Freedom of Contract vs. Public Protection and Regulations

שׁוֹמְרֵי פֵרוֹת אוֹכְלִין מֵהִלְכוֹת מְדִינָה, אֲבָל לֹא מִן הַתּוֹרָה. אַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִין הֵן. שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם, וְהַשּׁוֹאֵל, נוֹשֵׂא שָׂכָר, וְהַשּׂוֹכֵר. שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם נִשְׁבָּע עַל הַכֹּל, וְהַשּׁוֹאֵל מְשַׁלֵּם אֶת הַכֹּל, וְנוֹשֵׂא שָׂכָר וְהַשּׂוֹכֵר נִשְׁבָּעִים עַל הַשְּׁבוּרָה וְעַל הַשְּׁבוּיָה וְעַל הַמֵּתָה, וּמְשַׁלְּמִין אֶת הָאֲבֵדָה וְאֶת הַגְּנֵבָה:

Mishnah Bava Metzia 7:8

The mishna adds: Watchmen of produce may eat the produce of the field or vineyard by local regulations, i.e., in accordance with the ordinances accepted by the residents of that place, but not by Torah law. There are four types of bailees, to whom different halakhot apply. They are as follows: An unpaid bailee, who receives no compensation for safeguarding the item; and the borrower of an item for his own use; a paid bailee, who is provided with a salary for watching over an item; and a renter, i.e., a bailee who pays a fee for the use of a vessel or animal. If the item was stolen, lost, or broken, or if the animal died in any manner, their halakhot are as follows: An unpaid bailee takes an oath over every outcome; whether the item was lost, stolen, or broken, or if the animal died, the unpaid bailee must take an oath that it happened as he described, and he is then exempt from payment. The borrower does not take an oath, but pays for every outcome, even in a circumstance beyond his control. And the halakhot of a paid bailee and a renter are the same: They take an oath over an injured animal, over a captured animal, and over a dead animal, attesting that the mishaps were caused by circumstances beyond their control, and they are exempt, but they must pay for loss or theft.

משנה בבא מציעא ז׳:י׳

מֵתָה כְדַרְכָּהּ, הֲרֵי זֶה אֹנֶס. סִגְּפָהּ וָמֵתָה, אֵינוֹ אֹנֶס. עָלְתָה לְרָאשֵׁי צוּקִין וְנָפְלָה וָמֵתָה, הֲרֵי זֶה אֹנֶס. הֶעֱלָהּ לְרָאשֵׁי צוּקִין וְנָפְלָה וָמֵתָה, אֵינוֹ אֹנֶס. מַתְנֶה שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם לִהְיוֹת פָּטוּר מִשְּׁבוּעָה, וְהַשּׁוֹאֵל לִהְיוֹת פָּטוּר מִלְּשַׁלֵּם, נוֹשֵׂא שָׂכָר וְהַשּׂוֹכֵר לִהְיוֹת פְּטוּרִין מִשְּׁבוּעָה וּמִלְּשַׁלֵּם:

Mishnah Bava Metzia 7:10

If the animal died in its normal manner, this is considered a circumstance beyond one’s control; if he afflicted it by overworking it or by negligent treatment and it died, this is not considered a circumstance beyond one’s control. If the animal ascended to the top of a cliff and fell down and died, this is considered a circumstance beyond one’s control. If the shepherd himself brought it up to the top of a cliff and it fell down and died, this is not considered a circumstance beyond one’s control. The halakhot of bailees stated in the previous mishna apply to standard cases. The halakha is that in any case involving monetary matters the parties may agree to special terms. Therefore, an unpaid bailee may stipulate with the owner that he will be exempt from taking an oath if the item is lost, and similarly, a borrower may stipulate that he will be exempt from having to pay, and a paid bailee or a renter can stipulate that he will be exempt from taking an oath and from having to pay, as one can relinquish his monetary rights. With regard to matters that do not involve monetary claims, anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void.

משנה בבא מציעא ז׳:י״א

כָּל הַמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה, תְּנָאוֹ בָטֵל. וְכָל תְּנַאי שֶׁיֵּשׁ מַעֲשֶׂה בִתְחִלָּתוֹ, תְּנָאוֹ בָטֵל. וְכָל שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְקַיְּמוֹ בְסוֹפוֹ, וְהִתְנָה עָלָיו מִתְּחִלָּתוֹ, תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּם:

Mishnah Bava Metzia 7:11

And any condition that is preceded by an action, i.e., the agreement is formulated with the promise of an action followed by a statement that this action will be carried out only under certain terms, the condition is void and the promise remains intact. The condition must be stated before the action. And with regard to any condition that one can ultimately fulfill, but he stipulated with him initially, i.e., in practice the action is performed first, followed by the fulfillment of the condition, nevertheless, because it was formulated in the proper manner, with the condition first, his condition is valid. If the condition cannot be fulfilled at all, once the action has been carried out the condition is void.

משנה כתובות ה׳:א׳

אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאָמְרוּ, בְּתוּלָה גוֹבָה מָאתַיִם וְאַלְמָנָה מָנֶה, אִם רָצָה לְהוֹסִיף, אֲפִלּוּ מֵאָה מָנֶה, יוֹסִיף. נִתְאַרְמְלָה אוֹ נִתְגָּרְשָׁה, בֵּין מִן הָאֵרוּסִין בֵּין מִן הַנִּשּׂוּאִין, גּוֹבָה אֶת הַכֹּל. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה אוֹמֵר, מִן הַנִּשּׂוּאִין, גּוֹבָה אֶת הַכֹּל. מִן הָאֵרוּסִין, בְּתוּלָה גּוֹבָה מָאתַיִם וְאַלְמָנָה מָנֶה, שֶׁלֹּא כָתַב לָהּ אֶלָּא עַל מְנָת לְכָנְסָהּ. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, אִם רָצָה, כּוֹתֵב לִבְתוּלָה שְׁטָר שֶׁל מָאתַיִם, וְהִיא כוֹתֶבֶת, הִתְקַבַּלְתִּי מִמְּךָ מָנֶה, וּלְאַלְמָנָה, מָנֶה, וְהִיא כוֹתֶבֶת, הִתְקַבַּלְתִּי מִמְּךָ חֲמִשִּׁים זוּז. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר, כָּל הַפּוֹחֵת לִבְתוּלָה מִמָּאתַיִם וּלְאַלְמָנָה מִמָּנֶה, הֲרֵי זוֹ בְעִילַת זְנוּת:

Mishnah Ketubot 5:1

Although they said as a principle that a virgin collects two hundred dinars as payment for her marriage contract and that a widow collects one hundred dinars, if the husband wishes to add even an additional ten thousand dinars, he may add it. If she is then widowed or divorced, whether from betrothal or whether from marriage, she collects the entire amount, including the additional sum. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: If she is widowed or divorced from marriage, she collects the total amount, but if she is widowed or divorced from betrothal, a virgin collects two hundred dinars and a widow one hundred dinars. This is because he wrote the additional amount for her in the marriage contract only in order to marry her. Rabbi Yehuda says a related halakha with regard to the marriage contract: If he wishes, he may write for a virgin a document for two hundred dinars as is fitting for her, and she may then write a receipt stating: I received one hundred dinars from you. Even though she has not actually received the money, the receipt serves as a means for her to waive half of the amount due to her for her marriage contract. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the financial commitment in the marriage contract is a right due to the wife, which she may waive if she chooses to do so. And similarly, for a widow he may write one hundred dinars in the contract and she may write a receipt stating: I received from you fifty dinars. However, Rabbi Meir says: It is prohibited to do this, as anyone who reduces the amount of the marriage contract to less than than two hundred dinars for a virgin or one hundred dinars for a widow, this marital relationship amounts to licentious sexual relations because it is as if he did not write any marriage contract at all.

משנה כתובות ד׳

(ד) הָאָב זַכַּאי בְבִתּוֹ בְקִדּוּשֶׁיהָ, בַּכֶּסֶף בַּשְּׁטָר וּבַבִּיאָה, וְזַכַּאי בִּמְצִיאָתָהּ, וּבְמַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ, וּבַהֲפָרַת נְדָרֶיהָ. וּמְקַבֵּל אֶת גִּטָּהּ, וְאֵינוֹ אוֹכֵל פֵּרוֹת בְּחַיֶּיהָ. נִשֵּׂאת, יָתֵר עָלָיו הַבַּעַל שֶׁאוֹכֵל פֵּרוֹת בְּחַיֶּיהָ, וְחַיָּב בִּמְזוֹנוֹתֶיהָ, בְּפִרְקוֹנָהּ, וּבִקְבוּרָתָהּ. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, אֲפִלּוּ עָנִי שֶׁבְּיִשְׂרָאֵל, לֹא יִפְחֹת מִשְּׁנֵי חֲלִילִים וּמְקוֹנָנֶת:

(ז) לֹא כָתַב לָהּ כְּתֻבָּה, בְּתוּלָה גּוֹבָה מָאתַיִם, וְאַלְמָנָה מָנֶה, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא תְנַאי בֵּית דִּין. כָּתַב לָהּ, שָׂדֶה שָׁוֶה מָנֶה תַּחַת מָאתַיִם זוּז, וְלֹא כָתַב לָהּ, כָּל נְכָסִים דְּאִית לִי אַחֲרָאִין לִכְתֻבְּתִיךְ, חַיָּב, שֶׁהוּא תְנַאי בֵּית דִּין:

(ח) לֹא כָתַב לָהּ, אִם תִּשְׁתַּבָּאִי אֶפְרְקִנָּךְ וְאוֹתְבִנָּךְ לִי לְאִנְתּוּ, וּבְכֹהֶנֶת, אֲהַדְרִנָּךְ לִמְדִינְתָּךְ, חַיָּב, שֶׁהוּא תְנַאי בֵּית דִּין:

(ט) נִשְׁבֵּית, חַיָּב לִפְדּוֹתָהּ. וְאִם אָמַר, הֲרֵי גִטָּהּ וּכְתֻבָּתָהּ, תִּפְדֶה אֶת עַצְמָהּ, אֵינוֹ רַשָּׁאי. לָקְתָה, חַיָּב לְרַפֹּאתָהּ. אָמַר, הֲרֵי גִטָּהּ וּכְתֻבָּתָהּ, תְּרַפֵּא אֶת עַצְמָהּ, רַשָּׁאי:

(י) לֹא כָתַב לָהּ, בְּנִין דִּכְרִין דְּיֶהֱווֹן לִיכִי מִנַּאי אִנּוּן יִרְתוּן כְּסַף כְּתֻבְּתִיךְ יָתֵר עַל חוּלְקֵיהוֹן דְּעִם אֲחוּהוֹן, חַיָּב שֶׁהוּא תְנַאי בֵּית דִּין:

(יא) בְּנָן נֻקְבִין דְּיֶהֶוְיָן לִיכִי מִנַּאי, יֶהֶוְיָן יָתְבָן בְּבֵיתִי וּמִתְּזָנָן מִנִּכְסַי עַד דְּתִנַּסְּבָן לְגֻבְרִין, חַיָּב, שֶׁהוּא תְנַאי בֵּית דִּין:

(יב) אַתְּ תְּהֵא יָתְבָא בְּבֵיתִי וּמִתְּזָנָא מִנִּכְסַי, כָּל יְמֵי מִגַּד אַלְמְנוּתִיךְ בְּבֵיתִי, חַיָּב, שֶׁהוּא תְנַאי בֵּית דִּין. כָּךְ הָיוּ אַנְשֵׁי יְרוּשָׁלַיִם כּוֹתְבִין. אַנְשֵׁי גָלִיל הָיוּ כוֹתְבִין כְּאַנְשֵׁי יְרוּשָׁלָיִם. אַנְשֵׁי יְהוּדָה הָיוּ כוֹתְבִין, עַד שֶׁיִּרְצוּ הַיּוֹרְשִׁים לִתֵּן לִיךְ כְּתֻבְּתִיךְ. לְפִיכָךְ אִם רָצוּ הַיּוֹרְשִׁין, נוֹתְנִין לָהּ כְּתֻבָּתָהּ וּפוֹטְרִין אוֹתָהּ:

Mishnah Ketubot 4

(4) A father has authority over his daughter with regard to her betrothal through money, through a marriage document, or through intercourse. Likewise, a father is entitled to items she has found, and to her earnings, and to effect the nullification of her vows, i.e., a father may nullify his daughter’s vows. And he accepts her bill of divorce on her behalf if she is divorced from betrothal before she becomes a grown woman. And although he inherits her property when she dies, e.g., property she inherited from her mother’s family, he does not consume the produce of her property during her lifetime. If the daughter married, the husband has more rights and obligations than her father had before the marriage, as he consumes the produce of her property during her lifetime, and he is obligated to provide her sustenance, her redemption if she is captured, and her burial upon her death. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even the poorest man of the Jewish people may not provide fewer than two flutes and a lamenting woman, which it was customary to hire for a funeral, as these too are included in the duties of burial.

(7) If a husband did not write a marriage contract for his wife, a virgin collects two hundred dinars and a widow one hundred dinars upon divorce or the husband’s death, because it is a stipulation of the court that a wife is entitled to these amounts. If he wrote in her marriage contract that she is entitled to a field worth one hundred dinars instead of the two hundred dinars to which she is actually entitled, and he did not additionally write for her: All property I have shall serve as a guarantee for the payment of your marriage contract, he is nevertheless obligated to pay the full two hundred dinars; and he cannot say that she should take only a mortgaged field for payment of her marriage contract, as it is a stipulation of the court that all his property is held as surety for the entire sum.

(8) Similarly, if he did not write for her in the marriage contract: If you are taken captive I will redeem you and restore you to me as a wife, and in the case of a priestess, i.e., the wife of a priest, who is prohibited to return to her husband if she has intercourse with another man even if she is raped, if he did not write: I will return you to your native province, he is nevertheless obligated to do so, as it is a stipulation of the court.

(9) If a woman was taken captive, her husband is obligated to redeem her. And if he said: I hereby give my wife her bill of divorce and the payment of her marriage contract, and let her redeem herself, he is not permitted to do so, as he already obligated himself to redeem her when he wrote the marriage contract. If his wife was struck with illness, he is obligated to heal her, i.e., to pay for her medical expenses. In this case, however, if he said: I hereby give my wife her bill of divorce and the payment of her marriage contract, and let her heal herself, he is permitted to do so.

(10) If the husband did not write for her in her marriage contract: Any male children you will have from me will inherit the money of your marriage contract in addition to their portion of the inheritance that they receive together with their brothers, he is nevertheless obligated as though he had written it, as it is a stipulation of the court and therefore takes effect even if it is not explicitly stated.

(11) Likewise, if he omitted from the marriage contract the sentence: Any female children you will have from me will sit in my house and be sustained from my property until they are taken by men, i.e., until they are married, he is nevertheless obligated as though he had written it, as it too is a stipulation of the court.

(12) Similarly, if he omitted from the marriage contract the clause: You will sit in my house and be sustained from my property all the days you live as a widow in my house, he is nevertheless obligated as though he had written it, as it is a stipulation of the court. The mishna comments: The residents of Jerusalem would write in this manner, that a widow may remain in her husband’s house throughout her widowhood, and the residents of the Galilee would write in this manner as well, like the inhabitants of Jerusalem. In contrast, the residents of Judea would write: Until the heirs want to give you your marriage contract. Consequently, if the heirs wish, they may give her marriage contract to her and release her, and she must find her own living arrangements and provide for herself.

בבא מציעא צ״ד א:ב׳-ח׳

מתני׳ מתנה שומר חנם להיות פטור משבועה והשואל להיות פטור מלשלם נושא שכר והשוכר להיות פטורין משבועה ומלשלם כל המתנה על מה שכתוב בתורה תנאו בטל וכל תנאי שיש מעשה בתחילתו תנאו בטל וכל שאפשר לו לקיימו בסופו והתנה עמו מתחילתו תנאו קיים: גמ׳ אמאי מתנה על מה שכתוב בתורה הוא וכל המתנה על מה שכתוב בתורה תנאו בטל הא מני ר' יהודה היא דאמר בדבר שבממון תנאו קיים דתניא האומר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי על מנת שאין ליך עלי שאר כסות ועונה הרי זו מקודשת ותנאו בטל דברי ר"מ רבי יהודה אומר בדבר שבממון תנאו קיים ומי מצית מוקמת לה כר' יהודה אימא סיפא כל המתנה על מה שכתוב בתורה תנאו בטל אתאן לר"מ הא לא קשיא לעולם ר' יהודה היא וסיפא בדבר שאינו של ממון אימא סיפא כל תנאי שיש בו מעשה בתחילתו תנאו בטל מאן שמעת ליה דאית ליה הא סברא ר"מ דתניא אבא חלפתא איש כפר חנניא אמר משום ר"מ תנאי קודם למעשה הרי זה תנאי מעשה קודם לתנאי אינו תנאי אלא כולה ר"מ היא ושאני הכא דמעיקרא לא שעבד נפשיה

Bava Metzia 94a:2-8

MISHNA: The halakhot of bailees stated in the previous mishna apply to standard cases. The halakha is that in any case involving monetary matters the parties may agree to special terms. Therefore, an unpaid bailee may stipulate with the owner that he will be exempt from taking an oath if the item is lost, and similarly, a borrower may stipulate that he will be exempt from having to pay, and a paid bailee or a renter can stipulate that he will be exempt from taking an oath and from having to pay, as one can relinquish his monetary rights. With regard to matters that do not involve monetary claims, anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void. And any condition that is preceded by an action, i.e., the agreement is formulated with the promise of an action followed by a statement that this action will be carried out only under certain terms, the condition is void and the promise remains intact. The condition must be stated before the action. And with regard to any condition that one can ultimately fulfill, but he stipulated with him initially, i.e., in practice the action is performed first, followed by the fulfillment of the condition, nevertheless, because it was formulated in the proper manner, with the condition first, his condition is valid. If the condition cannot be fulfilled at all, once the action has been carried out the condition is void. GEMARA: The Gemara asks a question with regard to the mishna’s statement that bailees can issue conditions and change the liabilities imposed on them by Torah law: Why are they able to do so? This is a case of one who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, as the Torah determines who takes an oath and who must pay, and with regard to anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void. The Gemara explains: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is that of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that if the condition that runs counter to that which is written in the Torah is referring to monetary matters, his condition is valid. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that you have no claim against me to give you food, clothing, and conjugal rights, she is betrothed but his condition is void; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Yehuda said: With regard to monetary matters, i.e., her food and clothing, his condition is valid. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But can you establish the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? Say the latter clause of the mishna: Anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void. In this clause we arrive at the opinion of Rabbi Meir. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as actually you can explain that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and the latter clause is referring to non-monetary matters. The Gemara continues to question this explanation: But say the latter clause from near the end of the mishna: And any condition that is preceded by an action, the condition is void. Who have you heard who accepts this reasoning? It is Rabbi Meir, as it is taught in a baraita: Abba Ḥalafta, from the village of Ḥananya, said in the name of Rabbi Meir: If a condition was stated before the action, this is a valid condition, but if the action came before the condition, it is not a valid condition. Rather, the Gemara retracts the previous explanation and states that the entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Why, then, is the bailee exempt from payment or an oath? Because here it is different, as at the outset he did not obligate himself in the halakhot of a bailee as stated in the Torah. Before he entered into the agreement, he clearly stated that he is unwilling to accept upon himself the liabilities of a paid or an unpaid bailee by Torah law.

בבא בתרא ח׳ ב:ח׳

וְרַשָּׁאִין בְּנֵי הָעִיר לְהַתְנוֹת עַל הַמִּדּוֹת וְעַל הַשְּׁעָרִים וְעַל שְׂכַר פּוֹעֲלִים וּלְהַסִּיעַ עַל קִיצָתָן

Bava Batra 8b:8

Similarly, it is permitted for the residents of the city to set the measures used in that city, the prices set for products sold there, and the wages paid to its workers, and to fine people for violating their specifications, in order to enforce observance of these halakhot. This marks the end of the baraita, the details of which the Gemara proceeds to analyze.

שולחן ערוך, חושן משפט רל״א:כ״ז-כ״ח

רשאים בני העיר לקוץ להם שער לכל דבר שירצו ולהתנות ביניהם שכל מי שיעבור קונסים אותו כך וכך: רשאים בעלי אומנות (לעשות תקנות בענין מלאכתם כגון) (טור) לפסוק ביניהם שלא יעשה א' ביום שיעשה חבירו וכיוצא בזה וכל מי שיעבור על התנאי יענישו אותו כך וכך: הגה והא דבני אומנות יכולים לתקן ביניהם תקנות היינו כולם ביחד אבל שנים וג' מהם לא מהני (ב"י בשם הר"ן והמגיד פי"ד) בד"א במדינה שאין בה חכם חשוב ממונה על הציבור אבל אם ישנו אין התנאי שלהם (או של כל בני העיר) (טור) מועיל כלום ואין יכולים לענוש ולהפסיד למי שלא קיים התנאי אלא א"כ עשו מדעת החכם: הגה מיהו אם ליכא הפסד לאחריני יכולין לתקן ביניהם מה שירצו (ב"י בשם הר"ן):

Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 231:27-28

The city residents are permitted to fix prices as they please and to make conditions that anyone who violates these agreements will be fined. Artisans can make agreements that one will not produce on the day that the other does, and the like, and whoever violates the agreement will be punished in such and such a way. NOTE: The ability of artisans to make decrees among themselves is only if all agree, but not just two or three of them. And when is this said? In a region that does not have a prominent sage appointed over the community. But if there is one, their condition is invalid, and they cannot penalize someone who does not follow the condition without the agreement of the sage. NOTE: However, if there is no loss to others, they can decree as they wish.