"מי שהיה נשוי לשתי נשים": מונוגמיה ופוליגמיה, משפט והיסטוריה (וגם קצת תיאולוגיה)

(1) The heaven and the earth were finished, and all their array. (2) On the seventh day God finished the work that had been undertaken: [God] ceased on the seventh day from doing any of the work. (3) And God blessed the seventh day and declared it holy—having ceased on it from all the work of creation that God had done. (4) Such is the story of heaven and earth when they were created. When God יהוה made earth and heaven— (5) when no shrub of the field was yet on earth and no grasses of the field had yet sprouted, because God יהוה had not sent rain upon the earth and there were no human beings to till the soil, (6) but a flow would well up from the ground and water the whole surface of the earth— (7) God יהוה formed the Human from the soil’s humus, blowing into his nostrils the breath of life: the Human became a living being. (8) God יהוה planted a garden in Eden, in the east, and placed there the Human who had been fashioned. (9) And from the ground God יהוה caused to grow every tree that was pleasing to the sight and good for food, with the tree of life in the middle of the garden, and the tree of knowledge of good and bad. (10) A river issues from Eden to water the garden, and it then divides and becomes four branches. (11) The name of the first is Pishon, the one that winds through the whole land of Havilah, where the gold is. (12) (The gold of that land is good; bdellium is there, and lapis lazuli. ) (13) The name of the second river is Gihon, the one that winds through the whole land of Cush. (14) The name of the third river is Tigris, the one that flows east of Asshur. And the fourth river is the Euphrates. (15) God יהוה settled the Human in the garden of Eden, to till it and tend it. (16) And God יהוה commanded the Human, saying, “Of every tree of the garden you are free to eat; (17) but as for the tree of knowledge of good and bad, you must not eat of it; for as soon as you eat of it, you shall die.” (18) God יהוה said, “It is not good for the Human to be alone; I will make a fitting counterpart for him.” (19) And God יהוה formed out of the earth all the wild beasts and all the birds of the sky, and brought them to the Human to see what he would call them; and whatever the Human called each living creature, that would be its name. (20) And the Human gave names to all the cattle and to the birds of the sky and to all the wild beasts; but no fitting counterpart for a human being was found. (21) So God יהוה cast a deep sleep upon the Human; and, while he slept, [God] took one of his sides and closed up the flesh at that site. (22) And God יהוה fashioned the side that had been taken from the Human into a woman, bringing her to the Human. (23) Then the Human said, “This one at last Is bone of my bones And flesh of my flesh. This one shall be called Woman, For from a Human was she taken.” (24) Hence a man leaves his father and mother and clings to his wife, so that they become one flesh. (25) The two of them were naked, the Human and his wife, yet they felt no shame.

(1) If, in the land that your God יהוה is assigning you to possess, someone slain is found lying in the open, the identity of the slayer not being known, (2) your elders and magistrates shall go out and measure the distances from the corpse to the nearby towns. (3) The elders of the town nearest to the corpse shall then take a heifer which has never been worked, which has never pulled in a yoke; (4) and the elders of that town shall bring the heifer down to an everflowing wadi, which is not tilled or sown. There, in the wadi, they shall break the heifer’s neck. (5) The priests, sons of Levi, shall come forward; for your God יהוה has chosen them for divine service and to pronounce blessing in the name of יהוה, and every lawsuit and case of assault is subject to their ruling. (6) Then all the elders of the town nearest to the corpse shall wash their hands over the heifer whose neck was broken in the wadi. (7) And they shall make this declaration: “Our hands did not shed this blood, nor did our eyes see it done. (8) Absolve, יהוה, Your people Israel whom You redeemed, and do not let guilt for the blood of the innocent remain among Your people Israel.” And they will be absolved of bloodguilt. (9) Thus you will remove from your midst guilt for the blood of the innocent, for you will be doing what is right in the sight of יהוה. (10) When you [an Israelite warrior] take the field against your enemies, and your God יהוה delivers them into your power and you take some of them captive, (11) and you see among the captives a beautiful woman and you desire her and would take her [into your household] as your wife, (12) you shall bring her into your household, and she shall trim her hair, pare her nails, (13) and discard her captive’s garb. She shall spend a month’s time in your household lamenting her father and mother; after that you may come to her and thus become her husband, and she shall be your wife. (14) Then, should you no longer want her, you must release her outright. You must not sell her for money: since you had your will of her, you must not enslave her. (15) If a householder has two wives, one loved and the other unloved, and both the loved and the unloved have borne him sons, but the first-born is the son of the unloved one— (16) when he wills his property to his sons, he may not treat as first-born the son of the loved one in disregard of the son of the unloved one who is older. (17) Instead, he must accept the first-born, the son of the unloved one, and allot to him a double portion of all he possesses; since he is the first fruit of his vigor, the birthright is his due. (18) If a householder has a wayward and defiant son, who does not heed his father or mother and does not obey them even after they discipline him, (19) his father and mother shall take hold of him and bring him out to the elders of his town at the public place of his community. (20) They shall say to the elders of his town, “This son of ours is disloyal and defiant; he does not heed us. He is a glutton and a drunkard.” (21) Thereupon his town’s council shall stone him to death. Thus you will sweep out evil from your midst: all Israel will hear and be afraid. (22) If any party is guilty of a capital offense and is put to death, and you impale the body on a stake, (23) you must not let the corpse remain on the stake overnight, but must bury it the same day. For an impaled body is an affront to God: you shall not defile the land that your God יהוה is giving you to possess.

(1) There was a man from Ramathaim of the Zuphites, in the hill country of Ephraim, whose name was Elkanah son of Jeroham son of Elihu son of Tohu son of Zuph, an Ephraimite. (2) He had two wives, one named Hannah and the other Peninnah; Peninnah had children, but Hannah was childless. (3) This man used to go up from his town every year to worship and to offer sacrifice to the LORD of Hosts at Shiloh.—Hophni and Phinehas, the two sons of Eli, were priests of the LORD there. (4) One such day, Elkanah offered a sacrifice. He used to give portions to his wife Peninnah and to all her sons and daughters; (5) but to Hannah he would give one portion only—though Hannah was his favorite—for the LORD had closed her womb. (6) Moreover, her rival, to make her miserable, would taunt her that the LORD had closed her womb. (7) This happened year after year: Every time she went up to the House of the LORD, the other would taunt her, so that she wept and would not eat. (8) Her husband Elkanah said to her, “Hannah, why are you crying and why aren’t you eating? Why are you so sad? Am I not more devoted to you than ten sons?” (9) After they had eaten and drunk at Shiloh, Hannah rose.—The priest Eli was sitting on the seat near the doorpost of the temple of the LORD.— (10) In her wretchedness, she prayed to the LORD, weeping all the while. (11) And she made this vow: “O LORD of Hosts, if You will look upon the suffering of Your maidservant and will remember me and not forget Your maidservant, and if You will grant Your maidservant a male child, I will dedicate him to the LORD for all the days of his life; and no razor shall ever touch his head.” (12) As she kept on praying before the LORD, Eli watched her mouth. (13) Now Hannah was praying in her heart; only her lips moved, but her voice could not be heard. So Eli thought she was drunk. (14) Eli said to her, “How long will you make a drunken spectacle of yourself? Sober up!” (15) And Hannah replied, “Oh no, my lord! I am a very unhappy woman. I have drunk no wine or other strong drink, but I have been pouring out my heart to the LORD. (16) Do not take your maidservant for a worthless woman; I have only been speaking all this time out of my great anguish and distress.” (17) “Then go in peace,” said Eli, “and may the God of Israel grant you what you have asked of Him.” (18) She answered, “You are most kind to your handmaid.” So the woman left, and she ate, and was no longer downcast. (19) Early next morning they bowed low before the LORD, and they went back home to Ramah. Elkanah knew his wife Hannah and the LORD remembered her. (20) Hannah conceived, and at the turn of the year bore a son. She named him Samuel, meaning, “I asked the LORD for him.” (21) And when the man Elkanah and all his household were going up to offer to the LORD the annual sacrifice and his votive sacrifice, (22) Hannah did not go up. She said to her husband, “When the child is weaned, I will bring him. For when he has appeared before the LORD, he must remain there for good.” (23) Her husband Elkanah said to her, “Do as you think best. Stay home until you have weaned him. May the LORD fulfill His word.” So the woman stayed home and nursed her son until she weaned him. (24) When she had weaned him, she took him up with her, along with three bulls, one ephah of flour, and a jar of wine. And though the boy was still very young, she brought him to the House of the LORD at Shiloh. (25) After slaughtering the bull, they brought the boy to Eli. (26) She said, “Please, my lord! As you live, my lord, I am the woman who stood here beside you and prayed to the LORD. (27) It was this boy I prayed for; and the LORD has granted me what I asked of Him. (28) I, in turn, hereby lend him to the LORD. For as long as he lives he is lent to the LORD.” And they bowed low there before the LORD.

(1) Meanwhile, Boaz had gone to the gate and sat down there. And now the redeemer whom Boaz had mentioned passed by. He called, “Come over and sit down here, So-and-so!” And he came over and sat down. (2) Then [Boaz] took ten elders of the town and said, “Be seated here”; and they sat down. (3) He said to the redeemer, “Naomi, now returned from the country of Moab, must sell the piece of land which belonged to our kinsman Elimelech. (4) I thought I should disclose the matter to you and say: Acquire it in the presence of those seated here and in the presence of the elders of my people. If you are willing to redeem it, redeem! But if you will not redeem, tell me, that I may know. For there is no one to redeem but you, and I come after you.” “I am willing to redeem it,” he replied. (5) Boaz continued, “When you acquire the property from Naomi and from Ruth the Moabite, you must also acquire the wife of the deceased, so as to perpetuate the name of the deceased upon his estate.” (6) The redeemer replied, “Then I cannot redeem it for myself, lest I impair my own estate. You take over my right of redemption, for I am unable to exercise it.” (7) Now this was formerly done in Israel in cases of redemption or exchange: to validate any transaction, one man would take off his sandal and hand it to the other. Such was the practice in Israel. (8) So when the redeemer said to Boaz, “Acquire for yourself,” he drew off his sandal. (9) And Boaz said to the elders and to the rest of the people, “You are witnesses today that I am acquiring from Naomi all that belonged to Elimelech and all that belonged to Chilion and Mahlon. (10) I am also acquiring Ruth the Moabite, the wife of Mahlon, as my wife, so as to perpetuate the name of the deceased upon his estate, that the name of the deceased may not disappear from among his kinsmen and from the gate of his home town. You are witnesses today.” (11) All the people at the gate and the elders answered, “We are. May the LORD make the woman who is coming into your house like Rachel and Leah, both of whom built up the House of Israel! Prosper in Ephrathah and perpetuate your name in Bethlehem! (12) And may your house be like the house of Perez whom Tamar bore to Judah—through the offspring which the LORD will give you by this young woman.” (13) So Boaz married Ruth; she became his wife, and he cohabited with her. The LORD let her conceive, and she bore a son. (14) And the women said to Naomi, “Blessed be the LORD, who has not withheld a redeemer from you today! May his name be perpetuated in Israel! (15) He will renew your life and sustain your old age; for he is born of your daughter-in-law, who loves you and is better to you than seven sons.” (16) Naomi took the child and held it to her bosom. She became its foster mother, (17) and the women neighbors gave him a name, saying, “A son is born to Naomi!” They named him Obed; he was the father of Jesse, father of David. (18) This is the line of Perez: Perez begot Hezron, (19) Hezron begot Ram, Ram begot Amminadab, (20) Amminadab begot Nahshon, Nahshon begot Salmon, (21) Salmon begot Boaz, Boaz begot Obed, (22) Obed begot Jesse, and Jesse begot David.

(1) In the case of one who was married to two women and died, the first woman he married precedes the second in collecting the payment specified in her marriage contract if there are insufficient funds to pay both, because her document is dated earlier. So too, if the wives died after their husband before they received payment for their marriage contracts, the heirs of the first wife precede the heirs of the second wife in collecting these payments. If he married a first woman and she subsequently died, and he then married a second woman and he subsequently died, the second wife and her heirs precede the heirs of the first wife. This is because the marriage contract of the second wife is considered a debt that the estate of the deceased is required to pay, whereas the claim of the heirs of the first wife is based on the stipulation in the marriage contract that male children inherit their mother’s marriage contract. Heirs receive their share of the estate only from property that remains after all debts have been settled.

(2) In the case of one who was married to two women and the women died, and subsequently he died, and the orphans of one of the wives are now seeking to collect the payment specified in their mother’s marriage contract, i.e., the marriage contract concerning male children, but there is only enough in the estate to pay the value of the two marriage contracts, the marriage contract concerning male children cannot be collected, and the sons distribute the estate equally among themselves according to the biblical laws of inheritance. If there was a surplus of a dinar left there, in the estate, beyond the value of the two marriage contracts, then these sons collect their mother’s marriage contract and those sons collect their mother’s marriage contract, and the remaining property valued at a dinar is divided equally among all the sons. If the orphans who are entitled to receive the marriage settlement of greater value say: We inflate the value of our father’s property by a dinar, i.e., we agree to evaluate the property we will receive for our mother’s marriage settlement at a value higher than the market value so that there will be a dinar left in the estate after the two marriage contracts have been paid, so that they can collect their mother’s marriage contract, the court does not listen to them. Rather, the value of the property is appraised in court, and the distribution of the estate is based on that evaluation.

(3) If there was potential inheritance there, meaning that there was no surplus of a dinar in the existing properties of the estate, but there was property that was expected to be paid to the estate and which would increase the overall value of the estate so that there would be a surplus of a dinar after the payment of the marriage contracts, these properties are not considered to be in the possession of the estate in determining the total value of the estate. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if there is property that does not serve as guarantee for a loan, i.e., movable property, there in the estate, it does not have any impact on the value of the estate. The marriage contracts concerning male children are not collected unless there is property that serves as a guarantee, i.e., land, exceeding the value of the two marriage contracts by at least one additional dinar.

(4) In the case of one who was married to three women and died and the marriage contract of this wife was for one hundred dinars and the marriage contract of this second wife was for two hundred dinars, and the marriage contract of this third wife was for three hundred, and all three contracts were issued on the same date so that none of the wives has precedence over any of the others, and the total value of the estate is only one hundred dinars, the wives divide the estate equally. If there were two hundred dinars in the estate, the one whose marriage contract was for one hundred dinars takes fifty dinars, while those whose contracts were for two hundred and three hundred dinars take three dinars of gold each, which are the equivalent of seventy-five silver dinars. If there were three hundred dinars in the estate, the one whose marriage contract was for one hundred dinars takes fifty dinars, the one whose contract was for two hundred dinars takes one hundred dinars, and the one whose contract was for three hundred dinars takes six dinars of gold, the equivalent of one hundred and fifty silver dinars. Similarly, three individuals who deposited money into a purse, i.e., invested different amounts of money into a joint business venture: If they incurred a loss or earned a profit, and now choose to dissolve the partnership, they divide the assets in this manner, i.e., based upon the amount that each of them initially invested in the partnership.

(5) In the case of one who was married to four women and died, the woman he married first precedes the woman he married second in claiming her marriage contract, the second precedes the third, and the third precedes the fourth. And the first wife takes an oath to the second that she has taken nothing from the jointly owned properties of the estate in an unlawful manner, and the second takes an oath to the third, and the third to the fourth. The fourth wife is paid her share without having to take an oath. Ben Nanas says: Should she gain this advantage merely because she is last? After all, she too is being paid from property that would otherwise go to the orphans. Rather, she too is not paid without an oath. However, if all of the marriage contracts were issued on the same day, whichever wife’s marriage contract precedes that of another, even by a single hour, has acquired the right to be paid first. And so, the practice in Jerusalem was that they would write the hours when the documents had been signed on the documents, in order to enable the document holder to demonstrate that his or her document preceded that of another. If all the contracts were issued in the same hour and there is only one hundred dinars from which to pay all of them, all of the women divide the money equally.

(6) In a case of one who was married to two women and sold his field, and the wife whom he married first wrote to the purchaser: I do not have any legal dealings or involvement with you, then the second wife, who did not relinquish her claim to repossess this property, may appropriate the field from the purchaser as payment of her marriage contract. This is because the property was liened for the payment of her marriage contract before it was sold to this purchaser. Then, the first wife can appropriate the field from the second as payment for her marriage contract, since her marriage contract predates that of the second wife. The purchaser can then appropriate the field from the first wife, due to the fact that she relinquished her rights vis-à-vis the purchaser. They continue to do so according to this cycle [ḥalila] until they agree on a compromise between them. And so too, with regard to a creditor, and so too, with regard to a female creditor.

(6) A man may not neglect the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply unless he already has children. Beit Shammai say: One fulfills this mitzva with two males, and Beit Hillel say: A male and a female, as it is stated: “Male and female He created them” (Genesis 5:2). If a man married a woman and stayed with her for ten years and she did not give birth, he is no longer permitted to neglect the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply. Consequently, he must either divorce her and marry someone else, or take another wife while still married to her. If he divorced her she is permitted to marry another man, as it is not necessarily on her account that she and her first husband did not have children, and the second husband is permitted to stay with her for ten years. And if she had a miscarriage, he counts the ten years from the time of the miscarriage. A man is commanded with regard to the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply, but not a woman. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says that a woman is also commanded, as the verse states with regard to both of them: “And God blessed them, and God said to them: Be fruitful and multiply” (Genesis 1:28).

establish a set pattern of menstrual bleeding for herself, so that it can be assumed that she will start bleeding at a particular time, until she has established it three times. Similarly, she is not purified from her set pattern until it is uprooted from her three times, i.e., until she did not experience menstrual bleeding at the expected time according to her pattern on three occasions. And the case of a forewarned ox is as we learned in a mishna (Bava Kamma 23b): An ox does not become forewarned until witnesses testify that it has gored three times. Consequently, in the cases of set patterns and a forewarned ox, a legal presumption is created only after three occurrences, in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. The Sages taught: If a woman was married to her first husband and she did not have children, and then she was married to her second husband and she did not have children, she may not get married to a third husband unless it is to one who already has children and has fulfilled the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply, as it is presumed that she is unable to have children. If she got married to one who does not have children and he had been unaware of her presumptive status, she is divorced without receiving payment for her marriage contract, as he married her erroneously. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If she was married to a third husband and she did not have children for ten years, what is the halakha with regard to whether those first husbands can demand the return of the money they paid for her marriage contracts? Can they say to her: It has been revealed retroactively that it was you who caused our inability to have children, and therefore we entered our marriages erroneously, or perhaps she can say to them: It is now that I am older that I have become weak, but in my youth I could have had children with a different husband. The Sages answer: It is reasonable that she can say to them: It is now that I have become weak. Another dilemma was raised before the Sages: If she was married to a fourth husband and she had children with him, what is the halakha with regard to whether she can demand the payment of her marriage contract from her third husband by claiming that it is now evident that she was capable of having children? The Gemara answers: We say to her: Your silence is preferable to your speech, i.e., you are better off not making this claim, as he can say to her: I did not divorce you with this understanding, and now that I know you are capable of having children, I regret divorcing you. This would invalidate her divorce and, consequently, her marriage to her fourth husband, and would render her child a mamzer. Rav Pappa strongly objects to this: If she was silent do we remain silent? If there is room for concern that the divorce might be invalid, the concern exists regardless of her claim, and therefore the bill of divorce should be found invalid and her children from her fourth husband should be rendered mamzerin. Rather, we say that it is now that she has become healthy. In other words, she was previously incapable of bearing children, but she has since recovered from that disability. § The Gemara addresses a related case. If he said that the cause for their failure to have children is from her, i.e., it is she who is infertile, and she said it is from him, Rabbi Ami said: With regard to such matters between him and her, she is believed. The Gemara inquires: What is the reason for this ruling? She is certain whether his semen shoots like an arrow, whereas he is not certain whether his semen shoots like an arrow. If he says: I will go and marry a different woman and examine myself to see if I am indeed the cause, Rabbi Ami said: Even in this case he must divorce his first wife and give her the payment for her marriage contract, as I say that whoever marries a woman in addition to his first wife must divorce his first wife and give her the payment for her marriage contract. Conversely, Rava said that a man may marry several women in addition to his first wife, and there is nothing wrong with this practice as long as he has enough to support them all.

(1) The Torah law obligating a man whose brother died without children [yavam] to marry his deceased brother’s widow [yevama] or to free her from her levirate bonds through the act of ḥalitza applies only when it is permitted for the widow to marry her surviving brother-in-law. However, in cases where the yevama is forbidden to her yavam due to her status as a close family relative, the mitzva of levirate marriage is not applicable, and she is exempt from both levirate marriage and ḥalitza. The Sages further taught that the exemption of a yevama from levirate marriage also exempts her rival wife. In other words, if the deceased brother had two wives, each a so-called rival of the other, and only one wife is a relative of the surviving brother, then the rival wife is also exempt from both levirate marriage and ḥalitza. Moreover, if that same rival wife entered into levirate marriage with a different brother of the deceased, one to whom she is not forbidden, then were this third brother also to die childless, so that the obligation of levirate marriage would again be incurred by the second brother, not only is the forbidden rival wife exempt from levirate marriage and ḥalitza, her new rival wives from her second marriage are also exempt. That is to say, any other wife of the third brother is exempt from the mitzva of levirate marriage, as she is the rival wife of that first rival wife, who was exempted from levirate marriage following her first husband’s death due the exemption of her original rival wife. The same principle applies if that second rival wife subsequently enters into levirate marriage with another permitted brother, and so on. In summary, every widow who is exempt from marrying her brother-in-law due to her status as rival wife of a forbidden relative is treated as a forbidden relative herself and is therefore exempt from both ḥalitza and levirate marriage and causes exemption for future rival wives as well. The mishna describes various cases that invoke the principles above. Fifteen categories of women constitute familial relations that are forbidden as incestuous, and consequently, these women exempt their rival wives and the rival wives of their rival wives from ḥalitza and from levirate marriage forever, i.e., they also exempt rival wives of rival wives of rival wives, and so on. And these women are: The daughter of the yavam, i.e., the deceased brother had married a daughter of his brother, which means that when he died childless, his brother’s own daughter came before her father for levirate marriage, and therefore she is exempt. And the same applies if the deceased brother’s widow is the daughter of the daughter of the yavam, or if she is the daughter of his son, or the daughter of his wife. And similarly, if the yevama is the daughter of the son of the wife of her yavam or the daughter of his wife’s daughter, or if she is the mother-in-law of her yavam, or his mother-in-law’s mother, or his father-in-law’s mother, then she is exempt from ḥalitza and levirate marriage. The mishna continues its list of close relatives. If the yevama is the maternal half sister of the yavam, or if she is the sister of his mother, or his wife’s sister, then she is exempt from both ḥalitza and levirate marriage Or if she was the wife of his maternal half brother, and after this brother died or divorced his wife, she married another of his father’s brothers, who was not her relative, and this brother died, she is exempt. In this case, the obligation to enter into levirate marriage should be incurred by the surviving brother, but since she was previously the wife of his maternal brother, she is exempt. And the same applies to the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist, i.e., the wife of a man who died before his brother was born. As will be explained, the obligation of levirate marriage does not apply to the yavam in this case. Since levirate marriage does not apply to him, the yevama remains forbidden to him as his brother’s wife. And the last case is if one’s yevama had previously been his daughter-in-law, and after his son had died one’s brother married her, before he too passed away. These fifteen women exempt their rival wives and the rival wives of their rival wives from ḥalitza and levirate marriage forever. § And with regard to all of these women listed as prohibited relations, these halakhot apply only if they were married to the deceased brother until the time of his death. However, this is not the case if they died during the deceased brother’s lifetime, or if they refused their husbands when they were minors. This refusal is referring to the decree of the Sages that a girl under the age of twelve whose father is no longer alive may be married off by her mother or brothers. However, this marriage is not final, as she can terminate it by performing an act of refusal, i.e., by declaring, while still a minor, that she does not desire this marriage. In this case, the marriage is annulled retroactively and she is considered as though she were never married at all. Or if those women were divorced by their husband, the deceased brother, or were found to be a sexually underdeveloped woman [aylonit], i.e., a woman who is so underdeveloped that she is not considered a woman in the full sense, these halakhot do not apply. Her marriage is considered a mistaken marriage and is null and void. In all these cases their rival wives are permitted, as the exemption for rival wives of forbidden relatives applies only when the forbidden relative was the brother’s wife at the time of his death, when the halakhot of levirate marriage came into effect. § And the mishna comments that the language of this principle is imprecise, as you cannot say with regard to his mother-in-law and with regard to his mother-in-law’s mother and with regard to his father-in-law’s mother that they were found to be an aylonit, as an aylonit is sterile and therefore cannot become a mother or a mother-in-law. Nor is the mishna precise when it states: Or refused, as refusal applies only to minors, who cannot give birth.

(2) The mishna explains: How do these women exempt their rival wives? If, for example, his daughter or any one of those women with whom relations are forbidden was married to his brother and this brother had another wife, and the brother died, then just as his daughter is exempt from levirate marriage, so too her rival wife is exempt. If his daughter’s rival wife subsequently went and married his second brother, to whom she is permitted, and he had another wife, and he died childless as well, which means that his wife comes before the first yavam, the daughter’s father, for levirate marriage, then just as his daughter’s rival wife is exempt, so too the rival wife of her rival wife is exempt. The mishna adds: Even if they are one hundred brothers, the same logic applies. If a woman is exempt from levirate marriage because she is the rival wife of a forbidden relative or the rival wife of a rival wife of this kind, and she herself has an additional rival wife, this rival wife is also exempt and in turn exempts her own rival wives from levirate marriage. How so? What are the cases in which if they died their rival wives are permitted? If, for example, one’s daughter or any one of those women with whom relations are forbidden was married to his brother, and this brother had another wife, and then his daughter died or was divorced and afterward his brother died, her rival wife is permitted to him. § The mishna states another principle: And if any of these forbidden relatives was a minor who could refuse her husband, then even if she did not refuse, her rival wife performs ḥalitza and does not enter into levirate marriage. The rival wife may not enter into levirate marriage, as she is the rival wife of a forbidden relative. However, she is not entirely exempt from levirate marriage and must be released by ḥalitza because the marriage of the forbidden relative was not a fully valid marriage, and therefore, by Torah law, the other woman is not considered a rival wife of a forbidden relative.

(3) Six women with whom relations are forbidden who were not enumerated in the first mishna are forbidden by prohibitions that are more severe than those listed in that mishna because they may be married only to others and may never be married to any of the brothers, due to the closeness of their relationship. However, this stringency entails a corresponding leniency: Since the halakha of levirate marriage is entirely inapplicable in these cases, their rival wives are permitted. The rival wife of a forbidden relative is forbidden herself only if the mitzva of levirate marriage is applicable, but where it is not in effect she is permitted. The six women with whom relations are forbidden are as follows: His mother, and his father’s wife, and his father’s sister, and his paternal half sister, and the wife of his father’s brother, and the wife of his paternal half brother. Each of these women with whom relations are forbidden is forbidden equally to all of the brothers, and the mitzva of levirate marriage is inapplicable. Therefore, her rival wife is permitted.

(4) Up to this point, the discussions were based on the assumption that not only may a forbidden relative not enter into levirate marriage, but her rival wife is also exempt. However, this issue is subject to a long-standing dispute. Beit Shammai permit the rival wives to the brothers, as they did not accept the interpretation of the verses that indicates that rival wives are prohibited. And Beit Hillel forbid them. The previous mishnayot are in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. If any of the rival wives of the brother performed ḥalitza, Beit Shammai disqualify her from marrying into the priesthood, as in their opinion these rival wives were fit for levirate marriage, which means that the ḥalitza was fully valid. Consequently, they are disqualified from marrying a priest, like all other women who perform ḥalitza. And Beit Hillel deem them fit, as they maintain that no legal act of ḥalitza was performed here at all. If they entered into levirate marriage, Beit Shammai deem them fit for the priesthood, as in their opinion, this is a fully legal levirate marriage. And Beit Hillel disqualify them, because they engaged in licentious sexual relations as the rival wives of a forbidden relative. § The mishna comments: Although Beit Hillel prohibit the rival wives to the brothers and Beit Shammai permit them, and although these disqualify these women and those deem them fit, Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel, nor did Beit Hillel refrain from marrying women from Beit Shammai. Furthermore, with regard to all of the disputes concerning the halakhot of ritual purity and impurity, where these rule that an article is ritually pure and those rule it ritually impure, they did not refrain from handling ritually pure objects each with the other, as Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel frequently used each other’s vessels.

MISHNAH: The House of Shammai permit the co-wives to the brothers, but the House of Hillel forbid. If they took ḥalîṣah, the House of Shammai disqualify them for the priesthood but the House of Hillel declare them qualified. If they entered levirate, the House of Shammai declare them qualified but the House of Hillel as disqualified. Even though these forbid and those permit, these declare disqualified and those qualified, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel nor the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai. Regarding all purities and impurities which these were declaring as pure and those as impure, these did not refrain to process pure foods with the help of those. HALAKHAH: “The House of Shammai permit the co-wives to the brothers,” etc. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Yose in the name ofNehorai: The reason of the House of Shammai, “the outside wife of the deceased shall not belong to a strange man,” the “outer one” should not be another man’s. It turns out that the House of Shammai hold like those Samaritans who perform levirate with the betrothed but remove the married, for they explain “outside” as “the outer one.” How do the House of Shammai confirm “when he has no child”? Rebbi Jacob the Southerner said before Rebbi Yose, “when he has no child” from the married one, “the outer one shall not belong outside to a strange man.” He said to him, will not the Samaritans love you that you confirm their interpretations! Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar stated: I told the learned Samaritans, what did cause you to err? That you did not explain following Rebbi Neḥemiah, since it was stated in the name of Rebbi Neḥemiah: Anything which needs a ל as a prefix but did not get it, we give it a ה at the end, e. g., to the outside חוּצָה, to Se‘ir שְׂעִירָה, to Succoth סוּכּוֹתָה. They objected to Rebbi Neḥemiah, is it not written: “The wicked shall return to the pit לִשְׁאוֹלָה.” Rabba bar Zabda said, to the lowest living space in Sheol. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, look how this practice is widespread in Israel! If one upholds the words of the House of Shammai, the child is a bastard following the words of the House of Hillel. If one upholds the words of the House of Hillel, the child is a bastard following the words of the House of Shammai. Come and let us institute that the co-wife perform ḥalîṣah but not be admitted to levirate. It was stated: They did not manage to institute this before the time became unsuitable. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, if it were so, what would one have done with the earlier co-wives who married? Rebbi Eleazar said, even though the House of Hillel and the House of Shammai disagreed about co-wives, they agree that the child is not a bastard, since a bastard is only from a woman which is forbidden to [a man] by an incest prohibition and one is subject to extirpation for [sinning with] her. Rebbi Tarphon said, I would love to have a daughter’s co-wife to marry her into priesthood. They asked Rebbi Joshua, what are children of a daughter’s co-wife? He said to them, you bring my head between two large mountains, between the words of the House of Shammai and those of the House of Hillel, that they should smash my brain. But I testify about the family ‘Anubai from Bet Ṣeba‘im and the family Neqipai from Bet Meqošeš that they were sons of co-wives and their grandchildren were High Priests officiating on top of the altar. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It happened that the Sages visited Rebbi Dosa ben Hyrkanos to ask him about the daughter’s co-wife. They said to him, are you the one who permits co-wives? He said to them, what did you hear? Dosa ben Hyrkanos? They said to him, ben Hyrkanos. He said to them, my brother Jonathan is exceedingly sharpminded and of the students of the House of Shammai. Be careful with him, he has three hundred arguments about the daughter’s co-wife. They went to him. He sent and wrote to him, be careful because the Sages of Israel will visit you. They came and he placed them before him. He lectured but they did not understand, repeatedly. They started to get drowsy. He said to them, why are you getting drowsy? He started pelting them with pebbles. But some people said, they entered in one door and left in three. He sent to say to him, why did you send to me, the people want to learn and you said to me, these are the Sages of Israel? They came to him and said to him, what do you say in the matter? He said, on this stone sat the prophet Ḥaggai and testified to three things: On the daughter’s co-wife that she can be married into priesthood, on Ammon and Moab that they tithe for the poor in a Sabbatical year, and on proselytes of Palmyra that they are acceptable to marry into the congregation. He said, lift my eyelids so I can see the Sages of Israel. He saw Rebbi Joshua and said to him: “To whom will one teach knowledge?” I remember that his mother brought his crib to the Synagogue that his ears should cling to the words of the Torah. [He saw] Rebbi Aqiba, and said to him: “Lion cubs will be poor and hungry.” I know of him that he is a man strong in Torah. He saw Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah and said to him: “I was a youth but became an elder.” I know of him that he is the tenth generation from Ezra and their eyes are similar. Rebbi Ḥanina from Sepphoris said, Rebbi Tarphon also was with them and he addressed him as he did Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said, one accepts proselytes from Kurds and Palmyrenians. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A Mishnah said that the proselytes from Palmyra are acceptable. There, we have stated: “All stains coming from Petra are pure.” Therefore, the proselytes from Palmyra are acceptable. Text of the parallel Qiddušin4:1: Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa presented traditions: Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, one declares permissible and the other admits. He who declares permissible admits. But he who admits does not declare admissible. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Naḥman bar Jacob: Babylonia, as far as family pedigree is concerned, extends up to the zrvq canal. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel, one said up to the zrvq canal, the other said up to the Wani canal. Rav Jehudah said, between the rivers is like Nahardea as far as family pedigree is concerned. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Beroqa in the name of Rav Jehudah: The people of Mesene are questionable only because of doubts of desecrated women. The Cohanim amongst them did not care about divorcees. There, they called Mesene dead, Media sick, Elam and gbby dying. The maritime district is the purple-blue of Babylonia. Šny’, gbby’, and ṣrry are purple-blue of the maritime district. “Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and one who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, i. e., he who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and that a woman receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and the child of the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and the child of the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai says unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel, one said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed its own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened. In this matter, it was stated: “About anybody who wants to take upon himself the stringencies both of the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel it was said: ‘The silly one walks in darkness’. The leniencies of both of them, he is called wicked. Only either following the words of the House of Shammai in their leniencies and stringencies, or following the words of the House of Hillel in their leniencies and stringencies.” That is, before there came the disembodied voice. But after the disembodied voice was heard, “practice follows the House of Hillel forever.” And any who transgresses the words of the House of Hillel is deserving of death. It was stated: There came the disembodied voice and said: Both of them are the words of the Living God, but practice follows the House of Hillel forever. Where was the disembodied voice heard? Rav Bebai in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The disembodied voice was heard at Yabneh.

whereas with regard to the children of rival wives, I testify to you that they are not disqualified, since, as stated, their descendants served as High Priests. § The Gemara states: Come and hear another source that indicates Beit Shammai did act upon their opinions: In the time of Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas, the rival wife of a daughter was permitted to the brothers. Conclude from this that Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their opinions. The Gemara summarizes these proofs: Indeed, conclude from these sources that Beit Shammai did put their rulings into practice. § Since the last source is only part of a larger incident, the Gemara cites the matter itself. In the time of Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas the Sages permitted the rival wife of a daughter to the brothers. In other words, it became known that Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas deemed permitted a daughter’s rival wife. And this matter was difficult in the eyes of the Rabbis because he was a great Sage and his decision in favor of Beit Shammai carried great weight. They could not approach him immediately, as he was very old and his eyes had dimmed so much that he was incapable of coming to the study hall. They said: And who will go and notify him that this matter requires clarification? Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: I will go. They asked: And who shall go after him? They selected Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, who was one of the great Sages of the generation, notwithstanding his youth. They further inquired: And who after him? Rabbi Akiva. They went and stood at the entrance of Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas’s house. His maidservant entered and said to him: Rabbi, the Sages of Israel have come to you. He said to her: Let them enter, and they entered. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas grabbed Rabbi Yehoshua, with whom he was already acquainted, and sat him on a bed of gold, as Rabbi Dosa was extremely wealthy. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Rabbi, call your other disciple so that he may sit. He asked him to call the other Sage as well, as it is a mark of respect when speaking to a great scholar to call every other Sage his disciple. He said to him: Who is it? Rabbi Yehoshua replied: Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Rabbi Dosa said: And does our colleague Azarya have a son? Due to his old age and prolonged absence from the study hall he had not heard of him. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas recited this verse about Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya: “I have been young, and now am old; yet I have not seen the righteous forsaken, nor his seed begging bread” (Psalms 37:25). He interpreted this verse to mean that the son of a Torah scholar also becomes a Torah scholar. He grabbed him and sat him on a bed of gold. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Rabbi, call your other disciple so that he may sit. He said to him: Who is that? He said to him: Akiva ben Yosef. Rabbi Dosa said to him: You are Akiva ben Yosef, whose name has spread from one end of the world to the other? Even Rabbi Dosa had heard of Rabbi Akiva’s reputation as a great man. Sit, my son, sit. May the likes of you multiply in Israel. Out of courtesy, they did not wish to broach the subject immediately. Rather, they began to encircle him with deliberations on different halakhot, until they came to the case of the rival wife of a daughter. They said to him: What is the halakha with regard to the rival wife of a daughter? He said that it is a matter of dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. They asked him: According to whose statement is the halakha? He said to them: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. They said to him: But didn’t they say in your name that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai? He said to them: Did you hear that Dosa ben Harkinas issued this ruling, or did you hear that it was stated by ben Harkinas? They said to him: On your life, Rabbi, we heard simply ben Harkinas. He said to them: If so, it is no wonder, as I have a younger brother who is the firstborn of the Satan, i.e., he is extremely sharp and as brazen as a demon. And his name is Yonatan, and he is among the disciples of Shammai. It is he who issued this ruling. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas added: And beware that he not batter you with halakhot in this matter, as he has with him three hundred proofs with regard to the rival wife of a daughter that she is permitted. However, you need not worry about the issue itself, as I call as witnesses before me the heavens and the earth that on this very mortar, which was preserved in my house due to its historical importance, Haggai the prophet sat, and I have a tradition that he said three matters of halakha: First, that the rival wife of a daughter is forbidden. Second, that the halakhic rulings for the territories of Ammon and Moab in Transjordan, although similar to those of Eretz Yisrael, are not exactly the same, as their residents tithe the poor man’s tithe in the Sabbatical Year. The total abandonment of fields in the seventh year does not apply in Ammon and Moab, as they are not part of Eretz Yisrael. Instead, in those areas one must bring the poor man’s tithe to the paupers of Eretz Yisrael, as there are no tithes in Eretz Yisrael in the Sabbatical Year. Lastly, Haggai testified: And one accepts converts from the Karduyin and the Tarmodim, without concern that there might be Jews mingled among them, which could render them mamzerim and prohibited from entering the community. The Sage taught: When they entered, they all entered through one entrance. When they left, they left through three entrances, in an effort to try to find Rabbi Dosa’s brother. Rabbi Akiva encountered him. Yonatan ben Harkinas raised against him all of his objections to the opinion of Beit Hillel, and he withstood him, i.e., Rabbi Akiva was able to respond to all of them. Yonatan ben Harkinas grew angry and said to him: You are Akiva ben Yosef, whose name has spread from one end of the world to the other? Be happy that you have merited a great name, and yet you have not yet reached the level of cattle herders. Cattle herders were generally simple individuals who were not familiar even with ordinary matters, and certainly not with halakha. Rabbi Akiva said to him with characteristic modesty: And I have not even reached the level of shepherds, who are considered even worse than cattle herders, as they are unfit for giving testimony. § Since the halakhot of the prophet Haggai were mentioned, the Gemara discusses them here. Haggai said that Ammon and Moab tithe the poor man’s tithe in the Sabbatical Year, as the Master said: Many cities were conquered by those who returned from Egypt, and were not conquered by those who returned from Babylonia after the destruction of the First Temple. And the initial consecration of Eretz Yisrael, by those who returned from Egypt, sanctified it for its time and did not sanctify it forever, as the future sanctification of Eretz Yisrael depended on the renewed conquest of the land by the Jewish people. And those who returned from Babylonia left those places aside and did not consider them part of Eretz Yisrael even after Jewish settlement was renewed there. They would plow and harvest in these places in the Sabbatical Year and tithe the poor man’s tithe so that the poor of Eretz Yisrael who did not have sufficient income from the previous years could rely upon them. Consequently, in the Sabbatical Year the poor received help from this tithe. § Haggai also declared: And one accepts converts from the Karduyim and the Tarmodim. The Gemara asks: Is that so? But didn’t Rami bar Yeḥezkel teach in a baraita: One does not accept converts from the Karduyim? Rav Ashi said: Kartuyim, not Karduyim, was stated by Rami bar Yeḥezkel. As people say in common discourse: The Kartuyim are unfit. And there are those who say a slightly different version of this discussion. Rami bar Yeḥezkel taught: One does not accept converts from the Kartuyim. What, is it not the case that Kartuyim is the same as Karduyim? If so there is a contradiction between the baraita of Rami bar Yeḥezkel and the statement of Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas. Rav Ashi said: No; the Kartuyim are one discrete category and the Karduyim are another discrete category, as people say: Kartuyim are unfit. Rabbi Yoḥanan and the Elders both say: One does not accept converts from the Tarmodim. The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say this, that one does not accept converts from the Tarmodim due to a concern that Jews may have intermingled with them? But didn’t we learn in a mishna: All clothing with stains of blood that might be from a menstruating woman and that come from the city on the border of Eretz Yisrael called Rekem are ritually pure, as it can be assumed that they belong to gentiles, and the blood of a menstruating gentile woman is not ritually impure. And Rabbi Yehuda deems it ritually impure because those residents of that place are converts and are in error. In other words, some of the inhabitants of Rekem assimilated and no longer observe the halakhot of the Torah, and therefore one must be wary lest the stains are in fact from a Jewish menstruating woman. Stains that came from among the gentiles, however, are ritually pure. And we discussed the following problem:

(1) If witnesses said to a person: We saw that you ate forbidden fat, he is liable to bring a sin offering if he did so unwittingly. If a witness says: He ate forbidden fat, and a witness says: He did not eat forbidden fat, or if a woman says: He ate forbidden fat, and a woman says: He did not eat forbidden fat, he is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering, brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires a sin offering. If a witness says: He ate forbidden fat, and the person himself says: I did not eat forbidden fat, he is exempt. If two witnesses say: He ate forbidden fat, and the person himself says: I did not eat forbidden fat, Rabbi Meir deems him liable to bring a sin offering. Rabbi Meir said: This conclusion can be derived a fortiori: If two witnesses could have brought him liability to receive the severe punishment of death, can they not bring him liability to sacrifice an offering, which is relatively lenient? The Rabbis said to him: Witnesses are unable to render another person liable to bring an offering contrary to his statement, as what if he wishes to say: I did so intentionally, in which case he would be exempt from bringing an offering?

(2) If one unwittingly ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat and then ate another olive-bulk of forbidden fat during one lapse of awareness, i.e., in a case where he did not discover in the interim that fat is forbidden, or that the food he is eating is forbidden fat, he is liable to bring only one sin offering. If one ate forbidden fat, and blood, and piggul, and notar in one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every one of them. This is a stringency that applies to one who eats several types of forbidden food and does not apply to one who eats one type of forbidden food. And a stringency that applies to one who eats one type of forbidden food and not to one who eats several types of forbidden food is that if one ate half an olive-bulk and then ate another half an olive-bulk during one lapse of awareness, in a case where they were both from one type of forbidden food, he is liable to bring a sin offering. If they were from two types, he is exempt, because he did not eat an olive-bulk of any specific forbidden food.

(3) How much time can one expend while eating an olive-bulk of forbidden food and still be liable for violating the prohibition? The duration is calculated as though he were eating toasted grain, which one eats one kernel at a time. If he eats the olive-bulk of forbidden food within the amount of time it would take to eat an olive-bulk of toasted grain, he is liable. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Unless the amount of time he expends from beginning to end is more than the time it takes to eat a half-loaf [peras] of bread, he is liable. Likewise, one who ate a quarter-loaf of ritually impure foods or drank a quarter-log of ritually impure liquids within the amount of time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread is rendered unfit to partake of teruma, the portion of the produce designated for priests, until he becomes pure. Similarly, if one drank a quarter-log of wine and entered the Temple, and he remained there for the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread, he is liable. Rabbi Elazar says: If he interrupted his drinking of the quarter-log of wine or if he placed any amount of water into the wine, he is exempt.

(4) There is a case where one can perform a single act of eating an olive-bulk of food and be liable to bring four sin offerings and one guilt offering for it. How so? This halakha applies to one who is ritually impure who ate forbidden fat, and it was left over from a consecrated offering after the time allotted for its consumption [notar], on Yom Kippur. He is liable to bring sin offerings for eating forbidden fat and notar, for eating the meat of an offering while impure, and for eating on Yom Kippur. He is also liable to bring a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property. Rabbi Meir says: If it was Shabbat and he carried it out from a private domain to a public domain while eating it, he would be liable to bring an additional sin offering for performing prohibited labor on Shabbat. The Rabbis said to him: That liability is not from the same type of prohibition, as it is not due to the act of eating, and therefore, it should not be counted.

(5) There is a case where one can engage in a single act of intercourse and be liable to bring six sin offerings for it. How so? It is possible for one who engages in intercourse with his daughter to be liable due to having violated the prohibitions of engaging in intercourse with his daughter, his sister, the wife of his brother, the wife of his father’s brother, a married woman, and a menstruating woman. It is possible for one who engages in intercourse with his daughter’s daughter to be liable to bring sin offerings due to the unwitting violation of the prohibitions of engaging in intercourse with his daughter’s daughter, and his daughter-in-law, and the wife of his brother, and the wife of his father’s brother, and his wife’s sister, and a married woman, and a menstruating woman. Rabbi Yosei says: If the elder, i.e., the man’s father, who is the woman’s great-grandfather, transgressed and married her, the man would also be liable for engaging in intercourse with her due to the prohibition of intercourse with the wife of his father. And likewise, it is possible for one who engages in intercourse with the daughter of his wife to be liable to bring six sin offerings, similar to one who engages in intercourse with his own daughter, for violating the prohibitions against engaging in intercourse with his wife’s daughter, his sister, the wife of his brother, the wife of his father’s brother, a married woman, and a menstruating woman. And it is possible for one who engages in intercourse with his wife’s daughter’s daughter to be liable to bring seven sin offerings, similar to one who engages in intercourse with his own daughter’s daughter, for violating the following prohibitions: Engaging in intercourse with his wife’s daughter’s daughter, his daughter-in-law, the wife of his brother, the wife of his father’s brother, his wife’s sister, a married woman, and a menstruating woman.

(6) It is possible for one who engages in intercourse with his mother-in-law to be liable to bring seven sin offerings for doing so, due to the unwitting violation of the prohibitions of engaging in intercourse with his mother-in-law, and his daughter-in-law, and the wife of his brother, and the wife of his father’s brother, and his wife’s sister, and a married woman, and a menstruating woman. And likewise, the same applies with regard to one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his father-in-law or with the mother of his mother-in-law. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: It is possible for one who engages in intercourse with his mother-in-law to be liable due to the unwitting violation of the prohibitions of engaging in intercourse with his mother-in-law, and the mother of his mother-in-law, and the mother of his father-in-law. The Rabbis said to him: Those three prohibitions are all one category of prohibition, derived from the same verse: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; you shall not take her son’s daughter, or her daughter’s daughter” (Leviticus 18:17). Consequently, one is not liable to bring separate sin offerings for violating these prohibitions.

(7) Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua in the meat market [itlis] in Emmaus, where they went to purchase an animal for the wedding feast of the son of Rabban Gamliel: In the case of one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with his sister, and the sister of his father, and the sister of his mother, during one lapse of awareness, what is the halakha? Is he liable to bring one sin offering for all three prohibitions, or is he liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one of the prohibitions? They said to Rabbi Akiva: We did not hear a ruling from our teachers about that case, but we heard the following ruling: One who engages in intercourse with each of his five wives while they are menstruating, during one lapse of awareness, we heard that he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for having engaged in intercourse with each and every one of them. And it appears to me that these matters can be derived from an a fortiori inference: If he is liable to bring separate sin offerings for having engaged in intercourse with five menstruating women, who are forbidden by one prohibition, he should certainly be liable to bring separate sin offerings for having engaged in intercourse with his sister, the sister of his father, and the sister of his mother, who are forbidden by three separate prohibitions.

(8) And furthermore, Rabbi Akiva asked Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua in the meat market of Emmaus: What is the status of a dangling limb of an animal? Does it impart ritual impurity like a severed limb? They said to Rabbi Akiva: We have not heard a ruling from our teachers in that specific case, but we have heard with regard to a dangling limb of a person that it is ritually pure. And in this manner would the people afflicted with boils, whose limbs were dangling due to their affliction, act in Jerusalem: Each of them would go on Passover eve to the doctor, who would cut the affected limb almost completely until he would leave it connected by a hairbreadth of flesh, so that neither the doctor nor the afflicted would be rendered ritually impure by a severed limb. Then, the doctor would impale the limb on a thorn attached to the floor or the wall, and the afflicted would pull away from the thorn, thereby completely severing the limb. And that person afflicted with boils would perform the rite of his Paschal offering, and the doctor would perform the rite of his Paschal offering, as neither had come into contact with the limb once it was severed. In any case, as long as it was dangling, the limb did not impart impurity. And I consider that these matters can be derived from an a fortiori inference. If a person’s limb, the impurity of which when amputated is severe, does not impart impurity when it is dangling, it is all the more so logical that an animal’s limb, the impurity of which when amputated is lenient, does not impart impurity when it is dangling.

(9) And furthermore, Rabbi Akiva asked Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua: With regard to one who unwittingly slaughters five offerings outside the Temple during one lapse of awareness, what is the halakha? Is he liable to bring five sin offerings, one for each and every act of slaughter, or is he liable to bring one sin offering for all the acts of slaughter? They said to Rabbi Akiva: We have not heard a ruling from our teachers in that specific case. Rabbi Yehoshua said: I have heard with regard to one who eats meat from one offering from five different pots in which they were prepared, during one lapse of awareness, that he is liable to bring five guilt offerings, which are for the meat prepared in each and every pot, due to misuse of consecrated property. And I consider that these matters can be derived from an a fortiori inference: If one is liable to bring five guilt offerings for one offering prepared in five pots, all the more so is he liable to bring five sin offerings for slaughtering five offerings outside the Temple. Rabbi Shimon said: It was not that question that Rabbi Akiva asked them. Rather, it was with regard to one who eats notar from five offerings during one lapse of awareness. What is the halakha? Is he liable to bring one sin offering for all the offerings from which he ate notar, or is he liable to bring five sin offerings, one for each and every one of the offerings from which he ate notar? They said to Rabbi Akiva: We have not heard a ruling from our teachers in that specific case. Rabbi Yehoshua said: I have heard with regard to one who eats meat from one offering that was prepared in five different pots, during one lapse of awareness, that he is liable to bring separate guilt offerings for the meat prepared in each and every pot, due to misuse of consecrated property. And I consider that these matters can be derived from an a fortiori inference: If one is liable to bring five guilt offerings for one offering prepared in five pots, all the more so is he liable to bring five sin offerings for eating the notar of five separate offerings. Rabbi Akiva said to Rabbi Yehoshua: If you are reporting a halakha that you received from your teachers with regard to one who eats notar from five offerings, we will accept it, but if it is based merely on the a fortiori inference from misuse of consecrated property, there is a response that refutes the inference. Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Akiva: Respond. Rabbi Akiva said: And no; one cannot derive the halakha of notar through an a fortiori inference from misuse of consecrated property: If you said with regard to misuse of consecrated property that one is liable to bring five guilt offerings, perhaps that is because there are additional stringent elements unique to misuse. As, with regard to misuse, the Torah established that the status of one who feeds another person sacrificial meat is like that of one who eats sacrificial meat, and the status of one who gives benefit to another from consecrated property that is not food is like that of one who derives benefit himself, in that each is liable to bring a guilt offering for misuse. In addition, the Torah joined the misuse of consecrated property that was performed over an extended period, i.e., if one derived benefit worth half a peruta one day and half a peruta the next, he is liable to bring a guilt offering for misuse. Would you say the same with regard to notar, which has none of these halakhot?

(10) Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer with regard to one who performs multiple prohibited labors on several Shabbatot, and all those labors were subsumed as subcategories of one primary category of prohibited labor, and he performed them during one lapse of awareness. What is the halakha? Is he liable to bring one sin offering for unwitting performance of all these labors or is he liable to bring a sin offering for violation of each and every one of the labors? Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Akiva: He is liable to bring a sin offering for violation of each and every one of the labors, and this is derived from an a fortiori inference: Just as in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are not multiple actions that result in transgression and that result in multiple sin offerings, but rather only the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with her, and nevertheless one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one of his acts of unwitting intercourse; in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are multiple primary categories and subcategories of labor that result in transgression and that result in multiple death penalties or sin offerings, is it not right that he will be liable to bring a sin offering for performance of each and every one of the prohibited labors? Rabbi Akiva continues: I said to Rabbi Eliezer that the inference is not valid: If you said one is liable to bring multiple sin offerings in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are two prohibitions, as the man is prohibited from engaging in intercourse with the menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is prohibited from engaging in intercourse with him, would you say the same in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there is only one prohibition? Rabbi Eliezer said to me: The halakha of one who engages in intercourse with minor menstruating girls will prove this refutation is not valid, as in that case there is only one prohibition, because the minor is exempt from the mitzvot, and nevertheless the man is liable to bring a separate sin offering for intercourse for each and every one of the acts of intercourse. Rabbi Akiva said: I said to Rabbi Eliezer that the cases of Shabbat and minor menstruating girls are not comparable. If you said in the case of minor girls that although it is not prohibited for them at present it is prohibited for them after the passage of time, when they reach majority, would you say the same in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are neither two prohibitions at present, nor will there be after the passage of time? Rabbi Eliezer said to me: The halakha of one who copulates with an animal will prove this refutation is not valid, as there are never two prohibitions in that case, and nevertheless the person is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every act. Rabbi Akiva said: I said to Rabbi Eliezer that no proof can be cited from the case of an animal, as in my opinion the case of the animal is like that of Shabbat; there is uncertainty with regard to both cases.