שבת הגדול תשפ'א

(2) Rabbi Hanina, the vice-high priest said: pray for the welfare of the government, for were it not for the fear it inspires, every man would swallow his neighbor alive. R. Hananiah ben Teradion said: if two sit together and there are no words of Torah [spoken] between them, then this is a session of scorners, as it is said: “nor sat he in the seat of the scornful…[rather, the teaching of the Lord is his delight]” (Psalms 1:1); but if two sit together and there are words of Torah [spoken] between them, then the Shekhinah abides among them, as it is said: “then they that feared the Lord spoke one with another; and the Lord hearkened and heard, and a book of remembrance was written before Him, for them that feared the Lord and that thought upon His name” (Malachi 3:16). Now I have no [scriptural proof for the presence of the Shekhinah] except [among] two, how [do we know] that even one who sits and studies Torah the Holy One, blessed be He, fixes his reward? As it is said: “though he sit alone and [meditate] in stillness, yet he takes [a reward] unto himself” (Lamentations 3:28).

except for by taking of an oath, due to its more stringent nature. And Beit Hillel say: One may mislead them even by taking an oath. Beit Shammai say: When negotiating with a robber, one should not initiate by taking a vow for him unless the robber does not believe his claim, in which case he may take a vow to reinforce his words. And Beit Hillel say: He may even initiate by taking a vow to him. Beit Shammai say: One may take a vow only about that which the robber compels him to take a vow but may not add to it. And Beit Hillel say: One may take a vow even about that which he does not compel him to take a vow. The mishna explains the previous statement: How so? If the extortionist said to him that he should say: Benefiting from me is konam for my wife if the vow is not true, and he said: Benefiting from me is konam for my wife and my children, Beit Shammai say: His wife is permitted to benefit from him, since the extortionist demanded that he take that vow, but his children, whom he added of his own accord, are prohibited from benefiting from their father. And Beit Hillel say: Both these and those are permitted to benefit from him. GEMARA: The Gemara asks, concerning the mishna’s statement that one may take a vow to tax collectors: But didn’t Shmuel say: The law of the kingdom is the law, i.e., there is a halakhic principle that Jews must obey the laws of the state in which they live? Since one must pay the tax determined by the kingdom, how did the Sages permit one to lie in order to avoid paying? Rav Ḥinnana said that Rav Kahana said that Shmuel said: The mishna is referring to a tax collector who has no fixed amount for collection established by the kingdom, but rather collects the tax arbitrarily. Therefore, this case is not included in the law of the kingdom. A Sage of the school of Rabbi Yannai said: The mishna is referring to a tax collector who establishes himself as such independently and was not appointed by the kingdom. § The mishna states: He may also take a vow to them that his produce belongs to the house of the king, although it does not belong to the house of the king. The Gemara asks: How does he take a vow in this way? Rav Amram said that Rav said: This is a case where he said: The produce of the world should be forbidden to me if this produce does not belong to the house of the king. The Gemara asks: Since he said that the produce of the world shall be forbidden to him, shouldn’t all the produce of the world is forbidden to him, as this produce did not belong to the house of the king? The Gemara answers: This is a case where he says: They shall be forbidden to me only today. The Gemara wonders: If he says: Today, the tax collector will not accept it as a vow, since it is not difficult to avoid eating produce for one day. Therefore, he may still be suspected of lying. The Gemara answers: This is a case where he says: Today, in his heart but verbalizes the vow in an unspecified manner. And although we hold that unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters and are not taken into consideration, with regard to circumstances beyond one’s control it is different, and he is permitted to rely on the mental stipulation that he added in order to limit the duration of the prohibition effected by the vow. § The mishna states: Beit Shammai say that they may take a vow in such a case using every means of vowing except for an oath, while Beit Hillel say they may take a vow even using an oath. Beit Shammai say: One may vow only about that which the extortionist compels him to take a vow but may not add to it. And Beit Hillel say: One may take a vow even about that which he does not compel him to take a vow. How so? If the extortionist said to him that he should say: Benefiting from me is konam for my wife if the vow is not true, and he said: Benefiting from me is konam for my wife and my children, Beit Shammai say: His wife is permitted to benefit from him, since the extortionist demanded that he take that vow, but his children, whom he added of his own accord, are prohibited from benefiting from their father. And Beit Hillel say: Both these and those are permitted to benefit from him. Rav Huna said that a Sage taught: Beit Shammai say that one may not initiate by taking an oath to him unless the extortionist does not believe his claim, and Beit Hillel say: He may even initiate by taking an oath to him. The Gemara asks: A precise analysis of the wording indicates that according to Beit Shammai it is only by taking an oath to him that one may not initiate, but one may initiate by taking a vow to him. Rav Huna asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that Beit Shammai say: He may not initiate by taking a vow to him? Rav Huna asks another question: And furthermore, a precise analysis of the wording indicates that he may not initiate by taking an oath to him, but he may certainly vow with an oath if the tax collector insists on it; but didn’t we learn in the mishna that Beit Shammai say: They may take a vow in such a case using every means of vowing in order to mislead them except for by taking an oath, which indicates that one may not take an oath even if he does not initiate with one? The Gemara resolves the contradiction: The mishna taught the halakha that pertains to a vow to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Beit Shammai, who say that one may not initiate even with a vow. However, the baraita taught the halakha that pertains to an oath to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Beit Hillel, who maintain that initiating even with an oath is permitted. It is apparent that according to Beit Shammai one may not initiate with a vow and may not take an oath at all. Therefore, the baraita cannot be used to infer Beit Shammai’s opinion concerning oaths. Rav Ashi said the following to resolve the contradiction: This is what it is teaching: The baraita does not refer to a vow taken in the case of robbers or tax collectors. Rather, the dispute focuses on an entirely different topic: Beit Shammai say that there is no allowance for a request for dissolution of an oath, and the statement: He may not initiate, relates to a halakhic authority who seeks an opening to dissolve an oath. And Beit Hillel say there is an allowance for a request for dissolution of an oath. MISHNA: If one sees his property in danger of being destroyed, and takes a vow stating, for example: These saplings are like an offering if they are not cut down, or: This garment is like an offering if it is not burned, these items are consecrated if the saplings remain standing or if the garment is not burned. In addition, they are subject to the possibility of redemption just as other items consecrated for maintenance of the Temple may be redeemed. But if one said: These saplings are like an offering until they are cut down, or: This garment is like an offering until it is burned, then they are not subject to the possibility of redemption. GEMARA: The Gemara questions the language of the mishna: Why does the mishna utilize the wording: They have redemption and they do not have redemption? Let the mishna teach: They are consecrated and they are not consecrated, since the primary novelty is that they are consecrated, but not completely. The Gemara answers: Since it wanted to teach in the latter clause the phrase: They are not subject to the possibility of redemption, which cannot be expressed as: They are not consecrated, as they are consecrated, it taught also the first clause using the language: They are subject to the possibility of redemption. The Gemara elaborates: How did he take a vow? What was the precise language that he used? Ameimar said: Where he says: These saplings are like an offering if they are not cut down today, and the day passed and they were not cut down. The Gemara asks: If so, why do I need to say that they are consecrated? Isn’t it obvious that his vow takes effect? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case where there is a great strong wind and he thought that they would be uprooted by the wind. The Gemara asks: But isn’t this taught together with the case of a garment, indicating that the two are equivalent, and is a garment ready for burning, i.e., is it assumed that it will burn? The Gemara answers: Yes, in a case where there is a fire. The Gemara explains: Here also there is a great strong wind, and it enters your mind that one raised in his mind the possibility that the saplings will not be saved, and due to that reason he took a vow. Since in any event he assumes he will lose the saplings, perhaps he did not really intend to consecrate them. The mishna teaches us that in spite of this it is still considered a vow. § The mishna states that if he said: These saplings are like an offering until they are cut down, they are not subject to the possibility of redemption. The Gemara asks: And are they not subject to redemption forever? Bar Padda said: If he redeemed them, they become consecrated again, as they have not yet been cut down. If he redeemed them again, they become consecrated again, until they are cut down. Once they are cut down, he redeems them once and it is sufficient. And Ulla said: Once they are cut down one does not need to redeem them again because they are no longer consecrated.

The Gemara cites additional proof with regard to the extent to which human dignity overrides mitzvot in the Torah. Come and hear, as Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok the priest said: I and my fellow priests would jump over coffins of the deceased in order to hurry towards kings of Israel to greet them. And they did not say this only towards kings of Israel, but they said this even towards kings of the nations of the world, so that if one will be privileged to witness the redemption of Israel, he will distinguish between kings of Israel and kings of the nations of the world. The priest violated the Torah prohibition to become ritually impure through contact with the dead, in order to show respect for a king. And why is this? Let us say here too: “There is neither wisdom, nor understanding, nor counsel against the Lord.”

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One should always strive to run toward kings of Israel to greet them. And not only should he run toward kings of Israel, but also toward kings of the nations of the world, so that if he will be privileged to witnesses the glory of the Messiah (Rashi) and the World-to-Come, he will distinguish between the kings of Israel and the kings of the nations of the world.