Inchoate Offenses in Halacha: Is It Permitted To Shoot A Guy In the Face, If You Miss?

If one heard that a child was drowning at sea, and he spread a net to raise fish and the result was that he raised only fish, he is liable for transgressing the Shabbat prohibition of trapping. If he intended to raise fish, and he raised both fish and the child, Rava says: He is liable, as his intention was to transgress a prohibition, and Rabba says: He is exempt, as his act saved a life and was therefore permitted on Shabbat. And Rabba deemed him exempt only there, since the one who spread the net heard that a child had fallen in, and therefore we say that his intention in spreading the net was also to save the child. But had he not heard that the child had fallen in, he would not be exempt. [This is comparable to the case of two offerings, where he could not have known before its slaughter that the first animal had weak intestines.] Rather, Rabba says that he is exempt because one follows his actions, whereas Rava says that he is liable because one follows his intention.

It was stated that the amora’im disagree with regard to one who bakes bread on a Festival day for use during the week. Rav Ḥisda said: He is flogged because he has desecrated the Festival. Rabba said: He is not flogged. Rav Ḥisda said that he is flogged because [he did not intend it for guests, and] we do not say that since guests may happen to visit him, the bread is fit for use on the Festival day itself. Rabba said that he is not flogged because [even though he did not intend it for guests, nevertheless] we say that since guests may visit him, the bread is considered to have been baked for use on the Festival day itself.

MISHNA: With regard to a woman who vowed to be a nazirite, and she transgressed her vow since she was drinking wine and rendering herself ritually impure by contact with the dead, she incurs the forty lashes for each of the Torah prohibitions she transgressed. If her husband nullified her vow, and she did not know that her husband had nullified her vow, and she was drinking wine and rendering herself impure by contact with the dead, she does not incur the forty lashes, as she is no longer a nazirite. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if she does not incur the forty lashes by Torah law, she should incur lashes for rebelliousness [makat mardut].

Reish Lakish says: One who raises his hand to strike another, even if he ultimately does not strike him, is called wicked, as it is stated: “And two men of the Hebrews were struggling with each other, and he said to the wicked one: Why should you strike your friend?” (Exodus 2:13). The phrase: Why did you strike, is not stated, but rather: “Why should you strike,” indicating that one who raised his hand to strike another, even if he ultimately did not strike him, is called wicked.

The Gemara relates: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi was accustomed to say, whenever he would fall on his face in prayer: May the Merciful One save us from the evil inclination. One day his wife heard him saying this prayer. She said: After all, it has been several years since he has withdrawn from engaging in intercourse with me due to his advanced years. What is the reason that he says this prayer, as there is no concern that he will engage in sinful sexual behavior? One day, while he was studying in his garden, she adorned herself and repeatedly walked past him. He said: Who are you? She said: I am Ḥaruta, a well-known prostitute, returning from my day at work. He propositioned her. She said to him: Give me that pomegranate from the top of the tree as payment. He leapt up, went, and brought it to her, and they engaged in intercourse. When he came home, his wife was lighting a fire in the oven. He went and sat inside it. She said to him: What is this? He said to her: Such and such an incident occurred; he told her that he engaged in intercourse with a prostitute. She said to him: It was I. He paid no attention to her, thinking she was merely trying to comfort him, until she gave him signs that it was indeed she. He said to her: I, in any event, intended to transgress. The Gemara relates: All the days of that righteous man he would fast for the transgression he intended to commit, until he died by that death in his misery.

As it is taught in a baraita concerning a husband who nullified the vow of his wife: “Her husband has made them null; and the Lord will forgive her” (Numbers 30:13). With regard to what case is the verse speaking? It is referring to a woman who vowed to be a nazirite, and her husband heard and nullified her vow. And she did not know that her husband had nullified her vow, and she drank wine and contracted impurity from a corpse, violating her presumed vow. When Rabbi Akiva came to this verse he would cry. He said: And if with regard to one who intended to eat pork, and kosher lamb came up in his hand, like this woman who intended to violate her vow but in fact did not, the Torah nevertheless says: She requires atonement and forgiveness, all the more so does one who intended to eat pork and pork came up in his hand require atonement and forgiveness. In a similar manner, you can say that the same lesson can be derived from the verse: “Though he know it not, yet is he guilty, and shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:17). When Rabbi Akiva came to this verse he would cry. He said: And if with regard to one who intended to eat permitted fat, and forbidden fat mistakenly came up in his hand, the Torah states: “Though he know it not, yet is he guilty, and shall bear his iniquity,” all the more so is this true for one who intended to eat forbidden fat and forbidden fat came up in his hand.

Isi ben Yehuda says with regard to the verse “Though he know it not, yet is he guilty, and shall bear his iniquity”: With regard to this matter all sufferers shall grieve, since the verse teaches that one is punished even for sinning unawares.

We learned in a baraita: In what case is this statement said, [that one is liable to receive forty lashes for committing a transgression?] Regarding negative mitzvot. However, with regard to positive mitzvot, for example, if the court says to someone: Perform the mitzva of the sukka, and he does not do so, or: Perform the mitzva of the palm branch, and he does not do so, the court strikes him an unlimited number of times, even until his soul departs, [in order to force him to perform the mitzva].

Rav says: The court flogs one due to his being the subject of a bad rumor, As it is stated: “No, my sons, for it is no good report” (I Samuel 2:24). When Mar Zutra would flog a person for being the subject of a bad rumor, he would place the bridle of a donkey on the person’s shoulders and recite before him when administering lashes: “No, my sons, for it is no good report.”

The court flogs one due to his being the subject of a bad rumor: Meaning, if a person has a reputation for engaging in adultery or the like, and there is substance to the rumors [raglayim ladavar] or the rumors are unceasing, he is flogged lashes of rebelliousness [makkat mardut], for he has transgressed, based on the verse “No, my sons, for it is no good report.”

R' Yehudah says if we cannot flog the forty lashes [prescribed the Torah], we flog lashes of rebelliousness [makkat mardut], by Rabbinic decree, for he intended to commit a transgression purposefully.

(6) Therefore, I hold (and it should, indeed, be believed) that just as the statutes do not enter at all into the societal area but are exclusively confined to the investiture of the Divine Immanence — in like manner, the judgments of the Torah enter, to a great extent, into this last area, so that they are divided, as it were, between effecting the investiture of the Divine Immanence among us and furthering the societal common good. And it is possible that they are more greatly oriented to the more sublime area than they are to the ordering of society, for this last function is completed by the king that we appoint over us. The function of the judges and the Sanhedrin, however, is to judge us with judgments which are true and righteous in themselves, and which cause the divine Immanence to cleave to us, whether they do or do not completely fulfill the societal objective. It is therefore possible [paradoxically] that some of the judgments and laws of the nations will be found more effective in furthering societal order than some of the laws of the Torah. We lose nothing thereby, however, for whatever is left incomplete in this regard is completed by the king, and, of course, we gain great eminence thereby, for the laws of the Torah, being righteous in themselves (as stated: "and let them judge the people a righteous judgment"), ennoble us through the investiture and cleaving of the Divine Immanence.

There were these hooligans in Rabbi Meir’s neighborhood who caused him a great deal of anguish. Rabbi Meir prayed for God to have mercy on them, that they should die. Rabbi Meir’s wife, Berurya, said to him: What is your thinking? On what basis do you pray for the death of these hooligans? Do you base yourself on the verse, as it is written: “Let sins cease from the land” (Psalms 104:35), which you interpret to mean that the world would be better if the wicked were destroyed? But is it written, let sinners cease?” Let sins cease, is written. One should pray for an end to their transgressions, not for the demise of the transgressors themselves. Moreover, go to the end of the verse, where it says: “And the wicked will be no more.” If, as you suggest, transgressions shall cease refers to the demise of the evildoers, how is it possible that the wicked will be no more, i.e., that they will no longer be evil? Rather, pray for God to have mercy on them, that they should repent, as if they repent, then the wicked will be no more, as they will have repented. Rabbi Meir saw that Berurya was correct and he prayed for God to have mercy on them, and they repented.