בגדר אם איסור נדה לבעלה משום טומאה או רק איסור גרידא: על פי אתוון דאורייתא כלל כ"א

This means that the bailee should bring witnesses that the animal was mauled through circumstances beyond his control, and based on their testimony he is exempt from liability. Abba Shaul says: The word ed should not be interpreted as witness, but as carcass. Accordingly, the bailee should immediately bring the carcass [aduda] to court in order to appraise its current value. What, is it not so that they disagree about this matter: That one Sage,Abba Shaul, holds that the loss due to the diminishing value of the carcass is sustained by the injured party, and so there is a need to appraise its value immediately in order to correctly assess how much the one liable for the damage must pay, and the other Sage, the first tanna, holds that the loss due to the diminishing value of the carcass is sustained by the one liable for the damage because the Torah granted him ownership of it. The Gemara rejects this: No, everyone agrees that the loss due to the diminishing value of the carcass is sustained by the injured party, since he owns it, and here they disagree concerning who must go to the effort of retrieving the carcass and transporting it to the court to be appraised. And so it is taught in a baraita: Others say: From where is it derived that it is incumbent upon the owner of the pit to raise the ox from his pit after it was killed by falling into it? The verse states: “The owner of the pit shall pay; he shall restore money to its owner, and the carcass shall be his” (Exodus 21:34). They read the term “and the carcass” as a second subject of the term “he shall restore.” It therefore indicates that the one liable for the damage must restore the carcass to the injured party by retrieving it. The fact that this opinion is introduced with the phrase: Others say, suggests that it stands in opposition to another opinion. That other opinion apparently holds that the owner of the injured animal is responsible for retrieving the carcass. Abaye said to Rava: What are the circumstances in which the one liable for the damage is required to go to this effort, to retrieve the carcass from the pit? If we say that while still inside the pit, the carcass is worth a dinar, and when it is at the edge of the pit, since it is more accessible, its market value increases and is worth four dinars, then when the one liable for the damage expends the effort to retrieve the carcass, he is expending the effort for his own sake, since by increasing the value of the carcass he reduces his own liability. Therefore, he will certainly retrieve it of his own accord, and it is not necessary for the Torah to require him to do so. Ravasaid to him: No, it is necessary to require him to retrieve the carcass in a case where, while still inside the pit the carcass is worth one dinar, and when it is at the edge of the pit, despite being more accessible, it is still worth one dinar. Since it is of no benefit to him to retrieve it, the Torah had to require him to do so. The Gemara asks: But is there ever a case like this, where despite being more accessible its market value does not change? The Gemara answers: Yes, as people say, a beam of wood in the city sells for a dinar, and a beam of wood in the field also sells for a dinar, despite the fact that it needs to be transported from there to the city. § Shmuel says: The practice of the court is that when an animal or other item is stolen and then is damaged or dies, the court does not appraise its current value and assign ownership of it to its owner, in order that the perpetrator should have to pay only the difference between its prior value and its current value, neither for the sake of a thief nor for the sake of a robber. Rather, the thief or robber acquires ownership of the carcass or damaged item and compensates the owner for its prior value. The court appraises the item or carcass only for damages, as the Gemara explained above. And I say that they appraise the item or animal even for a borrower who borrowed an item and while it was in his possession it became damaged, or who borrowed an animal and while it was in his possession it died, and Abba, i.e., Rav, concedes to me.A dilemma was raised before them: Is this whatShmuelis saying: The court appraises the value of an item or a carcass even for the sake of a borrower, and Abba concedes to me; or perhaps, this is whatShmuelis saying: And I say that the court does not appraise its value even for a borrower, and Abba concedes to me?Come and hear a resolution from the following incident: There was a certain man who borrowed an ax from another and he broke it. He came before Rav to rule if, and how much, he was liable to pay for it. Ravsaid to him: Go and pay him with a full-fledged ax, i.e., you must compensate the owner for the full value of the ax that you broke. The Gemara suggests: Conclude from it that the court does not appraise its value for the sake of a borrower. The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, from the fact that Rav Kahana and Rav Asi said to Rav on that occasion: Is this the halakha? AndRavremained silent, this suggests that he conceded to their opinion that the borrower should not have had to pay the full value of the ax. Accordingly, conclude from it that the court appraises an item’s value for the sake of a borrower. An amoraic dispute was stated: Ulla says that Rabbi Elazar says: The court appraises a stolen item’s value for a thief and for a robber. Rav Pappi says: It does not appraise its value for them. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that the court does not appraise value either for a thief or for a robber; but it appraises value for a borrower, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Kahana and Rav Asi.§ The Gemara cites additional halakhot taught by Ulla, citing Rabbi Elazar: When a woman gives birth or miscarries a fetus she is thereby rendered ritually impure (see Leviticus 12:1–5). Even if she delivers only the afterbirth, with no discernible fetus, she is rendered ritually impure due to the possibility that the fetus was dissolved in the afterbirth, and it is therefore considered as though she delivered it (Nidda 24b). The length of the period of impurity depends on the sex of the child. In the case where it is unclear what the sex is, she must observe the longer period of fourteen days (Nidda 29a). At the end of that period she may purify herself by immersing in a ritual bath. And Ulla says that Rabbi Elazar says: If part of the afterbirth [shilya] emerged on the first day of a woman’s miscarriage and part of it emerged on the second day, one counts the period of ritual impurity from the first day. Rava said to him, to Ulla: What is the rationale for your opinion to begin counting from the first day? It would appear to be based on the following: Ritual impurity is engendered only once the woman has delivered the fetus. This is defined as the emergence of the majority of the fetus or its head. Since in this case the fetus is not discernible, one must consider the possibility that it had already emerged on the first day, and therefore one is required to act stringently and regard her as impure from the first day. Rava questions the propriety of acting stringently in this case, as it is a stringency that results in a leniency, because if she begins counting from the first day, you will also render her fit to immerse and become pure from fourteen days after the first day. This is a leniency because it is possible that the majority of the fetus emerged only on the second day and therefore her period of impurity began only then. She will therefore remain impure until the fifteenth day. Rather, Rava said: With regard to being concerned for the possibility that she is impure from the first day, she should be concerned. But with regard to counting the period of impurity, one counts only from the second day. The Gemara asks: What isUllateaching us through this halakha? Does he mean to teach us that part of the afterbirth does not emerge without part of the fetus inside? But we already learned that in a mishna (Ḥullin 77a): When an animal is ritually slaughtered, the animal and everything inside it becomes permitted for consumption. This applies to an unborn fetus as well. If prior to the slaughter the majority of the fetus emerged, it is considered to have been born, and therefore the entire fetus, even the part that is still within its mother, is not rendered permitted for consumption by the slaughter. Accordingly, if part of the afterbirth emerged prior to the slaughter, it is prohibited to eat it, because an afterbirth is a sign of a fetus in a woman and a sign of a fetus in an animal.The Gemara explains: If I would know this only from the mishna, I would say

For there is no partial placenta without a fetus.And if you ask: According to R’ Elozor who says that we are concerned with the possibility of a birth, because it is impossible that even a small part of the amniotic sac emerged without some part of a fetus, we must therefore consider the possibility that the head or majority of the fetus may have emerged, but if there was a possibility of part of the amniotic sac emerging without any part of the fetus, she need not be concerned that a birth occurred, because there would be a double doubt.
A) Perhaps no part of the fetus emerged.
B) Even if some of the fetus emerged, perhaps it was not the head or the majority.
From Tosafot’ analysis of R’ Elozor, there seems to be no doubt that the rule of being lenient when there is a double doubt would be in effect. Tosafot based on a Mishna in Masechet Taharos (Chapter 6, Mishna 4) challenges this conclusion. The Mishna there is discussing some rules about doubts that occur in matters that deal with tumoh and taharoh. The rule depends on where the doubt happened, whether in a public or private domain.
The Gemara in Needoh 3a says that this is derived from the laws of the sotoh, the suspected adulteress. When describing the events of the sotoh, the Torah constantly uses the expression ונטמאה and she will become tomay. Having an adulterous affair is not an issue of tumoh and taharoh; it is rather an issue of the sotoh becoming forbidden to her husband as a result of the adulterous relations. Why does the verse refer to it a tumoh? Our sages understood that the Torah is teaching us that the rules that govern doubts that occur in matters of tumoh are derived from the laws of the sotoh. The sotoh is forbidden to have relations with her husband as long as there is a suspicion that she committed adultery, so too when there is a suspicion that something may have become tomay, we are stringent. But the doubt that arises about a sotoh is always in a private area where a woman secluded herself with another man; therefore the rule of tumoh is that we are stringent only in a private area. If the doubt occurs in a public area we are lenient.
Tosafot asks: What exactly is the case? If it, the birth in question happened in a public domain, even if there is only one doubt, we rule that it is tohor.
And if it, the birth, happened in a private domain, even if there is a double doubt, there is also birth tumoh, for we have learned in a Mishna (Taharos Chapter 6, Mishna 4): all doubts that you can add in a private domain, even a double doubt is tomay.
Tosafot holds that the assumption of the question is correct. If the issue of this doubtful birth pertains to her status in relation to the laws of tumoh and taharoh, we must follow the ruling of the Mishna in Taharos and be stringent even in the case of a double doubt. However, the question of when this birth occurred not only affects her status of tumoh and taharoh, it also effects whether she is permitted to live with her husband.
And one can answer: that our Gemara is speaking about the matter of prohibiting her to her husband. That doubt is not governed by the Mishna in Taharos. It reverts to the standard rule that we are stringent for one doubt and lenient with a double doubt.

[The prohibitions that apply] to one who has relations with a nidah apply throughout the seven days, even if blood was sighted only on the first day. [These same prohibitions] apply to one who has relations with a woman who gave birth to a male throughout the seven days [following birth], to one who has relations with a woman who gave birth to a female throughout the fourteen days [following birth], to one who has relations with a zavah through the time she bleeds and then counts [seven "clean" days]. This applies also to a Canaanite maidservant and one who has been freed. All [of these relations] are punishable by kerait.
[The association is derived as follows:] With regard to a nidah, [Leviticus 15:19] states: "She will be in her niddah state for seven days." With regard to a zavah, [ibid.:25] states: "All the days of the flow of her impurity will be like the days of her niddah state." With regard to a woman who gave birth to a male, [ibid. 12:2] states: "She will become impure as in the days of her nidah affliction." And with regard to a woman who gave birth to a female, [ibid. 12:5] states: "She will be impure as in her niddah state for two weeks."

But isn’t it written in that same section dealing with a woman after childbirth: “She shall touch no hallowed thing, nor come into the Sanctuary, until the days of her purification are completed” (Leviticus 12:4), which comes to include teruma? Rather, the Torah considers several distinct matters separately, and not all the verses refer to teruma. The Gemara asks: And why do I need three verses with regard to teruma? The Gemara answers: They are all necessary, as, hadteruma been derived solely from the verse: “He shall not eat of the holy things until he be pure” (Leviticus 22:4), I would not have known by what means ritual purity is achieved, whether by immersion alone or in some other way. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “And when the sun has set he shall be pure, and afterward he may eat from the holy things” (Leviticus 22:7), to teach that he must also wait for sunset. And had the Merciful One written only: “And when the sun has set,” I might have said that this applies only to one who does not require an atonement offering, but as for one who requires an atonement offering, one might say that he may not eat terumauntil he brings his atonement offering. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “She shall touch no hallowed thing, nor come into the Sanctuary, until the days of her purification are completed” (Leviticus 12:4), which indicates that she may eat teruma as soon as her days of purification are completed, and she need not wait until after she has brought her atonement offering. And had the Merciful One written only: “Until the days of her purification are completed,” I would say that upon the completion of the purification period she is immediately purified even without immersion. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “Until he be pure.”The Gemara asks: And according to that tanna who disagrees with the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael and says that the verse “Any man from the seed of Aaron who is a leper or a zav shall not eat of the holy things until he be pure” (Leviticus 22:4) is speaking of a zav who already experienced three sightings of an emission, and of a confirmed leper, both of whom must bring an offering as part of their purification process; and, this being the case, that phrase “until he be pure” must mean until he brings his atonement offering; then why do I need two verses with regard to sacrificial food, this verse and the verse with regard to a woman after childbirth: “And the priest shall make atonement for her, and she shall be pure” (Leviticus 12:8), to teach us that sacrificial food may not be eaten until after the atonement offering has been brought? The Gemara answers: They are both necessary, as had the Merciful One written this halakha only with regard to a woman after childbirth, one might have said that it applies only to her because her period of ritual impurity is so long, as she may not return to eating teruma or sacrificial food for either forty days, in the case of a male child, or eighty days, in the case of a female. But with regard to a zav, say that this is not the case. And had the Merciful One written this halakha only with regard to a zav, one might have said that it applies only to him, as no exemption is ever made from its general prohibition and he is always impure. But as for a woman after childbirth, who is permitted to her husband for thirty-three or sixty-six days of that period, say that this is not the case. Both verses are therefore necessary.The Gemara asks: As for the verse stated with regard to a vessel that contracted ritual impurity through contact with a creeping animal: “It must be put into water, and it shall be impure until the evening; then shall it be pure” (Leviticus 11:32), why do I need it? Rabbi Zeira said: It is necessary in order to teach about touching. An impure vessel, even after it has been immersed, still imparts ritual impurity to the teruma that it touches until nightfall. The same applies to an impure individual who has already undergone immersion; not only is it prohibited for him to eat teruma, but also he renders it impure if he touches it. As it is taught in a baraita: Had the verse stated only: “It must be put into water, and it shall be impure until the evening,” one might have thought that it remains ritually impure until the evening in all regards. Therefore, the verse states: “Then shall it be pure,” indicating that it is pure following immersion, even before sunset. And had it stated only: “Then shall it be pure,” one might have thought that it is pure following immersion in all regards. Therefore, the verse states: “And it shall be impure until the evening.” How so; how can the apparent contradiction between the two parts of the verse be resolved? Here, the verse is referring to second tithe, for which immersion alone suffices; and there it is referring to teruma, for which sunset is required. The Gemara asks: But I can reverse this construct and say that the greater stringency should be applied to second tithe. The Gemara answers: It is reasonable to say that teruma is subject to the greater stringency; just as the eating of teruma is subject to greater stringency than the eating of second tithe, so too, the touching of teruma should be subject to greater stringency than the touching of second tithe.And if you wish, say that the prohibition with regard to the touching of teruma is derived from here: “She shall touch no hallowed thing, nor come into the Sanctuary, until the days of her purification are completed” (Leviticus 12:4); this is a warning with respect to one who eatsteruma after having immersed but before sunset. Or, perhaps, it is nothing other than a warning with respect to one who touchesteruma before sunset, as is implied by the plain reading of the verse? Therefore, the verse states: “She shall touch no hallowed thing, nor come into the Sanctuary, until the days of her purification are completed” (Leviticus 12:4), thereby juxtaposing consecrated food to the Sanctuary. Just as the prohibition against entering the Sanctuary is a matter that involves the taking of life, as one who enters the Sanctuary while impure is liable to receive karet, so too, the prohibition against touching consecrated food must be a matter that involves the taking of life, e.g., eating teruma in a state of ritual impurity; but the prohibition against touchingteruma in a state of impurity does not involve the taking of life, as there is no punishment of karet for mere touching. And as for the fact that the verse expressed this halakhain terms of touching, this is what it is saying: The halakha governing touching is like that of eating, as they are both prohibited to an impure person, even after immersion, until sunset. But the verse is actually speaking of the prohibition against eating teruma in a state of impurity. § It is taught in the mishna that the wife of a priest with crushed testicles or a severed penis may eat teruma on his account, provided that they have not engaged in sexual relations since his injury. The Gemara asks: Who is the tannawho taught with regard to a woman awaiting intercourse that would disqualify her from marrying into the priesthood by Torah law, as in this case, where the woman would become disqualified from marrying into the priesthood if she had relations with her injured husband, that such a woman may eatteruma? Rabbi Elazar said: This halakhais subject to dispute, and it is taught in the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, who similarly stated that a widow betrothed to a High Priest may eat teruma on his account, provided that he has not engaged in sexual relations with her. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The mishna can be understood even if you say that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who maintains that a widow betrothed to a High Priest may not eat teruma on his account, as it is different here, as she had already eatenteruma on her husband’s account before his injury. Since she has done nothing to disqualify herself, she retains her presumptive status as one for whom it is permitted to eat teruma. And how does Rabbi Elazar counter this argument? He maintains that we do not say that since she had already eatenteruma on her husband’s account she continues to do so, as, if you do not say that this argument must be rejected, then it should be permitted for an Israelite woman who married a priest and her husband died without children to continue eatingteruma on his account, as she had already eatenteruma because of him during his lifetime. However, such a conclusion is clearly incorrect. This halakha indicates that the fact that she had already eaten teruma is irrelevant. And Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that the two cases are not comparable, as there, where the husband died, his acquisition of his wife has lapsed, i.e., they are no longer married, and therefore she cannot continue to eat teruma on his account, whereas here, where his genitals were injured, his acquisition has not lapsed. While sexual relations between them are forbidden, their marriage remains intact. § It is taught in the mishna: Who is deemed a man with crushed testicles? The Sages taught in a baraita: Who is deemed a man with crushed testicles? It is anyone whose testicles have been wounded, even if only one of them. Furthermore, a man is considered to have crushed testicles not only if they have been wounded, but even if they have been punctured, or have decayed as the result of an injury, or are partly deficient for some other reason. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, said: I heard from the Sages in the vineyard in Yavne that anyone who has only one testicle is nothing other than a eunuch by natural causes, and he is fit.The Gemara is puzzled by the wording of this last teaching: Can it enter your mind that he is a eunuch by natural causes, i.e., from birth? That designation refers to one who was born without testicles, whereas the reference here is to one who lost a testicle as the result of an injury. Rather, say that he resembles a eunuch by natural causes, and he is fit.The Gemara asks: As for one whose testicles were punctured, is he incapable of having children, so that he should have the status of one whose testicles were crushed? Wasn’t there an incident where a certain man was climbing up a palm tree,

MISHNAH: There are 39 categories of work. He who ploughs, who sows, who harvests, who binds into sheaves, who threshes, and who winnows, who selects, who grinds, and who sifts, who makes dough, and who bakes. He who shears wool, who bleaches it, who cards it, who dyes it, who spins it, who prepares the loom, who ties two threads as warp, who weaves two rows, who hits two threads, who ties, and who unties. Also who sews two stitches, who tears in order to sew two stitches. He who catches a deer, who slaughters it, who skins it, who salts it, who rubs it clean, who tans it, who cuts it, who writes two letters, and who erases in order to write two letters. He who builds, and who tears down, who extinguishes fire, and who lights fire, and who hits with a hammer, and who transports from one domain to another; these are the 39 categories of work. HALAKHAH: “The categories of work are 39.” From where that the categories of work are from the Torah? Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: Corresponding to the thirty-nine occurrences of מלאכה in the Torah. They asked before Rebbi Aḥa, everywhere where מלאכות is written it should count for two! Rebbi Ashian said, Rebbi Aḥa checked by eye the entire Torah and did not find this word written. The following is necessary: He came into the house to do his work is with them. God completed on the Seventh Day His work which He did, is with them. Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai stated: Six days you shall eat unleavened bread and on the seventh day you should not do work comes to complete the 39 “works” written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥmani: Corresponding to the 39 times “service” and “work” is written about the Tabernacle. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, it does not say “this is the word” but these are the words.” “Word”, “words,” “words”. From here about categories and derivatives. Rebbi Ḥanina of Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Abbahu. Alef is one, Lamed is 30, He is five, “word” is one, “words” are two. From here the 39 “works” written in the Torah. The rabbis of Caesarea say, at its place nothing is missing, א is one, ל 30 , ח 8. The rabbis never hesitate to identify ה and ח. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish worked on this Chapter for three and one half years. They produced 39 derivatives for each single one. Where they found a way to include it they included it. Where they did not find a way to include it they classified it as “who hits with a hammer.” The sons of the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya worked on this Chapter for six months. They produced six derivatives for each single one. The sons of the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya follow the method of their father, as Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “One who cuts grain, harvests grapes, harvests olives, cuts tree branches, tears out, plucks fruits, are all [liable] because of harvesting.” Rebbi Sidor said, Jehudah the son of the rabbi studied Makhširin for six months. In the end there came a student of Rebbi Simai and asked him, but he could not answer. He said, it is recognizable that this one never passed by the gate of the Torah. “The categories of work are 39.” For which purpose? For if he did all of them in one oblivion he is liable only once. Rebbi Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting, he is guilty for each action separately. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands and were broken. He is guilty only once! {Before he broke it in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke it in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Zeˋira: Should he not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: Do not perform any work, principle. Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places, a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which one alone is guilty. Also here: Do not worship them, a principle. Do not prostrate yourself, a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the action of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which one alone is guilty. He answered: For the Sabbath, He mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail. He retorted: Is it not written: Do not prostrate yourself before another power? He who sacrifices to Elohim shall be banned. He mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place! He said, since you do [not] infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He gave the general principle regarding its worship but detailed the works of Heaven. Rebbi Mana said, lighting fire was mentioned unnecessarily; prostrating oneself was mentioned by necessity to explain about itself since it is not work. This follows what Ḥizqiah stated: He who sacrifices to powers shall be banned. Sacrificing was mentioned separately to teach about everything, prostrating oneself to explain about itself since it is not work. Rebbi Jeremiah said, lighting fire was mentioned by necessity, to teach that courts should not sit on the Sabbath. What is the reason? It says here, in all your settlements, and it says there, these . . should be rules of law for your generations, in all your settlements. Since “settlements” mentioned there refers to courts, “settlements” referred to here also refers to courts. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, even if you say that it was mentioned separately necessarily is as if it was mentioned separately not by necessity, and any item mentioned separately unnecessarily instructs. This implies that one item which was mentioned separately by necessity does not divide. If it was mentioned not by necessity it divides. If two items were mentioned separately, do they divide? Let us hear from the following: From where that he transgresses a prohibition whoever brings to the altar meat of a purification offering, or meat of a reparation offering, or meat of most holy offerings, or meat from simply holy offerings, or the remainder of the ˋOmer or the Two Breads, or the Shew Bread, or remainders of cereal offerings, or leaven, or date honey? The verse says, for any leaven or any date honey you may not turn into smoke as a fire gift to the Eternal. Therefore anything that had been given to the fire is under “do not turn into smoke”. Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan. Should not the Two Breads, being mentioned separately, teach about all sancta on the ramp? He told him, it follows what was stated, the altar, this means not only the altar, from where to include the ramp? The verse says, on the altar they shall not be lifted. I could think neither as an act of worship nor as act of worship. The verse says, as aroma smell, I was saying this only as an act of worship. (He retorted,) them is a restriction. For these one is liable on the ramp, for all other sancta one is not liable on the ramp. Because it is written them. If them had not been written, it would instruct. That means, two items which were mentioned separately do (not) separate. Rebbi Ḥananiah the son of Rebbi Hillel said, they do not separate, therefore they instruct. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun does not say so but Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan, should not the Two Breads, being mentioned separately, teach about all sancta on the ramp? He said to him, them is a restriction. For these one is liable on the ramp, for all other sancta one is not liable on the ramp. This implies that a single item which is mentioned separately necessarily does not divide, but unnecessarily it divides. Two items which are mentioned separately do not divide but according to Rebbi Ismael they do divide, as Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, the words of Rebbi Ismael are that two items which are mentioned separately divide. As Rebbi Ismael stated, you shall neither divine nor cast spells. Were not divining and spellbinding included in the general class? The were mentioned separately to be treated differently from the general case. In general by extirpation, the separate case by extirpation; the word of Rebbi Joḥanan implies that it is “general case and detail”, as Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, since anybody who would perform any of these abomination s, they will be extirpated. Was not his sister included in the general class and was mentioned separately of the general class to divide from the general class. Rebbi Eleazar objected, is it not written, the nakedness of your mother’s sister and your father’s sister you shall not uncover, for he would touch his relative? He told him, this was mentioned separately for a reason, to judge by “touching”. He said to him, is it not written, a man who would lie with an unwell woman, uncover her nakedness and touch her source? He told him, this was mentioned separately for a reason, to judge the one “touching” as finishing. That you should not say, since he is liable for her [already] for impurity we should not consider for him “touching” as finishing. Therefore it was necessary to mention (that he is liable for each single one.) He said to him, is it not written, a man who would sleep with his aunt, his uncle’s nakedness he uncovered? He told him, this was mentioned separately to judge by childlessness. But is it not written, a man who would marry his brother’s wife, she is separated? He told him, this was mentioned separately to judge by childlessness, as Rebbi Yudan said, where it is written childless they shall be, they will be without children, childless they shall die, they bury their children. Rebbi Yose said, it was necessary that his aunt be mentioned separately, to exclude his maternal brother’s wife. It is said here his aunt, and it is said there, either his uncle or his uncle’s son shall free him. Since by his uncle mentioned there, the verse understands his father’s paternal brother, also by his aunt mentioned here, the verse speaks of his father’s paternal sister. Also his brother’s wife can be inferred from his aunt. Since by his aunt mentioned there, the verse speaks of his father’s paternal brother’s wife, also by his brother’s wife mentioned here, the verse speaks of his paternal brother’s wife. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? As Rebbi Ismael stated: It is said here his brother’s wife and it is said there, a man who would take his brother’s wife, she is niddah. Since a menstruating woman will be permitted after being forbidden, also his paternal brother’s wife may be permitted after being forbidden. This excludes his maternal brother’s wife, who cannot be permitted after being forbidden. But Rebbi Ismael himself had a problem: from where does one prove it? Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Two prohibitions and one extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation. What is the reason? It should not be used to be rubbed on anybody’s skin and in its proportions you shall not imitate it, and it is written, a person who would compound similarly, or who would put it on a stranger, will be extirpated from his people, that is two prohibitions and one extirpation. The prohibitions split the extirpation. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? The verse speaks about males. His sister is mentioned to teach about all females. Does Rebbi Eleazar not accept this? He has it from do not come near, equally male or female. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? He explains it but it is not clear, so also from the following: Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Zeˋira, should not well-being sacrifices, being treated separately, split all sancta regarding impurity? He told him, it was necessary that they be treated separately, to eliminate sancta dedicated for the upkeep of the Temple regarding larceny, lest one be liable for them because of mushiness, leftovers, and impurity. But is that not a Mishnah? “All sancta destined for the altar combine with one another with respect to liability for mushiness, leftovers, and impurity,” in contrast to sancta destined for the upkeep of the Temple. Since they do not combine, they do split. Rebbi Ḥanina said, so it is. They split but do not combine. If He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as a prohibition, the word of Rebbi Eleazar is that this is a general principle followed by a detail. Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. What is Rebbi Eleazar’s reason? The Land shall keep a Sabbath for the Eternal, a general principle. Your field you shall not sow, your vineyard you shall not prune, detail. Sowing and pruning were included in the general case; why were they mentioned separately? To include with them; since sowing and pruning are particular in that they perform work on the soil or on a tree, I have only what is work on the soil or on a tree. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? They are two different things, and two different details for one general principle do divide. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion do they not divide? He holds that because they do not divide, they are for making inferences. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, are they not for making inferences? There is a difference here because He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as prohibitions. No positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. Rebbi Eleazar said, a positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition but no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion it is obvious that one may dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion, may one dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it? Just as one cannot make inferences for prohibitions, so one should not be able to make inferences for permissions. Rebbi Abba from Carthage said, Rebbi Joḥanan’s reason is six years you shall sow, not in the Sabbatical; and six years you shall prune your vineyard, not in the Sabbatical at all. Any prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment; one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Yose said, there is not even a positive commandment. Rebbi Jeremiah said, one violates a positive commandment. Why is it written that the Land shall keep a Sabbath for the Eternal? That is for the prohibition implied by it. I could think that they should be giving lashes for the addition. Rebbi Joḥanan explains the baraita: I could think that one gives lashes for ploughing during the Sabbatical year, but Rebbi Eleazar explains the baraita: I could think that one gives lashes for the first two terms. Some Tannaïm state: Six years you shall sow your field, and six years you shall prune your vineyard; but some Tannaïm state: Your field you shall not sow, etc. He who says six years supports Rebbi Joḥanan; he who says your field you shall not sow supports Rebbi Eleazar. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar: Beware of, a prohibition. Lest, a prohibition. And it is written: There, you shall offer your elevation offerings and there you shall make. There, you shall offer, that is the offering; and there you shall make, that is slaughtering and sprinkling. Just as offering is a positive commandment and a prohibition, so slaughtering and sprinkling which are positive commandments should be covered by a prohibition. Because it is written there you shall offer, and there you shall make. Therefore, if there you shall offer, and there you shall make were not written, no positive commandment would allow inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition would allow inferences for a positive commandment. How does Rebbi Joḥanan handle this? That you should not say as you say referring to the Sabbath: If one dug a hole, made a ditch, or dug to put in a pole, he is guilty only of one offense. Similarly, if he slaughtered and offered, he should be guilty only of one offense; therefore, it was necessary to say, he is liable for every single action. Anywhere one stated categories there are derivatives. There, we have stated: “There are four categories of damages. The ox”, this is the horn. Goring and pushing are main categories. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If it bit, lay down, kicked, these are derivatives of the horn. There, we have stated: “The categories of impurity, the crawling animal and semen.” What are derivatives of crawling animals? Rebbi Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Naḥum: pushings. What are pushings? Touching. The main category of impurity makes everything impure, derivative impurity transmits impurity only to food and drink, or clay vessels. Food and drink and [clay] vessels cannot become main categories of impurity to transmit impurity. Gonorrhea. And here, we have stated: “The categories of work are 39.” Ploughing is a category. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If one dug a hole, made a ditch, or dug to put in a pole, these are derivatives of ploughing. All categories of work they learned from the Tabernacle. What kind of ploughing was in the Tabernacle? They ploughed to plant dyestuff. How much does one have to plough to become liable? Rebbi Mattaniah said, enough to plant a leek. Rebbi Aḥa bar Rav said, enough to plant a wheat sprout. There, we have stated: “Two green melon seeds make liable, two squash seeds, two Egyptian bean seeds.” It was stated, two Median wheat kernels. Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: Since wheat was so much appreciated they treated it like garden vegetables that are not eaten. For everything which improves the soil one is liable because of ploughing: One who digs, who cuts, who inserts, who deposits dung, who hoes, who fertilizes, who sweeps, who sprinkles, who splits blocks, who clears forests, who sets fire to reed thickets or palm swamps, and following Rebbi Zeˋira a water canal prepares its banks for sowing, who removes stones, who builds terraces, who fills the rifts under olive trees, and who makes depressions for vines, and for anything which improves the soil one is liable because of ploughing. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He who cooks carcass meat on a holiday is not flogged, because the category of cooking is permitted on a holiday. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he is flogged, for the category of cooking is permitted only for food. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected to this [statement] by Rebbi Joḥanan. Then one who ploughs on a holiday should not be flogged since actions of the category of ploughing are permitted on a holiday. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ila: ordinary ploughing was not permitted. Rebbi Shammai said before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ila, this is Rebbi Simeon’s, for Rebbi Simeon said, only if he needs the essence of the matter. Rebbi Yose met Rebbi Aḥa. He said to him, did you say this? But did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, the words of Rebbi Meïr are that in 24 matters the House of Shammai are lenient and the House of Hillel restrictive, and this is one of them. Should we say 23? But Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon both said the same. But were we not of the opinion that Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon both said the same? Should we say, Rebbi Meïr, Rebbi Yose, and Rebbi Simeon all three said the same? But matters which are problematic for the rabbis are obvious for you; are those which are obvious for the rabbis [problematic for you]? If one harvested for grasses he is liable for harvesting but is not liable for improving the soil. There is only the problem if he harvested in order to improve the soil. Is he liable for harvesting and for improving the soil? Even if you say it follows Rebbi Simeon, but for the rabbis in any case he ploughed, in any case he harvested. Rebbi Mana said, the words of the rabbis support Rebbi Yose, for Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if one compressed a fish, if for its body he is not liable, but if to produce fish sauce he is liable. Even if you say that he said this following Rebbi Simeon, but for the rabbis in any case he compressed, in any case he produced fish sauce. For any activity which quickens a fruit to ripen one is liable because of sowing. One who plants, who sinks, who grafts, who prunes, who trains, who removes dead branches, who dirties, who removes leaves, who dusts, who smokes, who removes worms, who sprinkles with ashes, who oils, who waters, who drills holes, who makes houses, and for anything which quickens a fruit to ripen one is liable because of sowing. [Rebbi] Zeˋira, Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Cahana: He who is planting on the Sabbath is guilty because of sowing. Rebbi Zeˋira said, he who prunes is like one who plants. If he planted and pruned on the Sabbath, according to Cahana he is guilty on two counts, according to Rebbi Zeˋira only on one count. Did not Rebbi Zeˋira say the pruner is like the planter, did he say perhaps the planter is like the pruner? All was included in the category of sowing; pruning was singled out for particular stringency. Because pruning was singled out for particular stringency you want to exempt it because of sowing? This means, there is no difference. If he planted and pruned on the Sabbath, according to both Cahana and Rebbi Zeˋira he is guilty on two counts. “And who harvests.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “One who cuts grain, harvests grapes, harvests olives, cuts tree branches, tears out, plucks fruits, are all because of harvesting.” One who cuts sponge, papyrus, or corals is liable for harvesting and planting. One who cuts coriander, leeks, celery, rocket, endives, sesame, mint, is liable for harvesting and sowing. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, one who puts a flowerpot with a hole on a flowerpot with a hole is liable for harvesting and sowing. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, one who cuts down the stem of a sycamore is liable three for it. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, they do not disagree. One who cuts it is liable for harvesting and for sowing. One who planes it is liable for hitting with a hammer. The rabbis of Caesarea say, one who catches a fish or anything by which he separates it from the environment it needs to live is liable because of harvesting. “He who binds into sheaves.” Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai asked, what are the derivatives of binding into sheaves? Rebbi Yose: I heard the reason following Rebbi Simeon from Rebbi Aḥa, but I do not remember what I heard. What about it? One who pounds rice, barley, groats, is liable because of threshing. He who spreads out ṣeli figs, raisins, מסוסלה, bucellata, is liable because of binding into sheaves. For anything involving food one is liable because of binding into sheaves, involving shells because of threshing. A woman if she mixes wheat, because she is sifting; if she breaks the tips, because she is threshing; if she breaks the sides, because she is selecting; if she hits, because she is grinding; if she sifts, because she is winnowing; if she completes her work, because she is hitting with a hammer. This linen weaver with a mallet because of threshing; with a roller because of grinding; with a winnowing shovel because of winnowing; with a spoon because of selecting; if he splits because of using a hatchet; if he tears out because of cutting; if he completes his work, because he is hitting with a hammer. One who is grinding garlic, if he breaks the tips, because he is threshing; if he takes the outer leaves, because he is selecting; if he pounds in a mortar, because he is grinding; if it produces liquid, because of making dough; if he completes his work, because he is hitting with a hammer. This sausage maker, if he selects shavings for casings, because of selecting; if he hacks with a coarse file, because of threshing, if he pounds in a mortar, because he is grinding; if it produces liquid, because of making dough; if he fills a hollow, because of building; if he cuts off bast, because of cutting; if he completes his work, because he is hitting with a hammer. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if one compressed fish, if for their body he is not liable, but to produce fish sauce he is liable. Rav said, if one compressed pickles, if for their body it is permitted, for their fluid it is forbidden. Preserves both for their body or their fluid is forbidden. Samuel said, both for pickles and for preserves, both for their body or their fluid it is forbidden. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the statement of Rav disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan. Rebbi Mana asked him, why? Because one said forbidden and permitted but the other said liable and not liable. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, if one crushed an onion, if it was to give taste it is forbidden, if to reduce its sharpness it is permitted. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Huna: One may hide a radish in salt on condition not to leave it there. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Huna: [If there came] his clothes from the tailor he may wear them; if they tore they tore. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Huna: If his garments were entangled with thorns he straightens them out in a guarded place on condition that he not tear. Rebbi Zeˋira said in the name of Rav Huna: If (he took) mortar [fell] on his garments he may rub it off with one hand, on condition that he not grind down. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Huna: mint, one is permitted, three is forbidden, two is questionable. One who bathes, Rav Huna and Rav Jehudah. One said, so it is permitted and so it is forbidden. But the other one said, so and so it is forbidden. Rebbi Abba bar Zamina went bathing with Rebbi Zeˋira; he did not let him do either one or the other. If water fell on his garments. Rav Huna and Rav Jeremiah. One said, to shake it off is permitted, to rub it off is forbidden; but the other one switches. Rebbi Abba (bar) Ḥiyya bar Ashi, one who spits absorbs it in his garment and does not worry. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi, the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi disagreed. One said, one spits and crushes; the other said, one does not spit and crush. Where do they differ? If it is not on a mosaic floor. But if there is a mosaic floor he spits and crushes. If he spat and the wind carried it away he is liable because of winnowing; and for anything which is diminished by the wind one is liable because of winnowing. “And who selects.” Rebbi Yudan said, one picks out pebbles the entire day and does not incur liability, and one takes the volume of a dried fig and immediately incurs liability. How is this? If he was sitting on top of a heap of grain and picks out pebbles the entire day, he does not incur liability; if he took in his hand the volume of a dried fig and picked out he is liable. Rebbi Jonah asked, if he did this on the Sabbath, in the opinion of the House of Shammai would he be liable? Rebbi Yose said to him, why not? If he did it on the Sabbath would he not be liable according to the House of Hillel? And here he is liable. Rebbi Mana said, my father Rebbi Jonah said it correctly. It is a problem only for the House of Shammai. Why? Because the category of selecting was permitted on the holiday, nothing of the category of selecting was permitted on the Sabbath. If one selected food out of food, Ḥizqiah said, one is liable; Rebbi Joḥanan said, one is not liable. A baraita disagrees with Ḥizqiah: He selects and eats, he selects and puts on the table. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: explain it if guests were eating what was served. But was it not stated: On condition that he did not select all of its kind? In the opinion of Ḥizqiah, because one who selects (normally) on the Sabbath is liable. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, because one who selects normally at (one) [another] place is liable. In the opinion of Ḥizqiah, even rings among rings, even pomegranates among pomegranates. Or is it so, even people among people? How is this? Everybody agrees with that of Rebbi Immi. For Rebbi Immi had guests; he brought before them lupines and beans. He told them, be careful to eat (the wood-chips)(the sticks) [the artichokes] at the end. It was stated: One does neither select, nor grind, nor sift. He who selects, or grinds, or sifts, on the Sabbath is stoned. On a holiday he absorbs the 40. But did we not state: “he selects normally, on his chest, or from a pot”? Rebbi Ḥanina from Antonia said, this is Rabban Gamliel’s, for “Rabban Gamliel says, also he puts them in water and scoops off.” And (did we not state) [was it not stated], in the household of Rabban Gamliel they were grinding pepper in their mills? It is permitted to grind but forbidden to select. Rebbi Yose (in the name of Rebbi Ila) [ben Rebbi Abun]: Grinding as a category was not permitted. And from where that one may neither select, nor grind, nor sift? Rebbi (Yose) [Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: No work shall be done on them up to and you shall guard the unleavened bread. (It was stated.) Rebbi Yose asked, but did one not infer cooking only from there? Rebbi Yose did not say so, but Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Only what can be eaten by every person this alone may be made by you, up to and you shall guard the unleavened bread. Ḥizqiah stated in disagreement: only, every, person, are diminutions, not to select, nor to grind, nor to sift on a holiday. Rebbi Zeˋira, Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Samuel: One who filters is liable because of selecting. Rebbi Zeˋira said, it is more reasonable that it should be because of sifting. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both said, at the start we were saying that Rebbi Zeˋira said it correctly, since as in sifting the flour is below and the farina on top, so in filtering wine the wine as at the bottom and the yeast on top; but we were not saying anything. Why? Because the category of selecting was permitted, the category of filtering was permitted. The category of selecting was permitted: “he selects normally, on his chest, or from a pot”. Also the category of filtering was permitted, “on a holiday one puts into one which was hanging”. But the category of sifting was not permitted. As Rebbi Ḥanina ben Yaqe said in the name of Rav Jehudah, One does not re-sift the flour but one may pass it through the back of the sieve. If you say it is because of sifting, it should be forbidden. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it does not follow Rebbi Jehudah, for it was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, (in truth) [also] preparations for making food they permitted. There is a question about the following: following the rabbis, may one re-sift the flour through the back of the sieve? “And who grinds.” He who pulverizes salt, clay shards, peppers, is liable because of grinding. He who cuts into little pieces chalk, gypsum, chaff, sand, dirt, is liable because of sifting. He who kneads chalk, gypsum, dust, eye-salve, plaster, drugs, is liable because of making dough. One who makes dough, or kneads dough, or forms dough, all are because of making dough. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked, there you say, “and he is liable for making its dough, and for its forming, and for its baking,” and here you are saying so? But there he has to divide for he is liable for each single one, but here he is liable only once. You see that baking is a derivative of cooking, and you are saying so? But it was stated here since we are stating the order of the dough. He who burns potter’s clay, softens glass, melts pitch, melts מוסרין. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: One who melts down lead is liable because of cooking. One who roasts, or who fries, who preserves by cooking, or by smoking, all these because of cooking. If somebody cooked in the hot springs of Tiberias, what? Ḥizqiah said, it is forbidden; Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is permitted. Rebbi Mana said, I went to Caesarea and heard Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Ḥizqiah; for Ḥizqiah it was a problem: what if the Passover sacrifice was cooked in the hot springs of Tiberias? Two Amoraim, one said, it is forbidden; the other said, it is permitted. He who said, it is forbidden, do not eat from it raw, nor cooked in water. But he who said, it is permitted, but only roasted in fire, its head with its feet and its innards. All these measures, if for food, in the volume of a dried fig, if for an animal, the mouthful of a kid goat, if to cook, to cook a quick egg, [ ], if to weave, the length of a double siṭ, if to spin, the width of a double siṭ. “He who shears wool.” If he shore without specification, what? Let us hear from the following: If one brought out ink, if it was in a reed, in order to write two letters, if to correct, enough to correct one letter. There, we have stated: “He who slaughters the firstling makes space for the dagger on both sides and tears out the hair, but he should not move it from its place. Similarly, he who tears out hair to see a defect.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: One who tears out hair from a dedicated animal is not liable. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follows his own opinion, as they disagreed: If one tears out hair from a dedicated animal, Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is liable; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he is not liable. Rebbi Jeremiah asked, is not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s reasoning inverted? Since they disagreed. “One who tears out a wing of a bird, who plucks it, and who cuts it is liable under three [categories].” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, they do not disagree. He who tears out is liable because of shearing; he who plucks out is liable because of wiping clean; he who cuts it is liable because of hitting with a hammer. But it cannot be compared; for a bird which has no shearing, tearing out is its shearing. But here he is not liable unless he sheared. You should know that this is so since it was stated: If he tore from a dead animal he is liable since tearing is its shearing. “Who bleaches it.” He who impregnates wood for vessels and ropes for a windlass. This woman who painted her face red and painted her spindle red. This tailor who took a thread into his mouth. Rav Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: Asbestos is liable because of bleaching. “Who cards it.” He who cards date palm fiber, papyrus, is liable because of carding. “Who dyes it.” What kind of dying was in the Tabernacle? They were clobbering an animal for red skins of rams. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that he is liable who causes a wound which results in echymosis. He who colors his lips red is liable. He who causes bleeding, because of taking away life force at that place. He who makes a shape, the first one is liable because of writing and the second one because of dying. If he left out a limb and another came and finished it, he is liable because of hitting with a hammer. Wringing and washing are the same category of work. It was stated: Rebbi Ismael the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa says, the dyers in Jerusalem made wringing a separate category of work. In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa, there are 40 categories of work. Should we state this? We come to state only items to which everybody agrees. One who makes ropes. The one who twines them is liable because of spinning. One who makes basket work of reeds, sieves, bast mats, is liable because of weaving. A woman when she prepares the loom, because of preparing. When she fastens the web, because of tying threads. When she erects [the loom], because of building. When she hits, because of weaving. When she cuts the threads, because of cutting. When she finishes her work, because of hitting with a hammer. One who makes boxes, when he starts, because of preparing. When he tailors, because of sewing. When he bends, because of building. When he cuts, because of cutting. When he finishes his work, because of hitting with a hammer. One who makes bed-sheets, lengthwise because of preparing, crosswise because of weaving. Grating, because of tying threads. When he cuts, because of cutting. When he finishes his work, because of hitting with a hammer. There are two warp threads per peg and two pegs for each warp thread. “He who weaves two rows, who hits two threads, who ties, and who unties.” What tying was in the Tabernacle? They were tying down the ropes. But was this not temporarily? Rebbi Yose says, because they were camping and travelling by the Word, was it like temporarily? Rebbi Yose [ben Rebbi Abun] said, since the Holy One, praise to Him, has promised them that he will bring them into the Land, it is as if it were (temporary) [permanent]. Rebbi Phineas said, they learned it from the gobelin sewers. If [a thread] broke, he was tying it. If it broke again, it was impossible to make many knots but he would untie the first one. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, an expert tailor merges the two heads. And where was this said? As Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina said, they learned it from the weavers of the gobelins. What is the reason? The length of one gobelin, that it should be an entity. If [a thread] broke, he was tying it. When he came to the weave, he untied it and brought it in. Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of (Rav) [Rebbi] Ḥuna: Even on its warp there was neither knot nor connection. Rebbi Hoshaia stated, a basket of palm leaves for dates or a plate of palm leaves one may tear and open, only one may not tie. Is this not untying? It is like one who breaks an amphora to eat dried figs. The handles of a double sack one may tie and untie. It is as if one opened or locked on the Sabbath. Rebbi Ḥanina said, not until it comes down an entire side. Rebbi Yannai said, say to Rebbi Ḥanina, get out and read! Did we not state, “if the two ends appear on the same side”? That means, only if it goes up and down and up. And did we not state, “Rebbi Jehudah says, only if there are three needle stitches”? That means that [the thread] goes down, and up, and down. But so and so. A thread drawn through by means of a needle, even if it has a knot on each side, is no connection for cloth. The thread is a connection for cloth but not for the needle. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, only if it is knotted on both sides. The words of the rabbis disagree since Rebbi Abba, Rav Jeremiah said in the name of Rav: He who straightens out the sides on the Sabbath is liable because of sewing. He should have said, because of sewing and tying knots. Tearing applies to textiles and cutting to hides. Tearing in the middle and cutting from the sides. There are some who switch, tearing of hides and cutting of textiles. Tearing of hides, those soft ones, and cutting of textiles, felt. 3. One who catches a purple snail and crushes it. There are Tannaïm who state that he is liable twice. There are Tannaïm who state that he is liable only once. He who says twice, one because of catching and one because of depriving of life. But he who says once, this is because of depriving of life. Does he not have catching? It comes like what Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Meïr said: The Holy One, praise to Him, created for Moses in the desert a kind of pure animal. After the work of the Tabernacle had been finished it was hidden. Rebbi Abun said, its name was qereš. Rebbi Hoshaia stated, a unicorn. It is preferable to the Eternal to a cattle ox which sprouts a horn and has split hooves. It is written, it sprouts a horn. “Who slaughters it.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there is no slaughter here; slaughter is a derivative of wounding. And why was it (not) stated with it? Only because we stated the proceedings of a meal it was stated with it. “Who tans it.” What tanning was for the Tabernacle? They were drafting on them. What were they drafting on them? They were drawing lines with a ruler. It follows that what Rebbi Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Abbahu, it is permitted to make tents from the hide of an impure animal. “Who rubs it clean.” What kind of erasure was in the tabernacle? Zeˋir bar Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: They were rubbing the hide on a pillar. One who rubbed hide clear on a pillar is liable. For what is he liable? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Levi, Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Levi, because of rubbing clean. That is, if it is new. But if it be old, it is the disagreement between Rebbi Eliezer and the Sages. Since they disagreed: “One who sweeps, who sprinkles, who makes cheese, who makes butter, who milks, and who takes down honeycombs, is liable for a purification sacrifice. But the Sages say, it is because of Sabbath rest.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, they do not disagree. He who sweeps, who sprinkles, is liable because of threshing. He who makes cheese, who makes butter, is liable because of kneading. He who milks, and who takes down honeycombs, is liable because of harvesting. He who squeezes budding olives is liable because of harvesting. Who needs this? Rebbi Eliezer. He who files off heads of poles is liable because of cutting. He who applies salve on a wet bandage is liable because of rubbing clean. “If one erased a big letter where there is space to write in its stead two letters, he is liable. If he wrote one large letter even though there is space to write in its stead two letters, he is not liable. Rebbi Menaḥem ben Rabbi Yose says, this is more serious about him who erases than about him who writes that he who erases in order to correct is liable but he who writes in order to spoil is not liable.” It may happen that one writes a single dot and is liable for it because of writing and because of erasing; it may happen that one erases a single dot and is liable for it because of writing and because of erasing. How is this? If it was a ד and he makes it ר ,ר and he makes it ד; he is liable because of writing and because of erasing. 4. What building was at the Sanctuary? They were putting the planks on top of the bases. But was this not temporary? Rebbi Yose says, because they were camping and travelling by the Word, it was as though permanent. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, since the Holy One, praise to Him, has promised them that He will bring them into the Land, it is as if it were permanent. This implies, a temporary building is a building. This implies, even from the side. This implies even if was put on top of something else. Does it imply that building on implements is building? The bases are like soil. It was stated: “If one brings the stone and another one the mortar, he who brings the mortar is liable. Rebbi Yose says, both are liable.” Rebbi Yose is of the opinion that stone without mortar is building. Everybody agrees that if one put up mortar first and someone then brought stone that he is liable. “The builder who set the stone on top of the row is liable.” For whom is this needed? For the rabbis. One who put up planks and one who put up adobe walls is liable because of building. “And who tears down,” but only for a need. Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: he who braids a palm-leaf basket is liable because of building. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: he who blows a glass vessel is liable because of building. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: There are things which are close but far away; and there are things which are far away but close. He who braids a palm-leaf basket, and he who blows a glass vessel, and he who makes a vessel in a form, all are because of building. He who selects, who filters, and who sifts, all because of removing waste. Each of them is separately liable. And why was handing over not stated with them? Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Because of the disagreement of Rebbi Aqiba and the Sages. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Jehudah ben Levi, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi in the name of Rebbi: In addition, there is handing over. And why was it not stated with them? All categories of work involve one, and this one two. All categories of work have derivatives, but this has no derivative.

The Gemara further analyzes the list of women exempt from levirate marriage. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The rival wife of a sota is forbidden. In this context, sota refers to an unfaithful wife. If the husband died, the unfaithful wife and her rival wife are exempt from both ḥalitza and levirate marriage. What is the reason for this? The term defilement is written in that passage dealing with an unfaithful wife: “She being defiled secretly” (Numbers 5:13), just as defilement is written with regard to those with whom relations are forbidden in the verse: “Defile not yourselves in any of these things, for in all these the nations are defiled, which I cast out from before you” (Leviticus 18:24). This teaches that the halakha of an unfaithful wife is like that of a woman with whom relations are forbidden; both she and her rival wife are exempt from levirate marriage and ḥalitza.

When a woman willingly commits adultery while married to her husband, and [her act is observed by] witnesses [he is required to divorce her]. If he died [childless] before he divorced her, and she fell before a yavam, she is not obligated to perform chalitzah or yibbum. Moreover, [her deceased husband's] other wives are also [not obligated to perform chalitzah or yibbum], as if she were forbidden to the yavam as an ervah. For just as impurity is mentioned with regard to the arayot, so too, that term is mentioned with regard to such a woman, as [Numbers 5:13] states: "And she became impure."
When, however, the husband of a sotah dies [childless] before he has caused her to her drink the bitter waters, or if the woman must be divorced instead of drinking the bitter waters, she should perform chalitzah, but not yibbum. Similarly, if [her deceased husband] had another wife, that woman is permitted [to the yavam] and may perform chalitzah or yibbum.

עד אחד נאמן באיסורין—One witness is believed concerning prohibitive acts.

OVERVIEW
An עד אחד is believed to testify on matters of איסור והיתר. He can testify that this piece of meat is כשר and not נבילה, or whether this מקוה has the proper שיעור or not, etc. There is a qualification to this rule. If there is a חזקת איסור, then (it is questionable if) an ע"א is [not] believed to contradict the חזקת איסור. Were he to testify regarding a woman, whom we know that she was married, that she is now divorced, we may not accept his testimony. This qualification itself is subsequently qualified. An ע"א can be believed even when he contradicts a חזקת איסור, if he is capable of rectifying and removing the איסור. He can say that he was מפריש תרומה from this grain, even though there is a חזקת איסור טבל on it, nevertheless he is believed to say that he was מפריש תרומה since it is בידו to be מפריש תרומה. In regards to a שליח הגט who says בפ"נ that it was written לשמה, this seems to be the regular case of ע"א נאמן באיסורין, where there is no איתחזק איסורא – we do not assume the גט was written שלא לשמה, and it is not בידו of the שליח\עד to write the גט לשמה.
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פירוש הקונטרס שהרי האמינה התורה כל אחד ואחד –
רש"י explains; where do we see that ע"א נאמן באיסורין for the תורה believes every individual –
על הפרשת תרומה ושחיטה וניקור הגיד וחלב –
Concerning separating תרומה, ritual slaughtering of an animal, removal of forbidden sinews (גיד הנשה) and veins, and forbidden fats of an animal. A person, who is invited to a friend’s house to eat, may do so on the say so of the host that the food is kosher, and none of the abovementioned items presents any problem. Even though there are no two witnesses that the host was מפריש תרומה or the meat was נשחט properly etc. We believe the testimony of the single host. This proves that ע"א נאמן באיסורין.
תוספות comments on sרש"י' explanation:
ולא היה לו להזכיר הפרשת תרומה ושחיטה דבהנהו נאמן אף על גב דאיתחזק איסורא –
However, רש"י should not have mentioned תרומה ושחיטה among the items he listed to prove ע"א נאמן באיסורין, for in these two items he is believed even though there is a חזקת איסור originally on the food. This is highly unusual that an ע"א should be believed when איתחזק איסורא. Therefore we must say the reason why an ע"א is נאמן by תרומה ושחיטה even though that it is איתחזק איסורא, is –
משום דבידו לתקנם –
Because the ע"א has the capability to correct this איסור, by being מפריש תרומה and being שוחט the בהמה –
כמו שפירש הקונטרס בסמוך והכי אמר בהאשה רבה (יבמות פח,א) –
as רש"י will shortly comment. And similarly this is said in פרק האשה רבה. Therefore, this type of ע"א נאמן באיסורין where it is בידו לתקנם has no bearing on our case of the שליח testifying that it was written לשמה, where he does not have any capability at all to change the לשמה status of the גט.
תוספות challenges his own assumption that שחיטה is בידו לתקן:
ושחיטה אף על גב דהשתא אין בידו לתקנו –
and concerning שחיטה, which תוספות claimed that רש"י should not have included it since it is בידו, תוספות asks, even though that presently, when he is serving the meat, he is no longer capable to correct the problem of נבילה, so why is he נאמן, since it is איתחזק איסורא?
תוספות answers, that nevertheless since –
מעיקרא היה בידו לשחוט –
Originally he was capable of שחיטה (either by himself or arranging for someone else to be שוחט), that is sufficient to be considered בידו לתקנו. תוספות offers proof for his contention –
דאם לא כן אמאי מהימן כיון דאיתחזק איסורא –
For if you will not agree that this is considered בידו, but rather insist that it must be בידו now, then why indeed is anyone solely believed that this is בשר שחוטה, since it was איתחזק איסורא. One cannot say that indeed the only way that one is permitted to eat meat is only if two people will testify that it was נשחט properly –
דלא מצינו בשום מקום שיצטרך בגדול אחד עומד על גביו –
For we do not find it mentioned anywhere that there is a requirement that another adult should be standing together with the שוחט, so that we can have two witnesses testifying that it is בשר שחוטה. Therefore that proves that we do not require that it be בידו now, rather it is sufficient that originally it was בידו.
תוספות continues to prove his point, indicating a possible rebuttal to this logic:
One may challenge תוספות proof by saying that the נאמנות of בידו is only if it is בידו now, and not if it was only previously בידו, and the reason why we may eat on the testimony of the שוחט, is because there is a רוב (a ‘majority) that tells us it was נשחט properly, namely that the רוב people that are שוחט are competent שוחטים. Therefore it has nothing to do with the נאמנות of an ע"א, but rather on account of רוב. תוספות responds that this is not so, for there is a נאמנות of an ע"א by שחיטה even when we cannot utilize this רוב –
ומעשים בכל יום דמהימן –
And it is an everyday occurrence that the שוחט alone is believed (on account that it was previously בידו).
ואף על גב דלא שייך רוב מצויין אצל שחיטה מומחין הן –
Even in a situation where this rule that ‘most people who frequent at places of שחיטה are competent שוחטים’ does not apply –
כגון שנחתך כל הראש ואין בית השחיטה ניכר –
If for instance the entire head was cut off and the place of שחיטה cannot be discerned, nevertheless if someone claims that he was שוחט it properly, he is believed. In this case we cannot say that the reason he is believed is because רוב מצויין אצל שחיטה מומחין הן; for we do not know that this animal was נשחט, since its head was severed and we cannot tell if it was נשחט or not. This proves that the only נאמנות is because he is an ע"א, and regardless that there was a חזקת איסור מחיים on this animal nevertheless he is now נאמן to say that it was נשחט properly, since previously it was בידו that he could be שוחט the animal properly.
תוספות asks an additional question:
ומה שאנו סומכין על הנשים בשחיטה אף על פי שאין יודעות הלכות שחיטה –
And the reason why we depend on women concerning שחיטה, i.e. if a woman serves meat we trust her that it is בשר שחוטה, even thoughthey do not know the laws of שחיטה, therefore seemingly it is not בידה, not now and not previously, for they do not know how to be שוחט. The question is how can we depend on them, for they are only an ע"א, and it is איתחזק איסורא?
תוספות replies:
כיון שבידה ללמוד לשחוט או להשכיר אחרים שישחטו לה כבידה דמי –
Since she is capable of learning how to be שוחט (the שחיטה of a woman is a שחיטה כשרה) or she is capable of hiring others (valid שוחטים) that they do the שחיטה for her, this is considered as if it is בידה. It is not necessary that the persons themselves do the שחיטה. If, for instance, (s)he can see to it that the food is prepared in a כשר manner it is considered בידו.
תוספות asks:
ואם תאמר ומנלן דעד אחד נאמן באיסורין –
And if you will say; from where do we derive this דין that ע"א נאמן באיסורין. We have proof that ע"א נאמן באיסורין from ניקור הגיד וחלב, however what is the source מן התורה that ע"א נאמן באיסורין.
תוספות answers:
ויש לומר דגמרינן מנדה דדרשינן בפרק המדיר (כתובות עב,א) וספרה לה לעצמה –
And one can say; that we derive it from הלכות נדה, for we have a דרשה in פרק המדיר that when the תורה states, concerning a זבה; ‘and she shall count for her(self)’ the דרשה of the word לה is to be understood, that she may count it by herself, and she will be believed to say that the required seven days have passed and she was טובלת and is טהורה. We see that we believe an ע"א, that she is טהורה.
תוספות poses a question:
ואם תאמר אם כן אפילו איתחזק איסורא –
And if you will say; if we are deriving the דין of ע"א נאמן באיסורין from נדה, then an ע"א should be believed even in a case where it is איתחזק איסורא. When the אשה sees דם she becomes a נדה (or זבה), and is בחזקת איסור, and nevertheless she is believed to say that she is טהורה against a חזקת איסור.
תוספות responds:
ויש לומר דאינה בחזקת שתהא רואה כל שעה –
And one can say; that there is no חזקה by this woman that she will continually see דם, on the contrary, she will see דם naturally only for a limited period and then cease seeing דם –
וכשעברה שבעה טהורה ממילא ולא איתחזק איסורא –
And once the seven days pass and she is not seeing דם, as is the natural state of affairs, that דם נדה does not last seven days, she becomes טהורה automatically and therefore there is no real חזקת איסור, as opposed to טבל for instance, where the איסור טבל will not go away on its own, only if you are מפריש תרו"מ, here however the איסור will automatically disappear in the allotted time when she will not see דם. Therefore when she says that her seven days of נדה have passed, she is not testifying against any חזקת איסור, for we expect the seven days to pass at one point or another; she is merely informing us that the time is now.
There is still a question remaining: After the seven days passed she is still בחזקת איסור נדה, since she was not טובלת. How can we believe her that she is completelyטהורה, against this חזקת איסור?! To which תוספות responds in his conclusion:
וגם בידה לטבול –
And concerning the completion of her טהרה – she is certainly capable of being טובלת in a מקוה, and as was stated earlier, that when it is בידו, then an ע"א is believed even against a חזקת איסור.

SUMMARY
The proof that ע"א נאמן באיסורין, in a situation similar to a שליח הגט who is testifying that it was written לשמה, can be derived from the fact that people are נאמן on ניקור הגיד and חלב. For in those two instances there is no חזקת איסור on this meat that it is either גיד הנשה or חלב. The fact that people are believed for הפרשת תרומה and שחיטה is irrelevant to our discussion here, since in both those cases there is a חזקת איסור, and the reason the ע"א is נאמן, is only because it is בידו. This cannot apply to our case of שליח הגט, where it is definitely not בידו to write the גט לשמה.
The נאמנות of בידו is not limited to a situation where it is only presently בידו; it applies even if it was בידו in the past. This explains why people are נאמן to state that this meat is שחוטה, since in the past they were capable of either themselves being שוחט the animal properly or hiring others to be שוחט properly.
We derive the rule of ע"א נאמן באיסורין, from the פסוק concerning a [זבה] (נדה), which says וספרה לה, that the woman can count by herself and tell us when she is a טהורה, we see from here that even one person is believed to testify that there is no איסור.
We cannot assume that since by a נדה she was בחזקת איסור once she saw דם, therefore the fact that she is believed to say she is a טהורה, proves that an ע"א is נאמן even against a חזקת איסור. This is incorrect for the חזקת איסור by a נדה is a חזקה that will automatically become nullified as soon as she ceases to see דם, which is the natural state of affairs, therefore her testimony that she is no longer seeing דם, is not contradicting any חזקה; and we subsequently believe her that she was טובל, even though she is still בחזקת איסור נדה (even after seven days), because in regards to טבילה, it is obviously בידה.

THINKING IT OVER
1. Why is בידו believed even if איתחזק איסורא? Is it because בידו removes the איתחזק איסורא, or because בידו is a special נאמנות?
2. How shall we explain the difference between the בידו of a שוחט in the past, to the בידה of a woman concerning שחיטה?
3. How can we derive ע"א נאמן באיסורין from נדה, perhaps by נדה she is believed because it is הפה שאסר הפה שהתיר (she had the option of not informing anyone that she is a נדה)?

But if you do this then you provide benefit. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the expression: If you do this you provide benefit? This means that if the husband comes to contest the validity of the bill of divorce, we pay no attention to him and his claim. As it is taught in the Tosefta (1:3): An incident occurred involving a man who brought a bill of divorce before Rabbi Yishmael, and said to him: Am I required to say: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence, or am I not required to state that declaration? Rabbi Yishmaelsaid to him: My son, where are you from? He said toRabbi Yishmael: My teacher, I am from the village of Sisai.Rabbi Yishmaelsaid to him: You are required to say: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence, so that you will not cause the woman to need to find witnesses if the husband contests its validity. After that man left, Rabbi Elai entered beforeRabbi Yishmael and said to him: My teacher, but isn’t the village of Sisai located within the boundary of Eretz Yisrael, and it is even closer to Tzippori, which is within the main portion of Eretz Yisrael, more so than Akko. And we learned in the mishna that Rabbi Meir says: Akko is like Eretz Yisrael with regard to bills of divorce. And even the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir only with regard to Akko, which is distant. However, with regard to the village of Sisai, which is close, no, they do not dispute the ruling of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yishmaelsaid toRabbi Elai: Be silent my son, be silent. Since the matter of her divorce was issued as permitted, it was issued, and her divorce is valid. This incident proves that the declaration: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence, is effective to the extent that the divorce is considered to have been performed in an entirely permitted manner, and the husband cannot contest its validity at a later stage. The Gemara asks: Why was it necessary for Rabbi Yishmael to explain the meaning of his ruling to Rabbi Elai? But after all, when he issued his ruling Rabbi Yishmaelalso stated his reason, as he said to the man: Do this so that you will not cause the woman to need to find witnesses. The Gemara answers: Those who were present did not concludeRabbi Yishmael’s statement beforeRabbi Elai. Rabbi Elai was unaware of Rabbi Yishmael’s reasoning, and therefore he questioned him. § The Gemara relates that Rabbi Evyatar sent a letter from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia to Rav Ḥisda in which he wrote the following: With regard to bills of divorce that come from there, Babylonia, to here,Eretz Yisrael, the agent is not required to say: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence. The Gemara asks: Shall we say that Rabbi Evyatarholds that the reason for the declaration: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence, is because they are not experts in writing a bill of divorce for her sake, and these residents of Babylonia are learned with regard to this issue? The Gemara challenges: And can you understand it in this way? After all, Rabba is of the opinion that the reason is also in accordance with the opinion of Rava, that the declaration serves to ratify the bill of divorce. Rather, everyone agrees that we require the declaration to ratify the document. But since there are many people who ascend to Eretz Yisraeland descend from there to Babylonia, witnesses are frequently available, and there is no reason to be concerned about the ratification of the bill of divorce. Rav Yosef said: Who will tell us that Rabbi Evyatar is a reliable authority? And furthermore, there is good reason to question his statement: He is the one who sent a letter to Rav Yehuda, and wrote: People who ascend from there, Babylonia, to here,Eretz Yisrael, fulfill by themselves the verse: “And they have given a boy for a prostitute, and sold a girl for wine, and have drunk” (Joel 4:3), i.e., these people abandon their families. AndRabbi Evyatarwrote him this verse without scoring, i.e., etching lines into, the parchment upon which he wrote the letter. And Rabbi Yitzḥak says with regard to the writing of a verse from the Torah: One may write two words without scoring the parchment, but one may not write three words without scoring the parchment. Instead, one scores the parchment before writing the verse, as one does when writing a Torah scroll. This ensures that the writing will be done on a straight line, thereby rendering it more beautiful. And it was taught in a baraita: One may write three, but one may not write four. Since Rabbi Evyatar wrote more than three words from a verse without scoring the parchment, his halakhic rulings are evidently unreliable. Abaye said to him: Is that to say that anyone who does not know thishalakhaof Rabbi Yitzḥak is not a great man? Granted, with regard to a matter that depends on reasoning, it is well, as it is possible to say that an individual who does not know a halakha that can be inferred by logical reasoning cannot be considered a reliable authority. However, thishalakhais a tradition, and it is possible that Rabbi Evyatar simply did not hear this tradition.And furthermore, Rabbi Evyatar is the one that his Master, the Holy One, Blessed be He, agreed with in his interpretation of a verse, as it is written with regard to the episode involving the concubine in Gibeah: “And his concubine went away from him” (Judges 19:2). The Sages discussed what occurred that caused her husband to become so angry with her that she left him, and Rabbi Evyatar says: He found her responsible for a fly in the food that she prepared for him, while Rabbi Yonatan says: He found her responsible for a hair [nima].And Rabbi Evyatar found Elijah the prophet and said to him: What is the Holy One, Blessed be He, doing now? Elijahsaid to him: He is currently engaged in studying the episode of the concubine in Gibeah.Rabbi Evyatar asked him: And what is He saying about it? Elijahsaid to him that God is saying the following: Evyatar, My son, says this and Yonatan, My son, says that. It is seen here that God saw fit to cite the statement of Rabbi Evyatar. Rabbi Evyatarsaid to him: God forbid, is there uncertainty before Heaven? Doesn’t God know what happened? Why does He mention both opinions? Elijahsaid to him: Both these and those are the words of the living God, i.e., both incidents happened. The incident occurred in the following manner: He found a fly in his food and did not take umbrage, and later he found a hair and took umbrage.Rav Yehuda says a different explanation: The man found a fly in the dish that she cooked for him, and he found a hair in that place, i.e., in her genital area. When he found a fly it produced a reaction of disgust, and he did not grow angry with her, but the hair was a matter of danger, as he might be hurt by it, and therefore he became angry with her. There are those who say: This and that were found in a dish. The difference is that the fly was a result of circumstances beyond her control, as it fell into the dish on its own, but the hair was found in the dish due to her negligence.Rav Ḥisda says: A person should never impose excessive fear upon the members of his household, as the husband of the concubine of Gibeah imposed excessive fear upon her and this ultimately caused the downfall of many tens of thousands of Jews in the resulting war (see Judges 19–20). Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Anyone who imposes excessive fear upon the members of his household will ultimately come to commit three sins: Engaging in forbidden sexual intercourse, as the wife will be so fearful of her husband that she will sometimes tell him that she has immersed in a ritual bath after her menstruation has ended when she has not done so; and he will also end up committing bloodshed, as she is likely to run away from him and expose herself to dangers; and desecration of Shabbat, as she will cook for him on Shabbat because she is scared that he will be angry with her for neglecting to do so beforehand. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said a halakha with regard to this statement that the Sages said: There are three matters a person must say in his home on Shabbat eve at nightfall. He should ask the members of his household: Have you tithed the produce that required tithing? Have you placed the eiruv for joining the courtyards? If you have already done so, light the lamp in honor of Shabbat. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that one must

a sleeping man has not acquired his yevama, as he did not intend to perform the act of intercourse at all? Rather, the mishna was referring to one who was inserted into his yevama by accident. But didn’t Rabba say: One who fell from a roof and was inserted into a woman due to the force of his fall is liable to pay four of the five types of indemnity that must be paid by one who damaged another: Injury, pain, medical costs, and loss of livelihood. However, he is not liable to pay for the shame he caused her, as he did not intend to perform the act, and if she is his yevama, he has not acquired her in this manner. Rather, it is a case where he intended to have intercourse with his wife and became erect, and his yevama forcefully grabbed hold of him and he had intercourse with her. The Gemara further asks: If so, what are the circumstances of the case when both of them were coerced that was mentioned by the school of Rabbi Ḥiyya? The Gemara answers: It is a case where he intended to have intercourse with his wife, and gentiles grabbed hold of him and pressed him and his yevamaagainst each other, and he thereby had intercourse with her.§ The Gemara inquires as to the source of these halakhot: From where are these matters derived? As the Sages taught with regard to the verse “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5), that this indicates that the act of intercourse in this circumstance is a mitzva, i.e., it is preferable to the alternative, which is ḥalitza. Alternatively, the verse “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her,” indicates that it does not matter how he had intercourse with her, whether unwittingly or intentionally, whether due to coercion or willingly.The Gemara asks: Didn’t you derive from this phrase that the act of intercourse in this case is a mitzva? How can the same phrase also indicate that it does not matter what the intentions of the two parties were during the act of intercourse? The Gemara answers: The fact that it is a mitzva is derived from the verse: “And if the man does not wish to take his yevama” (Deuteronomy 25:7), which indicates that if he wishes, he performs levirate marriage, which is preferable to ḥalitza. Therefore, when the verse cited above came, it indicated that levirate marriage has occurred whether the parties acted unwittingly or intentionally, whether due to coercion or willingly.It is taught in anotherbaraita that the phrase: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” indicates that levirate marriage has been performed if they engage in typical sexual intercourse. The next phrase, “and take her,” includes even atypical, i.e., anal, sexual intercourse. The concluding phrase of the verse, “and consummate the levirate marriage,” indicates that sexual intercourse completes her acquisition, but money and a marriage document do not complete her acquisition to him as his fully betrothed wife, in contrast to the regular halakhot of marriage. By emphasizing “and consummate the levirate marriage with her,” the verse teaches that he acquires her even if he acted against her will. Alternatively: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” indicates that levirate marriage has occurred whether the parties acted unwittingly or intentionally, whether due to coercion or willingly. The Gemara asks: Didn’t you derive from this phrase that levirate marriage has been performed if they engage in typical sexual intercourse? How can it also indicate that it does not matter what the intentions of the two parties were during the act of intercourse? The Gemara answers: Thathalakhais derived from a different verse: “To establish a name for his brother” (Deuteronomy 25:7), which indicates that intercourse must occur in the place where he establishes a name, i.e., where it can lead to childbirth. Therefore, when the verse cited above came, it indicated that levirate marriage has occurred whether the parties acted unwittingly or intentionally, whether due to coercion or willingly.§ The Gemara addresses the matter itself cited in the previous discussion. Rav Yehuda said: A sleeping man has not acquired his yevama, as the verse states: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5), which indicates that he does not acquire her unless he intends to act for the sake of sexual intercourse. Since a sleeping man does not intend to engage in sexual intercourse, he does not acquire his yevama. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it taught in a baraita that one acquires his yevama through sexual intercourse regardless of whether he was awake or asleep? The Gemara answers: Say the baraita in the following emended form: Whether she was awake or asleep. The woman’s awareness is not a necessary component in order to perform levirate marriage. The Gemara asks further: Wasn’t it taught in another baraita that one acquires his yevama through sexual intercourse regardless of whether he was awake or he was asleep and regardless of whether she was awake or she was asleep? The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here when the baraita says that a sleeping man acquires his yevama? It is referring to a man who is dozing. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of dozing? Rav Ashi said: One is asleep but not asleep, awake but not awake, when, if they call him, he will answer, but he is unable to provide a reasonable answer. And when they later inform him of what happened, he remembers it. The Gemara returns to the statement of Rabba cited earlier in order to discuss the matter itself that Rabba addressed. Rabba said: One who fell from a roof and was inserted into a woman due to the force of his fall is liable to pay four of the five types of indemnity that must be paid by one who damaged another, and if she is his yevama he has not acquired her in this manner. He is liable to pay for injury, pain, loss of livelihood, and medical costs. However, he is not liable to pay for the shame he caused her, as the Master said: One is not liable to pay for shame unless he intends to humiliate his victim. Consequently, one who fell from a roof accidentally is not liable to pay for the shame he caused the woman. Rava said: If he intended to press his sexual organ into a wall, and he accidentally pressed it into his yevama, he has not acquired her, as he did not intend to engage in an act of sexual intercourse. However, if he intended to press his sexual organ into an animal, and he pressed it into his yevama, he has acquired her, as he at least intended to act for the purpose of sexual intercourse in general, i.e., for some form of sexual intercourse. § We learned in the mishna that both one who merely begins the act of intercourse and one who completes it has acquired the yevama through this act. Ulla said: From where is it derived that the initial stage of intercourse is considered an act of sexual intercourse by Torah law? As it is stated: “And if a man shall lie with a woman having her sickness and shall uncover her nakedness, he has made naked [he’era] her fountain” (Leviticus 20:18). The verse is referring to the first stage of intercourse, and from here it is derived that the initial stage of intercourse [ha’ara’a] is considered sexual intercourse by Torah law.The Gemara asks: We have found a source for this halakha in the case of a menstruating woman, the subject of the verse cited above. From where is it derived that the initial stage of intercourse is considered sexual intercourse with regard to the rest of those with whom relations are forbidden? And if you say we should derive it from the halakha with regard to a menstruating woman, what comparison can be made to a menstruating woman, concerning whom the halakha is more stringent than others with whom relations are forbidden, in that she causes one who has intercourse with her to become ritually impure?Rather, the halakha in other cases comes from a verse about a brother’s wife, as it is written: “And if a man shall take his brother’s wife, it is impurity [nidda]” (Leviticus 20:21). The word nidda generally refers to a menstruating woman, and so the Gemara asks: Is his brother’s wife always menstruating? Rather, it means that the halakha with regard to her is like that of a menstruating woman: Just as one is liable to receive punishment for violating the prohibition against engaging in sexual intercourse with a menstruating woman through the initial stage of intercourse, so too, one is liable to receive punishment for violating the prohibition against engaging in sexual intercourse with a brother’s wife through the initial stage of intercourse.The Gemara asks: What comparison can be made between a brother’s wife and other women with whom relations are forbidden? The prohibition with regard to a brother’s wife is more stringent in that it is within his power to increase the number of women forbidden by this prohibition, as, if he wishes, he can go on betrothing a thousand women, all of whom would be forbidden to his brother. Consequently, the prohibition with regard to a brother’s wife cannot serve as a model for other prohibitions. Rather, the halakha in other cases comes from a verse with regard to a father’s sister and a mother’s sister, as it is written: “And you shall not uncover the nakedness of your mother’s sister nor of your father’s sister; for he has made naked [he’era] his kin” (Leviticus 20:19). The Gemara asks: It is possible to refute this source as follows: What comparison can be made between other women with whom relations are forbidden and a father’s sister and a mother’s sister, which are unique in that they are prohibited due to a prohibition that comes on its own? The prohibition with regard to a father’s sister and a mother’s sister does not stem from marriage, but from the biological fact that she is his father’s or mother’s sister. It is therefore dissimilar to prohibitions that result from marriage. The Gemara states: The principle that the initial stage of intercourse is considered sexual intercourse does not come from any one of the sources cited above. Let it come by deriving the halakha in any one other case from the common denominator of two of the sources mentioned above. The Gemara asks: From which two sources could this principle come to be derived? If you say it can come to be derived from the combination of the source with regard to a brother’s wife and the source with regard to a father’s sister and a mother’s sister, what comparison may be drawn from these cases, which are unique in that they are prohibited because they are kin?Rather, let it come from the prohibition proscribing a menstruating woman and the prohibition with regard to a father’s sister and a mother’s sister, as a menstruating woman is not prohibited as a family relative. The Gemara raises a difficulty: What comparison may be drawn from these cases, which are each a prohibition that comes of its own accord, as neither one is created through marriage? Rather, let it come from the prohibition proscribing a menstruating woman and the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife. As, what can you say to refute this teaching? These two cases do not share any unique features that might be cause for stringency. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, strongly objects to this: What comparison may be drawn based upon the precedent of a menstruating woman and a brother’s wife, which are stringent in that they cannot be permitted to others for the duration of the existence of the factor that renders them prohibited? A menstruating woman is forbidden as long as she experiences a flow of menstrual blood, while a brother’s wife is forbidden for the duration of the brother’s lifetime. Can you say the same with regard to a married woman, who can become permitted during the lifetime of the one who renders her prohibited, i.e., if her husband divorces her? Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: Is that to say that it is only during the existence of the factor that renders them prohibited that a menstruating woman and a brother’s wife cannot be permitted to others, but afterward, when the prohibiting factor has been resolved, they can be permitted? In the case of a menstruating woman,

The Gemara asks: If your interpretation above is correct, that a garment with confirmed leprosy can still transmit ritual impurity even though the object is to be burned and should be considered crushed, let us learn from this concerning a sandal that even after it has been definitively determined to have leprosy, it is still considered a shoe and should be eligible for ḥalitza, at least after the fact, in accordance with Rav Pappa’s opinion. The Gemara answers: We cannot derive a halakha of a prohibition from a halakha of ritual impurity, as these different areas of halakha cannot be compared. Therefore, although a garment with leprosy is considered intact with regard to the transmission of ritual impurity, that status cannot act as a source to teach that it is intact for the purpose of ruling that ḥalitza performed with a shoe with confirmed leprosy is valid.

49. The Rabbi: Impurity and holiness are contradictory ideas; one cannot be thought of without the other. Without holiness we should not know the signification of impurity. Impurity means that the approach to holy objects, hallowed by God, is forbidden to the person so affected. Such would be priests, their food, clothing, offering, sacrifices, the holy House, etc. In the same way the ideas of holiness include something which forbids the person connected with it to approach many ordinary objects. This chiefly depends on the vicinity of the Shekhinah, which we now lack entirely. The prohibition which still holds good, of cohabiting with a woman in her period or after confinement has nothing to do with impurity, but is an independent divine law. The practice we observe to keep aloof from them as much as possible is but a restriction and hedge to prevent cohabitation. The regulations of impurity proper ceased to exist for us, because we live in 'an unclean land and in unclean air,' especially as we move about among graves, vermin, lepers, persons affected with issue, corpses, etc. To touch carrion is not forbidden on account of its impurity, but it forms a special law connected with the prohibition of eating the same to which impurity is accessory. If Ezra had not ordained a bath for certain contaminated persons, this would not be a regulation but simply a matter of cleanliness. If these persons would conceive this regulation in the sense of cleanliness, it would lose nothing, as long as it is not taken for a religious law. Otherwise they might draw conclusions from their own folly, try to improve upon the law and cause heterodoxy, I mean the splitting of opinions, which is the beginning of the corruption of a religion. They would soon be outside the pale of 'one law and one regulation.' Whatever we might allow ourselves in matters of touching even repulsive things, is out of proportion to their (the Karaites) schismatic views, which might cause us to find in one house ten persons with as many different opinions. Were our laws not fixed and confined in unbreakable rules, they would not be secure from the intrusion of strange elements and the loss of some component parts, because argument and taste would become guiding principles. The Karaite would have no compunction in using the implements of idolatry, such as gold, silver, frankincense and wine. Indeed, death is better than this. On the other hand, he would abstain from using parts of the pig, even for purposes of medicine, although this is in reality one of the lighter transgressions, and only punished with 'forty stripes.' In the same way he would allow the Nazirite to eat raisins and grapes rather than be intoxicated with mead and cider. But the opposite is true. This prohibition only refers to the products of the vine, but there was no intention of prohibiting intoxication altogether, as one might surmise. This is one of the secrets known only to God, his prophets and the pious. One must not, however, charge traditionists or those who draw their own conclusions, with ignorance in this matter, because the word shēkhār is common property. They have a tradition that the 'wine and strong drink' (Leviticus 10:8), mentioned in connexion with the priests includes all kinds of intoxication, whilst the same words in the case of the Nazirite only refer to the juice of grapes. Every law has certain limits fixed with scientific accuracy, though in practice they may appear illogical. He who is zealous tries to avoid them, without, however, making them unlawful, as e.g. the flesh of an animal in peril of death, which is lawful. For it is uncertain whether this animal will die, because some one might assert that it will recover, and then be permitted. A diseased animal which externally looks in good health is unlawful, if it suffers internally from an incurable illness, with which it can neither live nor recover. Those who judge according to their own taste and reasoning may arrive in these matters at an opposite conclusion. Follow not, therefore, thy own taste and opinion in religious questions, lest they throw thee into doubts, which lead to heresy. Nor wilt thou be in harmony with one of thy friends on any point. Every individual has his own taste and opinion. It is only necessary to examine the roots of the traditional and written laws with the inferences codified for practice, in order to trace the branches back to the roots. Where they lead thee, there put thy faith, though thy mind and feeling shrink from it. Common view and assumption deny the non-existence of the vacuum, whilst logical conclusion rejects its existence. Appearance denies the infinite divisibility of a body, whilst logic makes it an axiom. Appearance denies that the earth is a globe and the one hundred and sixtieth part of the sun disc. There are also other matters which astronomy establishes against mere appearances. Whatever the Sages declared lawful they did neither in obedience to their own taste or inclination, but to the results of the inherited knowledge, handed down to them. The same was the case with what they declared unlawful. He who is unable to grasp their wisdom, but judges their speech according to his own conception, will misinterpret them in the same way as people do with the words of natural philosophers and astronomers. Whenever they settle the limits of the code, and explain what is lawful or unlawful in strictly juridical deduction, they indicate apparently unseemly points. They consider it revolting to eat the flesh of a dangerously sick animal, or to gain money by means of legal trickery, or to travel on the Sabbath with the assistance of the Erūb, or to render certain marriages lawful in a cunning manner, or to undo oaths and vows by circumvention, which may be permitted according to the paragraph of the law, but is devoid of any religious feeling. Both, however, are necessary together, for, if one is guided by the legal deduction alone, more relaxation would crop up than could be controlled. If, on the other hand, one would neglect the legalized lines which form the fence round the law, and would only rely on religious zeal, it would become a source of schism, and destroy everything.

And the other Sage said: David said the following before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, am I not pious? For all of the kings of the East and the West sit in groups befitting their honored status, but I sit as a judge who issues rulings for the people. Women come with questions of ritual impurity and my hands become soiled with their blood as I labor to determine whether or not it is blood of impurity and she has menstruating woman status, and with a fetus that miscarried at a stage of development before it was clear whether or not it is considered a birth, and with placenta, which women sometimes discharge unrelated to the birth of a child (see Leviticus 15:19–30 with regard to blood, and 12:1–8 with regard to miscarriage and placenta). King David went to all this trouble in order to render a woman ritually pure and consequently permitted to her husband. If, after examination, a Sage declares the woman ritually pure, she is permitted to be with her husband, which leads to increased love and affection, and ultimately to procreation (Rabbi Yoshiyahu Pinto). And not only do I engage in activity considered to be beneath the station of a king, but I consult my teacher, Mefivoshet, son of King Saul’s son, Jonathan, with regard to everything that I do. I say to him: Mefivoshet, my teacher, did I decide properly? Did I convict properly? Did I acquit properly? Did I rule ritually pure properly? Did I rule ritually impure properly? And I was not embarrassed. Forgoing royal dignity should make me worthy to be called pious.