ולהנך תנאי דמפקי ליה להאי בעל השור נקי לדרשה אחרינא [כדבעינן למימר קמן] הנאת עורו מנא להו נפקא להו מאת בשרו את הטפל לבשרו מאי ניהו עורו והאי תנא את לא דריש כדתניא שמעון העמסוני ואמרי לה נחמיה העמסוני היה דורש כל אתין שבתורה כיון שהגיע (דברים ו, יג) לאת ה' אלהיך תירא פירש אמרו לו תלמידיו רבי כל אתין שדרשת מה תהא עליהן אמר להם כשם שקבלתי שכר על הדרישה כך קבלתי שכר על הפרישה עד שבא ר' עקיבא ולימד את ה' אלהיך תירא לרבות תלמידי חכמים:
The Gemara asks: And according to those tanna’im who expound this verse: “The owner of the ox shall be clear,” for another interpretation, as we wish to state below, from where do they derive this prohibition against deriving benefit from the ox’s hide? The Gemara answers: They derive it from the wording: “Its flesh may not be eaten [velo ye’akhel et besaro].” The verse could have been formulated: Velo ye’akhel besaro, which already means: And its flesh shall not be eaten. The addition of the word “et” teaches that the prohibition applies also to that which is secondary to the flesh. And what is that? That is its hide. The Gemara adds: And this tanna, who derives it from the statement: “The owner of the ox shall be clear,” does not interpret the word “et” as a means to derive new halakhot. He considers the word “et” to be an ordinary part of the sentence structure and not a source for exegetical exposition. As it is taught in a baraita: Shimon HaAmasoni, and some say that it was Neḥemya HaAmasoni, would interpret all occurrences of the word “et” in the Torah, deriving additional halakhot with regard to the particular subject matter. Once he reached the verse: “You shall fear the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 6:13), which is written with the added word “et,” he withdrew from this method of exposition, as whose fear could be an extension of the fear of God? His students said to him: Our teacher, what will be with all the occurrences of the word “et” that you interpreted until now? He said to them: Just as I received reward for the exposition, so I received reward for my withdrawal from using this method of exposition. The word “et” in this verse was not explained until Rabbi Akiva came and expounded: “You shall fear the Lord your God”: The word “et” serves to include Torah scholars, i.e., that one is commanded to fear them just as one fears God. In any event, Shimon HaAmasoni no longer derived additional halakhot from the word et.
ואמר רבה נפל מראש הגג ונתקע באשה חייב בד' דברים וביבמתו לא קנה חייב בנזק בצער בריפוי בשבת אבל בשת לא דתנן אינו חייב על הבשת עד שיהא מתכוין ואמר רבה נפל מראש הגג ברוח שאינה מצויה והזיק ובייש חייב על הנזק ופטור בד' דברים ברוח מצויה והזיק ובייש חייב בד' דברים ופטור על הבשת ואם נתהפך חייב אף על הבשת דתניא ממשמע שנאמר (דברים כה, יא) ושלחה ידה איני יודע שהחזיקה מה ת"ל והחזיקה לומר לך כיון שנתכוין להזיק אע"פ שלא נתכוין לבייש
§ Rabba says another similar halakha: If a man fell from a roof and while falling was inserted into a woman due to the force of the fall, but he did not have the intention to engage in sexual intercourse, he is liable to pay the four types of indemnity. And if this woman was his yevama waiting for him to perform levirate marriage, he has not acquired her as his wife through this act of intercourse. This is true even though a levirate marriage is ordinarily effected through sexual intercourse, even if unintentional, i.e., if he thought she was someone else. Nevertheless, since in this case he did not intend to engage in intercourse at all, the levirate marriage is not effected. The Gemara explains: What are the four types of indemnity that he is liable to pay? He is liable to pay for the damage, for the pain, for the medical costs, and for the loss of livelihood. But he is not liable to pay compensation for humiliation, as we learned in a mishna (86a): One is not liable to pay compensation for humiliation unless he intends to humiliate the injured party, and that was certainly not the case in this situation. And Rabba says another, similar halakha: If one fell from a roof due to an atypical wind, such that it could not have been anticipated in advance that he would fall, and while falling he caused damage and humiliated the injured party, he is liable for the damage but exempt from paying the four types of indemnity, as he did not intend to fall. If he fell due to a typical wind and caused damage and humiliated the injured party while falling, he is liable to pay the four types of indemnity, as his fall was caused by negligence. But he is nevertheless exempt from paying compensation for humiliation, as he did not intend to fall. But if he tumbled while falling so he could fall on this person in order to protect himself from the impact with the ground, he is liable to pay compensation for humiliation as well, because although he did not intend to cause shame he did intend to land on the person. The halakha that one is exempt from paying compensation for humiliation unless he intended to strike his victim is as it is taught in a baraita: From the fact that it is stated: “And she extended her hand” (Deuteronomy 25:11), do I not know that she took hold of something? Consequently, what is the meaning when further on in the verse it states: “And she took him by his genitals”? It is to teach you that one who intends to cause damage, even if he does not intend to humiliate the injured party, is nevertheless liable to pay compensation for humiliation.
מתני׳ החובל בחבירו חייב עליו משום חמשה דברים בנזק בצער בריפוי בשבת ובושת: בנזק כיצד סימא את עינו קטע את ידו שיבר את רגלו רואין אותו כאילו הוא עבד נמכר בשוק ושמין כמה היה יפה וכמה הוא יפה: צער כואו (או) בשפוד או במסמר ואפילו על ציפורנו מקום שאינו עושה חבורה אומדין כמה אדם כיוצא בזה רוצה ליטול להיות מצטער כך: ריפוי הכהו חייב לרפאותו עלה בו צמחים אם מחמת המכה חייב שלא מחמת המכה פטור חייתה ונסתרה חייתה ונסתרה חייב לרפאותו חייתה כל צורכה אינו חייב לרפאותו: שבת רואין אותו כאילו הוא שומר קישואין שכבר נתן לו דמי ידו ודמי רגלו: בושת הכל לפי המבייש והמתבייש:
MISHNA: One who injures another is liable to pay compensation for that injury due to five types of indemnity: He must pay for damage, for pain, for medical costs, for loss of livelihood, and for humiliation. How is payment for damage assessed? If one blinded another’s eye, severed his hand, broke his leg, or caused any other injury, the court views the injured party as though he were a slave being sold in the slave market, and the court appraises how much he was worth before the injury and how much he is worth after the injury. The difference between these two sums is the amount that one must pay for causing damage. How is payment for pain assessed? If one burned another with a skewer [beshapud] or with a hot nail, or even if one burned another on his fingernail, which is a place where he does not cause a bruise that would affect the victim’s value on the slave market, the court evaluates how much money a person with a similar threshold for pain as the victim is willing to take in order to be made to suffer in this way. The one who burned the victim must then pay this amount. How is payment for medical costs assessed? If one struck another, then he is liable to heal him by paying for his medical costs. In a case where growths, e.g., blisters or rashes, appeared on the injured party, if the growths are due to the blow, the one who struck him is liable; if the growths are not due to the blow, the one who struck him is exempt. In a case where the wound healed, and then reopened, and again healed, and then reopened, the one who struck him remains liable to heal the injured party by paying for his medical costs, as it is apparent that the current wound resulted from the original injury. If the injury healed fully, the one who struck him is not liable to heal him by paying for any subsequent medical costs. How is payment for loss of livelihood assessed? The court views the injured party as though he were a watchman of cucumbers, and the one who caused him injury must compensate him based on that pay scale for the income that he lost during his convalescence. This indemnity does not take into account the value of the standard wages of the injured party because the one who caused him injury already gave him compensation for his hand or compensation for his leg, and that compensation took into account his professional skills. How is payment for humiliation assessed? It all depends on the stature of the one who humiliates the other and the one who is humiliated.
בושת הכל לפי המבייש והמתבייש: מני מתניתין לא רבי מאיר ולא ר' יהודה אלא ר' שמעון היא דתנן וכולן רואין אותן כאילו הם בני חורין שירדו מנכסיהם שהן בני אברהם יצחק ויעקב דברי ר' מאיר ר' יהודה אומר הגדול לפי גודלו והקטן לפי קטנו רבי שמעון אומר עשירים רואין אותן כאילו הם בני חורין שירדו מנכסיהם עניים כפחותין שבהן מני (השתא) אי רבי מאיר מתניתין קתני הכל לפי המבייש והמתבייש ורבי מאיר כולהו בהדי הדדי נינהו ואי ר' יהודה מתניתין קתני המבייש את הסומא חייב ואילו ר' יהודה אומר סומא אין לו בושת אלא לאו רבי שמעון היא אפי' תימא ר' יהודה כי אמר ר' יהודה סומא אין לו בושת למשקל מיניה אבל למיתבא ליה יהבינן ליה והא מדקתני סיפא המבייש את הישן חייב וישן שבייש פטור ולא קתני סומא שבייש פטור מכלל דלא שנא הכי ולא שנא הכי אלא מחוורתא מתניתין רבי שמעון היא: מאן תנא להא דתנו רבנן נתכוון לבייש את הקטן ובייש את הגדול נותן לגדול דמי בושתו של קטן לבייש את העבד ובייש את בן חורין נותן לבן חורין דמי בושתו של עבד מני לא רבי מאיר ולא רבי יהודה ולא רבי שמעון קא סלקא דעתך קטן קטן בנכסים גדול גדול בנכסים אי רבי מאיר האמר כולהו בהדי הדדי נינהו ואי רבי יהודה האמר אין לעבדים בושת ואי ר"ש האמר נתכוון לבייש את זה ובייש את זה פטור מאי טעמא כקטלא מה קטלא עד דמתכוון ליה דכתיב (דברים יט, יא) וארב לו וקם עליו עד שיתכוון לו בושת נמי עד דמיכוין ליה דכתיב (דברים כה, יא) ושלחה ידה והחזיקה במבושיו עד שיתכוון לו לעולם ר' יהודה וכי קאמר ר' יהודה אין לעבדים בושת למיתבא להו אבל למישם שיימינן בהו ואי בעית אימא אפילו תימא רבי מאיר מי סברת גדול גדול בנכסים קטן קטן בנכסים לא גדול גדול ממש וקטן קטן ממש וקטן בר בושת הוא אין כדאמר רב פפא דמיכלמו ליה ומיכלם הכא נמי
§ The mishna teaches: How is payment for humiliation assessed? It all depends on the stature of the one who humiliates the other and the one who is humiliated. The Gemara asks: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is not the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and it is not the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Rather, it is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. These opinions are as we learned in a baraita: And in all of those cases of Jews who were humiliated, regardless of their individual stature, they are viewed as though they were freemen who lost their property and were impoverished, and their humiliation is calculated according to this status, as they are the sons of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and are all of prominent lineage. Humiliation is assessed according to a standard formula, regardless of who was humiliated. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: The court views each person according to his stature, the great person according to his greatness, and the small person according to his smallness. Rabbi Shimon says: In a case of wealthy people, the court views them as though they were freemen who lost their property; in a case of poor people, the court views them as the least among the poor. This lessens the payment of compensation for the one who caused humiliation. The Gemara explains: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? Now, if it is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, the mishna teaches: It all depends on the stature of the one who humiliates the other and the one who is humiliated, and Rabbi Meir holds in the baraita that all of those who were humiliated are considered alike to one another. And if it is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, a mishna teaches (86b): One who humiliates a blind person is liable, whereas Rabbi Yehuda says in a baraita: A blind person does not have humiliation. Rather, is the opinion expressed in the mishna not that of Rabbi Shimon? The Gemara rejects this conclusion: You can even say that the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. When Rabbi Yehuda said that a blind person does not have humiliation, he meant with regard to another taking compensation for humiliation from him. A blind person is not fully aware of what he does, and one can be rendered liable for causing humiliation only if he intended to humiliate the other. But with regard to giving him compensation for humiliation, he is given compensation. The Gemara challenges this explanation of the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda: But from the fact that the latter clause of that mishna teaches that one who humiliates a sleeping person is liable but a sleeping person who humiliates another is exempt, and does not teach that a blind person who humiliates another is exempt, by inference, the mishna teaches that there is no difference this way, and no difference that way; whether a blind person humiliates another or is humiliated, the one who causes humiliation is liable to pay compensation. Rather, it is clear that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. § The Gemara analyzes a related baraita in light of the three opinions cited earlier. Who is the tanna who taught this baraita, as the Sages taught: If one intended to humiliate a small man [katan] and instead humiliated a great man [gadol], he gives the money he would have owed for the small man’s humiliation to the great man. If one intended to humiliate a slave and instead humiliated a freeman, he gives the money he would have owed for the slave’s humiliation to the freeman. Whose opinion is this? It is not the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and not the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and not the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara explains why this is not in accordance with the opinion of any of these tanna’im: It enters your mind to say that when the baraita is referring to a katan, it means that he is small in terms of his property, i.e., he is poor; and when the baraita is referring to a gadol, it means that he is great in terms of his property, i.e., he is wealthy. If this baraita is stating the opinion of Rabbi Meir, doesn’t he say in the baraita that all of those who were humiliated are considered similar to one another? And if it is stating the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, doesn’t he say: Slaves have no humiliation; whereas the baraita discusses the compensation owed to a slave. And if it is stating the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, doesn’t he say: If one intended to humiliate this one, and instead humiliated that one, he is exempt? The Gemara explains Rabbi Shimon’s statement: What is the reason for exempting one who humiliated a person whom he did not intend to humiliate? The halakha of humiliation is like the halakha of killing. Just as in a case of killing, the murderer is not executed unless he intended to kill the victim specifically, as it is written: “And he lies in wait for him, and rises up against him” (Deuteronomy 19:11), which means he is not liable unless he intended to kill him specifically, so too, in a case of humiliation, the one who humiliated is not liable unless he intended to humiliate him specifically, as it is written: “And she put forth her hand, and took him by his genitals” (Deuteronomy 25:11); this teaches that one is not liable for humiliation unless he intended to humiliate him specifically. The Gemara returns to analyzing the baraita: Actually, the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and when Rabbi Yehuda said: Slaves have no humiliation, he meant that one would not be liable to give them compensation for humiliation; but if the court needs to appraise compensation for the humiliation of others according to their humiliation, and thereby determine the compensation one owes to a freeman when he intended to humiliate a slave, then we do appraise according to their humiliation. The Gemara presents an alternative explanation of the baraita: And if you wish, say instead: You can even say that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Do you maintain that when the baraita is referring to a gadol, it means he is great in terms of his property, and when the baraita is referring to a katan, it means he is small in terms of his property? No, rather, when the baraita is referring to a gadol, it means an actual adult [gadol]; and when the baraita is referring to a katan, it means an actual minor [katan]. The Gemara asks: But is a minor subject to humiliation? The Gemara answers: Yes, as Rav Pappa said with regard to another halakha: The case involves a minor who has reached a stage in which when others humiliate him he feels humiliation; here, too,
מתני׳ המבייש את הערום המבייש את הסומא והמבייש את הישן חייב וישן שבייש פטור נפל מן הגג והזיק ובייש חייב על הנזק ופטור על הבושת עד שיהא מתכוין: גמ׳ ת"ר ביישו ערום חייב ואינו דומה ביישו ערום לביישו לבוש ביישו בבית המרחץ חייב ואינו דומה ביישו בבית המרחץ לביישו בשוק אמר מר ביישו ערום חייב ערום בר בושת הוא אמר רב פפא מאי ערום דאתא זיקא כרכינהו למאניה ואתא הוא דלינהו טפי וביישיה ביישו בבית המרחץ חייב בית המרחץ בר בושת הוא אמר רב פפא שביישו על גב הנהר בעי ר' אבא בר ממל ביישו ישן ומת מהו מאי קמבעיא ליה אמר רב זביד הכי קמבעיא ליה משום כיסופא הוא והא מית ליה ולית ליה כיסופא או דלמא משום זילותא הוא והא אוזליה ת"ש ר"מ אומר חרש וקטן יש להן בושת שוטה אין לו בושת אא"ב משום זילותא היינו דקתני קטן אלא אי אמרת משום כיסופא קטן בר בושת הוא אלא מאי משום זילותא אפילו שוטה נמי אמרי שוטה אין לך בושת גדולה מזו מכל מקום ניפשוט מינה דמשום זילותא הוא דאי משום כיסופא קטן בר כיסופא הוא כדאמר רב פפא דמיכלמו ליה ומיכלם הכא נמי דמיכלמו ליה ומיכלם רב פפא אמר הכי קמבעיא ליה משום כיסופא דידיה הוא והא מיית ליה או דלמא משום בושת משפחה תא שמע חרש וקטן יש לו בושת שוטה אין לו בושת אי אמרת בשלמא משום בושת משפחה היינו דקתני קטן אלא אי אמרת משום כיסופא דידיה קטן בר בושת הוא אלא מאי משום בושת דבני משפחה אפי' שוטה נמי שוטה אין לך בושת גדולה מזו מ"מ ניפשוט מינה דמשום בושת משפחה דאי משום כיסופא קטן בר כיסופא הוא אמר רב פפא אין דמיכלמו ליה ומיכלם והתניא ר' אומר חרש יש לו בושת שוטה אין לו בושת קטן פעמים יש לו פעמים אין לו הא דמיכלמו ליה ומיכלם הא דמיכלמו ליה ולא מיכלם:
MISHNA: One who humiliates a naked person, or one who humiliates a blind person, or one who humiliates a sleeping person is liable, but a sleeping person who humiliates another is exempt. If one fell from the roof onto another person, and thereby caused him damage and humiliated him, then the one who fell is liable for the indemnity of damage, since a person is always considered forewarned, and exempt from the indemnity of humiliation, since a person is not liable for humiliation unless he intends to humiliate the other person. GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 9:12): If one humiliated another who was naked, he is liable, but the magnitude of humiliation felt when he humiliated him while naked is not comparable to the magnitude of humiliation felt had he humiliated him while clothed, since one who chooses to be naked is less sensitive to humiliation. Similarly, if one humiliated another in a bathhouse, he is liable, but the magnitude of humiliation felt when he humiliated him in a bathhouse is not comparable to the magnitude of humiliation felt had he humiliated him in the marketplace. The Gemara clarifies the baraita: The Master says: If one humiliated another who was naked, the one who humiliated him is liable. The Gemara asks: Is a naked person subject to humiliation? Is it possible to humiliate him in this state? Rav Pappa said: What does the baraita mean when it says: Naked? It means a case where a gust of wind came and lifted his clothes, and then this one came and raised them higher and humiliated him. The baraita also teaches: If one humiliated another in a bathhouse, he is liable. The Gemara asks: Is one in a bathhouse subject to humiliation? In a place where people stand naked, can a person be humiliated by having his clothes removed? Rav Pappa said: This is a case where he humiliated him not in an actual bathhouse, but on the bank of the river, which is a place where people behave more discreetly when they undress. § Rabbi Abba bar Memel raises a dilemma: If one humiliated another who was asleep, and he died before he awoke, so he never knew of his humiliation, what is the halakha? The Gemara asks: What is his dilemma? Rav Zevid said that this is his dilemma: Is the compensation for humiliation due to embarrassment, i.e., that his feelings suffer because of what he experienced, and this one died and does not have that feeling of embarrassment? Or perhaps the compensation for humiliation is due to disgrace, i.e., lessening of his honor in front of other people, and he disgraced him. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution to the dilemma from a baraita: Rabbi Meir says: A deaf-mute and a minor have the right to receive compensation for humiliation; an imbecile does not have the right to receive compensation for humiliation. The Gemara explains: Granted, if you say that the compensation is due to disgrace, this explanation is consistent with that which the baraita teaches concerning a minor, who can be disgraced; but if you say that the compensation is due to embarrassment, is a minor subject to humiliation? The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Rather, what do you mean by stating that the compensation is due to disgrace? If compensation is granted due to disgrace, then an imbecile should receive compensation as well. The Sages say in response: With regard to an imbecile, you can have no greater humiliation than this. It is impossible to degrade him further. The Gemara returns to the original suggestion: In any case, resolve from this baraita that the compensation is due to disgrace, as, if it is due to embarrassment, is a minor subject to embarrassment? The Gemara rejects this proof: This is as Rav Pappa said with regard to a different halakha, cited later by the Gemara: The case involves a minor who has reached an age in which when others humiliate him he feels humiliation; here, too, say that this baraita discusses a case involving a minor who has reached an age in which when others humiliate him he feels humiliation. This is how Rav Zevid understands the dilemma of Rabbi Abba bar Memel. Rav Pappa explains Rabbi Abba bar Memel’s dilemma differently: Rav Pappa said that this is his dilemma: Is the compensation for humiliation due to his own embarrassment, and this one died and was not embarrassed? Or perhaps the compensation for humiliation is due to his family’s humiliation, and therefore the one who humiliated him must pay compensation to his family? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from the same baraita: A deaf-mute and a minor have the right to receive compensation for humiliation; an imbecile does not have the right to receive compensation for humiliation. The Gemara explains: Granted, if you say that the compensation is due to his family’s humiliation, this explanation is consistent with that which the baraita teaches concerning a minor, whose family can experience humiliation based on what was done to their relative; but if you say that the compensation is due to his own embarrassment, is a minor subject to humiliation? The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Rather, what do you mean by stating that the compensation is due to the humiliation of members of his family? If this is the case, an imbecile should receive compensation as well. The Sages say in response: If one is an imbecile, you can have no greater humiliation than this. The Gemara returns to the original suggestion: In any case, resolve from this that the compensation is due to his family’s humiliation, as, if it is due to embarrassment, is a minor subject to embarrassment? Rav Pappa said: Yes, he is subject to embarrassment, as the baraita discusses a case involving a minor who has reached an age in which when others humiliate him he feels humiliation. The Gemara adds: And this distinction is taught in a baraita, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: A deaf-mute has the right to receive compensation for humiliation; an imbecile does not have the right to receive compensation for humiliation. With regard to a minor, sometimes he has the right to receive compensation for humiliation, and sometimes he does not have the right. Why is this so? This case where he has the right to receive compensation for humiliation is one involving a minor who has reached the stage in which when others humiliate him he feels humiliation; that case where he does not have the right to receive compensation for humiliation is one involving a minor who has not reached the stage in which when others humiliate him he feels humiliation.