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Section III: Relating to the Past
Source material from the Maimonides Moot Court Competition 2021

Innocent After Proven Guilty?
The previous two units explored the foundations of teshuvah along with various questions which arise during the rehabilitation process after one has committed a transgression. In this unit, we will turn our attention to a related set of questions regarding the relationship between the past and the future. For example, is it ever appropriate to bring up someone’s past offenses? How should we relate to an individual who has been through the criminal justice system? Should we offer individuals the benefit of the doubt over their past actions?
1. The presumption of innocence is a key foundation of our modern criminal justice systems. In the eyes of the court, we are each innocent until proven guilty. The following mishnah in Pirkei Avot will offer what may be a different perspective—relating to how litigants should be perceived during and after court proceedings.

יְהוּדָה בֶן טַבַּאי אוֹמֵר, אַל תַּעַשׂ עַצְמְךָ כְעוֹרְכֵי הַדַּיָּנִין. וּכְשֶׁיִּהְיוּ בַעֲלֵי דִינִין עוֹמְדִים לְפָנֶיךָ, יִהְיוּ בְעֵינֶיךָ כִרְשָׁעִים. וּכְשֶׁנִּפְטָרִים מִלְּפָנֶיךָ, יִהְיוּ בְעֵינֶיךָ כְזַכָּאִין, כְּשֶׁקִּבְּלוּ עֲלֵיהֶם אֶת הַדִּין:

Yehudah ben Tabbai said, do not make yourself an advocate in court. When the litigants are standing before you [in court], they should appear in your eyes as if they were both guilty; and when they leave your presence, look upon them as if they were both innocent, as they have accepted the judgement.

2. In his commentary on this mishnah, Ovadiah Bartenura offers an explanation of Yehudah ben Tabbai’s teaching.

יִהְיוּ בְעֵינֶיךָ כִרְשָׁעִים. שֶׁלֹּא יַטֶּה לִבְּךָ לְאֶחָד מֵהֶם לוֹמַר אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי חָשׁוּב הוּא וְלֹא יִטְעֹן טַעֲנַת שֶׁקֶר. שֶׁאִם אַתָּה אוֹמֵר כֵּן, אֵין אַתָּה רוֹאֶה לוֹ חוֹבָה:

כְּשֶׁקִּבְּלוּ עֲלֵיהֶם אֶת הַדִּין. שֶׁלֹּא תַּחְשֹׁד הַחַיָּב לוֹמַר גַּזְלָן הָיָה זֶה, אֶלָּא תֹּאמַר שֶׁמָּא טוֹעֶה הָיָה וְלֹא נִתְכַּוֵּן לִגְזֹל. אִי נַמִּי, נִתְחַיֵּב אֶחָד מֵהֶם שְׁבוּעָה וְנִשְׁבַּע, לֹא תֹּאמַר לַשֶּׁקֶר נִשְׁבַּע:

Look upon them as if they were both guilty: so that your heart should not lean towards one of them, saying, “Such and such is a distinguished person and would not make a false claim.” Since if you say this, you will not be able to see them as guilty.

As they have accepted the judgment: Such that you should not suspect the obligated party by saying “This one is a thief.” Rather say, “maybe he was mistaken and did not intend to steal.” Alternatively: if one of them became obligated to make an oath [to testify in court] and subsequently made the oath, do not say, “he made a false oath.”

In his commentary, Bartenura suggests that the reason one should view both parties as guilty in the courtroom is to ensure that the judge will view the situation objectively, rather than allowing a litigant’s reputation to cloud their judgement. Likewise, after a guilty verdict has been delivered, one should aim to see both parties in a positive light, even if one of them was found to owe the other party.
The presumption of innocence is widely regarded today as a basic human right. In this mishnah, we see a concern not only with a litigant’s standing during a court proceeding—but after its conclusion as well. The next section will present another situation where there is concern expressed for how a convicted person should be perceived.

What Happens After a Sentence is Carried Out?
3. The following verses in Deuteronomy describe the process of a person being sentenced to lashes after being convicted of wrongdoing in court. As you read these verses, try to pay particular attention to how the Torah refers to the two parties at various points of the judgement process.

(א) כִּֽי־יִהְיֶה רִיב בֵּין אֲנָשִׁים וְנִגְּשׁוּ אֶל־הַמִּשְׁפָּט וּשְׁפָטוּם וְהִצְדִּיקוּ אֶת־הַצַּדִּיק וְהִרְשִׁיעוּ אֶת־הָרָשָׁע׃ (ב) וְהָיָה אִם־בִּן הַכּוֹת הָרָשָׁע וְהִפִּילוֹ הַשֹּׁפֵט וְהִכָּהוּ לְפָנָיו כְּדֵי רִשְׁעָתוֹ בְּמִסְפָּר׃ (ג) אַרְבָּעִים יַכֶּנּוּ לֹא יֹסִיף פֶּן־יֹסִיף לְהַכֹּתוֹ עַל־אֵלֶּה מַכָּה רַבָּה וְנִקְלָה אָחִיךָ לְעֵינֶיךָ׃

(1) When there is a dispute between men and they go to law, and a decision is rendered declaring the one in the right and the other in the wrong— (2) if the guilty one is to be flogged, the magistrate shall have him lie down and be given lashes in his presence, by count, as his guilt warrants. (3) He may be given up to forty lashes, but not more, lest being flogged further, to excess, your brother be degraded before your eyes.
4. These verses describe court proceedings between two parties, which conclude with lashes being carried out against the guilty party. The following midrash from the Sifrei comments on these verses, particularly taking notice of a shift in language in how the Torah refers to the guilty party.

ר' חנניה בן (גמלא) [גמליאל] אומר: כל היום קורא אותו הכתוב "רשע", שנאמר "והיה אם בן הכות הרשע". אבל כשלקה, הכתוב קוראו "אחיך".

Rabbi Hanania ben Gamliel says: Throughout the day [in court], the verse refers to him as “guilty,” as it says: “if the guilty one is to be flogged.” But once he has been flogged, the verse refers to him as “your brother.”

This midrash notes a significant shift in how the Torah describes the person convicted of wrongdoing. During the court proceedings (verse 2), he is called “guilty.” However, once the sentence has been carried out (verse 3), the Torah now refers to this individual as “your brother.”

Ona'at Devarim: The Prohibition of Oppressive Language
In the previous section, we encountered texts which emphasized the importance of seeing people in a positive light, even after they have been convicted in court. The following source will explore a related theme: the prohibition of “oppressive language” (אוֹנָאָת דְבָרִים) which includes not reminding an individual of their past if it will cause them pain. Halakhah is deeply concerned with the power of words, and oppressive language is one of several commandments related to forbidden forms of speech.
5. The Mishnah delineates the prohibition of oppression mentioned in Exodus 22:20.

(י) כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאוֹנָאָה בְמִקָּח וּמִמְכָּר, כָּךְ אוֹנָאָה בִדְבָרִים. לֹא יֹאמַר לוֹ בְּכַמָּה חֵפֶץ זֶה, וְהוּא אֵינוֹ רוֹצֶה לִקַּח. אִם הָיָה בַעַל תְּשׁוּבָה, לֹא יֹאמַר לוֹ זְכֹר מַעֲשֶׂיךָ הָרִאשׁוֹנִים. אִם הוּא בֶן גֵּרִים, לֹא יֹאמַר לוֹ זְכֹר מַעֲשֵׂה אֲבוֹתֶיךָ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות כב) וְגֵר לֹא תוֹנֶה וְלֹא תִלְחָצֶנּוּ:

Just as the laws of oppression apply to buying and selling, they also apply to oppressive language. One may not say, “How much is this object?” if he does not wish to buy it. If one had repented, another should not say to him, “Remember your earlier deeds.” If one descends from proselytes, another should not say to him, “Remember the deeds of your ancestors.” For it is said, “A stranger you shall not wrong or oppress.”

One of the examples of oppressive language listed in the mishnah above is reminding someone of their past sins. For our purposes, how might this relate to the question of Banning the Box?

The Responsibility to Intervene
In the previous section we explored the concept of oppressive language (אוֹנָאָת דְבָרִים), which includes a prohibition against embarrassing an individual by bringing up their past sins. In this section, we’ll test the limits of this prohibition by asking an important question from the opposing perspective: is there ever a responsibility to speak up regarding someone’s past actions if they may present a danger to someone else?
6. The following text is from the Sifra and expounds on the verse: "Do not stand by the blood of your fellow."

(ח) [ח] ומנין שאם אתה יודע לו עדות שאין אתה רשאי לשתוק עליו? תלמוד לומר "לא תעמוד על דם רעך". ומנין אם ראית טובע בנהר או לסטים באים עליו או חיה רעה באה עליו, חייב אתה להצילו בנפשו? תלמוד לומר "לא תעמוד על דם רעך".

From where is it derived that if you have information to testify on behalf of someone, that you are not permitted to remain silent? The verse teaches: “Do not stand by the blood of your fellow.” From where is it derived that if you see someone drowning in the river or threatened by robbers or attacked by a wild animal, that one is obligated to rescue him? The verse teaches: “Do not stand by the blood of your fellow.”

In this passage, the Midrash includes remaining silent while your testimony is needed as a violation of "Do not stand by the blood of your fellow." How might this obligation to speak up be relevant for our case this year?

Gossip and Evil Speech
Our final section explores the transgressions of gossip (רכילות) and evil speech (לשון הרע), which add important dimensions to this conversation around forbidden forms of speech. Notably, the prohibition of gossip is rooted in the same verse we explored above.
7. In this passage, Maimonides parses the difference between gossip (רכילות), evil speech (לשון הרע), and defamation (מוציא שם רע). As you read, pay attention to how Maimonides distinguishes between these forms of speech.

(ב) אֵי זֶהוּ רָכִיל. זֶה שֶׁטּוֹעֵן דְּבָרִים וְהוֹלֵךְ מִזֶּה לָזֶה וְאוֹמֵר כָּךְ אָמַר פְּלוֹנִי כָּךְ וְכָךְ שָׁמַעְתִּי עַל פְּלוֹנִי. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא אֱמֶת הֲרֵי זֶה מַחֲרִיב אֶת הָעוֹלָם. יֵשׁ עָוֹן גָּדוֹל מִזֶּה עַד מְאֹד וְהוּא בִּכְלַל לָאו זֶה וְהוּא לָשׁוֹן הָרַע. וְהוּא הַמְסַפֵּר בִּגְנוּת חֲבֵרוֹ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאוֹמֵר אֱמֶת. אֲבָל הָאוֹמֵר שֶׁקֶר נִקְרָא מוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע עַל חֲבֵרוֹ. אֲבָל בַּעַל לָשׁוֹן הָרַע זֶה שֶׁיּוֹשֵׁב וְאוֹמֵר כָּךְ וְכָךְ עָשָׂה פְּלוֹנִי וְכָךְ וְכָךְ הָיוּ אֲבוֹתָיו וְכָךְ וְכָךְ שָׁמַעְתִּי עָלָיו וְאָמַר דְּבָרִים שֶׁל גְּנַאי. עַל זֶה אָמַר הַכָּתוּב (תהילים יב ד) "יַכְרֵת ה' כָּל שִׂפְתֵי חֲלָקוֹת לָשׁוֹן מְדַבֶּרֶת גְּדלוֹת":

(ג) אָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים שָׁלֹשׁ עֲבֵרוֹת נִפְרָעִין מִן הָאָדָם בָּעוֹלָם הַזֶּה וְאֵין לוֹ חֵלֶק לָעוֹלָם הַבָּא. עֲבוֹדַת כּוֹכָבִים וְגִלּוּי עֲרָיוֹת וּשְׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים. וְלָשׁוֹן הָרַע כְּנֶגֶד כֻּלָּם. וְעוֹד אָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים כָּל הַמְסַפֵּר בְּלָשׁוֹן הָרַע כְּאִלּוּ כּוֹפֵר בָּעִקָּר.

(2) Who is a gossiper? One who makes claims, and goes from this person to that person, saying, so-and-so said this, and I heard that from so-and-so. Even though it is true, this is destructive for the world. There is an even worse transgression which is included [within gossip], and that is evil speech, one who spreads disgrace about his fellow even though he is telling the truth.

But if he is lying, that is called defaming his fellow. One who speaks evil speech is one who sits and says so-and-so did this, and his parents were such-and-such and I heard this about them, and says words of disgrace. About this the verse says:

“May God cut off all flattering lips, the tongue that speaks proud things.”


(3) The sages said: “There are three transgressions for which retribution is exacted from a person in this world, and denies the person a portion in the world to come. They are: idolatry, adultery, and murder; And evil speech is parallel to all of these.” Furthermore the sages said: “One who tells evil speech is like one who denies [God] entirely.”

In this passage, Maimonides explains that the prohibitions of gossip and evil speech refer to a situation in which the content of the speech is actually true. These forms of speech are prohibited as they lead to destructive outcomes. Maimonides explains this is the reason that the Biblical prohibition of gossip appears adjacent to the prohibition of standing by the blood of your fellow. Moreover, Maimonides writes of these prohibitions in extremely severe terms, comparing them to Judaism’s most serious transgressions.
8. The final text comes from Chofetz Chaim (חפץ חיים), an important late-19th-century work that is viewed authoritatively regarding the ethics and laws of speech. In this passage, the author writes that it is permissible to share negative information about someone if it will prevent harm from taking place. However, in order to do so, several criteria must be met before sharing this negative information.

אִם אֶחָד רוֹאֶה, שֶׁחֲבֵרוֹ רוֹצֶה לְהִשְׁתַּתֵּף בְּאֵיזֶה דָּבָר עִם אֶחָד, וְהוּא מְשַׁעֵר, שֶׁבְּוַדַּאי יְסִבַּב לוֹ עַל יְדֵי זֶה עִנְיָן רַע, צָרִיךְ לְהַגִּיד לוֹ כְּדֵי לְהַצִּילוֹ מִן הָעִנְיָן הָרַע הַהוּא, אַךְ צָרִיךְ לָזֶה חֲמִשָּׁה פְּרָטִים שֶׁאֲבָאֲרֵם בְּסָמוּךְ.

(א) וְאֵלּוּ הֵן: א) יִזָּהֵר מְאֹד, שֶׁלֹּא יַחְלִיט תֵּכֶף אֶת הָעִנְיָן בְּדַעְתּוֹ לְעִנְיָן רַע, רַק יִתְבּוֹנִן הֵיטֵב מִתְּחִלָּה, אִם הוּא בְּעֶצֶם רַע.

(ב) שֶׁלֹּא יַגְדִּיל בְּסִפּוּרוֹ אֶת הָעִנְיָן לְרַע יוֹתֵר מִמַּה שֶּׁהוּא.

(ג) שֶׁיְּכַוֵּן רַק לְתוֹעֶלֶת, דְּהַיְנוּ, לְסַלֵּק הַנְּזָקִין מִזֶּה, וְלֹא מִצַּד שִׂנְאָה עַל הַשֶּׁכְּנֶגְדּוֹ.

(ד) (וּבְזֶה הַפְּרָט הַג' נִכְלָל גַּם כֵּן עוֹד עִנְיָן אַחֵר, שֶׁמִּלְבַד הַכַּוָּנָה, שֶׁיְּכַוֵּן לְתוֹעֶלֶת, וְלֹא מִצַּד שִׂנְאָה, יִתְבּוֹנִן מִתְּחִלָּה, אִם תָּבוֹא מִזֶּה תּוֹעֶלֶת, לַאֲפוּקֵי {להוציא} מִמַּה שֶּׁמָּצּוּי כַּמָּה פְּעָמִים, שֶׁאֲפִלּוּ אִם יֹאמַר לוֹ, לֹא יִשְׁמַע לוֹ, וְיִשְׁתַּתֵּף עִמּוֹ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ כְּשֶׁיַּרְגִּיזוֹ חֲבֵרוֹ בְּאֵיזֶה דָּבָר, אוֹמֵר לוֹ: יָפֶה אָמַר עָלֶיךָ פְּלוֹנִי, שֶׁאֵין רָאוּי לְהִשְׁתַּתֵּף עִמְּךָ, וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה, לַאֲנָשִׁים כָּאֵלּוּ שֶׁהוּא מַכִּירָם, שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶם מִדָּה רָעָה זוֹ דִּרְכִילוּת, לֹא יְצֻּיַּר שׁוּם הֶתֵּר, כִּי הוּא מַכְשִׁיל אֶת הָעִוְּרִים הַלָּלוּ בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה גְּמוּרָה דִּרְכִילוּת).

(ה) אִם הוּא יָכוֹל לְסַבֵּב אֶת הַתּוֹעֶלֶת הַזּוֹ, מִבְּלִי שֶׁיִּצְטָרֵךְ לְגַלּוֹת לְפָנָיו עִנְיָנָיו לְרַע, אֵין לְסַפֵּר עָלָיו.

(ו) כָּל זֶה אֵינוֹ מֻתָּר, רַק אִם לֹא יְסֻבַּב עַל יְדֵי הַסִפּוּר רָעָה מַמָּשׁ לַנִּדּוֹן, דְּהַיְנוּ, שֶׁלֹּא יָרֵעוּ עִמּוֹ מַמָּשׁ, רַק שֶׁתּוּסַר מִמֶּנּוּ עַל יְדֵי זֶה הַטּוֹבָה, שֶׁהָיָה עוֹשֶׂה עִמּוֹ הַשֶּׁכְּנֶגְדּוֹ, אַף דְּמִמֵּילָא דָּבָר זֶה הוּא רָעָה לוֹ, מִכָּל מָקוֹם מִתָּר. אֲבָל אִם יַגִּיעַ לוֹ עַל יְדֵי סִפּוּרוֹ רָעָה מַמָּשׁ, אָסוּר לְסַפֵּר עָלָיו, כִּי יִצְטָרֵךְ לָזֶה עוֹד פְּרָטִים...

If one sees that his friend wishes to enter into partnership with someone, and he feels that he will undoubtedly be harmed by this, he must tell him to rescue him from that harm, but the following five conditions must be met:

(1) He must be careful not to immediately conclude that harm will result, but must reflect carefully from the beginning to see if the result will, indeed, be harmful.

(2) He must not exaggerate the matter to be worse than it actually is.

(3) His intent must be for benefit only; that is, to remove the harm from the first, and not because he hates the other.

(4) And in this third condition, we shall include yet another matter—that aside from his intending benefit and not being motivated by hatred, he must first reflect as to whether benefit will actually sprout from this—as opposed to what happens very often, that even if tells him, he will not listen to him, but will enter into partnership with him, and afterwards, when his partner angers him with something, he will tell him: “He was right when he told me not to become your partner,” and the like. For such people, whom he recognizes to possess this evil trait of gossip, no permission [to speak up] is conceivable, for it makes these blind men stumble in the absolute transgression of gossip.

(5) If he can accomplish the goal without having to speak badly of the other, he should do so.

(6) All this is permitted only if absolute harm will not come to the one spoken of because of what is said about him. That is, they are not permitted to do him any positive harm, but only to deprive him of the good that might have come to him from the partnership. Even though [even] this is bad for him, in any event it is permitted. But if absolute harm comes to him because of what is said about him, it is forbidden to speak about him; for this would require other conditions...


Unit 3 Summary: In this unit we explored a number of issues related to how one’s past should dictate our relationship with them in the present. First we discussed a mishnah and midrash related to how to perceive a person after they have been convicted in court. In addition, we explored the transgression of oppressive speech (אוֹנָאָת דְבָרִים) regarding inappropriate ways of bringing up someone’s past. We then discussed the obligation to intervene and not stand by when someone is in need of assistance. Lastly, we approached this question through a lens of gossip and evil speech, reflecting on when it is appropriate to sound the alarm by sharing information about someone’s past.
Questions for further reflection
1. What values come into play regarding the question of bringing up someone's questionable past? Do these values ever come into conflict with each other?
2. Which source is most pertinent to evaluating Ban the Box? How does it apply?
3. Reflecting on this unit as a whole, how does it inform whether or not a university admissions committee should require students to disclose information about their criminal record?