בַּמֶּה מְגָרְרוֹ? אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: בְּגַב סַכִּין.
With what does one scrape it off? Rabbi Abahu said: With the back of a knife, which is a departure from the typical manner of doing so.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ הָהוּא סָבָא: סְמִי דִּידָךְ מִקַּמֵּי הָא דְתָנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: אֵין מְגָרְרִין לֹא מִנְעָל חָדָשׁ וְלֹא מִנְעָל יָשָׁן, וְלֹא יָסוּךְ אֶת רַגְלוֹ שֶׁמֶן וְהוּא בְּתוֹךְ הַמִּנְעָל אוֹ בְּתוֹךְ הַסַּנְדָּל. אֲבָל סָךְ אֶת רַגְלוֹ שֶׁמֶן, וּמַנִּיחַ בְּתוֹךְ הַמִּנְעָל אוֹ בְּתוֹךְ הַסַּנְדָּל. וְסָךְ כׇּל גּוּפוֹ שֶׁמֶן, וּמִתְעַגֵּל עַל גַּבֵּי קַטְבֻלְיָא, וְאֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ.
A certain Elder said to Rabbi Abbahu: Delete your teaching before this statement taught by Rabbi Ḥiyya: One may not scrape at all; neither a new shoe nor an old shoe, and one may not smear oil on one’s foot while it is inside the shoe or inside the sandal, as the oil is absorbed by the leather of the shoe and strengthens it, which constitutes performance of the prohibited labor of tanning. However, one may smear oil on his foot in the typical manner and place it afterward in a shoe or in a sandal, and he need not be concerned that this oil will enhance the shoe leather. And he may likewise smear oil on his entire body with oil and roll on a leather carpet, and he need not be concerned.
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא לְצַחְצְחוֹ, אֲבָל לְעַבְּדוֹ — אָסוּר.
Rav Ḥisda said: They only taught this in a case where he does so in order to polish the carpet. But if he does so to tan the carpet, it is prohibited.
לְעַבְּדוֹ, פְּשִׁיטָא? וְתוּ: לְצַחְצְחוֹ, מִי אִיכָּא מַאן דְּשָׁרֵי?
The Gemara raises a difficulty: If he does so to tan the leather, it is obvious that it is prohibited, as tanning is a labor prohibited by Torah law. And furthermore: If he does so in order to polish it, is there an opinion that permits one to perform this act intentionally on Shabbat ab initio?
אֶלָּא, אִי אִיתְּמַר הָכִי אִיתְּמַר: אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא, לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שִׁיעוּר לְצַחְצְחוֹ, אֲבָל שִׁיעוּר לְעַבְּדוֹ — אָסוּר.
Rather, if it was stated, it was stated as follows: Rav Ḥisda said: They only taught that it is permitted to do so on Shabbat in a case where one smears a measure sufficient only to polish it; however, if one smears a measure sufficient to tan it, it is prohibited, even if he did not intend to tan the leather.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: לֹא יֵצֵא קָטָן בְּמִנְעָל גָּדוֹל, אֲבָל יוֹצֵא הוּא בְּחָלוּק גָּדוֹל.
The Sages taught in a baraita: A small person may not go out in a too large shoe, due to concern lest the shoe fall off and he will come to carry it in the public domain; but he may go out in a too large cloak. Even if it does not fit him properly, it will certainly not fall off.
וְלֹא תֵּצֵא אִשָּׁה בְּמִנְעָל מְרוּפָּט, וְלֹא תַּחֲלוֹץ בּוֹ, וְאִם חָלְצָה — חֲלִיצָתָהּ כְּשֵׁרָה.
And a woman may not go out on Shabbat in a shoe that is torn on top, lest she be mocked, remove it, and carry it on Shabbat. And a shoe of that kind may not be used to perform ḥalitza, as it is not a suitable shoe. Ḥalitza is performed by a widow bound in a levirate bond with her brother-in-law. However, if she performed ḥalitza with it, her ḥalitza is valid, since ultimately it is a shoe.
וְאֵין יוֹצְאִין בְּמִנְעָל חָדָשׁ. בְּאֵיזֶה מִנְעָל אָמְרוּ — בְּמִנְעָל שֶׁל אִשָּׁה.
And one may not go out on Shabbat wearing a new shoe, due to the concern that it will not fit properly, and then one will remove it and carry it. The Gemara comments: In what case did they say that one may not wear a new shoe? They said this with regard to a woman’s shoe, as women are very particular about having their shoes fit properly.
תָּנֵי בַּר קַפָּרָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא יָצְאָה בּוֹ שָׁעָה אַחַת מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם, אֲבָל יָצְאָה בּוֹ מֵעֶרֶב שַׁבָּת — מוּתָּר.
Bar Kappara taught: They only taught that she may not go out wearing a new shoe on Shabbat if she did not yet go out wearing it for any length of time while it was still day. However, if she went out wearing it on Shabbat eve, at which point she would have ascertained if it fits her, she is permitted to go out wearing it on Shabbat.
תָּנֵי חֲדָא: שׁוֹמְטִין מִנְעָל מֵעַל גַּבֵּי אֵימוּס, וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ: אֵין שׁוֹמְטִין. לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא — רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, הָא — רַבָּנַן.
One baraita taught: One may remove a shoe from the shoemaker’s last, the frame on which a shoe is shaped, on Shabbat. And another baraita taught the opposite: One may not remove it. The Gemara explains that this is not difficult: This baraita, which prohibits doing so, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, and that baraita, which permits doing so, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis dispute the applicability of the halakhot of ritual purity and impurity in a similar case.
דִּתְנַן: מִנְעָל שֶׁעַל גַּבֵּי אֵימוּס, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מְטַהֵר, וַחֲכָמִים מְטַמְּאִים.
As we learned in a mishna: A shoe that remains on a last, Rabbi Eliezer deems it pure, i.e., unable to become impure, as in his opinion the shoe is not yet complete, and therefore it is not yet a vessel and cannot become impure. And the Rabbis deem it capable of becoming impure, as in their opinion, the shoe is completed, and any vessel whose work is complete can become ritually impure. Correspondingly, the Rabbis, who hold that a shoe on a last is a completed vessel, hold that it may be moved on Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that it is an incomplete vessel, holds that it may not be moved.
הָנִיחָא לְרָבָא, דְּאָמַר: דָּבָר שֶׁמְּלַאכְתּוֹ לְאִיסּוּר, בֵּין לְצוֹרֶךְ גּוּפוֹ, בֵּין לְצוֹרֶךְ מְקוֹמוֹ — מוּתָּר, שַׁפִּיר.
The Gemara poses a question: It works out well according to the opinion of Rava, who said: Moving an object whose primary function is for a prohibited use, whether for the purpose of utilizing the object itself to perform a permitted action or for the purpose of utilizing its place, is permitted. It is well understood that one may move the last slightly while removing the shoe, since removing the shoe is considered utilizing the last’s place.
אֶלָּא לְאַבָּיֵי, דְּאָמַר: לְצוֹרֶךְ גּוּפוֹ — מוּתָּר, לְצוֹרֶךְ מְקוֹמוֹ — אָסוּר. מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
However, according to Abaye, who said that for the purpose of utilizing the object itself to perform a permitted action, it is permitted; however, for the purpose of utilizing its place, it is prohibited, what can be said? It is prohibited to move the last, which is clearly a utensil whose primary function is for a prohibited use. How is it possible to remove the shoe without moving the last?
הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — בְּרָפוּי. דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אִם הָיָה רָפוּי — מוּתָּר.
The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? It is with a shoe placed loosely on the last, so the shoe can be removed without moving the last. As it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: If it was loose, it is permitted.
טַעְמָא דְּרָפוּי, הָא לֹא רָפוּי — לָא. הָנִיחָא לְאַבָּיֵי, דְּאָמַר: דָּבָר שֶׁמְּלַאכְתּוֹ לְאִיסּוּר, לְצוֹרֶךְ גּוּפוֹ — מוּתָּר, לְצוֹרֶךְ מְקוֹמוֹ — אָסוּר, שַׁפִּיר.
The Gemara infers: The reason it is permitted is only because it is loose; however, if it is not loose, no, it is prohibited. It works out well according to the opinion of Abaye, who said that moving an object whose primary function is for a prohibited use for the purpose of utilizing the object itself to perform a permitted action it is permitted; however, for the purpose of utilizing its place, it is prohibited to move it. It is well understood that it is prohibited to move the last if the shoe is tightly attached to it.
אֶלָּא לְרָבָא, דְּאָמַר: בֵּין לְצוֹרֶךְ גּוּפוֹ, בֵּין לְצוֹרֶךְ מְקוֹמוֹ — מוּתָּר, מַאי אִירְיָא רָפוּי? אֲפִילּוּ לֹא רָפוּי נָמֵי!
However, according to Rava, who said that moving an object whose primary function is for a prohibited use, whether for the purpose of utilizing the object itself to perform a permitted action or for the purpose of utilizing its place, is permitted, why discuss specifically a case where it is loose? Even if it were not loose, it should also be permitted to move it.
דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה מִשּׁוּם דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הוּא. דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: אִם הָיָה רָפוּי — מוּתָּר.
The Gemara answers: That baraita is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the name of Rabbi Eliezer, and it is not a clarification of the opinion of the Rabbis. Although Rabbi Eliezer holds that the shoe is not yet completed, nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer that it is permitted to carry it. As it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: If it was already loose and no longer requires a last, it is permitted to move it, since it is a completed vessel and no longer needs the last to shape it.
הדרן עלך תולין
מַתְנִי׳ נוֹטֵל אָדָם אֶת בְּנוֹ וְהָאֶבֶן בְּיָדוֹ. וְכַלְכַּלָּה וְהָאֶבֶן בְּתוֹכָהּ. וּמְטַלְטְלִין תְּרוּמָה טְמֵאָה עִם הַטְּהוֹרָה, וְעִם הַחוּלִּין.
MISHNA: A person may take his son in his hands on Shabbat, and even though there is a stone, which is a set-aside item, in the child’s hand, it is not prohibited to pick up the child. And it is permissible to take a basket with a stone inside it on Shabbat. And one may move ritually impure teruma, which may not be eaten and is set-aside, with ritually pure teruma, as well as with non-sacred produce.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אַף מַעֲלִין אֶת הַמְדוּמָּע בְּאֶחָד וּמֵאָה.
Rabbi Yehuda says: One may even lift a measure of teruma that was nullified from a mixture of one hundred measures of non-sacred produce and one measure of teruma. When a measure of teruma is mixed with non-sacred produce, if the non-sacred produce is one hundred times the measure of teruma, the teruma is nullified. However, the Sages instituted that one must remove an amount equivalent to that measure of teruma and give it to a priest. The remainder is considered non-sacred produce. Rabbi Yehuda permits removing that measure on Shabbat to render the mixture permitted to eat.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רָבָא: הוֹצִיא תִּינוֹק חַי וְכִיס תָּלוּי בְּצַוָּארוֹ — חַיָּיב מִשּׁוּם כִּיס. תִּינוֹק מֵת וְכִיס תָּלוּי לוֹ בְּצַוָּארוֹ — פָּטוּר.
GEMARA: Rava said: If one carried out a living baby to the public domain on Shabbat, and the baby had a purse that was hanging around his neck, he is liable for carrying out the purse. However, one who carried out a dead baby, with a purse hanging around his neck, is exempt.
תִּינוֹק חַי וְכִיס תָּלוּי לוֹ בְּצַוָּארוֹ — חַיָּיב מִשּׁוּם כִּיס: וְלִיחַיַּיב נָמֵי מִשּׁוּם תִּינוֹק!
Rava said: If one carried out a living baby to the public domain on Shabbat, and a purse was hanging around the baby’s neck, he is liable for carrying out the purse. The Gemara asks: And let him be liable for carrying out the baby as well.
רָבָא כְּרַבִּי נָתָן סְבִירָא לֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר חַי נוֹשֵׂא אֶת עַצְמוֹ.
The Gemara responds: Rava holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, who said: A living being carries itself. Therefore, one who carries a living being from one domain to another is not liable.
וְלִיבְטַל כִּיס לְגַבֵּי תִּינוֹק, מִי לָא תְּנַן אֶת הַחַי בַּמִּטָּה — פָּטוּר אַף עַל הַמִּטָּה, שֶׁהַמִּטָּה טְפֵילָה לוֹ?
The Gemara asks: And let the purse be negated relative to the baby; and he should be exempt for carrying out the purse as well. Didn’t we learn in a mishna: One who carries out a living person on a bed is exempt even for carrying out the bed, because the bed is secondary to the person? The same should be said with regard to the purse, relative to the baby.
מִטָּה לְגַבֵּי חַי — מְבַטְּלִי לֵיהּ, כִּיס לְגַבֵּי תִּינוֹק — לָא מְבַטְּלִי לֵיהּ.
The Gemara answers: In a case where a bed is relative to a living being, the living being negates it, as the bed is needed to carry the person and is secondary to him. However, in a case where a purse is relative to a baby, the baby does not negate it, since it is independently significant.
תִּינוֹק מֵת וְכִיס תָּלוּי לוֹ בְּצַוָּארוֹ — פָּטוּר: וְלִיחַיַּיב מִשּׁוּם תִּינוֹק! רָבָא כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סְבִירָא לֵיהּ דְּאָמַר: כׇּל מְלָאכָה שֶׁאֵין צָרִיךְ לְגוּפָהּ — פָּטוּר עָלֶיהָ.
And Rava said: One who carried out a dead baby with a purse hanging around the baby’s neck is exempt. The Gemara asks: And let him be liable for carrying out the baby. The Gemara answers: Rava holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said: With regard to any labor that is not needed for its own sake, one is exempt for performing it on Shabbat. One who carries out a corpse does not do so because he needs it; rather, he does so for the sake of the corpse, i.e., to bury it or to move it from a degrading place. Therefore, he has not performed a labor prohibited by Torah law. Similarly, he is also exempt for carrying out the purse because due to his distress and mourning he negates the purse, as it is insignificant relative to the baby.
תְּנַן: נוֹטֵל אָדָם אֶת בְּנוֹ וְהָאֶבֶן בְּיָדוֹ? אָמְרִי דְּבֵי רַבִּי יַנַּאי בְּתִינוֹק שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ גַּעֲגוּעִין עַל אָבִיו.
We learned in the mishna: A person may take his son in his hands on Shabbat; and this is permitted even though there is a stone in the child’s hand. As it can be inferred from this mishna that the stone is negated relative to the child, why, then, is he liable in the case of a purse hanging around a live baby’s neck? Let the purse be negated relative to the baby. The Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai say: You cannot infer from this mishna that the stone is negated and therefore it is permitted to move it. Rather, the mishna is referring to a baby who has longings for his father. It is permitted for the father to move the stone because if the father does not lift him, the baby might take ill.
The Gemara asks: If so,