The Law of the Land is not Always the Law

שלח ליה ר' יהושע בן קרחה חומץ בן יין עד מתי אתה מוסר עמו של אלהינו להריגה שלח ליה קוצים אני מכלה מן הכרם שלח ליה יבא בעל הכרם ויכלה את קוציו יומא חד פגע ביה ההוא כובס קרייה חומץ בן יין אמר מדחציף כולי האי שמע מינה רשיעא הוא אמר להו תפסוהו תפסוהו לבתר דנח דעתיה אזל בתריה לפרוקיה ולא מצי קרי עליה (משלי כא, כג) שומר פיו ולשונו שומר מצרות נפשו זקפוהו קם תותי זקיפא וקא בכי אמרו ליה רבי אל ירע בעיניך שהוא ובנו בעלו נערה מאורסה ביום הכפורים הניח ידו על בני מעיו אמר שישו בני מעי שישו ומה ספיקות שלכם כך ודאית שלכם על אחת כמה וכמה מובטח אני בכם שאין רמה ותולעה שולטת בכם ואפי' הכי לא מייתבא דעתיה

R`Joshua, son of Karchah, sent word to him, 'Vinegar, son of wine! How long will you deliver up the people of our God for slaughter!'

[R' Eleazar] sent back the reply: 'I weed out thorns from the vineyard.'

R`Joshua sent back the reply: 'Let the owner of the vineyard [God] come and weed out the thorns.'

One day a laundryman met him, and called him: 'Vinegar, son of wine.'

Said the Rabbi to himself, 'Since he is so insolent, deduce from it that he is certainly a culprit.'

So he gave the order to his attendant: 'Arrest him! Arrest him!' When his anger cooled, he went after him in order to secure his release, but did not succeed.

Thereupon he applied to him, the verse, "One who guards his mouth and his tongue, guards his soul from troubles (Prov. 21:23)

Then they hanged him, and [R`Eleazar] stood under the gallows and wept.

Said [his disciples] to him: 'Master, do not grieve; for he and his son seduced a betrothed maiden on Yom Kippur.'

[On hearing this,] he laid his hand upon his innards and exclaimed: 'Rejoice, my innards! If matters on which you are doubtful are such, how much more so those on which you art certain! I am well assured that neither worms nor decay will have power over you.'

In spite of this, his conscience disquieted him.

על שבע מצוות נצטוו בני נח על הדינין ועל עבודה זרה ועל קיללת השם ועל גילוי עריות ועל שפיכות דמים ועל הגזל...כל ערוה שבית דין של ישראל ממיתין עליה בני נח מוזהרין עליה

Tosefta Masechet Avodah Zarah (Zuckermandel) 8:4

Regarding seven things, the children of Noach were commanded: regarding (the establishment of) courts, and regarding idolatry, and regarding profaning the name of God, and regarding sexual impropriety, and regarding murder, and regarding stealing...Every act of sexual impropriety that a Jewish court gives the death sentence for, the children of Noach are (only) warned regarding it

The specific content of the Tosefta aside (i.e. don't get caught up in sexual moralism and who is more strict--that is an important conversation but not our focus) what does the Tosefta offer us in ways of thinking about Jewish governance and non-Jewish governance? How do they relate to each other? How does this vision for governance compare to the modern nation states we have today?

נודרין להרגין. ולחרמין. ולמוכסין. שהיא תרומה. אף על פי שאינה תרומה.

One may vow [in front of] murderers and thieves and [royal] tax collectors that [something] is terumah, even if it isn't terumah

Terumah is a Temple offering--essentially, it is property that is set aside as God's under the Jewish sacrificial system. Why might murderers, thieves and tax collectors be grouped together like this? What does this assume about non-Jewish respect for Jewish law? Jewish respect for non-Jewish law (and those who break it?)

והאמר שמואל דינא דמלכותא דינא אמר רב חיננא אמר רב כהנא אמר שמואל במוכס שאין לו קצבה דבי ר' ינאי אמר במוכס העומד מאליו:

Didn't Shmuel say: The law of the land is the law?

Rav Chinena said that Rav Kahana said that Shmuel said: [This Mishnah refers to] a tax collector who does not have a limit [on what he can tax].

The House of Rabbi Yannai said: [This Mishnah refers to] a self appointed tax collector.

This is the Talmud commenting on the Mishnah above. What are the difference between the two positions (Rav Chinena vs. Yannai)? How do they understand the relationship between law and justice?

כללו של דבר כל דין שיחקוק אותו המלך לכל ולא יהיה לאדם אחד בפני עצמו אינו גזל. וכל שיקח מאיש זה בלבד שלא כדת הידועה לכל אלא חמס את זה הרי זה גזל. ג לפיכך גבאי המלך ושוטריו שמוכרים השדות במס הקצוב על השדות ממכרן ממכר. אבל מס שעל כל איש ואיש אינו גובה אלא מן האדם עצמו ואם מכרו השדה במס שעל הראש הרי זה אינו ממכר אלא אם כן היה דין המלך כך.

The general principle is: Any law that a king decrees to be universally applicable, and not merely applying to one person, is not considered robbery. But whenever he takes from one person alone in a manner that does not conform to a known law, but rather seizes the property from the person arbitrarily, it is considered to be robbery.
Therefore, when the king's tax collectors and enforcement officers sell fields because the owner did not pay the fixed tax for the field, the sale is binding. A head tax, however, is the personal responsibility of each person and it may not be collected from his property. Thus, if a field was sold because an individual was delinquent in paying the head tax, the sale is not binding, unless this is the law enacted by this particular king.

This text is by the Rambam--a medieval Jewish scholar who worked for the Spanish king (important detail, no?). As a Jew with multiple allegiances, how might this inform how he views kingly authority? What limits does he (not) set for the king's authority? What is he (not) protecting Jews from?

Codex Theodosianus, Book 16.8.20, 412 CE

If it should appear that any places are frequented by conventicles of the Jews and are all called by the name of the synagogues, no one shall dare to violate or to occupy and retain such places, since all persons must retain their own property in undisturbed right, without any claim of religion or worship. Moreover, since indeed ancient custom and practice have preserved for the aforesaid Jewish people the consecrated day of the Sabbath, We also decree that is shall be forbidden that any man of the aforesaid faith be constrained by any summons on that day, under the pretext of public or private business, since all the remaining time appears sufficient to satisfy the public laws, and since it is most worthy of the moderation of Our time that the privileges granted should not be violated, although sufficient provision appears to have been made with reference to the aforesaid matter by general constitutions of earlier Emperors.

This is our first non-Jewish text about Jews. It was written by the Romans who held Jews in a particular legal status. What are the dis/advantages of this relationship between non-Jewish law and Jewish law?

Las Siete Partidas 1265 CE, Title XXIV: Concerning the Jews

LAW IV. HOW JEWS CAN HAVE A SYNAGOGUE AMONG CHRISTIANS

A synagogue is a place where the Jews pray, and a new building of this kind cannot be erected in any part of our dominions, except by our order. Where, however, those which formerly existed there are torn down, they can be built in the same spot where they originally stood; but they cannot be made any larger or raised to any greater height, or be painted. A synagogue constructed in any other manner shall be lost by the Jews, and shall belong to the principal church of the locality where it is built. And for the reason that a synagogue is a place where the name of God is praised, we forbid any Christian to deface it, or remove anything from it, or take anything out of it by force; except where some malefactor takes refuge there; for they have a right to remove him by force in order to bring him before the judge. Moreover, we forbid Christians to put any animal into a synagogue, or loiter in it, or place any hindrance in the way of the Jews while they are there performing their devotions according to their religion.

853 years after the Codex Theodosianus, the Spanish (Catholic) government made these (and more) laws about Jews. Muslims, in contrast, were not permitted to have mosques. What is (not) appealing about these laws? Why might they have been necessary? Are they necessary today? Would these "special protections" hold up to Rambam's framework of equality under the law? What are some similar legal/political debates we have today?

(יא) וכן מלך שגזר שכל מי שיתן מס הקצוב על האיש ישתעבד בזה שלא נתן ובא ישראל ונתן המס שעל ישראל זה העני הרי זה עובד בו יותר מדאי שדין המלך דין אבל אינו עובד בו כעבד: הגה: ישראל שהיה חייב לעכו"ם והעכו"ם מכר השטר לישראל אע"פ שאסור לדון עם ישראל חבירו בפני עכו"ם ואע"פ שבא מכח עכו"ם מ"מ דייני ישראל יפסקו לישראל זה מה שהיה העכו"ם מרויח לפני דייני עכו"ם הואיל וישראל זה בא מכחו הרי הוא כמוהו בכל מה שהיה יכול לזכות לפני דייני עכו"ם שהוא דינא דמלכותא (תשובת הרא"ש כלל י"ח סי' א' וכנ"ל ס"ס כ"ו) הנושא אשה במקום שדנין בדיני עכו"ם ומתה אשתו לא יוכל אבי אשתו או שאר יורשיה לומר כל הנושא אשה על דעת המנהג הוא נושא ונדון הדבר בדיני עכו"ם דאם מתה (לא) יורשה בעלה או כדומה לזה וליכא בזה משום דינא דמלכותא (ב"י בסי' כ"ו בשם תשובת הרשב"א) דלא אמרינן דינא דמלכותא אלא בדבר שיש בו הנאה למלך או שהוא לתקנת בני המדינה אבל לא שידונו בדיני עכו"ם דא"כ בטלו כל דיני ישראל (מהרי"ק שורש קפ"ח בשם רשב"א):

if a king decrees that whoever pays a head tax for a person who has not paid acquires the delinquent person as a servant the decree is binding. If one Jew comes and pays a head tax for another indigent, he may compel him to work beyond ordinary limits, for the laws of a king are binding. He may not, however, have him toil as a slave.

Gloss (from the Mappah): ...If a (man) marries a woman in a place in which rulings are (made) in the courts of non-Jews and his wife died, the father of his wife or the rest of her successors could not (claim the inheritance), which is to say, any man who marries a woman, who gets married under (non-Jewish) custom, and the matter is ruled through non-Jewish courts that if she died, her husband inherits it or something along these lines, there is no grounds to apply the concept of "the law of the land is the law," for we only apply "the law of the land is the law" in a matter that involves benefit for the king, or that is for a legal change for the members of the state, but not in the cases where non-Jewish courts make rulings, for if this were so, they would have nullified all the laws of Israel.

The Shulchan Aruch (meaning "set table") is a text that's core was written by Yosef Karo (Spanish scholar) in 1563 with responses by Moses Isserles, a Polish scholar known as the Mappah (meaning the "tablecloth"--get it?). Notice how Karo phrases the kingly authority differently from how we've seen it previously. How might we understand the the authority of a "king" to be different from the authority of a "kingdom?" What are the implications of this move?

Don't worry too much about the situation the Mappah outlines--it is very confusing! Know that he is describing a situation where Jewish law and civil law are in conflict and the people involved want to "double dip." What do you make of his conclusion? How does his concern for a maximalist reading of dina d'malchuta dina strike you today?