- Sanctuary in Time
- Promptness, Focus, Confidentiality, Trust
- We are all someone’s rebbe and someone’s talmid - i.e. step up, step back
- Bring your whole, authentic self
- Dan L’Chaf Zechut (Benefit of the Doubt)
- Suspension of Disbelief / Productive Discomfort
- "Eilu v’eilu”
I’m bringing a range of different sources. Some of them will be provocative. Some of them will deeply resonate with you, while others won’t. Try to reserve judgement until the end, and remember that the Talmud in particular is not just one opinion but a collection of a broad range of (often-contradictory) opinions.
1) Should women perform mitzvot from which they are exempt? What benefits/challenges (both personal and social) may ensue from taking on the regular practice of voluntarily performing such mitzvot?
2) Who do we perform mitzvot for? (Ourselves? Others? G-d? )
1) Would you choose to obligate yourself (or be obligated through communal expectations) in any/all mitzvot from which women are exempt (i.e. reciting Shema, donning tzitzit, laying tefillin on the head and on the hand, hearing shofar, taking lulav, dwelling in the sukka, and counting the omer)?
2) What might be the pros/cons of participating in a community where these observances are expected/socially mandated for women?
3) What is greater - a compulsory (i.e. mandatory) or a voluntary performance of a mitzva? Why?
דַּבֵּ֞ר אֶל־בְּנֵ֤י יִשְׂרָאֵל֙ וְאָמַרְתָּ֣ אֲלֵהֶ֔ם אָדָ֗ם כִּֽי־יַקְרִ֥יב מִכֶּ֛ם קָרְבָּ֖ן לַֽה' ... וְסָמַ֣ךְ יָד֔וֹ עַ֖ל רֹ֣אשׁ הָעֹלָ֑ה וְנִרְצָ֥ה ל֖וֹ לְכַפֵּ֥ר עָלָֽיו׃
Speak to benei (lit. children of or sons of) Yisrael and say to them: A person from amongst you when he brings a sacrifice to God… and he shall lean his hand on the head of the burnt offering and it will be accepted for him, to atone for him.
"דבר אל בני ישראל" בני ישראל סומכין ואין בנות ישראל סומכות דברי רבי יהודה רבי יוסי ורבי שמעון אומרים נשים סומכות רשות:
“Speak to benei Yisrael" - the sons of Israel lean, but the daughters of Israel do not lean; these are the words of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: Women may lean voluntarily [reshut].
According to Rabbi Yehuda, women may not lean on a sacrifice at all. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon agree that women are not obligated in semicha, but maintain that women may lean voluntarily.
Unless there is a specific reason to prohibit a woman’s voluntarily performing a particular mitzva, perhaps it should be permitted.
ספרא דבורא דנדבה פרק ב פרשה ב:ב
רבי יוסי ורבי שמעון אומרי’: הנשים סומכות רשות. אמר רבי יוסי: אמר לי אבא אלעזר: היה לנו עגל זבחי שלמים, והוצאנוהו לעזרת הנשים, וסמכו עליו הנשים. לא מפני שהסמיכה בנשים – אלא מפני נחת רוח של נשים.
Sifra, Dibura De-Nedava II 2:2
Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: Women lean voluntarily. Rabbi Yosei said: Abba Elazar said to me: We had a calf for a peace offering, and we brought it out to the women’s area, and the women leaned on it. Not because leaning is [the law] with women, but rather because of nachat ru’ach shel nashim [women’s gratification].
Apparently, women in the Temple wanted to perform semicha [consecrating a sacrificial animal], even though they were exempt from it. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon maintain that women’s gratification, nachat ru’ach shel nashim, has independent value. If we assume that they, too, might have been concerned about the appearance of performing avodah she'be'kodshim [labor with sanctified animals, which is rabbinically prohibited] when leaning on animals voluntarily, we can learn here that nachat ru’ach shel nashim supersedes that rabbinic prohibition. On this view, Halacha takes women’s feelings into account.
As we have seen, Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon permit a woman to perform semicha [consecration] as a matter of reshut [i.e. voluntarily]. There are two main ways in which to understand reshut here (and in general):
I. The voluntary act has little or no objective halachic value. Here, we would say that a woman receives personal emotional satisfaction, but her action is not a direct fulfillment of God’s will.
II. The voluntary act has objective halachic value. There are two major elements to a mitzva: the command and the mitzva act. Although the command element of the mitzva is absent and cannot be recreated, the act of mitzva performance itself still has meaning as a fulfillment of God’s will.
(ז) כן הורה ר' יצחק הלוי ...[דאינן] חייבות ואינן צריכות אבל אם חפיצות להביא עצמם בעול המצוה הרשות בידה... דמקיימת מצוה היא
Rav Yitzchak Ha-levi - one of Rashi's teachers, 11th century, Ashkenaz
So ruled Rav Yitzchak Ha-levi, that they are not obligated and don’t need [to perform positive time-bound mitzvot]. But if they desire to bring themselves into the yoke of mitzva the permission is in her hand… for she is one who fulfills a mitzva [mekayyemet mitzva].
דרשות דמצוה הוא והקב"ה צוה במצוה זו לאנשים חובה לנשים רשות
Ramban / Nachmanides - Sephard, 13th century
For it is reshut de-mitzva [a voluntary mitzvat], and God commanded this mitzva to men as an obligation, to women [God commanded the mitzvah] as optional.
According to Ramban, a woman is commanded in the mitzva. It’s just that men receive the mitzva as an obligatory act to pursue, while women receive it as an optional act to fulfill.
ראבי”ה חלק ב – מסכת סוכה סימן תרמ
דנהי שגדול המצווה ועושה ממי שאינו מצווה, מכל מקום מצוה הוי:
Ra'avya II Sukka 640
For albeit one who is commanded and performs [a mitzvah] is greater than one who [performs but] is not commanded, in any case it is a mitzva.
ת״ר לא יפרוס. דאע״ג דלא מחייבי מצוה איכא עליה ונוטלות עליהם שכר
For even though they [women] are not obligated, there is a mitzva upon them and they receive reward for them.
Halacha generally permits a woman to perform mitzvot from which she is exempt – and recognizes these acts as halachically meaningful.
1) What are the benefits and drawbacks of some mitzvot being optional for women?
2) Do you see a woman's performance of a mitzvah in which she is not obligated as having objective halachic value? If so, why would you say that might be the case?
Kiddushin 31a-b: Greater is One Who is Commanded and Performs
Who gets more credit – someone who does mitzvot because he is obligated or someone who does mitzvot as a volunteer?
Although most people’s immediate reaction is to give more credit to the volunteer who has indicated a personal desire to perform mitzvot, Rabbi Hanina rules, “Gadol ha-mitzuveh ve-oseh me-me she-aino metzuveh ve-oseh – someone who is commanded to perform a mitzva and does so is greater than someone who performs the commandment without being obligated to do so.” The Gemara reports that upon hearing this teaching, Rabbi Yosef who was blind said that he would throw a party for the Sages who ruled against Rabbi Yehuda who says that blind people are not obligated to perform mitzvot, since he wanted to receive appropriate reward for his actions.
Why would this be true? Several approaches are offered by the rishonim.
The Tosafot explain that a person who is commanded to perform mitzvot has a harder time doing them because his evil inclination discourages him from doing what he needs to do. A volunteer, who knows that he is not really obligated in the mitzva and can choose not to do it, does not have to resist his evil inclination when performing the mitzva. Tosafot Tokh suggests simply that there is less reward for someone who performs an action that may not be God’s will, as evidenced by the fact that he was not commanded to do it.
The Rambam concludes from this Gemara that we cannot discount the actions performed by someone who was not commanded to do a mitzva, since the Gemara states that such a person receives less of a reward, but clearly he does receive some level of reward for doing what he did. Rabbeinu Tam goes so far as to use this Gemara as a source for his ruling that women who are not obligated in mitzvot aseh she-hazman gerama – positive commandments that are time-related – should, nevertheless, recite a blessing upon performing them. This has become the accepted ruling on this matter, at least in the Ashkenazi community.
הגהות סמ”ק צב בשם רבנו פרץ
ומ”מ [ומכל מקום] רגילין לתקוע לנשים יולדות, גם מברכין ולא הוי ברכה לבטלה, כיון שמכניסות עצמן בחיוב מידי דהוי אלולב
Hagahot Semak 92 (in the name of Rabbeinu Peretz)
And in any case, we are accustomed to blow shofar for women who have just given birth, and we also recite a beracha [a blessing] and it is not a beracha in vain, because they bring themselves into the obligation, just as with lulav.
A community can take a practice upon itself, transforming that practice into custom. A custom can sometimes become so prevalent and entrenched that it takes on a sort of obligatory status.
For example, the Talmud concludes that the evening prayer of aravit (ma’ariv) is reshut (for men). But, since men have adopted this prayer as a longstanding practice, it becomes like an obligation:
היכא דצלי ליה לתפלת ערבית כבר שוייה עליה חובה:
Where they pray tefilat aravit [evening prayer service], it is considered upon him as an obligation.
Are there any examples of women having a binding communal custom to perform positive time-bound commandments? There is a near universal custom for Jewish women to hear the shofar on Rosh Hashana, even though it is a positive time-bound commandment, and for communities to treat that practice like an obligation.
As early as the 14th century, Maharil notes the implications of this quasi-obligation for individual women and for the community as a whole:
ספר מהרי”ל (מנהגים) הלכות שופר
אכן נשים פטורות דמצות עשה דזמן גרמא הוא. אך שמכניסין את עצמן לחיוב. והואיל שמחייבין את עצמן צריכין להזדרז לתקן צרכיהן הן בתכשיטין הן בתבשילין להיות פנויות לבא בית הכנסת ולהיות שם לשמוע קול שופר, ואל יטריחו את הציבור להמתין אחריהם.
Maharil, Laws of Shofar
Indeed women are exempt [from shofar], for it is a positive time-bound commandment. But they bring themselves into the obligation. Since they obligate themselves, they must make haste to prepare their needs, whether in adornment or in cooked dishes, to be available to come to the synagogue and to be there to hear the shofar blast, and they should not impose upon the congregation to wait for them.
Centuries later, Magen Avraham (1633-1683, Poland) and Rabbi Akiva Eiger (1761-1837, Austria/Poland) extend the idea of communal obligation to other mitzvot. Magen Avraham notes that, since women of his day count the omer, it has become like an obligation:
נשים פטורות מספירה דהוי מצות עשה שהזמן גרמה ומיהו כבר שוויה עלייהו חובה:
Women are exempt from counting [the omer], for it is a positive time-bound commandment, and nevertheless it is already considered upon them as an obligation.
שו”ת רבי עקיבא איגר סימן א:
ולזה נראה דבאמת אינן בחיוב המצוה זו כיון דהוי ז”ג [זמן גרמא] אלא דמ”מ [דמכל מקום] רוב נשי דידן מחמירין לעצמן וזהירות וזריזות לקיים רוב מ”ע שהז”ג [מצוות עשה שהזמן גרמא], כגון שופר סוכה לולב וכן בקידוש יו”ט [יום טוב] והוי כקיבלו עלייהו
Responsa of Rabbi Akiva Eiger 1
It seems that in truth they [women] are not obligated in this mitzva since it is time-bound, but since in any case most of our women are stringent for themselves and are scrupulous and eager to fulfill most positive time-bound commandments, such as shofar, sukka [and] lulav and so too kiddush on Yom Tov, and it is as if they have accepted it upon themselves.
1) Are there any practical or philosophical differences between having a commandment and "obligating oneself" in a way that is binding through custom?
2) How do you see the narrative of women performing "voluntary" mitzvot changing through successive centuries of rabbinic discourse (the early medieval period - Hagahot Semak, etc) to the modern period (Rabbi Akiva Eiger)?
Should a woman make an effort to perform mitzvot from which she is exempt?
ותני חזקיה כל מי שהוא פטור מדבר ועושהו נקרא הדיוט.
And Chizkiya taught: Anyone who is exempt from a matter and does it is called a hedyot (a simpleton).
The Jerusalem Talmud appears to assert that voluntary mitzva performance by one exempted is pointless and to be discouraged.
Ramban explains, however, that this principle is not at all what it at first seems:
והא אמרינן בירושלמי כל העושה דבר שאינו מצווה בו נקרא הדיוט התם שעושה דבר שאינו מצווה מן התורה כלל שהוא כמוסיף על התורה אבל מי שעושה מצות התורה כתקנן אף על פי שלא נצטוה הוא בהם כגון נשים מקבלים עליהן שכר שכל דרכיה דרכי נועם
Behold, we say in the Yerushalmi, ‘Anyone who performs something in which he is not commanded is called a simpleton!’ That refers to a person who does something that is not commanded from the Torah at all, where it is as if he adds to the Torah. But someone who does the mitzvot of the Torah as enacted even though he was not commanded in them, like women, receives reward for them, for all of her [the Torah’s] paths are paths of pleasantness.
When an action is not commanded for anyone, as for example sitting in the sukka on Passover [reminder: we only sit in a sukkah on Sukkot, not Passover], performing it has no value. When someone invents a “mitzva,” he or she diverges from the Torah. That is the case in which one is called a hedyot [simpleton].
This label does not apply when a person voluntarily performs a genuine mitzva from which she, personally, is exempt. Voluntary action in this case is a reflection of yearning for mitzvot.
If we view voluntary mitzva performance as a reshut de-mitzva [a permitted, though not obligatory, observance of a commandment], then we should generally encourage it, as long as it does not conflict with other religious obligations or values. Rav Yisrael Ze’ev Gustman (Lithuania and Israel, 20th century) makes this case forcefully:
רב ישראל זאב גוסטמן, קונטרסי שעורים מסכתא קדושין עמוד 254:
ונלענ”ד לחדש להלכה דגם במצות עשה שהזמן גרמא אין לנשים לבטלן בחנם אם לא מפני מצוה עוברת או משום טירחא יתירה…לא לבטלה אמרה תורה נשים סומכות רשות..מעשה המצוה מן התורה, ומן התורה היא רשות דמצוה.
Rav Yisrael Gustman, Kuntresei Shiurim, Kiddushin, p. 254:
In my humble opinion, it seems warranted to rule that even in positive time-bound commandments, it is not worthy for women to free themselves from these mitzvot if not for some [other] mitzva [whose time is] passing or because of excessive effort… It is not for nothing that the Torah said women have permission to lean on a sacrifice…The mitzva act is from the Torah, and from the Torah it is [considered] reshut de-mitzva.
Einah Metzuvah v'Osah in a Post-Modern World
Rabbanit Henkin is the founder Nishmat, a Modern Orthodox institute of higher Torah learning for women
Einah Metzuvah v’Osah [she is not commanded and does] gives us freedom, spontaneity, and meaning. Metzuveh v’Oseh [commanded and does] ensures that we are worshipping God, not ourselves. By the nature of their role in Judaism, women partake of both.