Common Morality In a Unique Religion

There are multiple implications of this pasuk:
The Verbal Report: - From the juxtaposition of the pasuk
Gray Matter II, Family Matters, Revealing Flaws of a Potential Marriage Partner 28
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 426:1) cites this passage from the Rambam almost verbatim. Consequently, as we shall discuss, one must balance the prohibitions of rechilut and standing by idly, by not revealing insignificant flaws while also not remaining silent about major flaws. The Netziv (Ha’ameik Davar, Vayikra 19:16) explains that God placed the prohibitions of rechilut and standing by idly in the same verse in order to clarify when one should not speak rechilut. Their juxtaposition indicates that despite the prohibition to gossip, one nevertheless may not remain silent about information that can save another person from danger.
The Physical Rescue: - From the latter half of the pasuk
Gray Matter II, Family Matters, Revealing Flaws of a Potential Marriage Partner 27
Whoever can save another individual [from an assailant] and fails to do so violates the Torah’s prohibition, “Do not stand idly by while your brother’s blood is being shed” (“Lo ta’amod al dam rei’echa;” Vayikra 19:16). Similarly, if one sees someone drowning in the sea or sees that robbers are attacking him or a wild animal is pouncing on him, and one can save him... but fails to do so... one violates the prohibition of lo ta’amod al dam rei’echa.

It should now be clear that a Torah commandment exists not to remain passive while another person is in danger. One must either save them by their own actions or report the situation to someone else.

Rabbi Yitzchak Ginsburgh
The Jew is commanded to respect all human beings. The Torah prohibits any negative behavior toward a non-Jew, so long as he is not an enemy. He is instructed, however, not to become too close a companion to him. Thus the above verse, veahavta l’reyacha kamocha, “You shall love your neighbor as your self”, does not imply a universal neighbor. To be honest with the text, the parenthetical “a fellow Jew” must appear.

A Stranger and a Resident by Rav Soloveitchik
One is either a stranger, an alien, or one is a resident, a citizen. How could Abraham claim both identities for himself?
Abraham’s definition of his dual status, we believe, describes with profound accuracy the historical position of the Jew who resides in a predominantly non-Jewish society. He was a resident, like other inhabitants of Canaan, sharing with them a concern for the welfare of society, digging wells, and contributing to the progress of the country in loyalty to its government and institutions. Here, Abraham was clearly a fellow citizen, a patriot among compatriots, joining others in advancing the common welfare. However, there was another aspect, the spiritual, in which Abraham regarded himself as a stranger. His identification and solidarity with his fellow citizens in the secular realm did not imply his readiness to relinquish any aspects of his religious uniqueness. His was a different faith and he was governed by truths, and observances which set him apart from the larger faith community. In this regard, Abraham and his descendants would always remain “strangers.”

By His Light by HaRav Aharon Lichtenstein
Conflicts Between Religion and Morality
"THE DUNGHILL OF MORALITY"
Having addressed the phenomena of frumkeit devoid of goodness and of goodness devoid of frumkeit, I would like to move on to the next issue. I emphasized before that frumkeit and goodness are not synonymous; rather, goodness is ideally to be included within frumkeit. But if they are not to be regarded as synonymous, is there a possibility that frumkeit and goodness can sometimes be antonymous?
There is such a possibility, and we should confront it. At one level, there is a question as to whether the quest for morality somehow conflicts with one's religious commitment. Some would claim that the focus on developing one's character undercuts the central experience of one's religious being, namely, relating directly and submitting to God. This point of view was expressed in early Christianity, and it reared its headagain during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries within the Protestant world. In the controversy regarding salvation through faith or through works (i.e. deeds), those works which were rejected most sharply were the moral works. In this perspective, morality is regarded as an audacious human undertaking, a challenge to God, where one stakes out an independent moral area instead of gearing one's entire spiritual being to submitting to God. Puritan preachers used to describe works as "the dunghill of morality" and regarded them simply as a spiritual abomination. For them, being good was indeed antonymous to being frum, because via "morality" you set yourself up as an alternative to the eved Hashem (servant of God) in you.
This notion has a history in Christianity, but it surely has no place within our beit midrash. Our conception of religious life highlights man's free will and emphasizes our efforts to build ourselves spiritually. As I mentioned before, these certainly include an emphasis upon morality. Therefore, this kind of tension between morality and religion is not a significant factor for us.