Medical Ethics Spring 2017 Unit 4: Aborting a Tay-Sachs Foetus

Can we say that Nathan would have been better not to be born?

What are the ethical challenges of saying that?

What Jewish values/texts would inform an answer to this question?

Assuming we can halachically abort such a foetus, what are the ethical dangers of doing so?

If we say it is okay to abort, what about other genetic disorders, such as Down's Syndrome?

Pre-natal genetic screening allows parents to know if their child will have Down's Syndrome. 90% of them do so. Is it unethical to select such children for abortion?

How do you draw the line between normal/abnormal?

The Torah teaches us that every moment of life is intrinsically valuable; life itself is never futile. Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, a leading halachic authority of the past generation, points out that we have no "yardstick" by which to measure value of life. Even for a deaf, demented elderly man, incapable of doing any mitzvot, we must violate the Shabbat to save his life.(Auerbach, Rav Shlomo Zalman, "Responsum Regarding a Very Sick Patient," Halacha U'Refuah, vol. 3, p. 60

Although these passages are about end-of-life, they are interesting to apply to our case. What would Rav Auerbach say about aborting a tay-sachs or downs syndrome foetus? Is the situation different?

(ו) האשה שהיא מקשה לילד, מחתכין את הולד במעיה ומוציאין אותו אברים אברים, מפני שחייה קודמין לחייו. יצא רבו, אין נוגעין בו, שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש.

(6) [If] a woman is having trouble giving birth, they cut up the fetus inside her and take it out limb by limb, because her life comes before its life. If most of it had come out already they do not touch it because we do not push off one life for another.

According to this text, under what circumstances can one abort?

unborn baby:

partially born baby:

Why would the halachic status of the child change once its head has emerged?

If the mother were NOT in danger, according to this text, may she have an abortion?

If not, what is the origin of the prohibition?

איתיביה רב חסדא לרב הונא יצא ראשו אין נוגעין בו לפי שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש ואמאי רודף הוא שאני התם דמשמיא קא רדפי לה

R. Hisda asked R. Huna: we learnt: "Once his head has come forth, he may not be harmed, because one life may not be taken to save another.

[objection:]

"But why so? Is he not a pursuer?

[answer:]

There it is different, for she is pursued by heaven.

This text raises an objection to the above mishnah, by suggesting that we should abort the partially born baby to save the mother's life.

1. According to the objection, what should we do and why?

2. On that logic, what is the status of the fetus? Is it a life?

3. On the same logic, did the fetus have the same status before it was partially born? If not, what was its status?

The last line answers the objection, and defends why the partially-born baby is not killed.

4. How does the Talmud rejects the initial objection?

5. By rejecting the objection, does this also mean the answers to #2 & #3 are rejected? If so, what is the status of the baby before and after the head emerges?

יצא ראשו - באשה המקשה לילד ומסוכנת וקתני רישא החיה פושטת ידה וחותכתו ומוציאתו לאברים דכל זמן שלא יצא לאויר העולם לאו נפש הוא וניתן להורגו ולהציל את אמו אבל יצא ראשו אין נוגעים בו להורגו דהוה ליה כילוד ואין דוחין נפש מפני נפש

[In the case of] a pregnant woman [who is in mortal danger during childbirth, she may] extend her hand and cut up [her fetus] and remove it limb by limb, for as long as it has not emerged to the world, it is not a nefesh [soul] and it is permitted to kill it and to save its mother. But if its head has emerged, one may not touch it to kill it, for it is as living offspring, and one does not set aside one nefesh for another.

According to Rashi, what is the baby's status before the head emerges?

Before the head emerges, when is an abortion permitted?

Is there any prohibition on abortion before the head emerges? If so, is it drabbanan or d'orayta?

(ט) אף זו מצות לא תעשה שלא לחוס על נפש הרודף. לפיכך הורו חכמים שהעוברה שהיא מקשה לילד מותר לחתוך העובר במיעיה. בין בסם בין ביד מפני שהוא כרודף אחריה להורגה. ואם משהוציא ראשו אין נוגעין בו שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש וזהו טבעו של עולם.
(9) ... It is a negative commandment that one should not protect the life of a rodef (pursuer). For this reason, the sages ruled that in the case of a pregnant woman in a dangerous labor, it is permissible to dismember the fetus in her womb - whether with a drug or by hand because it is like a rodef pursuing her to kill her. However, once his head has emerged one may not touch him, as we do not set aside one nefesh [soul] for another, and this is the natural way of the world.

According to Rambam, what is the reason we allow an abortion?

Is the ban d'rabbanan (i.e. based in Torah) or d'oraita (i.e. a rabbinic enactment)? (hint: there is a clue in the text)

According to him, what is the reason we do not allow an abortion on a partially born foetus?

How does Rambam understand Sanhedrin 72b?

What would Rambam say in a situation where the fetus is not a rodef?

(כב) וְכִֽי־יִנָּצ֣וּ אֲנָשִׁ֗ים וְנָ֨גְפ֜וּ אִשָּׁ֤ה הָרָה֙ וְיָצְא֣וּ יְלָדֶ֔יהָ וְלֹ֥א יִהְיֶ֖ה אָס֑וֹן עָנ֣וֹשׁ יֵעָנֵ֗שׁ כַּֽאֲשֶׁ֨ר יָשִׁ֤ית עָלָיו֙ בַּ֣עַל הָֽאִשָּׁ֔ה וְנָתַ֖ן בִּפְלִלִֽים׃ (כג) וְאִם־אָס֖וֹן יִהְיֶ֑ה וְנָתַתָּ֥ה נֶ֖פֶשׁ תַּ֥חַת נָֽפֶשׁ׃ (כד) עַ֚יִן תַּ֣חַת עַ֔יִן שֵׁ֖ן תַּ֣חַת שֵׁ֑ן יָ֚ד תַּ֣חַת יָ֔ד רֶ֖גֶל תַּ֥חַת רָֽגֶל׃ (כה) כְּוִיָּה֙ תַּ֣חַת כְּוִיָּ֔ה פֶּ֖צַע תַּ֣חַת פָּ֑צַע חַבּוּרָ֕ה תַּ֖חַת חַבּוּרָֽה׃ (ס)

(22) And if men strive together, and hurt a woman with child, so that her fruit depart, and yet no harm follow, he shall be surely fined, according as the woman’s husband shall lay upon him; and he shall pay as the judges determine. (23) But if any harm follow, then thou shalt give life for life, (24) eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, (25) burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe.

According to Torah civil law, is the foetus treated as a full human being? If not, what is it?

עיברה לא תאכל בתרומה נחתך העובר במעיה תאכל ...

והתניא בת כהן שנישאת לישראל ומת טובלת ואוכלת בתרומה לערב אמר רב חסדא טובלת ואוכלת עד ארבעים דאי לא מיעברא הא לא מיעברא ואי מיעברא עד ארבעים מיא בעלמא היא

If a priest's daughter was married to an Israelite who died, she may perform her ritual immersion and eat terumah the same evening! R. Hisda replied: ... She performs the immersion but may eat terumah only until the fortieth day. For if she is not found pregnant she never was pregnant; and if she is found pregnant, the semen, until the fortieth day, is only a mere fluid.

What is the case being discussed?

What is the ruling?

What does this say about the status of a fetus?

ששנינו הרי את שפחה וולדך בן חורין אם היתה עוברה זכתה לו מאי אם היתה עוברה זכתה לו כי אתא רב שמואל בר יהודה אמר ר' יוחנן תרתי אמר נראים דברים שהעבד מקבל גט לחבירו מיד רבו של חבירו אבל לא מיד רבו שלו ואם לחשך אדם לומר זו הלכה שנויה אם היתה עוברה זכתה לו אמור לו שני גדולי הדור פירשו את הדבר ר' זירא ור' שמואל בר רב יצחק חד אמר הא מני רבי היא דאמר המשחרר חצי עבדו קנה וחד אמר מאי טעמא דרבי בהא קסבר עובר ירך אמו הוא ונעשה כמי שהקנה לה אחד מאבריה:

[If a man says to his female slave], 'You are a slave, but your child is free', if she was pregnant at the time she acquires freedom for it [the child]...

Rabbi ...looks upon the embryo as part of the mother, and therefore the master [in freeing the child] as it were made her owner of one of her own limbs.

What is the case being discussed, and what is the ruling?

What approach does this text take to the nature of the foetus?

If a foetus is a "limb of the mother," should she be allowed to abort it?

Abortion of a Tay-Sachs Fetus

Aryeh Gurvich

The genetic syndrome Tay-Sachs, common among Ashkenazi Jews, renders ineffective an enzyme responsible for the breakdown of a certain fat in the brain and spinal chord. By the first few months of the child’s life, this fat accumulates to toxic levels, and symptoms including deteriorating motor function, seizures, and paralysis become apparent. Children with Tay-Sachs generally do not live past the age of four. If prenatal testing finds evidence of Tay-Sachs, the most desirable option seems to be to abort the pregnancy.

When the question of aborting a fetus determined to express Tay-Sachs was first raised in 1975, the test available to establish that diagnosis could only be done after the third month of pregnancy. This would mean missing a crucial deadline established by Halacha – after three months, abortion for reasons other than to save the mother (if delivering the fetus would place her life at risk) is prohibited. So does this unquestionably preclude a pregnancy with a Tay-Sachs fetus from being aborted?

Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg, in his responsa Tzitz Eliezer,1 relied on some Rishonim who held that it is prohibited for a Jew to kill a fetus only on a D’Rabanan, rabbinic, level, as opposed to a biblical prohibition. In Israel, where most of the physicians are Jewish, this would be less of an issue. Another source for which he found support for permitting this case is a responsa of the Maharit,2 in which he ruled that it would even be permitted for a Jewish mother to have an abortion for reasons of health, even not in the face of life-threatening danger.

Based on these sources and others, Rav Waldenberg held that since there was no pain greater than the inevitable loss of the child, as well as the years of suffering for both the parents and the baby before that, there was room to apply the heter of the Maharit to abort when delivering the fetus would adversely affect the health of the mother.

Rabbi Moshe Feinstein wrote a lengthy essay in which he sharply challenged the ruling of Rav Waldenberg.3 He cites two major Rishonim that were of the opinion that abortion is, in fact, murder:

[Rav Moshe's Position]

One of the sources for the prohibition of abortion is a Tosfos in Sanhedrin4 that says that while a Jew is not administered capital punishment for killing a fetus, he is still prohibited against doing so. Rav Moshe understands this prohibition to be categorized as retzicha, or murder. There is also a Tosfos in Nida that has a discussion in which he says twice that killing the fetus before birth is totally permitted. But as was just mentioned, Tosfos in Sanhendrin wrote that killing a fetus is murder. So how could Tosfos suggest in Nida that killing a fetus is permitted?
So Rav Moshe posits that there must have been a copying mistake in the Tosfos. Rather, instead of “mutar”, or permitted, the text in Tosfos should have said “patur”, or exempt from punishment, yet still prohibited.

Rav Moshe then introduces the Rambam’s approach to abortion. For the Rambam, abortion is almost always prohibited – except when delivering the baby would endanger the mother’s life. The Rambam subsumes this exception within the laws of rodef,6 or one who pursues a potential victim with the intent to murder him. There is a mitzvah to prevent the pursuer from committing the murder, even if that would require killing him. In the middle of the discussion, the Rambam says that this is the reason why Chazal said that if a woman in labor runs the risk of death, the fetus should be aborted. Since the fetus is threatening her life, he has the status of rodef and must be killed so that she may live.

Rav Moshe writes that it is very clear from the Rambam that the fetus is aborted precisely because he is a rodef – and not because there is no prohibition of murder in killing the fetus. According to the Rambam, there is indeed a prohibition of murder in abortion, but the only reason we abort the fetus when it endangers the mother is because the mitzvah to save the life of the victim being pursued – in this case, the mother – supersedes this prohibition.

With regards to the Tzitz Eliezer’s source in the Maharit, Rav Moshe thought that particular responsa was falsified in his name, and finds strong proof in the words of the Maharit himself just two simanim previously, where he ruled on this exact issue to the contrary.

Rav Moshe ends by saying that since the fetus with Tay-Sachs does not pose a threat to the mother, he may not be aborted past three months because he cannot be defined as a Halachic rodef. This is the case even though the child will certainly die within a few years, and his death will cause much suffering to the parents. Furthermore, he cautions Torah-observant doctors against screening the fetus for the syndrome, since no good will come out of it, because they will be unable to abort the fetus and will cause grief to the parents for longer than necessary.

[Rav Waldenberg's position]

Rav Waldenberg later wrote a point-by-point rebuttal7 to Rav Moshe. He points out that the only incontrovertible conclusion from the Tosfos in Sanhedrin is that Jews are prohibited to kill a fetus as much as non-Jews are, and that there is no consensus among scholars as to whether Tosfos meant that the prohibition is biblical or rabbinic. With regards to the Tosfos in Nida, Rav Waldenberg was taken aback at how Rav Moshe “took the easy way out” and dismissed the proof there as a printing typo in the face of centuries of rabbinic literature that struggled to explain the text as is, some of which Rav Waldenberg references to. Rav Waldenberg also challenged Rav Moshe’s assessment of the Rambam, citing the Sema8, who maintained that the Rambam did not hold that killing the fetus is murder, as well as the Radvaz9 (who disagreed with the Rambam entirely on whether the baby is a rodef). Concerning the Maharit, Rav Waldenberg brought his own evidence to reaffirm the validity of that responsa, all the while criticizing Rav Moshe’s seemingly simplistic approach.

In the world of Halacha, generally speaking, what Rav Moshe had to say always carried tremendous weight, and many of his rulings have shaped our Halachic practice today. It would seem that the issue of abortion of Tay-Sachs fetuses would be no different. However, considering both Rav Waldenberg’s particular expertise in medical ethics, as well as his sound arguments, the discussion is far from closed, and experts of stature should be consulted on this still-controversial issue.

שו”ת ציץ אליעזר חלק יג סימן קב .1
שו”ת מהרי”ט חלק א סימן צט .2
תס”ט-ספר הזכרון למרן הגר”י אברמסקי זצ”ל, עמ’ תס”א .3
סנהדרין נט. תד”ה ליכא מידעם דלישראל שרי .4
נדה מד. תד”ה איהו .5
רוצח פרק א הל’ ט .6
שו”ת ציץ אליעזר חלק יד סימן ק .7
סמ”ע חו”מ ס’ תכה סק”ח .8
שו”ת רדב”ז חלק ב סימן תרצה .9

1. What was Rav Waldenberg's position:

what is the legal status of abortion?

why did he allow a Tay-Sachs fetus to be aborted?

2. What was Rav Feinstein's position:

what is the legal status of abortion?

when did he allow abortion, and what was the justification?

Conservative teshuvah:

https://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/sites/default/files/public/halakhah/teshuvot/20052010/grossman_partial_birth.pdf

see pp. 15-18 where she discusses different approaches to when abortion is allowed

According to this teshuvah:

1. What is the status of the fetus?

2. Do they side with Rashi or Rambam, and why?

3. When is abortion prohibited and when is it allowed?

Responsum from the reform movement:

https://www.ccarnet.org/responsa/tfn-no-5755-13-171-176/

According to this teshuvah:

1. What is the status of the fetus?

2. Do they side with Rashi or Rambam, and why?

3. When is abortion prohibited and when is it allowed?

Unit Summary:

Which of the thinkers/sources we have read would allow a Tay-Sachs abortion? What would their reasoning be?

Which of the thinkers/sources would not allow it? For those thinkers, when is abortion permissible?