers of wine for you, but they fermented.The case came before Rava, who said to the second man: If four hundred pitchers of wine had fermented, this matter would generate publicity, i.e., people would have heard of this occurrence. Consequently, go and bring proof that initially, when you purchased the pitchers, the wine was good, and you will be exempt. Rav Yosef,Rava’s son, said to him: In accordance with whose opinion did you issue this ruling? According to that of Isi ben Yehuda? Ravasaid to him: Yes, I ruled in accordance with the ruling of Isi, and we hold in accordance with his opinion. The Gemara relates: Rav Ḥiyya bar Yosef issued a decree in the city of Sikhra, where he was the presiding Sage: With regard to those who carry loads on a pole [be’agra] and the item breaks, they must pay half. What is the reason? Such a pole is used to carry loads that are too much for one individual to carry and too little for two. Consequently, this breakage is close to an accident and equally close to negligence, and therefore they compromise with a payment of half liability. If he carried it with a digla, a wooden tool designed for double loads, he pays in full, as the use of such a tool indicates that he was carrying a load beyond the capacity of a single individual to bear and therefore acted negligently. The Gemara relates an incident involving Rabba bar bar Ḥanan: Certain porters broke his barrel of wine after he had hired them to transport the barrels. He took their cloaks as payment for the lost wine. They came and told Rav.Ravsaid to Rabba bar bar Ḥanan: Give them their cloaks.Rabba bar bar Ḥanan said to him: Is this the halakha?Ravsaid to him: Yes, as it is written: “That you may walk in the way of good men” (Proverbs 2:20). Rabba bar bar Ḥanan gave them their cloaks. The porters said toRav: We are poor people and we toiled all day and we are hungry and we have nothing.Ravsaid toRabba bar bar Ḥanan: Go and give them their wages.Rabba bar bar Ḥanan said to him: Is this the halakha?Ravsaid to him: Yes, as it is written: “And keep the paths of the righteous” (Proverbs 2:20). MISHNA: With regard to one who hires laborers and tells them to rise exceptionally early and to continue working until exceptionally late, if this is in a locale where laborers are not accustomed to rising so early or to continuing to work until so late, the employer is not permitted to compel them to do so. In a locale where employers are accustomed to feeding their laborers, the employer must feed them. If they are in a locale where an employer is accustomed to providing their laborers with sweet foods, he must provide such food. Everything is in accordance with the regional custom in these matters. There was an incident involving Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Matya, who said to his son: Go out and hire laborers for us. His son went, hired them, and pledged to provide sustenance for them as a term of their employment, without specifying the details. And when he came back to his father and reported what he had done, Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Matyasaid to him: My son, even if you were to prepare a feast for them like that ofKing Solomon in his time, you would not have fulfilled your obligation to them, as they are the descendants of Abraham,Isaac, and Jacob. Rather, before they begin engaging in their labor, go out and say to them: The stipulation that food will be provided is on the condition that you have the right to claim from me only a meal of bread and legumes, which is the typical meal given to laborers. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Matya’s son did not need to state this condition, as the principle is that everything is in accordance with the regional custom.GEMARA: With regard to the mishna’s statement that an employer may not compel his laborers to rise exceptionally early and continue working until exceptionally late, the Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? By what right can he force them to do so? The Gemara explains: No, the mishna’s ruling is necessary only in a case where the employer increased their wages beyond the standard in that place. Lest you say that the employer could say to the laborers: The fact that I increased your wages was with the understanding that you would rise early and continue working late for me, the mishna therefore teaches us that the laborers can say in response to the employer: The fact that you increased our wages was with the understanding that we would perform quality work for you, not that we would work longer hours. § Reish Lakish says:

there shall be no needy among you” (Deuteronomy 15:4). This verse can be understood as a command, indicating that it is incumbent upon each individual to ensure that he will not become needy. Therefore, your assets take precedence over the assets of any other person.The Gemara concludes: Rather, the verse is necessary to derive the exemption from returning the lost item in the case where he was an elderly person and it is not in keeping with his dignity to tend to the item. Rabba says: If there was a lost animal and the elderly person began the process of returning it, e.g., if he struck it even once to guide it in a certain direction, he is obligated to tend to it and return it. The Gemara relates: Abaye was sitting before Rabba and saw these goats standing nearby. He picked up a clod of dirt and threw it at them, causing them to move. Rabbasaid to him: You have thereby obligated yourself to return them. Arise and return them to their owner. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In a case of a person for whom it is his typical manner to return an item of that type in the field, where there are fewer onlookers, but it is not his typical manner to return an item of that type in the city, what is the halakha? Do we say that for one to be obligated to return a lost item we need an unequivocal obligation to return it that applies in all cases, and since it is not his typical manner to return an item of that sort in the city, let him not be obligated to return such an item at all? Or perhaps, he is obligated in any event to return the item in the field, and once he is obligated to return it in the field, he is also obligated in the city. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved. Rava says: In any case where he would recover his own item and would consider it to be in keeping with his dignity, he is also obligated to return another’s item. And any case where he unloads and loads his own animal’s burden, he is also obligated to unload and load the burden of another’s animal. The Gemara relates: Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, was walking on the road. A certain man encountered him, and that man was carrying a burden that consisted of sticks of wood. He set down the wood and was resting. The man said to him: Lift them for me and place them upon me. Since it was not in keeping with the dignity of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, to lift the wood, Rabbi Yishmaelsaid to him: How much are they worth? The man said to him: A half-dinar.Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, gave him a half-dinar, took possession of the wood, and declared the wood ownerless.The man then reacquired the wood and again requested that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, lift the wood for him. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, again gave him a half-dinar, again took possession of the wood, and again declared the wood ownerless. He then saw that the man desired to reacquire the sticks of wood. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said to him: I declared the sticks of wood ownerless with regard to everyone else, but I did not declare them ownerless with regard to you.The Gemara asks: But is property rendered ownerless in a case like this? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Pe’a 6:1) that Beit Shammai say: Property declared ownerless for the poor is thereby rendered ownerless. And Beit Hillel say: It is not ownerless, until the property will be ownerless for the poor and for the rich, like produce during the Sabbatical Year, which is available for all. As the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, how could Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, declare the wood ownerless selectively, excluding the prior owner of the wood? Rather, Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, actually declared the wood ownerless to everyone without exception, and it was with a mere statement that he prevented him from reacquiring the wood, i.e., he told the man not to reacquire the wood even though there was no legal impediment to that reacquisition. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, an elderly person and it was not in keeping with his dignity to tend to the item? Why did he purchase the wood and render it ownerless in order to absolve himself of the obligation to lift the burden if he had no obligation to do so in the first place? The Gemara answers: In the case of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, he conducted himself beyond the letter of the law, and he could have simply refused the request for help. The Gemara cites a source for going beyond the letter of the law in the performance of mitzvot. As Rav Yosef taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “And you shall teach them the statutes and the laws, and shall show them the path wherein they shall walk and the action that they must perform” (Exodus 18:20). The baraita parses the various directives in the verse. “And you shall teach them,” that is referring to the structure of their livelihood, i.e., teach the Jewish people trades so that they may earn a living; “the path,” that is referring to acts of kindness; “they shall walk,” that is referring to visiting the ill; “wherein,” that is referring to burial; “and the action,” that is referring to acting in accordance with the letter of the law; “that they must perform,” that is referring to acting beyond the letter of the law.The Gemara analyzes the baraita. The Master said: With regard to the phrase “they shall walk,” that is referring to visiting the ill. The Gemara asks: That is a detail of acts of kindness; why does the baraita list it separately? The Gemara answers: The reference to visiting the ill is necessary only for the contemporary of the ill person, as the Master said: When one who is a contemporary of an ill person visits him, he takes one-sixtieth of his illness. Since visiting an ill contemporary involves contracting a bit of his illness, a special derivation is necessary to teach that even so, he is required to go and visit him.It was taught in the baraita: With regard to the phrase “wherein,” that is referring to burial. The Gemara asks: That is a detail of acts of kindness; why does the baraita list it separately? The Gemara answers: The reference to burial is necessary only to teach the halakha of an elderly person, and it is in a circumstance where it is not in keeping with his dignity to bury the dead. Therefore, a special derivation is necessary to teach that even so, he is required to participate in the burial. It was taught in the baraita: “That they must perform”; that is referring to acting beyond the letter of the law, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Jerusalem was destroyed only for the fact that they adjudicated cases on the basis of Torah law in the city. The Gemara asks: Rather, what else should they have done? Should they rather have adjudicated cases on the basis of arbitrary decisions [demagizeta]? Rather, say: That they established their rulings on the basis of Torah law and did not go beyond the letter of the law.MISHNA:Which is the item that is considered lost property? If one found a donkey or a cow grazing on the path, that is not lost property, as presumably the owners are nearby and are aware of the animals’ whereabouts. If one found a donkey with its accoutrements overturned, or a cow that ran through the vineyards, that is lost property. In a case where one returned the lost animal and it fled, and he again returned it and it fled, even if this scenario repeats itself four or five times, he is obligated to return it each time, as it is stated: “You shall not see your brother’s ox or his sheep wandering and disregard them; you shall return them to your brother” (Deuteronomy 22:1). If in the course of tending to and returning the lost item, the finder was idle from labor that would have earned him a sela, he shall not say to the owner of the item: Give me a sela to compensate me for my lost income. Rather, the owner gives him his wage as if he were a laborer, a payment that is considerably smaller. If there are three men there who can convene as a court, he may stipulate before the court that he will undertake to return the item provided that he receives full compensation for lost income. If there is no court there before whom he can stipulate his condition, his financial interests take precedence and he need not return the lost item. GEMARA: With regard to the question in the mishna: Which is the item that is considered lost property, the Gemara asks: Is that to say that all those other cases that we stated in this chapter are not lost property? Rav Yehuda said that this is what the tannais saying: What is the principle employed in defining a lost item that one is obligated to return? The mishna cites examples to illustrate the principle: If one found a donkey or a cow grazing on the path, that is not lost property, and he is not obligated to return it. But if one found a donkey with its accoutrements overturned, or a cow that was running through the vineyards, that is lost property, and he is obligated to return it.With regard to the ruling in the mishna that a donkey and cow grazing on the path are not considered lost property, the Gemara asks: And is that the case even if they graze there untended forever? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Until three days pass they are not lost. Thereafter, they are considered lost. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If the animal is found grazing at night, even if it is untended for even one hour it can be presumed to be lost, as an owner never grazes his animals untended at night. If the animal is found grazing during the day, even if it is untended for more than three days, it is also not presumed to be lost. The Gemara answers: No, the measure of three days is necessary only in a case where one saw the animal grazing in the early hours in the morning and in the dark of nightfall. For the first three days, we say: It happened that the animal went out a bit earlier or a bit later than usual, but nevertheless, it was with the owner’s knowledge. Once this is observed for more than three days, it is certainly a lost item.This is also taught in a baraita: If one found a cloak or an ax

(5) This is not the limit of this principle. Even when a person sells property which he owns to another person, his colleague, the owner of the property neighboring his, has the right to pay the purchase price to the buyer and remove him from his purchase. The purchaser who comes from afar is considered as the agent of the neighbor. This applies whether the original owner's agent conducted the sale, or whether the property was sold by the court, the privilege of a neighbor is granted. Even if the purchaser was a Torah scholar, a non-immediate neighbor,and a relative of the seller, while the neighbor was an unlearned learned person with no family connections to the seller, the neighbor receives priority and may remove the purchaser. This practice stems from the charge Deuteronomy 6:18: "And you shall do what is just and good. " Our Sages said: "Since the sale is fundamentally the same, it is 'just and good,' that the property should be acquired by the neighbor, instead of the person living further away." If there are many neighbors, all have a right to acquire the property which was sold. It is divided among them equally, according to their number, and they all must reimburse the buyer for the purchase price. This applies provided they all come at the same time. If, however, one comes and purchases the property from the buyer, he alone acquires it, for he is a neighbor. Similarly, if some of the neighbors comes and purchase it and others are in a distant country, those who are present are entitled to purchase it and it becomes theirs. Similarly, if a person sells a property to one neighbor or one of his business partners, even if he is not a partner in the ownership of landed property, that person acquires it. The other partners or neighbors do not have the right to acquire it together with him.