Balancing law and human dignity
(יח) וְעָשִׂ֛יתָ הַיָּשָׁ֥ר וְהַטּ֖וֹב בְּעֵינֵ֣י יְהוָ֑ה לְמַ֙עַן֙ יִ֣יטַב לָ֔ךְ וּבָ֗אתָ וְיָֽרַשְׁתָּ֙ אֶת־הָאָ֣רֶץ הַטֹּבָ֔ה אֲשֶׁר־נִשְׁבַּ֥ע יְהוָ֖ה לַאֲבֹתֶֽיךָ׃
(18) Do what is right and good in the sight of the LORD, that it may go well with you and that you may be able to possess the good land that the LORD your God promised on oath to your fathers,
(כ) לְמַ֗עַן תֵּ֭לֵךְ בְּדֶ֣רֶךְ טוֹבִ֑ים וְאָרְח֖וֹת צַדִּיקִ֣ים תִּשְׁמֹֽר׃
(20) So follow the way of the good And keep to the paths of the just.

(א) בֶּן זוֹמָא אוֹמֵר, אֵיזֶהוּ חָכָם, הַלּוֹמֵד מִכָּל אָדָם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (תהלים קיט) מִכָּל מְלַמְּדַי הִשְׂכַּלְתִּי כִּי עֵדְוֹתֶיךָ שִׂיחָה לִּי. אֵיזֶהוּ גִבּוֹר, הַכּוֹבֵשׁ אֶת יִצְרוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (משלי טז) טוֹב אֶרֶךְ אַפַּיִם מִגִּבּוֹר וּמשֵׁל בְּרוּחוֹ מִלֹּכֵד עִיר. אֵיזֶהוּ עָשִׁיר, הַשָּׂמֵחַ בְּחֶלְקוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (תהלים קכח) יְגִיעַ כַּפֶּיךָ כִּי תֹאכֵל אַשְׁרֶיךָ וְטוֹב לָךְ. אַשְׁרֶיךָ, בָּעוֹלָם הַזֶּה. וְטוֹב לָךְ, לָעוֹלָם הַבָּא. אֵיזֶהוּ מְכֻבָּד, הַמְכַבֵּד אֶת הַבְּרִיּוֹת, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמואל א ב) כִּי מְכַבְּדַי אֲכַבֵּד וּבֹזַי יֵקָלּוּ:

(1) Ben Zoma said:Who is wise? He who learns from every man, as it is said: “From all who taught me have I gained understanding” (Psalms 119:99). Who is mighty? He who subdues his [evil] inclination, as it is said: “He that is slow to anger is better than the mighty; and he that rules his spirit than he that takes a city” (Proverbs 16:32). Who is rich? He who rejoices in his lot, as it is said: “You shall enjoy the fruit of your labors, you shall be happy and you shall prosper” (Psalms 128:2) “You shall be happy” in this world, “and you shall prosper” in the world to come. Who is he that is honored? He who honors his fellow human beings as it is said: “For I honor those that honor Me, but those who spurn Me shall be dishonored” (I Samuel 2:30).

In certain cases, such as the kohen attending the funeral of an immediate family member, involving human dignity, Torah law is superseded and the kohen is permitted to contaminate himself.

אֲבָל מִטַּמֵּא הוּא לְמֵת מִצְוָה. אַמַּאי, לֵימָא: ״אֵין חׇכְמָה וְאֵין תְּבוּנָה וְאֵין עֵצָה לְנֶגֶד ה׳״! שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דִּכְתִיב ״וְלַאֲחוֹתוֹ״. וְלִיגְמַר מִינַּהּ! שֵׁב וְאַל תַּעֲשֶׂה שָׁאנֵי.
but he does become impure for a met mitzva. Here too, the question is asked: Let us say that the obligation to bury a met mitzva, which is predicated on the preservation of human dignity, should not override mitzvot explicitly written in the Torah, as it is stated: “There is neither wisdom, nor understanding, nor counsel against the Lord.” The Gemara answers: There it is different, as it is explicitly written: “And his sister,” from which we derive that although he may not become ritually impure to bury his sister, he must do so for a met mitzva. The Gemara suggests: Let us derive a general principle that human dignity takes precedence over all mitzvot in the Torah from this case. This possibility is rejected: This is a special case, because a case of “sit and refrain from action” [shev ve’al ta’aseh] is different. Engaging in the burial of a met mitzva is not actually in contravention of a mitzva. Rather, by doing so he becomes ritually impure and is then rendered incapable of fulfilling that mitzva. We cannot derive a general principle from here that human dignity would also override a Torah prohibition in a case where that prohibition is directly contravened.

Even rules of rest on Shabbat may be set aside to honor the dead.

הָהוּא שָׁכְבָא דַּהֲוָה בִּדְרוֹקֶרֶת, שְׁרָא רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק לְאַפּוֹקֵיהּ לְכַרְמְלִית. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אֲחוּהּ דְּמָר בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַבְנָא לָרַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: כְּמַאן, כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? אֵימַר דְּפָטַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מֵחִיּוּב חַטָּאת, אִיסּוּרָא דְרַבָּנַן מִיהָא אִיכָּא! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָאֱלֹהִים, דְּעָיְילַתְּ בֵּיהּ אַתְּ? וַאֲפִילּוּ לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה שְׁרֵי, דְּמִי קָאָמֵינָא לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים? לְכַרְמְלִית קָאָמֵינָא, גָּדוֹל כְּבוֹד הַבְּרִיּוֹת שֶׁדּוֹחֶה אֶת ״לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה״ שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה.
The Gemara relates: There was a corpse in the city of Derokera and Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak permitted carrying it out into a karmelit on Shabbat because, for some reason, it could not remain where it was. Rabbi Yoḥanan, brother of Mar, son of Rabbana, said to Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak: In accordance with whose opinion did you permit moving the corpse to the karmelit? If it was in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, say that in that case Rabbi Shimon exempted one from the obligation to bring a sin-offering. However, there remains a rabbinic prohibition. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to him: By God, have you entered into an understanding of the matter? Even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda it is permitted to carry out the corpse, as did I say they may carry it out to the public domain? I said that it may be carried out into a karmelit, which is only prohibited by rabbinic law. With regard to prohibitions by rabbinic law, the principle states: Great is human dignity, as it overrides a prohibition in the Torah: “You shall not deviate from that which they tell you to the right or to the left” (Deuteronomy 17:11).

By contrast, we have the story of two priests competing for the honor of clearing ashes from the altar. One priest is stabbed and the response of the father is puzzling.

מַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁהָיוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן שָׁוִין וְרָצִין וְעוֹלִין בַּכֶּבֶשׁ. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מַעֲשֶׂה בִּשְׁנֵי כֹהֲנִים שֶׁהָיוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן שָׁוִין, וְרָצִין וְעוֹלִין בַּכֶּבֶשׁ, קָדַם אֶחָד מֵהֶן לְתוֹךְ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ, נָטַל סַכִּין וְתָקַע לוֹ בְּלִבּוֹ. עָמַד רַבִּי צָדוֹק עַל מַעֲלוֹת הָאוּלָם, וְאָמַר: אָחִינוּ בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל שִׁמְעוּ! הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר ״כִּי יִמָּצֵא חָלָל בָּאֲדָמָה ... וְיָצְאוּ זְקֵנֶיךָ וְשׁוֹפְטֶיךָ״. אָנוּ, עַל מִי לְהָבִיא עֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה? עַל הָעִיר, אוֹ עַל הָעֲזָרוֹת? גָּעוּ כׇּל הָעָם בִּבְכִיָּה. בָּא אָבִיו שֶׁל תִּינוֹק וּמְצָאוֹ כְּשֶׁהוּא מְפַרְפֵּר. אָמַר: הֲרֵי הוּא כַּפָּרַתְכֶם, וַעֲדַיִין בְּנִי מְפַרְפֵּר, וְלֹא נִטְמְאָה סַכִּין. לְלַמֶּדְךָ שֶׁקָּשָׁה עֲלֵיהֶם טׇהֳרַת כֵּלִים יוֹתֵר מִשְּׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים. וְכֵן הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״וְגַם דָּם נָקִי שָׁפַךְ מְנַשֶּׁה [הַרְבֵּה מְאֹד] עַד אֲשֶׁר מִלֵּא [אֶת] יְרוּשָׁלִַים פֶּה לָפֶה״.
§ It was taught in the mishna: An incident occurred where both of the priests were equal as they were running and ascending on the ramp, and one of them shoved the other and he fell and his leg was broken. The Sages taught in the Tosefta: An incident occurred where there were two priests who were equal as they were running and ascending the ramp. One of them reached the four cubits before his colleague, who then, out of anger, took a knife and stabbed him in the heart. The Tosefta continues: Rabbi Tzadok then stood up on the steps of the Entrance Hall of the Sanctuary and said: Hear this, my brothers of the house of Israel. The verse states: “If one be found slain in the land... and it be not known who had smitten him; then your Elders and your judges shall come forth and they shall measure…and it shall be that the city which is nearest to the slain man…shall take a heifer” (Deuteronomy 21:1–3). And the Elders of that city took that heifer and broke its neck in a ritual of atonement. But what of us, in our situation? Upon whom is the obligation to bring the heifer whose neck is broken? Does the obligation fall on the city, Jerusalem, so that its Sages must bring the calf, or does the obligation fall upon the Temple courtyards, so that the priests must bring it? At that point the entire assembly of people burst into tears. The father of the boy, i.e., the young priest who was stabbed, came and found that he was still convulsing. He said: May my son’s death be an atonement for you. But my son is still convulsing and has not yet died, and as such, the knife, which is in his body, has not become ritually impure through contact with a corpse. If you remove it promptly, it will still be pure for future use. The Tosefta comments: This incident comes to teach you that the ritual purity of utensils was of more concern to them than the shedding of blood. Even the boy’s father voiced more concern over the purity of the knife than over the death of his child. And similarly, it says: “Furthermore, Manasseh spilled innocent blood very much, till he had filled Jerusalem from one end to another” (II Kings 21:16), which shows that in his day as well people paid little attention to bloodshed.

Balance between law and humanity is also essential in Talmud.

רַב וְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרַב חֲבִיבָא מַתְנוּ: בְּכוּלֵּיהּ דְּסֵדֶר מוֹעֵד כָּל כִּי הַאי זוּגָא חַלּוֹפֵי רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וּמְעַיֵּיל רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן. כׇּל מִי שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לִמְחוֹת לְאַנְשֵׁי בֵיתוֹ וְלֹא מִיחָה — נִתְפָּס עַל אַנְשֵׁי בֵיתוֹ. בְּאַנְשֵׁי עִירוֹ — נִתְפָּס עַל אַנְשֵׁי עִירוֹ. בְּכָל הָעוֹלָם כּוּלּוֹ — נִתְפָּס עַל כָּל הָעוֹלָם כּוּלּוֹ.
It was related that Rav, and Rabbi Ḥanina, and Rabbi Yoḥanan, and Rav Ḥaviva taught the statement cited below. The Gemara comments: Throughout the order of Moed, wherever this pair of Sages is mentioned, exchange Rabbi Yoḥanan and insert Rabbi Yonatan in his place. In any event, they said: Anyone who had the capability to effectively protest the sinful conduct of the members of his household and did not protest, he himself is apprehended for the sins of the members of his household and punished. If he is in a position to protest the sinful conduct of the people of his town, and he fails to do so, he is apprehended for the sins of the people of his town. If he is in a position to protest the sinful conduct of the whole world, and he fails to do so, he is apprehended for the sins of the whole world.
רבי יהושע בן קרחה אומר מצוה לבצוע שנאמר (זכריה ח, טז) אמת ומשפט שלום שפטו בשעריכם והלא במקום שיש משפט אין שלום ובמקום שיש שלום אין משפט אלא איזהו משפט שיש בו שלום הוי אומר זה ביצוע וכן בדוד הוא אומר (שמואל ב ח, טו) ויהי דוד עושה משפט וצדקה והלא כל מקום שיש משפט אין צדקה וצדקה אין משפט אלא איזהו משפט שיש בו צדקה הוי אומר זה ביצוע אתאן לת"ק דן את הדין זיכה את הזכאי וחייב את החייב וראה שנתחייב עני ממון ושלם לו מתוך ביתו זה משפט וצדקה משפט לזה וצדקה לזה משפט לזה שהחזיר לו ממון וצדקה לזה ששילם לו מתוך ביתו (וכן בדוד הוא אומר ויהי דוד עושה משפט וצדקה לכל עמו משפט לזה שהחזיר לו את ממונו וצדקה לזה ששילם לו מתוך ביתו)

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: It is a mitzva to mediate a dispute, as it is stated: “Execute the judgment of truth and peace in your gates” (Zechariah 8:16). Is it not that in the place where there is strict judgment there is no true peace, and in a place where there is true peace, there is no strict judgment? Rather, which is the judgment that has peace within it? You must say: This is mediation, as both sides are satisfied with the result. And similarly, with regard to David, it says: “And David executed justice and charity to all his people” (II Samuel 8:15). And is it not that wherever there is strict justice, there is no charity, and wherever there is charity, there is no strict justice? Rather, which is the justice that has within it charity? You must say: This is mediation. The Gemara cites an alternative interpretation of David’s method of judgment, in which we come to the opinion of the first tanna, i.e., Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that it is prohibited to mediate a dispute: If a judge adjudicated a case of monetary law, and he correctly exonerated the party who was exempt from payment and deemed liable the party who was liable to pay, if he then saw that due to his ruling a poor person became liable to pay an amount of money that is beyond his means and therefore the judge himself paid for him from his own house, this is justice and also charity. The Gemara continues: It is justice for this one and charity for that one: It is justice for this one, because the judge restored his money to him; and it is charity for that poor person, because the judge paid for him from his own house. And similarly, with regard to David, it says: “And David executed justice and charity to all his people” (II Samuel 8:15). He executed justice for this one, because he restored his money to him, and charity for that one, because he paid for him from his own house.