Additional sources and background info retrieved from Deracheha.org.
- Sanctuary in Time
- Promptness, Focus, Confidentiality, Trust
- We are all someone’s rebbe (teacher) and someone’s talmid (student)
- Bring your whole, authentic self
- Dan L’Chaf Zechut
- Suspension of Disbelief / Productive Discomfort
- "Eilu v’eilu”
I’m bringing a range of different sources. Some of them will be provocative. Some of them will deeply resonate with you, while others won’t. Try to reserve judgement until the end, and remember that the Talmud in particular is not just one opinion but a collection of a broad range of (often-contradictory) opinions.
1. Why are women exempt from certain mitzvot? For what purpose(s), if any, are these exemptions carved out? What do these exemptions accomplish, whether in the positive or the negative?
2. How do the halachic differences in mitzvah obligations between men and women create different lived realities and social expectations for both?
1) Make a list of mitzvot/observances/customs from which you believe women are exempt according to halacha [Jewish law].
2) Do you see any commonalities in your list? Why do you think these particular items are the exemptions? (i.e. different level of obligation, social custom, etc.)
(ז) כָּל מִצְוֹת הַבֵּן עַל הָאָב, אֲנָשִׁים חַיָּבִין וְנָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת. וְכָל מִצְוֹת הָאָב עַל הַבֵּן, אֶחָד אֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד נָשִׁים חַיָּבִין. וְכָל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהַזְּמָן גְּרָמָהּ, אֲנָשִׁים חַיָּבִין וְנָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת. וְכָל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁלֹּא הַזְּמָן גְּרָמָהּ, אֶחָד אֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד נָשִׁים חַיָּבִין. וְכָל מִצְוַת לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה, בֵּין שֶׁהַזְּמָן גְּרָמָהּ בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא הַזְּמָן גְּרָמָהּ, אֶחָד אֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד נָשִׁים חַיָּבִין, חוּץ מִבַּל תַּשְׁחִית וּבַל תַּקִּיף וּבַל תִּטַּמָּא לְמֵתִים:
(7) All mitzvot of the son upon the father, men are obligated, but women are exempt. But all mitzvot of the father upon the son, both men and women are obligated. All positive, time-bound commandments, men are obligated and women are exempt. But all positive non-time-bound commandments both men and women are obligated. And all negative commandments, whether time-bound or not time-bound, both men and women are obligated, except for, the prohibition against rounding [the corners of the head], and the prohibition against marring [the corner of the beard], and the prohibition [for a priest] to become impure through contact with the dead.
Positive Time-Bound Mitzvot: In Depth
Deracheha
By Laurie Novick
Rav Ezra Bick, Ilana Elzufon, and Shayna Goldberg, eds.
This section of the mishna discussing prohibitions employs the phrase “zeman geramah,” literally ‘time causes it,’ to categorize mitzvot. This means that the mitzva is time-bound, it applies at a specific time and not at another. [See Rambam, Peirush Ha-mishnayot Kiddushin 1:7]
The mishna tells us that, as a rule, men are obligated in positive time-bound commandments while women are not. Before we explore this category further, it is important to remember its context. Overall, the mishna has divided mitzvot into four major categories (positive time-bound, positive non-time-bound, negative time-bound, and negative non-time-bound). Women are generally obligated in three out of four.
An example of a negative time-bound commandment is the prohibition of eating chametz (leaven) on Pesach. An example of a negative commandment that is not time-bound is the prohibition against stealing. Halacha follows this mishna. As a rule, women are subject to both sets of negative prohibitions.
In general, men and women are equally obligated in positive non-time-bound commandments. These include loving our fellow person, returning a lost object, giving tzedaka, affixing a mezuza, and many other essential elements of Jewish observance.
In fact, out of the 613 Torah-level mitzvot, there seem to be only eight instances where women are exempted specifically from positive time-bound mitzvot: reciting Shema, donning tzitzit, laying tefillin on the head and on the hand, hearing shofar, taking lulav, dwelling in the sukka, and counting the omer. This is not a long list.
Additionally, women are also usually exempt from rabbinic-level positive time-bound mitzvot.
Why Does The Exemption From This Single Category Loom Large?
Deracheha
Here are two thoughts:
I. Most of the positive non-time-bound mitzvot create the Jewish character and general approach to life, the Jewish gestalt. In contrast, positive time-bound mitzvot are rituals. Three of them are central mitzvot of major holidays.
Although positive non-time-bound mitzvot are more numerous and arguably more fundamental to Jewish life than many of the rituals, the latter (especially when connected to objects or holidays) draw our attention.
For example, viduy, confession of sin as part of the process of repentance, is a significant mitzva. Both men and women are required to perform viduy. But it is the shofar on Rosh Ha-shanah, from which women are exempt on a Torah level, that has come to symbolize teshuva.
When women’s exemptions fall largely in the area of ritual, they tend to stand out disproportionately because of their symbolic value and because of the significance we ascribe to the holidays.
II. Many of the positive time-bound rituals stand out in the context of prayer in the synagogue. When Jewish communities are decentralized and dislocated and the Judaism of the home and society takes second place to institutional Judaism, synagogues take on greater, perhaps outsized, importance.
The more a community’s Jewish life emphasizes synagogue and ritual over holistic Judaism based in the home and the Jewish street, the more time-bound positive commandments appear central and the more central commands, such as believing in God, move to the periphery of religious attention. Perhaps for this reason, there is less communal discussion of this exemption in Israel, where the social and national experience overshadow the synagogue.1
Of course positive time-bound commandments are important, and the exemption from them matters, but they are not the only cornerstones of Jewish religious life.
(ב) נשים ועבדים פטורים מפני שהיא מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא: הגה ומ"מ אם רוצים לעטפו ולברך עליו הרשות בידם כמו בשאר מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא [תוס' והרא"ש והר"ן פ"ב דר"ה ופ"ק דקידושין] אך מחזי כיוהרא לכן אין להן ללבוש ציצית הואיל ואינו חובת גברא [אגור סי' כ"ז]
(2) Women and slaves are exempt [from wearing tzitzit] because it is a time-dependent commandment.
Rema: And if they wish to wrap [in tzitzit] and say the blessing on them it is up to them to do so as with all time-dependent commandments (Tosafot and the Rosh and the Ran, Chapter 2, Rosh Hashanah, First Chapter of Kiddushin).
However, it looks as if they are doing it to appear more observant than others, therefore, they should not wear tzitzit, as it is not a commandment of the person [rather of the object] (Agur Section 27).
מַתְנִי׳ נָשִׁים וַעֲבָדִים וּקְטַנִּים פְּטוּרִין מִקְּרִיאַת שְׁמַעוּמִן הַתְּפִילִּין, וְחַיָּיבִין בִּתְפִילָּה וּבִמְזוּזָה וּבְבִרְכַּת הַמָּזוֹן. גְּמָ׳ קְרִיאַת שְׁמַע: פְּשִׁיטָא! מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהַזְּמַן גְּרָמָא הוּא, וְכׇל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהַזְּמַן גְּרָמָא נָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת? מַהוּ דְתֵימָא: הוֹאִיל וְאִית בַּהּ מַלְכוּת שָׁמַיִם, קָמַשְׁמַע לַן. וּמִן הַתְּפִלִּין. פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְתֵימָא: הוֹאִיל וְאִתַּקַּשׁ לִמְזוּזָה — קָמַשְׁמַע לַן. וְחַיָּיבִין בִּתְפִלָּה. דְּרַחֲמֵי נִינְהוּ. מַהוּ דְתֵימָא: הוֹאִיל וּכְתִיב בַּהּ ״עֶרֶב וָבֹקֶר וְצָהֳרַיִם״, כְּמִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהַזְּמַן גְּרָמָא דָּמֵי — קָמַשְׁמַע לַן. וּבִמְזוּזָה. פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְתֵימָא: הוֹאִיל וְאִתַּקַּשׁ לְתַלְמוּד תּוֹרָה — קָמַשְׁמַע לַן. וּבְבִרְכַּת הַמָּזוֹן. פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְתֵימָא הוֹאִיל וּכְתִיב ״בְּתֵת ה׳ לָכֶם בָּעֶרֶב בָּשָׂר לֶאֱכֹל וְלֶחֶם בַּבֹּקֶר לִשְׂבֹּעַ״, כְּמִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהַזְּמַן גְּרָמָא דָּמֵי — קָמַשְׁמַע לַן.
[MISHNA] Women, slaves, and minors, who have parallel obligations in various mitzvot, are exempt from the recitation of Shema and from tefillin, but they are obligated in the mitzvot of prayer, mezuza, and Grace after Meals.
[GEMARA] With regard to the Mishna’s statement that women are exempt from the recitation of Shema, the Gemara asks: That is obvious, as Shema is a time-bound, positive mitzva, and the halakhic principle is: Women are exempt from any time-bound, positive mitzva, i.e., any mitzva whose performance is only in effect at a particular time. Shema falls into that category as its recitation is restricted to the morning and the evening. Why then did the mishna need to mention it specifically? The Gemara replies: Lest you say: Since Shema includes the acceptance of the yoke of the kingdom of Heaven, perhaps women are obligated in its recitation despite the fact that it is a time-bound, positive mitzva. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that, nevertheless, women are exempt from reciting the Shema.
We also learned in the mishna that women are exempt from tefillin. The Gemara asks: That is obvious as well. The donning of tefillin is only in effect at particular times; during the day but not at night, on weekdays but not on Shabbat or Festivals. The Gemara replies: Lest you say: Since the mitzva of tefillin is juxtaposed in the Torah to the mitzva of mezuza, as it is written: “And you shall bind them as a sign upon your hands and they shall be frontlets between your eyes” (Deuteronomy 6:8), followed by: “And you shall write them upon the door posts of your house and on your gates” (Deuteronomy 6:9), just as women are obligated in the mitzva of mezuza, so too they are obligated in the mitzva of tefillin. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that nevertheless, women are exempt from putting on tefillin.
We also learned in the mishna that women, slaves, and children are obligated in prayer. The Gemara explains that, although the mitzva of prayer is only in effect at particular times, which would lead to the conclusion that women are exempt, nevertheless, since prayer is supplication for mercy and women also require divine mercy, they are obligated. However, lest you say: Since regarding prayer it is written: “Evening and morning and afternoon I pray and cry aloud and He hears my voice” (Psalms 55:18), perhaps prayer should be considered a time-bound, positive mitzva and women would be exempt, the mishna teaches us that, fundamentally, the mitzva of prayer [i.e. not fixed prayer, as in our modern day, but prayer as general concept] is not time-bound and, therefore, everyone is obligated.
We also learned in the mishna that women are obligated in the mitzva of mezuza. The Gemara asks: That too is obvious. Why would they be exempt from fulfilling this obligation, it is a positive mitzva that is not time-bound? The Gemara replies: Lest you say: Since the mitzva of mezuza is juxtaposed in the Torah to the mitzva of Torah study (Deuteronomy 11:19–20), just as women are exempt from Torah study, so too they are exempt from the mitzva of mezuza. Therefore, the mishna explicitly teaches us that women are obligated in mezuza.
We also learned in the mishna that women are obligated to recite the Grace after Meals. The Gemara asks: That too is obvious. The Gemara replies: Lest you say: Since it is written: “When the Lord shall give you meat to eat in the evening and bread in the morning to the full” (Exodus 16:8), one might conclude that the Torah established fixed times for the meals and, consequently, for the mitzva of Grace after Meals and, therefore, it is considered a time-bound, positive mitzva, exempting women from its recitation. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that women are obligated in Grace after Meals.
[the Gemara continues from the previous source...]
Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Women are obligated to recite the sanctification of the Shabbat day [kiddush] by Torah law. The Gemara asks: Why? Kiddush is a time-bound, positive mitzva, and women are exempt from all time-bound, positive mitzvot. Abaye said: Indeed, women are obligated to recite kiddush by rabbinic, but not by Torah law. Rava said to Abaye: There are two refutations to your explanation. First, Rav Adda bar Ahava said that women are obligated to recite kiddush by Torah law, and, furthermore, the very explanation is difficult to understand. If the Sages do indeed institute ordinances in these circumstances, let us obligate them to fulfill all time-bound, positive mitzvot by rabbinic law, even though they are exempt by Torah law. Rather, Rava said: This has a unique explanation. In the Ten Commandments in the book of Exodus, the verse said: “Remember Shabbat and sanctify it” (Exodus 20:8), while in the book of Deuteronomy it is said: “Observe Shabbat and sanctify it” (Deuteronomy 5:12). From these two variants we can deduce that anyone included in the obligation to observe Shabbat by avoiding its desecration, is also included in the mitzva to remember Shabbat by reciting kiddush. Since these women are included in the mitzva to observe Shabbat, as there is no distinction between men and women in the obligation to observe prohibitions in general and to refrain from the desecration of Shabbat in particular, so too are they included in the mitzva of remembering Shabbat.
Ravina said to Rava: We learned in the mishna that women are obligated in the mitzva of Grace after Meals. However, are they obligated by Torah law or merely by rabbinic law? What difference does it make whether it is by Torah or rabbinic law? The difference is regarding her ability to fulfill the obligation of others when reciting the blessing on their behalf. Granted, if you say that their obligation is by Torah law, one whose obligation is by Torah law can come and fulfill the obligation of others who are obligated by Torah law. However, if you say that their obligation is by rabbinic law, then from the perspective of Torah law, women are considered to be one who is not obligated, and the general principle is that one who is not obligated to fulfill a particular mitzva cannot fulfill the obligations of the many in that mitzva. Therefore, it is important to know what is the resolution of this dilemma.
Come and hear from what was taught in a baraita: Actually they said that a son may recite a blessing on behalf of his father, and a slave may recite a blessing on behalf of his master, and a woman may recite a blessing on behalf of her husband, but the Sages said: May a curse come to a man who, due to his ignorance, requires his wife and children to recite a blessing on his behalf.
The Gemara comments: And now that women have been included in the prohibition against eating leavened bread, they should also be included in the obligation to eat matza, even though it is a time-bound, positive mitzva, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. As Rabbi Eliezer said: Women are obligated to eat matza by Torah law, as it is stated: “You shall eat no leavened bread with it; seven days you shall eat with it matzot” (Deuteronomy 16:3). These two commandments are juxtaposed to teach that anyone included in the prohibition against eating leavened bread is also included in the obligation to eat matza. And these women too, since they are included in the prohibition against eating leavened bread, they are also included in the obligation to eat matza.
אִשָּׁה וַדַּאי מַדְלִיקָה, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי: נָשִׁים חַיָּיבוֹת בְּנֵר חֲנוּכָּה שֶׁאַף הֵן הָיוּ בְּאוֹתוֹ הַנֵּס.
A woman certainly may light [Hanukkah candles], as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Women are obligated in lighting the Hanukkah light, as they too were included in that miracle of being saved from the decree of persecution.
ואריב"ל נשים חייבות במקרא מגילה שאף הן היו באותו הנס
And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi also said: Women are obligated in the reading of the Megillah, as they too were significant partners in that miracle.
And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Women are obligated in these four cups of wine at the Passover seder. As they too were included in that miracle of the Exodus, they are therefore obligated to participate in the celebration.
(יד) גם הנשים חייבות בארבע כוסות ובכל מצות הנוהגות באותו לילה:
רמא
הגה: (סב) ויאמרו (סג) בלשון שמבינים הנשים והקטנים, או יפרש להם הענין וכן עשה ר"י מלונדרי כל ההגדה בלשון לע"ז, (סד) כדי שיבינו הנשים והקטנים.
(14) Women are also obligated in the four cups and in all the mitzvot performed on that night.
Rema: And they will say, in a language that women and children understand, or the matter will be explained to them and so did Rabbi Y. of Londari, who told the whole haggadah in secular language, so that the children and women will understand.
וַאֲפִילּוּ עָנִי שֶׁבְּיִשְׂרָאֵל לֹא יֹאכַל עַד שֶׁיָּסֵב
אִשָּׁה אֵצֶל בַּעְלָהּ לָא בָּעֲיָא הֲסִיבָּה וְאִם אִשָּׁה חֲשׁוּבָה הִיא צְרִיכָה הֲסִיבָּה
We learned in the mishna that even the poorest of Jews should not eat until he reclines...
A woman who is with her husband is not required to recline, but if she is an important woman, she is required to recline.
"And if she is an important woman, she is required to lean" - and according to the Tosafists, all of our women are important and are required to lean
אשה אינה צריכה הסיבה - מפני אימת בעלה וכפופה לו ומפרש בשאילתות דרב אחאי לאו דרכייהו דנשי למיזגא
(1085 - 1158, France)
A woman does not recline, out of awe for her husband and her subordinate position. (Obviously this interpretation is only valid in the case of a married woman who is in the presence of her husband - Nechama Goldman Barash)
[R' Yosef Karo, 16th century Sephardi halachic decisor. His magnum opus, the Shulchan Aruch, is the gold standard text for Jewish law until the present day, with many, many commentaries]
It is not necessary for a woman to recline, unless she is important.
Rema:
[R' Moshe Isserles, 15th century Ashkenazi commentator on the Shulchan Aruch. His commentary appears inter-textually on every page of the S"A]
All of our women are called important, but they do not have the custom to recline because we rely on the words of the Ribah who wrote that at that time they do not recline [and so nowadays, reclining is not mandatory for women].
excerpted from Expanding the Palace of Torah:
Women’s unequal obligation to perform mitzvoth:
(See below for full source)
In the course of such discussions, which display a more gender-based legislative bias, women’s obligations usually appear as an addendum or as an exception to the male norm. Even including women in the religious obligations that apply on the holiday of Purim – commemorating an event with a female protagonist – necessitates a special argument “They too were witness to that miracle”. The net result is that women are at times classified in halakhic literature together with other marginalized groups such as slaves, children, imbeciles, androgens, hermaphrodites and the deaf-mute – either because they are excluded from certain mitzvoth altogether or because they are merely exempt.
...The Mishnah attempts to understand distinctions in the halakhic obligation of men and women that are not biologically based in terms of a neat legal-logical principle, establishing that women are generally exempt from the positive mitzvoth that are “time-bound” – performed at a particular time of day or year. However, the existence of so many exceptions to this principle supports the suggestion that rather than governing as an a priori rule, this criterion probably developed as after-the-fact formulation of an existing socio-cultural reality.
Why Are Women Exempt From Time-Bound Commandments? A Variety of Approaches
רב אחא בר יעקב אמר קרא (שמות יג, ט) והיה לך לאות על ידך ולזכרון בין עיניך למען תהיה תורת ה' בפיך הוקשה כל התורה כולה לתפילין מה תפילין מ"ע שהזמן גרמא ונשים פטורות אף כל מ"ע שהזמן גרמא נשים פטורות
Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov, who said as follows: The verse states: “And it shall be a sign for you on your arm and for a memorial between your eyes, that the Torah of the Lord may be in your mouth” (Exodus 13:9). The entire Torah is juxtaposed to phylacteries: Just as phylacteries is a positive, time-bound mitzva and women are exempt, so too are women exempt every positive, time-bound mitzva.
And is it a rule? Behold: matza, rejoicing [on a festival], Hakhel [assembly at the end of the sabbatical year] - which are positive time-bound commandments and women are obligated. And further, behold: learning Torah [the command to] be fruitful and multiply, and redeeming the first born - which are not positive time-bound commandments, and women are exempt. Rabbi Yochanan said: We do not learn [definitively] from rules, even in a place where exceptions are stated.
(א) וכבר ידעת שהעיקר אצלנו אין למדין מן הכללות ומה שאמר כל אמנם רוצה לומר הרוב ואמנם מה שהנשים מחוייבות ממצות עשה ומה שאינן מחוייבות ממה שמגיע אליהן אינו תלוי בכלל ואמנם נמסרים על פה והם דברים שבאו בקבלה
For we have a rule that we do not learn [Halacha] from rules, and they say “all” to indicate “for the most part.” But positive mitzvot in which women are or are not obligated, in all of their scope, do not follow a rule but are transmitted orally and these are received traditions.
ESSENTIAL AND PRACTICAL GENDER DIFFERENCES
“Therefore men bless every day that “He has not made me a Cuthite [i.e. a non-Jew], that He has not made a slave and that He has not made me a woman….because the souls of Israel are holier than that of the other nations, and from Canaanite slaves and even from women, and even though women are relevant with regard to mitzvoth and they are from Israelite seed, their souls are not like the souls of men.”
Clearly women’s exemption from positive time-bound mitzvot is not a consequence of their diminished worth; nor is it because the Torah found them unfit, as it were, to fulfill these mitzvot. Rather, it seems to me, the Torah did not impose these mitzvot on women because it did not consider them necessary to be demanded from women [i.e. women are not in need of them]. All time-bound mitzvot are meant, by symbolic procedures, to bring certain facts, principles, ideas and resolutions afresh to our minds from time to time to fortify us to realize them to keep them. The Torah affirms that our women are imbued with a great love and a holy enthusiasm for their role in Divine worship, exceeding that of man. The trials men undergo in their professional activities jeopardize their fidelity to Torah and therefore, they require from time to time reminders and warnings in the form of time-related precepts. Women, whose lifestyle does not subject them to comparable trials and hazards, have no need for such periodic reminders to remain true to their calling...
While fully appreciating the special and deeply implanted characteristics of the female sex, the Sages also attribute to it complete spiritual and intellectual equality with the male.
“…In order that man learn to sanctify time, the Law ordains for him many commandments which are governed by a calendar and a clock. Women, on the other hand, by the very nature of their physical constitution and the requirements of the Law regarding their menstrual periods, needed little more to make them aware of the sanctity of time.”
Women are passive, led and impressionable, leaving no imprint on life or on the world. Thus men’s essence is more elevated, since men are form and women are matter. Hence men are more fortunate and recite the blessing “Who has not made me a woman” (Olat Re’ayah (OR), 71). The limited number of women’s religious obligations stems from their essential difference from men, not from their subjugation to their husbands. Since their spiritual essence is inferior, they are obligated in fewer commandments and prohibitions than men, who have a higher spiritual potential, with a correspondingly higher level of risk (OR 72).
…Today American Jewish boys and men have fewer connections to Jews and Judaism than girls and women in almost every venue and in every age…Gender makes less of a difference among Orthodox Jews: the social capital of men and women within Orthodoxy is equal…American males are less attached to Jewish life not because men are innately “less religious” than women in some essential psychological way, but because American culture and society value religious activities and behaviors for women but devalue them for men. Moreover, those aspects of religion that men are typically more attracted to—namely religious activities—are not regarded as religious by the Christian-shaped society that values religious belief over religious behavior.
TRADITIONAL ROLES AT HOME
The sign of the covenant [circumcision] is rightly limited to the male, seeing that the female’s role is that of help-mate to the male. It is said, Yet, your urge shall be for your husband, and he shall dominate you (Gen. 3:16); implying that her husband will lead her and direct her in his ways, and that she act in accordance with his instructions.
For this same reason, women are exempt from all Positive Precepts dependent on a set time. Were she bound to observe these mitzvoth at the set time, her husband would then be left without help at such times. This would lead to discord between them and undermine his authority, which was designed to benefit both husband and wife.
(כח) והטעם שנפטרו הנשים ממצות עשה שהזמן גרמה לפי שהאשה משועבדת לבעלה לעשות צרכיו. ואם היתה מחוייבת במצות עשה שהזמן גרמא איפשר שבשעת עשיית המצוה יצוה אותה הבעל לעשות מצותו. ואם תעשה מצות הבורא ותניח מצותו אוי לה מבעלה. ואם תעשה מצותו ותניח מצות הבורא אוי לה מיוצרה. לפיכך פטרה הבורא ממצותיו כדי להיות לה שלום עם בעלה. וגדולה מזאת מצאנו שהשם הגדול הנכתב בקדושה ובטהרה נמחה על המים כדי להטיל שלום בין איש לאשתו.
(14th century, Spain)
Woman is exempt from Positive Precepts dependent upon a set time because she is bound to her husband, to attend to his needs. Were a woman obliged to perform such mitzvoth, her husband might bid her to do something at the precise moment that she is fulfilling one of these mitzvoth. Should she fulfill the bidding of her Creator and neglect her husband’s demands, she faces her husband’s wrath. On the other hand, should she fulfill her husband’s demands and neglect the bidding of her Creator, she faces the wrath of her Creator. Consequently, the Creator exempted her from these obligations in order to promote harmony between husband and wife.
Women are freed from performing mitzvos which are obligatory only at a specific time (e.g., tzitzis, which is obligatory only during the day). The AriZal writes concerning such mitzvos: “When the male performs the mitzvah, it is unnecessary that the woman should also do them separately, for she has already been included with him at the time when he does the mitzvah… This is the meaning of our Sages’ statement, ‘One’s wife is as one’s body.’”…In other words, when Torah frees a women from certain mitzvos, it frees her only from doing them — so that she can devote her time and energies to her unique mission. The state of wholeness and perfection that is attained, and the reward that accrues, from these mitzvos, does pertain to women also — through her husband performing them.
רב ישראל גוסטמן, קונטרסי שעורים מסכתא קדושין, עמ’ 254
ונלענ”ד [ונראה לעניות דעתי] לחדש להלכה דגם במצות עשה שהזמן גרמא אין לנשים לבטלן בחנם אם לא מפני מצוה עוברת או משום טירחא יתירה…
Rav Yisrael Gustman
(Lithuania and Israel, 20th century)
Kuntresei Shiurim, Kiddushin, p. 254
In my humble opinion, it seems warranted to rule that even in positive time-bound commandments, it is not worthy for women to free themselves from these mitzvot if not for some [other] mitzva [whose time is] passing or because of excessive effort…
אגרות משה אורח חיים ד:מט
…סתם נשים בעולם אינם עשירות ועליהן מוטל גידול הילדים והילדות שהיא מלאכה היותר חשובה להשי”ת [להשם יתברך] ולהתורה… שגם טבע הנשים מסוגל יותר לגידול הילדים שמצד זה הקל עליהן שלא לחייבן בלמוד התורה, ובמ”ע שהזמ”ג [ובמצוות עשה שהזמן גרמא], שלכן אף אם ישתנה סדור החיים בעולם גם לכל הנשים ולעשירות בכל הזמנים ואף כשאפשר למסור הגידול לאיזה אינשי ונשי כבמדינתנו לא נשתנה דין התורה ואף לא דין דרבנן…
Iggerot Moshe, OC 4:49
Rav Moshe Feinstein (1970s, NYC)
The average women in the world are not rich and are responsible for raising the boys and girls, which is the most important labor to God and to the Torah… For the nature of women is also more suited for child-rearing; therefore, [God] was lenient with them so as not to obligate them in learning Torah and in positive time-bound commandments. Therefore, even if the order of life in the world should change for all women, and for the wealthy in all eras, and even when it is possible to give over the child-rearing to some men and women as in our country, the law of the Torah has not changed and neither has rabbinic law.
While not demanding adherence to one particular role, it is nevertheless clear that since for most of our history, our continuation as a people depended upon the voluntary selection by women of the role of wife-mother-homemaker, the law would and did encourage the exercise of that choice…. Exemption would be a tool used by the Torah to achieve a particular social goal, namely to assure that no legal obligation would interfere with the selection by Jewish women of a role which was centered almost exclusively in the home. However, it is vital to emphasize that even with these exemptions, the wife-mother-homemaker role is not the mandated, or exclusively proper role, though it is clearly the preferred and therefore protected role.
I have always believed that women are released from positive time-bound mitzvot in order that they have more flexibility and more choices.
MODERN / FEMALE PERSPECTIVES (via N.G.B.)
Women’s unequal obligation to perform mitzvoth:
A few rabbinic sources appear to have assumed that all the commandments were at the outset addressed only to men. This would mandate examining each mitzvah separately in order to see whether it might apply to women as well. The established consensus of rabbinic law, however, is that all the negative commandments of the Torah apply equally to men and women aside from those that are related to obvious biological differences (such as trimming the beard and sidelocks and for a kohen – only male – to acquire corpse impurity). Women are also obligated to carry out most of the positive mitzvoth that are prescribed for men, excepting those based on clearly physical distinctions (circumcision for men and the sacrifices at the Temple that a new mother must bring).
There are however, other important distinctions between the legal obligations of men and women that are not biologically based. Halakhic compendiums will list such mitzvoth as wearing fringes on any four-cornered garment, donning tefillin in the course of the morning prayer and dwelling in the sukkah and acquiring and blessing the “four species” during the Festive of Sukkot, citing the reasons for the mitzvah. Thereafter, they will deliberate whether or not women are exempt, for whatever given reason.
In the course of such discussions, which display a more gender-based legislative bias, women’s obligations usually appear as an addendum or as an exception to the male norm. Even including women in the religious obligations that apply on the holiday of Purim – commemorating an event with a female protagonist – necessitates a special argument “They too were witness to that miracle”. The net result is that women are at times classified in halakhic literature together with other marginalized groups such as slaves, children, imbeciles androgens, hermaphrodites and the deaf-mute – either because they are excluded from certain mitzvoth altogether or because they are merely exempt.
The Mishnah attempts to understand distinctions in the halakhic obligation of men and women that are not biologically based in terms of a neat legal-logical principle, establishing that women are generally exempt from the positive mitzvoth that are “time-bound” – performed at a particular time of day or year. However, the existence of so many exceptions to this principle supports the suggestion that rather than governing as an a priori rule, this criterion probably developed as after-the-fact formulation of an existing socio-cultural reality.
As further examples will demonstrate, men’s greater religious obligations, whether or not they are actually fulfilled, confer other legal privileges. By the same token, women’s lesser obligations disenfranchise them in many areas. As in the case of other classes situated on the hierarchical scale, difference in religious responsibility then serves as rationale for women’s diminished valuation. Under certain circumstances, the legal repercussions are significant indeed. Because greater obligation to mitzvoth is translated in halakhic terms as greater worth, the Mishnah rules that a man’s right to life precedes that of a woman’s in most life-threatening situations. This consideration is explicitly stated in some sources as justification for the ruling that if a man and a woman are drowning, the man should be saved first.
Of particular significance is also the fact that women are exempt (and according to dominant traditional position, even deliberately distanced) from the central religious activity of studying Torah, despite the fact that this activity is not classified as time-bound. As a result, although there is no ban in principle on women functioning as halakhic authorities, in practice they have had no official part to play in the tradition’s legislative and interpretive process. Because of their lack of proficiency in the Oral Law, women have been virtually excluded from any participation in halakhic discussion and its formulation.
Make no mistake; for centuries, the lot of the Jewish woman was infinitely better than that of her non-Jewish counterpart. She had rights which other women lacked until a century ago...the problem is that very little has been done since then (1000 CE) to ameliorate the position of Jewish women in observant society.
All of this can quickly be rectified if one steps outside of Jewish tradition and Halacha. The problem is how to attain some justice and some growing room for the Jewish woman if one is committed to remaining within Halacha. Some of these problems are more easily solved than others. For example, there is ample precedent for decisions permitting women to study Talmud, and it should become the policy of Jewish day schools to teach their girls Talmud. It would not be difficult to find a basis for giving women aliyot to the Torah. Moreover, it is both feasible and desirable for the community to begin educating women to take on the positive time-bound mitzvot from which they are now excused; in which case, those mitzvot would eventually become incumbent upon women. The more difficult questions are those involving minyan and mechitza (segregation at prayers). There are problems concerning the right of women to be rabbis, witness in Jewish courts, judges and leaders of religious services. We need decisions on these problems which will permit Jewish women to develop roles and role models in which righteousness springs from self-actualization, in contrast to the masochistic, self-annihilating model of the post-Biblical tzadeket. The halachic scholars must examine our problem anew, right now, with open minds and with empathy. They must make it possible for women to claim their share in the Torah and begin to do the things a Jew was created to do. If necessary we must agitate until the scholars are willing to see us as Jewish souls in distress rather than as tools with which men do mitzvot. If they continue to turn a deaf ear to us, the most learned and halachically committed among us must make halachic decisions for the rest. That is a move to be saved for desperate straits, for even the most learned of us have been barred from acquiring the systematic halachic knowledge which a rabbi has. But to paraphrase Hillel, in a place where there are no menschen, we may have to generate our own menschlichkeit. There is no time to waste. For too many centuries, the Jewish woman has been a golem, created by Jewish society. She cooked and bore and did her master's will, and when her tasks were done, the Divine Name was removed from her mouth. It is time for the golem to demand a soul.
…"I am a fifth-generation Reform Jew and a fourth-generation native of Chicago," she says. "I became a ba'alat teshuva [returning to religion] in my teens and lived as an Orthodox Jew for about 20 years," she adds. "Now I jokingly call myself a round-trip ba'alat teshuva. But one never returns the same as one was. Theologically, I am Reform but like many educated Reform Jews, I keep a kosher home. I honor Shabbat and holy days. I study. I pray. I try to respond to poverty and injustice with tsedaka and chesed [kindness]. My son Amitai is a fourth-year rabbinical student at American Jewish University, the California Masorati seminary. He is marrying a Reform rabbi. We are a pluralistic family."
Adler continues: "I can't really pinpoint a definitive time when I became a feminist. I think I always was... I was fortunate that I was enabled to learn Talmud. But I puzzled over texts in which I was an object, not a subject and over laws that obligated women but that women had not helped to formulate." Nevertheless, she adds, "being a committed Jew and being a feminist is not an either/or proposition for me. I cannot maintain intellectual or spiritual integrity without being both, so I have to construct a theory of Judaism in which both can coexist."
Why did she leave Orthodoxy? "I left Orthodoxy for several reasons," Adler says. "First of all, I do not believe in an ahistorical revelation. I believe God reveals Godself to us progressively and always within historical contexts. Second, for my graduate studies in literature, I learned about the redaction and recension of manuscripts and then could not ignore signs of multiple traditions joined together in the Torah as we have it. Third, I saw how rabbis manipulated halakha [Jewish law] to maintain their own power and to disempower women, and I decided my life was too short to wait for them to take the legal risks that would be necessary to make changes."
We who are committed to traditional Judaism are standing today at the crossroads on the question of women. Feminism disturbs our previous equilibrium, for it makes a fundamental claim about women contrary to the model generated by halakhah [Jewish law].
Principles of Jewish Feminism
Let us reduce these broad statements from the level of generalization to a theology of woman as Jew:
1. A woman of faith has the same innate vision and existential longing for a redemptive‑covenantal reality as a man of faith. She has the same ability and need to be in the presence of God alone and within the context of the community. Such a woman is sufficiently mature to accept the responsibilities for this relationship and the rights that flow from these responsibilities. If these spiritual gifts do not flow naturally from her soul, she can be educated and uplifted in them in much the same fashion that Jewish men are.
2. Jewish women, as much as men, have the mental and emotional capacities to deal directly with the most sacred Jewish texts and primary sources. Jewish women are capable of interpreting tradition based on the sources. They can be involved in the decision‑making process that grows out of the blending of inherited tradition with contemporary needs.
3. Some women, as some men, are capable of functioning in the positions of authority related to the religious and physical survival of the Jewish people.
4. Women as a class should not find themselves in discriminatory positions in personal situations. In such matters as marriage and divorce, a woman should have no less control or personal freedom than a man, nor should she be subject to abuse resulting from the constriction of freedom.
Women in Jewish Law
These, then, are the basic claims that a woman, sensitized to the new, broader, cultural value system, can carry over into her life as a Jew. I am not arguing here whether halakhic Judaism deems a woman inferior, although there are more than a few sources in the tradition that lend themselves to such a conclusion; nor will I accept at face value those statements that place women on a separate but higher pedestal. What I am saying is that halakhah, contrary to the feminist values I have described above, continues to delimit women. In some very real ways, halakhic parameters inhibit women's growth, both as Jews and as human beings.
I do not speak here of all of halakhah. One must be careful not to generalize from certain critical comments and apply them to the system as a whole. In fact, my critique could grow only out of a profound appreciation for the system in its entirety‑-its ability to preserve the essence of an ancient revelation as a fresh experience each day; its power to generate an abiding sense of kinship, past and present; its intimate relatedness to concerns both immediate and other‑worldly; its psychological soundness; its ethical and moral integrity.
On the whole, I believe that a Jew has a better chance of living a worthwhile life if he or she lives a life according to halakhah. Therefore, I do not feel threatened when addressing the question of the new needs of women in Judaism nor in admitting the limitations of halakhah in this area. Indeed, it is my very faith in halakhic Judaism that makes me believe we can search within it for a new level of perfection, as Jews have been doing for three thousand years.
Texts are important. We cherish them. They are part of the glory of our heritage. But we should not become prisoners of the past. The time has come for modern halakhists to admit that, reflecting an evolution which covers almost 4,000 years, the vehicle of the halakhah occasionally has paused to take on unnecessary baggage at various stations along its difficult and often tragic journey into the present. Today it is overloaded and therefore finds itself almost incapable of movement.
Jewish men must recognize the fact that the halakhah often has been unfair, ungracious and discriminatory towards our women. We cannot undo the past, but we can measure up to the needs of the present by granting full equality to Jewish women under the halakhah.
Any halakha that is part of a feminist Judaism would have to look very different from halakha as it has been. It would be different not just in its specifics but in its fundamentals. It would begin with the assumption of women’s equality and humanity and legislate only on that basis. Laws governing the formation and dissolution of relationships, for example, would acknowledge women’s full agency, so that the present laws of marriage and divorce would be ruled unjust and unacceptable. It would be different not only in its content but in its practitioners. Women would shape halakhah along with men, codetermining the questions raised and the answers given. The boundaries of the legal system would be contracted and expanded as certain questions would become unthinkable, others imperative. It would be different also in method, for it would know that law is human and be aware of and humble before its own potential ideological abuse and captivity. It would be open to continual transformation in the light of deeper understandings of justice.
By: Josephine Felix
Published: February 17th, 2014
I am a woman. I am a wife. I am a mother. I am an observer of Halacha. I am a professional. I am a shul board member. I am a writer. I am Orthodox. I am committed to Jewish tradition, to the Oral and Written Torah. I am a proponent for the advancement of women’s viewpoints and concerns.
If the combination of those terms seem paradoxical to you, trust me, I understand. I have spent a lot of my life trying to resolve this odd dichotomy.
I have read about the recent uproar over women and tefillin with growing interest. It was interesting to read about a modern Orthodox school allowing a couple of girls to wear tefillin, but it was even more fascinating to read the various reactions inundating the blogosphere.
If you are an Orthodox woman and this story did not interest you, it should. And here is why:
As an Orthodox woman, whether you realize it or not, whether you are bothered by it or not, you are living a paradox. As a woman alive in the 21st century, you can be a lawyer, a doctor, an accountant, an engineer, a researcher, a psychologist, a computer programmer, a judge, an academic professor. If you do not have a career in any of these fields, you most likely know a woman who does.
Kollel lifestyle has ironically helped promote this, as women seek to find means to support their husbands. Frum women are creating careers for themselves in all areas. They are working as professionals, pursuing intellectual careers, managing finances, taking on leadership roles… all successfully.
Yet while they may be respected as professional and competent contributor to their profession, when it comes to discussing Divrei Torah at the Shabbos table, they often take a side line. They may become CEO of a company, but when it comes to being president of a shul board, they are forbidden by many Orthodox Poskim. They may be a doctor whose decision impacts the life or death of a patient, but when it comes to deciding Halacha, they cannot contribute.
Women are generally exempt from mitzvos that are time-bound. Traditionally, this was more easily understood, providing women who were housewives and mothers with greater leeway. This may continue to be easily understood for contemporary women who are functioning as the primary caregiver. However, Halachically-observant women in the workforce who are complying with various time-bound constraints due to a professional work-day, create their own anomaly. There is something odd about seeing women at a professional conference, who sit around and “schmooze” while their male colleagues stop to daven mincha.
Traditional Bais Yaakovs do not teach Oral Law to girls. When I repeatedly asked my teachers if I could learn Gemara as a young child, I was given numerous answers as to why it was not okay. Mostly because “women’s brains are not cut out for that type of learning” or “women are too emotional to analyze text objectively."
Looking at the various careers my fellow classmates and friends have embarked on, I see a blatant inconsistency. Halachically, women cannot be judges (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 7:4) or bear witness in court (BT Shevuos, 30a; Baba Kama I 5a; Rambam Hilchos Edus 9:2). When I asked why, again I was told it was because women were too emotional and could not be relied on for objective observations.
With female Supreme Court Justices in the United States who seem as objective in their decisions as their male counterparts, with a court system that relies on women witnesses just as much as men, it makes the reasons I was given seem inadequate. Interestingly, numerous recent research studies have shown no significant differences in gender in eyewitness memory, other than women remembered more details when observing women and men remembered more details when observing men (Google it!).
Although Bais Yaakov education ingrains in girls the glorified role of a woman in the home, not many Bais Yaakovs harp on the negative legal ramifications of the traditional role of woman. In traditional Halacha, men were the official heads of household and women had few independent rights and privileges. Halachically, men had sole custody of their children- they were the final decisor in all matters until the child reached puberty (BT Sotah 23b). In most instances, all of a woman’s earnings belonged to her husband, in exchange for him supporting her (BT Gittin 77a).
Not only that, but a woman was not responsible for something she damaged since legally, she owned nothing—it all belonged to her husband (similar to a slave who was also not responsible for what he damaged- BT Baba Kama 87a). In Kesubos (59b), the Gemara lists a wife’s responsibility to her husband (in response to his responsibilities to her). The list includes various domestic obligations. In Kesubos, 61a, the Gemara goes on to say that if a women brings maidservant to the marriage, she is released from these obligations, with a few exceptions. She still had the obligation to personally wash her husband’s feet, prepare his cup of wine, and make his bed. Rashi says that these are not obligations but rather suggestions to make a wife beloved in her husband’s eyes. Rambam, however, says these were obligations that were enforceable by whipping (Hilchos Ishus 21:10).
So while the “frummest” girls may say they have no interest in the feminist agenda, there are many apparent paradoxes that they have to contend with. I cannot imagine that most women would lie awake at night and lament a time when a woman’s role followed the legal aspects dictated above.
If all of these inconsistencies between your general lifestyle and traditional approaches don’t bother you, they may bother your daughter. And if they don’t bother your daughter consciously, they may bother her subconsciously. And by that I mean that even if she cannot articulate any issues she has, somewhere deep inside she has to deal with these paradoxes. To do so, she either ignores them and doesn’t think too deeply or tells herself that was then- it doesn’t apply now. Either of these scenarios runs the risk of significantly diminishing the passion with which the next generation commits to Halachic Judaism. When there are major inconsistencies in how you think the Torah law understands something and how you live in your “regular” life, you are already making your commitment to a Torah lifestyle severely diminished.
So if you want to help ignite your daughter’s passion to Halachic observance- to the preservation of traditional Torah observance and to the commitment to seek greater meaning to life than just materialistic goals, you are best to recognize these issues and take them seriously. Observance of Halacha can only be maintained when there is a fixed Halachic process. But within the parameters of the Halachic process, there are lots of ways to maneuver within the law. Taking a proactive approach to making a woman’s general life and Torah life consistent will do a lot for the continuance of Torah observant Jewry.
These women’s issues are not going away. They are only going to increase.
Do We Have To Take Sides In This Discussion?
Deracheha
Many women do commit themselves to observing some positive time-bound mitzvot voluntarily, out of a desire to serve God in those ways. Some of these women, though, find that over time, especially with marriage or motherhood, outlooks and priorities change.
Husbands do increasingly participate in housekeeping and child care. Babies do nap. A woman is not necessarily engaged 24/7 in child-rearing. But perhaps because of the physicality of pregnancy, the vulnerability of childbirth, and the intensity of nursing, women’s sense of spirituality can shift at each stage of life; for many women, that personal shift finds expression in a shift in preferred forms of avodat Hashem.
Some women find the above conceptual approaches to the topic helpful, and some do not. Some women marry and some do not; some have children and some do not. Some keep up more mitzvot aseh shehazman geraman than others. Some change practice and thinking from year to year.
Many women appreciate having the flexibility to redefine the relationship to these mitzvot and to God over different stages of life.