Conversion and Controversy TNT

(38) Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe Y.D. 1:157) clearly states that if a convert does not intend to observe mitzvot, his conversion is invalid. Rav Moshe does, however, offer “a bit of a Limmud Zechut” (defense) for those Orthodox rabbis who convert individuals who clearly have no intention of observing mitzvot in Teshuvot Igrot Moshe Y.D. 1:160. Rav Moshe suggests that in today’s circumstances, when most Jews do not observe the Torah, many converts perceive non-observance of Halachah to constitute mainstream Jewish practice. They perceive observance of mitzvot as a preferred manner of Jewish living, not as an absolute requirement.

(39) In such a situation, the convert may be compared to the Gemara’s case of one who converted amongst non-Jews and was not informed about the mitzvot yet was considered to be a full-fledged Jew. In today’s environment, it is as if the convert was not informed of the mitzvot, since many converts do not accept what they are taught about the obligation of mitzvot.

(40) Rav Moshe Feinstein does not endorse such conversions. Rather he presents this reasoning “so that they (the rabbis involved in such conversions) should not be considered worse than uneducated.” Interestingly, Rav Moshe Feinstein does not disqualify these rabbis from serving as dayanim due to their lenient approach to conversion. On the other hand, he does not endorse or recognize such lenient conversions. Similarly, I recall that Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik presented³⁰In a shiur delivered at Yeshiva University. a bit of a limmud zechut for those who adopt the lenient approach to geirut, based on the aforementioned Rashi to Shabbat 31a. However, Rav Soloveitchik did not validate such conversions.

(5) The problem is that in this case the prescribed laws on conversion are in conflict with another important principle of Judaism, that of preserving the unity of Israel, the idea of k’neset Yisrael, with the obligation of ahavat Yisrael, the love for the people of Israel. Only when we understand this, have we raised the halakhic question. For, indeed, such is the classical halakhic problematics, i.e., that the strict adherence to one law is in conflict with the strict adherence to another law and obligatory principle of Judaism. We repeat, then: in the case on hand, any Orthodox Jew has the right to say that, for him, the importance of the laws of gerut (conversion) are so vital that for their sake he will push aside all the important obligations regarding the ideal of klal Yisrael and ahavat Yisrael. But where does he find the authoritative basis for his decision? In the Shulḥan Arukh on hilkhot gerim, in the section on conversion? Certainly not! There he will find all the rules on how to convert a non-Jew. What he will not find there is the answer to our problem of halakhah, i.e., in view of the importance of the idea of klal Yisrael and all that it involves. For Torah-true Judaism, what should be our attitude to a vast number of fellow Jews who do not observe the laws on conversion as we do? Where, then, will he find the answer to his question, in which book, in which code? In no book, in no code. He must make this decision by himself, in his own heart, in his own Jewish conscience. But how so? He will accept the authoritative validity of the law on conversion, at the same time that he will acknowledge the importance of the reality of klal Yisrael and ahavat Yisrael and will then seek a resolution of the conflict from the source and the quality of the comprehensive ethos of Judaism, from what Judaism is about in its totality, according to his understanding and commitment. Moreover, this is an understanding and commitment which has grown into a measure of maturity as the result of the dedicated study of the classical sources of Judaism and of adherence to a way of life inseparable from it. This is not a purely subjective decision; but just because of the subjective element involved in it, it will be a truly halakhic solution to a genuinely halakhic problem.

(1) ...Is there now any further principle in the totality of the system of Judaism that might be used as the basis for a halakhic solution? One could perhaps make the following suggestion. It is true that the laws of conversion do prescribe that a non-Jew be accepted into Judaism only if he is willing to accept all the commandments of the Torah in all sincerity and if he is circumcized and immersed in the properly prepared ritual bath. Yet, it is also established that if this were not the case, but a person converted without the religious responsibilities having been explained to him, even if he or she undertook this step for the sake of marrying a Jew or a Jewess or for any other ulterior reason, even if the conversion had taken place in the presence of three laymen, ignorant of the laws and teachings of Judaism, the conversion is still valid. Of course, this is allowed only be’d’eebad i.e. post factum, after the event of conversion had taken place. But l’khatḥilah, as a rule, from the start of the conversion process, it is not permissible. On the other hand, there exists a general principle of halakhah that all cases of need, of urgency, eyt hazorekh or hadḥak, are to be treated as b’ed’eebad. In other words, what normally would be admissible only post factum, under the pressure of circumstances is allowed l’khatḥilah, from the start. Now, I do not hesitate to say that the preservation of aḥdut Yisrael, the unity of klal Ysrael, and the practice of ahavat Yisrael are matters of utmost urgency. With this understanding of the problem, I might well think that a compromise with our non-Orthodox brothers and sisters was possible. I imagine that I would have every right to approach them and talk to them somewhat as follows:

(2) We have our own views on what constitutes genuine conversion and you have yours. We disagree on this point. We shall not force our view on you as you will not force yours on us. But insofar as we are both part of k’neset Yisrael and desire to have our place of responsibility in it, we do have in common our concern for the preservation of klal Yisrael and are equally motivated by ahavat Yisrael. Therefore, in this matter of conversion your problem is very similar to ours. It is not really a question of how to admit a non-Jew into Judaism. It is a “halakhic” problem for you no less than for us, i.e., how to resolve the conflict between your requirements for conversion and your commitment to the reality of klal Yisrael. We know well what your l’khatḥilah position on conversion is. But since this is a case of eyt hazorekh and shaat hadḥak, what would be your be’d’eebad position in view of the need for Jewish unity and for the sake of your love for your fellow Jews? In view of the need and the urgency dictated by our understanding of Judaism’s call for ahavat Yisrael and the safeguarding of the unity of the community of Israel in our relationship to you we are, be’d’eebad, willing to forego the demand for full adherence to the requirements for conversion as we accept it for our own conduct. How far can you go in allowing your obligation to preserve unity and commitment to a common destiny to control and modify your requirements for conversion? I disagree with Reform Jews as to what these requirements ought to be. As to Conservative Judaism, I understand from some of its leading spokesmen that the majority of the Conservative rabbis do adhere to the laws of conversion as stated in the Shulḥan Arukh, though I assume that the Orthodox interpretation as to what constitutes kabbalat ol mizvot, the acceptance of the yoke of the Commandments, may differ from theirs. But notwithstanding the disagreements, I do have sufficient respect for the leading rabbinical and scholarly personalities in both the Conservative and Reform groups to know that, in moral responsibility, they could not, and would not, refuse to respond positively to such an approach on the part of those who came to them in the name of halakhah. At least, instead of shouting at each other, we might start talking to each other.