Drabanan: They Make Sure To Not Confuse Us

One who worships idolatry out of love, for instance, he coveted a given image because it was made superbly beautiful, or he worshiped it out of fear lest it perpetrates harm against him, as its devotees imagine that it can do good and evil, if he accepted it as a god he is guilty of an offense punishable by stoning; but if he worshiped it after its mode or worship, or with one of the four kinds of worship either because of love for art or because of superstitious fear, he is guiltless. He embraces an idol, or kisses it, or who prostrates himself before it, who washes it, anoints it, puts shoes on it, or does any other like service of honor violates a prohibitive commandment, for it says: "Nor serve them" (Ex. 23.24.), and, of course, such attention is included in service. Nevertheless, no lashes is inflicted upon him for doing any of these, seeing that none of them are mentioned in detail. If, however, one of these attentions was a mode of service and he did it in order to worship it, he is guilty.

Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rav, his sister’s son: Son of great men, didn’t I tell you that when Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is involved in this tractate do not ask him questions in another tractate, as perhaps it will not be on his mind and he will be unable to answer? The dilemma that Rav asked was not related to the subject matter of the tractate which they were studying. As, had it not been for the fact that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is a great man, you would have shamed him, as he would have been forced to give you an answer that is not an appropriate answer.Now, he was involved in another tractate. Nevertheless, he answered you well, as it was taught in a baraita: One who was laden with food and drink while it was still day, before Shabbat began, and, consequently, did not perform the act of lifting on Shabbat, and he carried them out into the public domain after dark on Shabbat is liable. Since, as a rule, his body is fixed in one place, moving it is considered like lifting an object, and he is liable. It is not similar to lifting his hand and moving it from place to place. Since his hand is not fixed in one place, moving it is not considered lifting.Abaye said: It is obvious to me that the hand of a person in and of itself, when he moves it out of the domain where he is located, is considered to be neither like the public domain nor like the private domain, even if it is the hand of someone standing in one of those domains. Proof that the hand is not considered like the public domain can be derived from the ruling of the mishna with regard to the hand of the poor person. As we learned with regard to the poor person who brought his hand carrying an object that he lifted from the public domain into the private domain and the homeowner took the object from his hand; the homeowner is not liable. Apparently, the hand of the poor person is not considered part of the public domain, even though he himself is located in the public domain. Proof that it is not considered like the private domain can be derived from the ruling of the mishna with regard to the hand of the homeowner. As we learned with regard to the homeowner who moved his hand carrying an object that he lifted from the private domain into the public domain and the poor person took the object from his hand; the poor person is not liable for carrying out from a private domain.However, Abaye raised a dilemma: What is the ruling with regard to the hand of a person with an object in it, when that person reached his hand into a different domain? Does it assume karmelit status? A karmelit is an intermediate domain established by the Sages that is neither a private nor a public domain. This dilemma is based on the fact that his hand left one domain and did not yet enter a second domain. In terms of practical halakha, the two sides of this dilemma are: Did the Sages penalize him and issue a rabbinic decree prohibiting him from bringing his hand with the object back to the domain where he is standing or not?The Gemara says: Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from that which we learned elsewhere, with regard to the question: What must one in the private domain do in a case where his hand was filled with fruits and he extended it outside, into the public domain? It was taught in onebaraita that it is prohibited for him to bring it back into his house, and it was taught in anotherbaraita that it is permitted for him to bring it back. Is it not with regard to this that they disagree; that the Sage in one baraitaholds that his hand is like a karmelit, and the Sage in the other baraitaholds that it is not like a karmelit?The Gemara rejects this explanation: No, everyone agrees that it is like a karmelit, and yet, this is not difficult, as the difference between the baraitot can be explained in the following manner: Here, the baraita prohibiting him from bringing his hand back, is referring to a case where he took it out at a height below ten handbreadths off the ground, within the airspace of the public domain. And there, the baraita permitting him to bring his hand back, is referring to a case where he took it out at a height above ten handbreadths off the ground, outside the airspace of the public domain. Consequently, the object is considered to be neither in the public domain nor in a karmelit.And if you wish, say instead that thisbaraitaand thatbaraita are both referring to a case where he took his hand out to the public domain at a height below ten handbreadths, and his hand is not considered a karmelit. And yet, this is not difficult. As here, the baraita permitting him to bring it back, is referring to a case where he took it out while it was still day on Shabbat eve. Since he extended his hand before Shabbat and, in doing so, did nothing wrong, the Sages did not penalize him and permitted him to bring his hand back on Shabbat itself. However, there, the baraita prohibiting him from bringing it back, is referring to a case where he took it out after dark, and Shabbat had already begun. Since there is an element of prohibition involved, the Sages penalized him and prohibited him from bringing it back.The Gemara comments that this explanation is difficult. On the contrary, the opposite is reasonable. In the case where he extended his hand while it was still day, when even were he to throw the object from his hand into the public domain, he would not incur liability to bring a sin-offering because the object was lifted from its place on a weekday, let the Sages penalize him. However, in the case where he extended his hand after dark, where were he to throw the object from his hand into the public domain, he would thereby incur liability to bring a sin-offering, let the Sages not penalize him. Were the Sages to penalize him by prohibiting him from bringing his hand back, he is liable to drop the object in the public domain, and by doing so he would violate a Torah prohibition.And from the fact that we did not explain it that way, but preferred the contrary distinction, resolve the dilemma raised by Rav Beivai bar Abaye, whose dilemma is predicated on the same fundamental issue. As Rav Beivai bar Abaye raised the dilemma: One who unwittingly stuck bread in the oven on Shabbat, as bread was baked by sticking the dough to the sides of a heated oven, did they permit him to override a rabbinic prohibition and remove it from the oven before it bakes, i.e., before he incurs liability to bring a sin-offering for baking bread on Shabbat, or did they not permit him to do so? Removing the bread is also prohibited on Shabbat. However, its prohibition is only by rabbinic law. The fundamental dilemma is: May one violate a rabbinical prohibition in order to avoid violating a Torah prohibition or not?Based on the above, resolve that the Sages did not permit one to do so. In resolving Abaye’s dilemma, the concern that one would likely throw the object from his hand, and thereby violate a Torah prohibition, was not taken into consideration. The one who extended his hand into the public domain was penalized by the Sages and prohibited to bring his hand back. Here too, resolve the dilemma and say that he may not remove the bread, even though he will thereby violate a Torah prohibition. The dilemma of Rav Beivai bar Abaye, which was thought to be unresolved, is thereby resolved. As a result, there is room for uncertainty whether or not the resolution of the previous dilemma, through which Rav Beivai’s dilemma would also be resolved, is valid. The Gemara rejects this difficulty: That is not difficult. It is possible that even though a resolution had not been previously found for the dilemma of Rav Beivai bar Abaye, that does not mean that it cannot be resolved And, indeed, as proof can be brought from the resolution of the other dilemma, resolve this dilemma as well.And if you wish, say instead: Actually, do not resolve the dilemma, but, nevertheless, resolve the contradiction between the baraitot in the following manner. Here, the baraita that taught that it is permitted to bring one’s hand back is referring to a case where he extended it unwittingly. There, the baraita that taught that it is prohibited for one to bring it back is referring to a case where he took it out intentionally. When he took it out unwittingly, the Sages did not penalize him. When he took it out intentionally, the Sages penalized him and prohibited him from bringing it back.And if you wish, say instead, in order to resolve the contradiction that thisbaraitaand thatbaraitaare both referring to a case where he took his hand out unwittingly. And here they disagree with regard to the question: Did the Sages penalize an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender? The Sage who prohibits him from bringing his hand back holds that they penalized an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender. Therefore, even though he took his hand out unwittingly, they penalized him and prohibited him from bringing the object back so that he would not come to do so intentionally. The Sage who permits him to bring it back holds that they did not penalize an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender. Therefore, they did not prohibit him from bringing it back.And if you wish, say instead that, actually, they did not penalize an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender, and still, this is not difficult, and there is no contradiction. Here, the baraita that permits bringing it back, is referring to bringing it back to the same courtyard where he is standing.

The Gemara asks: What is different with regard to a zav, concerning whom the Sages decreed that liquids that issue from him are ritually impure, and what is different with regard to a corpse, concerning which the Sages did not decree that liquids that issue from it are ritually impure? The Gemara responds: In the case of a zav, since people do not naturally separate from him, the Sages decreed additional restrictions with regard to him in order to prevent others from contracting impurity from liquids that issue from a zav that are impure by Torah law. In the case of a corpse, since people naturally separate from it, the Sages did not decree additional restrictions with regard to it.

These two scholars, however, began to dispute every decision Ḥanina rendered in response to questions raised in the study hall. He ruled it impure and they ruled it pure; he prohibited it and they permitted it. Eventually, he proclaimed about them: These people are worthless. They are good for nothing and they know nothing. They said to him: You have already built up our names and glorified us; you cannot now demolish. You have already built a fence and you cannot break through it.

They said to Hillel: Our teacher, if one forgot and did not bring a knife on the eve of Shabbat and cannot slaughter his Paschal lamb, what is the law? Since he could have brought the knife before Shabbat, he cannot bring it on Shabbat; but what should he do in this situation? He said to them: I once heard this halakha from my teachers but I have forgotten it. But leave it to the Jewish people; if they are not prophets to whom God has revealed His secrets, they are the sons of prophets, and will certainly do the right thing on their own.

In any case, it is clear that according to this baraita the halakhot of prayer are based on the Temple offerings. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, who held that the forefathers instituted the prayers. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, could have said to you: Actually, I will say to you that the Patriarchs instituted the prayers and the Sages based the times and characteristics of prayer on the Temple offerings, even though they do not stem from the same source. As, if you do not say so, that even Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, would agree that the laws of offerings and those of prayers are related, then, according to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, who instituted the additional prayer? It is not one of the prayers instituted by the forefathers. Rather, even according to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, the prayers were instituted by the Patriarchs and the Sages based them on the laws of the offerings.

Ben Bag Bag said: Turn it over, and [again] turn it over, for all is therein. And look into it; And become gray and old therein; And do not move away from it, for you have no better portion than it.

The a fortiori inference from the testimony of one witness was also rejected, as what is notable about the extension of an oath resulting from the testimony of one witness? It is notable in that the defendant takes an oath with regard to the matter concerning that which he testifies. Would you say the same with regard to two witnesses, in which case the defendant takes an oath with regard to the claim that he denies? Admission to part of a claim by one’s mouth can prove this difference irrelevant, as a defendant can be required to take an oath even with regard to a claim that he denies.

If he transgressed and annulled? Let us hear from the following: “If he annulled it is annulled, the words of Rebbi. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he can neither annul it nor add to his condition.” Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says it correctly. What is the reason of Rebbi? It is the word of the Torah that he has the power to annul but they said, he shall not annul. Can their word uproot the words of the Torah? But is it not from the Torah that one may [give as heave] olives for oil and grapes for wine, but because of robbing the tribe they said not only that one may not give heave [in this way] but if he transgressed and gave, his heave is not heave. Rebbi Oshaia bar Abba said to Rebbi Yudan the Prince: Who could tell exactly what your ancestor meant?

The Gemara asks: Isn’t the second day of a Festival in the Diaspora a rabbinic ordinance instituted due to uncertainty whether the first day or the second is the actual Festival, and nevertheless a blessing is required? On the second day of the Festival one recites the same blessings as he does on the first. The Gemara answers: There, in the case of the second day of the Festival, the reason that blessings are required is so that people will not treat it with contempt. If Festival blessings were not required on the second day of the Festival, people would take its sanctity lightly. Rava said another reason: Demai is not considered to be an ordinance instituted by the Sages due to uncertainty. In fact, in most cases, an am ha’aretz tithes. The concern lest they do not tithe is not a full-fledged case of uncertainty. It is merely a case of suspicion for which the Sages did not institute a blessing. That is not the case with regard to the second day of a Festival. Even though it was instituted due to uncertainty, one must recite the Festival blessings. Since it was instituted by the Sages, one is obligated to recite a blessing just as he recites blessings for other rabbinic ordinances.

And if you would say that indeed this method is not effective in a case of this kind, if so you have rendered your statement subject to circumstances. In other words, the application of the acquisition in the presence of all three parties is not absolute, and instead depends on whether in this particular case the borrower agrees to transfer his debt from one person to another.

And if you would say that indeed this method is not effective in a case of this kind, if so you have rendered your statement subject to circumstances. In other words, the application of the acquisition in the presence of all three parties is not absolute, and instead depends on whether in this particular case the borrower agrees to transfer his debt from one person to another. Rather, the Gemara retracts the previous explanation in favor of that which Mar Zutra said: These three matters were instituted by the Sages as a halakha without a reason, i.e., they instituted these ordinances despite the fact that the logical mechanism by which they function is unclear: One is this case of an acquisition in the presence of all three parties. And another is that which Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: One who writes over all of his property to his wife as a gift has rendered her only a steward [eppitrofeya], but she does not become the owner. And another is that which Rav Ḥananya says: With regard to one who marries a woman to his eldest son, and the wedding takes place in his house, the son has acquired that house.

The Gemara asks: Is that so? But didn’t Rav Yehuda say that Rav said: Wherever the Sages prohibited an action due to the appearance of prohibition, even if one performs the act in his innermost chamber, where no one will see it, it is prohibited. The Gemara answers: This is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: One whose clothes fell into water on Shabbat or a Festival may spread them out to dry in the sun, but he may not do so opposite the masses, i.e., in a place where people can see him, lest they suspect him of laundering on Shabbat. However, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon prohibit doing so even in private.