So what does this mishnah seemingly prove?
What is the underlying assumption behind this difficulty?
There are three different contextualizations of the mishnah here. What qualitative differences are there between them? In other words, what would be the difference in principle behind them? Focus specifically on Rav's statement.
Rav Papa is raising a difficulty on Rav's understanding of the mishnah. What is the underlying basis of this difficulty?
Rav Zevid offers a defense of Rav's reading of the mishnah. But then he encounters a problem--why does the mishnah teach "stumbled" and not "broke intentionally?"
So in the end what is the rule if he stumbled and broke the vessel? If he intentionally broke the vessel?
Note how the amoraim do not seem to follow the ruling found in the Mishnah.
How does Shmuel's ruling accord with his reading of the Mishnah?
בשלמא שמואל כשמעתיה - דמוקי למתניתין באפילה הא באורה חייב:
With this resolution in mind, how does Rava's opinion differ from Shmuel's?
By this point in the sugya there seem to be several different opinions? What are they? What are the variables that impact whether the one who breaks the jug is liable?
The fine here seems to be for embarrassment, which is one of the five payments a person is obligated to make if he injures his fellow. The assumption is that striking a person with different objects can be more/less embarrassing.
According to the Talmud, rabbis in Babylonia do not have the authority to collect "fines" which is usually defined as payment beyond the actual damage.
Note how this stammaitic comment recontextualizes Rav Yehudah's statement.
Who is Rav Kahana raising a difficulty on?
How does R. Yehudah avoid the difficulty? Why doesn't he cite a source to substantiate his claim?
Note that in the lines that come, this line seems to be ignored.
Why does Rabbi Yannai offer such a non-literal interpretation of the phrase "break his teeth?"
R. Yannai's understanding of the baraita is rejected. On what grounds?
Background info: An ox that is an "attested danger" is one that has injured another ox three times. The owner of the ox is liable to pay full damages. Thus in this case, even if the upper ox killed the lower ox, the owner of the lower ox would not lose any value for he would be fully compensated.
With that in mind, what is the Talmud trying to prove from this baraita?
If the attacking ox is an unattested danger, the owner will pay only half damages. How does this effect the overall argument about "a person can take justice into his own hands"?
The Talmud here cites the second half of the baraita. Think about the baraita in its entirety. What is its simple meaning?
How is this a difficulty on the previous resolution? Why does the Talmud think that if the ox is an unattested danger then the owner he pushed him and caused him to die should not be liable?
Where does the Talmud currently stand in terms of the question of whether a person may take justice into his own hands?
What does this source prove with regard to the overall question of whether a person may take judgment into his own hands?
What does R. Nachman b. Yitzchak hold with regard to the question of whether one can take justice into one's own hands?
Background info: A Hebrew slave who wants to extend his term of servitude can have his ear pierced. In such a case he will serve until the Jubilee year. But at the Jubilee year he loses his option of continuing to serve. He must go free.
In this baraita the slave does not want to go free. The master strikes him in order to get him to leave his house. The baraita rules that if the master injures him, he is exempt.
What does this prove with regard to the question: "Can a person take justice into his own hands?"
Why does it matter if the slave is a thief?
And according to this line, if he is not a thief and the master injures him in an attempt to get him to go free the master is liable. Why?
The assumption is that the slave was not a thief during his term of servitude, for if he had been a thief all along, the master would have kicked him out long ago or at least punished him accordingly. So how come he suddenly turned into a thief now?
How does this effect the overall argument?
איסורא - ורשאי להלקותו ולהפרישו דהאי דינא לאו לנפשיה הוא:
[She is] prohibited [to him]: And he [the master] may strike him to separate him from her, for this "justice" is not for his own sake.
Again, what does R. Nahman b. Yitzchak think about taking justice into one's own hands? When is it allowed, and when is it not?
What does this prove?
Background information: The verse here refers to D'varim 25:11-12:
If two men get into a fight with each other, and the wife of one comes up to save her husband from his antagonist and puts out her hand and seizes him by his genitals, you shall cut off her hand; show no pity.
The rabbis interpret "cut off her hand" to mean that the woman owes money.
The question is whether she could have stopped the assailant in any other way. How does this effect the overall question of whether a person may take justice into his own hands?
The baraita itself makes a distinction. What is that distinction? What is the logic lying behind it and what implications would that have on the overall question of "can a person take justice into his own hands?"
The Talmud seems to offer a different distinction. What is that distinction?
So what then is the difficulty the Talmud is raising on the previous line?
What does this imply concerning taking justice into one's own hands?
How does this source prove that one may not take justice into one's own hands? In order for this to work, what assumptions does the Talmud have to make.
The following is Rashi's commentary:
לנקוט פזרא וליתיב - יקח מקל וישב על דרך הראשון דהא דינא הוא דהא אמרת מה שנתן נתן אלמא חילוף מעליא הוי
Let him take a stick and sit by the original road. For he has acted justly, for the baraita said that the path he gave to the public belongs to them. Therefore, it is a legitimate exchange.
What is the "decree" here? How does this effect the overall argument?
If it is only a "decree" then what does the baraita imply with regard to taking justice into one's own hands.
If the mishnah refers only to a case where he gave them a "circuitous" route then what would be the rule if he gave them a straight path? Would he be able to guard the path that he seized with a stick? Would one be allowed to take justice into one's own hands?
This is really a question about the imbalance in the ruling in the baraita. If that which he gave the public belongs to them, then why does he not get to keep the property that he seized?
So why can't he take his property back?
So what does this mishnah seem to prove?
Background info: Peah, and any "gifts to the poor" are exempt from tithes.
Thus Rava says that the other side is not really "peah" in the sense that it belongs to the poor. Rather, it is "peah" only in the sense that it is exempt from tithes. But the owner can prevent the poor from taking from the side that he did not allocate.
This source explains why the corner of the field that he set aside as peah is exempt from tithes. It is like ownerless property, which is also exempt from tithes, even if the owner reclaims it.
This is the end of the sugya. What do you think the final resolution is? Before you look ahead see if you can anticipate how rishonim will rule.