Background info: If one carries two things, one being the "main" thing and the other an "accessory" his liability is according to the "main" thing. Thus if he is not liable for the food (because it is less than the prescribed quantity) then he is also not liable for the vessel.
This anonymous Mishnah clearly hold that carrying a live person out from one domain to another (or four amot in the public domain) is not considered a biblical violation of Shabbat (אב מלאכה). In contrast, carrying out a dead body is. Note that in neither case is he liable for carrying the bed because the bed is an "accessory" to the body.
Question for further thought: Why would carrying a live person be different from carrying a dead body? Note there are probably multiple answers to this question.
According to the Tanna Kamma, one is liable for carrying live or dead animals. And according to R. Natan, one is liable for carrying dead animals but not live ones.
What is unclear in this Tosefta is whether the tanna kamma holds that there is a difference between animals and a human being. Might the tanna kamma hold that one is exempt for carrying live human beings? In other words, does the Mishnah, according to which a person is liable for carrying a dead human but not liable for carrying a live one, accord only with R. Natan or with the first opinion as well.
Questions for further thought: Why would there be a difference between carrying live animals and live human beings?
This is the first time we read of the concept that "the living carry themselves." Here the phrase is in Aramaic, whereas in the Bavli it is in Hebrew.
Question for further thought: Taking only the Yerushalmi into account, how would we understand the Tosefta? Particularly, is there a difference between human beings and animals? Does the creation of a "general principle" effect the understanding of the earlier, particular sources?
Section one: This is basically the question that we have been asking about the relationship between the Mishnah and the Tosefta. Does the Mishnah accord only with R. Natan?
Section two: Rava offers a distinction between animals and people. When one holds a person they will naturally try to make themselves lighter. Animals do not. Therefore the Mishnah which talks about people, can accord even with the rabbis.
Question: Does this make sense? What motivates Rava to say this? Is it simply an attempt to say that the Mishnah agrees even with the rabbis from the Tosefta?
Section three: This section quotes a mishnah from Masechet Avodah Zarah (1:6). The issue in that mishnah is selling animals to non-Jews, and the problem is that the non-Jew will work the animal on Shabbat. Ben Batera allows one to sell a horse to a non-Jew because the horse does not perform forbidden labor. The horse carries a rider, and since humans "carry themselves" one is not liable for such an act, and therefore the animal can be sold to a non-Jew.
In that context, R. Yohanan identified Ben Betera with R. Natan who holds that one is exempt from carrying live human beings. R. Yohanan did not identify Ben Batera with the rabbis from the Tosefta who disagree with R. Natan. Assumedly, he thinks that these rabbis hold that just as one is liable for carrying a live animal, so too one is liable for carrying a live human being. This contradicts Rava's statement who said that all agree that one is not liable for carrying a live human being.
Question: How does R. Yohanan relate differently to the Mishnah/Tosefta than does Rava?
Question: How does the answer "a horse designated for fowl" solve the problem?
Section four: Here we have yet another statement of R. Yohanan: R. Natan agrees that if the person is bound one is liable for carrying him on Shabbat. R. Ada b. Matana tries to draw a contradiction between this statement and the other statement of R. Yohanan--if R. Natan thinks horses never perform work then he would have to allow the sale of horses to Persians even though Persians wear so much armor when they ride that it is as if they are bound.
Question: How does this statement of R. Yohanan reflect on his overall thinking about whether the "living carry themselves?"
What is the halakhah that would emerge from this sugya?
How does this mishnah relate to the other mishnah we learned above?
Section one contains Rava's statement. Sections two and three explain the statement.
If he carries out a live baby he is liable for the purse. The purse is not ancillary to the baby. He is not liable for the baby because he holds like R. Natan, who says that one is not liable for carrying a living being. What is crucial to note is that the Talmud here thinks that Rava holds that only R. Natan exempts one from carrying a live human.
Section three is really not crucial to the issue at hand. The Talmud explains that Rava holds that one is always exempt for performing labor not needed for its own sake. [Note that the Talmud does not really explain why he is exempt for carrying the purse.]
Section four raises a difficulty from Mishnah Shabbat 21:1. The difficulty is supposedly on the stone--the stone is ancillary to the child. So then why was he liable for carrying the purse in the case of the live child and the purse.
The answer seems to be brought from a statement of the House of Yannai.
However, this answer does not fit the question particularly well. Think about what the "House of Yannai" might really be saying. They say that the Mishnah relates only to a case where the child desperately needs to be picked up by his father. The Talmud takes this to mean that in such a case one is not liable for the stone. Does this make sense? Might the House of Yannai actually be saying that one is allowed to pick up a child only if the child is desperate? This might be in line with the rabbis in the Mishnah, assuming that contra Rava (94a) the rabbis do not generally allow one to carry another human being. But in the context of our sugya, this statement is used to resolve Rava and not to contradict him.
To summarize the rules up until now:
The rabbis and R. Natan disagree concerning carrying a live animal. R. Natan says that one is exempt, whereas the rabbis say that one is liable.
Rava on 94a posits that the rabbis agree with R. Natan when it comes to a human being--the living carry themselves.
Mishnah Shabbat 18:2 implies that one may not carry a small child.
The Talmud on 141b holds that according to Rava only R. Natan allows one to carry a human being.
There are no sugyot that make any overt distinction between human beings. Either one is never liable for carrying a human being (R. Natan, and also the rabbis according to Rava on 94a) or one is liable (the rabbis according to 141b).
Note how the Ri (R. Yitzchak, one of the great Tosasfists, 12th century France) is immediately perplexed by the entire notion that the "living carry themselves." Empirically this is simply not true. People are heavy--even children!
What is the nature of the answer to which he resorts? Do you think this could be the original "pshat" of the concept? Note how this answer reveals two different sides to the laws of Shabbat. The first idea is that one cannot "work" on Shabbat. The second idea is that one cannot do any of the acts that were performed in the Tabernacle.
What bearing would this explanation have on halakhah lema'aseh? How does it accord with other sugyot in the Talmud?
תוספות מסכת שבת דף צד עמוד א
אבל אדם חי נושא את עצמו -
תימה דבריש נוטל (לקמן דף קמא:) משמע דפליגי נמי באדם דקאמר גבי תינוק רבא כרבי נתן סבירא ליה.
ואומר רשב"א דקטן כבהמה דמי דמשרביט נפשיה.
אך קשה לן דבפרק מפנין (שם דף קכח:) תניא מדדין בהמה חיה ועוף בחצר אבל לא ברה"ר והאשה מדדה את בנה ברה"ר ופירש התם בקונטרס דבהמה ברה"ר לא שמא יגביהנה מן הארץ וסתמא כרבנן דר' נתן דמחייבי אבל בנה אי נמי מגבה ליה הא באדם מודו רבנן דחי נושא את עצמו [ושמא ההוא דבפרק נוטל איירי בתינוק בן יומו].
Tosafot Shabbat 94a
(1) But a live human carries himself--
This is perplexing for on Shabbat 141b it seems that they disagree also about a person, for it says with regard to a child that Rava holds like R. Natan.
(2) And the Rashba says that a child is like an animal for it makes itself heavy.
(3) But this is still difficult for on Shabbat 128b it teaches that one may pull along an animal in a courtyard but not in the public domain. And a woman may pull her child along even in the public domain.
And Rashi explained there that an animal may not be pulled along in the public domain lest one lift it off the ground. And the anonymous voice agrees with the rabbis who make one liable [for carrying an animal] and they disagree with R. Natan. But when it comes to her child even if she lifts him up, when it comes to a person the rabbis agree that the living carry themselves.
(4) [Perhaps that case on 141b refers to a newborn child].
Section one points out a contradiction between the two sugyot. On 94a Rava states that even the rabbis agree with R. Natan that one is not liable for carrying a human being.
But on 141b the Talmud says that Rava hold like R. Natan, and not like the other rabbis.
Section two: The Rashba (a Tosafist, not the Spanish rishon) solves the problem by distinguishing between an adult (94a) and a child (141b). The child does not make it easier for himself to be carried. Therefore the sages would say that it is prohibited to carry a child. But R. Natan would still say that it is permitted to carry a child.
But all opinions hold that it is permitted to carry an adult human being.
Section three: The Tosafot then go on to note that this still does not accord with the sugya on 128b (which explains the Mishnah Shabbat 18:2). There it seems like the rabbis agree that one who lifts a child is not liable.
Therefore they solve this by claiming that that sugya refers to a very young child, one who is a day old.
Note how this Tosafot has used the impulse to solve contradictions in the Talmud by creating new halakhot. For the first time we hear explicitly that there is a difference between a very young child and a child who can walk a little bit. One is exempt if one carries the latter, but liable if one carries the former.
What are the Rambam's sources for his halakhah? See if you can go through all of the sugyot and pinpoint each of his sources.
This is similar to the Tosafot, but is more worked out.
Try to trace out the different halakhot and why the Rashba comes up with each of them. What problems is he trying to solve?
חידושי הריטב"א שבת דף קמא עמוד ב
ופרקינן רבא כרבי נתן סבירא ליה דאמר חי נושא את עצמו. הקשו בתוספות והאמר רבא בפרק המצניע (לעיל צ"ד א') דמודים חכמים לרבי נתן באדם דאמרינן חי נושא את עצמו ואם כן אמאי תלינן ברבי נתן, וכי תימא דהכא גבי קטן כבהמה דמי דמש[ר]בט נפשיה, והא בפרק מפנין (לעיל קכ"ח ב') אמרינן [האשה] מדדה את בנה ברשות הרבים ולא גזרינן דילמא אתי לטלטוליה משום דכי מטלטל ליה ליכא איסורא דאוריתא דחי נושא את עצמו, ולא פליגי רבנן עליה, וכדפרש"י ז"ל (שם ד"ה דמקפיא עיין שם) דהתם למאן דאמר דקטן מודו רבנן.
ויש מתרצין דשאני התם [דמיירי] בתינוק שיודע ליטול רגלו אחד וכיון שמכיר בהילוך לא משרביט נפשיה, אבל הכא מיירי בקטן שאינו יודע לדדות אלא שהוא נגרר ואינו מגביה רגליו דדמי לבהמה דפליגי רבי נתן ורבנן, ושלשה דרכים בקטן, דכל דמדדה מודו רבנן לרבי נתן, וכל שאינו מדדה ואף על פי שמכיר כלום בהילוך לענין שיהיה נגרר פלוגתא דרבי נתן ורבנן, ואם הוא קטן גמור כגון בן חדש וכיוצא בו שאינו מכיר כלום בהילוך אפילו רבי נתן מודה דהוה ליה כחולה וכפות, ומודה רבי נתן בכפות כדאיתא בפרק המצניע, זו שיטת קצת בעלי התוספות ז"ל.
אבל הנכון דהא [ד]אוקימנא הכא כרבי נתן לאו לאפוקי מדרבנן, דהא לרבא מודו רבנן באדם, אלא דההיא סברא דרבא הוא דפרישנן הכא ואנן לא שמעינן לה בפירוש אלא לרבי נתן ומשום הכי תלינן לה ברבי נתן, וכן היה מפרש מורי רבינו ז"ל, ואח"כ מצאתי כך בחבור ה"ר ישעיה ז"ל וגם במקצת תוספות.
R. Yom Tov Ishbilli (Ritba) Shabbat 141b
We resolve the difficulty: Rava holds like R. Natan who said that the living carry themselves.
The Tosafot raised a difficulty: But did Rava not say on 94a that the sages agree with R. Natan who says that the living carry themselves. And if so, why does the gemara here attribute this to R. Natan?
And if you were to say, that here where it refers to a minor, he is like an animal who makes himself difficult to carry, behold on 128b we say that a woman can drag her son in the public domain and we are not strict less she come to carry him, for even if she were to carry him, this is not a biblical prohibition, for the living carry themselves, and the rabbis do not disagree with this, as Rashi explained according to the one who holds that the rabbis agree about a minor.
And there are those who say that that case (on 128b) is different because it refers to a child who knows how to lift one leg, and since he knows how to walk, he will not make himself heavy. But here we are dealing with a child that does not know how to shuffle along when he is being dragged, and who does not lift his leg, and he is like the animal that the rabbis and R. Natan disagree about.
And any child who does not shuffle along, even though he knows a little bit about walking, when he is being dragged, there is a dispute between the rabbis and R. Natan. And if he is a really young child, such as a month old who does not know how to walk at all, even R. Natan would agree that he is like a sick person or one tied up, and R. Natan agrees that [one may not carry] a tied up person, as we learn...And this is the resolution of some of the Tosafot.
But the correct resolution is that the reason why we say that he follows R. Natan is not to exclude the rabbis, for to Rava the rabbis agree [with R. Natan] when it comes to a person. Rather, this logic is Rava's that we are explaining, but we have only heard this from R. Natan and therefore we ascribe it to him. And this is what I learned from my teacher. And afterwards I found it in the words of R. Isaiah [De-Trani] and also in some of the Tosafot.
Only this last section differs from the Rashba and the Tosafot. Here he seems to say that there is no difference between human beings--Rava holds that the rabbis always agree with R. Natan. We (meaning those understanding Rava) have not heard that the rabbis agree with R. Natan.
There is a large consequence in halakhah lema'aseh between the Ritba and the Rashba. What is it?
משנה ברורה סימן שח ס"ק קנג
(קנג) אפילו בר"ה - דהא אפילו תגביהנו פטורה דחי נושא את עצמו ולית בזה אלא איסורא דרבנן והוי גזירה לגזירה ואם נושא כפות או חולה חייב דבזה לא שייך שנושא את עצמו.
Mishnah Berurah 308:153
Even in the public domain: For even if she lifts him she is exempt for the living carry themselves and this is only a rabbinic prohibition, and thus would be a "decree on a decree." But if she holds one tied up or sick she is liable for in such a case one does not say "the living carrying themselves."
There is an interesting piece on this in Minchat Shabbat, a commentary on the Kitzur Shulchan Aruch. Its a bit long and I can't comment on it. But here's a link to find it. You may have to cut and paste in order to get to Hebrewbooks.org.