כׇּל יוֹמָא דְשַׁבְּתָא הֲוָה יָתֵיב וְגָרֵיס כּוּלֵּי יוֹמָא. הַהוּא יוֹמָא דְּבָעֵי לְמֵינַח נַפְשֵׁיהּ, קָם מַלְאַךְ הַמָּוֶת קַמֵּיהּ וְלָא יְכִיל לֵיהּ, דְּלָא הֲוָה פָּסֵק פּוּמֵּיהּ מִגִּירְסָא. אֲמַר: מַאי אַעֲבֵיד לֵיהּ? הֲוָה לֵיהּ בּוּסְתָּנָא אֲחוֹרֵי בֵּיתֵיהּ, אֲתָא מַלְאַךְ הַמָּוֶת סָלֵיק וּבָחֵישׁ בְּאִילָנֵי. נְפַק לְמִיחְזֵי. הֲוָה סָלֵיק בְּדַרְגָּא, אִיפְּחִית דַּרְגָּא מִתּוּתֵיהּ, אִישְׁתִּיק וְנָח נַפְשֵׁיהּ. שְׁלַח שְׁלֹמֹה לְבֵי מִדְרְשָׁא: אַבָּא מֵת וּמוּטָל בַּחַמָּה, וּכְלָבִים שֶׁל בֵּית אַבָּא רְעֵבִים — מָה אֶעֱשֶׂה? שְׁלַחוּ לֵיהּ: חֲתוֹךְ נְבֵלָה וְהַנַּח לִפְנֵי הַכְּלָבִים. וְאָבִיךְ, הַנַּח עָלָיו כִּכָּר אוֹ תִּינוֹק וְטַלְטְלוֹ. וְלֹא יָפֶה אָמַר שְׁלֹמֹה: ״כִּי לְכֶלֶב חַי הוּא טוֹב מִן הָאַרְיֵה הַמֵּת״. וּלְעִנְיַן שְׁאֵילָה דְּשָׁאֵילְנָא קֳדָמֵיכוֹן: נֵר קְרוּיָה ״נֵר״, וְנִשְׁמָתוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם קְרוּיָה ״נֵר״. מוּטָב תִּכְבֶּה נֵר שֶׁל בָּשָׂר וָדָם מִפְּנֵי נֵרוֹ שֶׁל הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא. אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר שִׁילַת מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב: בִּקְּשׁוּ חֲכָמִים לִגְנוֹז סֵפֶר קֹהֶלֶת מִפְּנֵי שֶׁדְּבָרָיו סוֹתְרִין זֶה אֶת זֶה. וּמִפְּנֵי מָה לֹא גְּנָזוּהוּ? — מִפְּנֵי שֶׁתְּחִילָּתוֹ דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה וְסוֹפוֹ דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה. תְּחִילָּתוֹ דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה, דִּכְתִיב: ״מַה יִּתְרוֹן לָאָדָם בְּכׇל עֲמָלוֹ שֶׁיַּעֲמוֹל תַּחַת הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ״ — וְאָמְרִי דְּבֵי רַבִּי יַנַּאי תַּחַת הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ הוּא דְּאֵין לוֹ. קוֹדֶם שֶׁמֶשׁ — יֵשׁ לוֹ. סוֹפוֹ דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה, דִּכְתִיב: ״סוֹף דָּבָר הַכֹּל נִשְׁמָע אֶת הָאֱלֹהִים יְרָא וְאֶת מִצְוֹתָיו שְׁמוֹר כִּי זֶה כׇּל הָאָדָם״. מַאי ״כִּי זֶה כׇּל הָאָדָם״? — אָמַר רַבִּי (אֱלִיעֶזֶר) [אֶלְעָזָר]: כׇּל הָעוֹלָם כּוּלּוֹ לֹא נִבְרָא אֶלָּא בִּשְׁבִיל זֶה. רַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר כָּהֲנָא אָמַר: שָׁקוּל זֶה כְּנֶגֶד כׇּל הָעוֹלָם כּוּלּוֹ. שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי אוֹמֵר, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן זוֹמָא אוֹמֵר: לֹא נִבְרָא כׇּל הָעוֹלָם כּוּלּוֹ אֶלָּא לִצְווֹת לָזֶה. וּמַאי ״דְּבָרָיו סוֹתְרִין זֶה אֶת זֶה״? כְּתִיב: ״טוֹב כַּעַס מִשְּׂחוֹק״, וּכְתִיב ״לִשְׂחוֹק אָמַרְתִּי מְהוֹלָל״! כְּתִיב ״וְשִׁבַּחְתִּי אֲנִי אֶת הַשִּׂמְחָה״, וּכְתִיב ״וּלְשִׂמְחָה מַה זֹּה עוֹשָׂה! לָא קַשְׁיָא ״טוֹב כַּעַס מִשְּׂחוֹק״: טוֹב כַּעַס שֶׁכּוֹעֵס הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא עַל הַצַּדִּיקִים בָּעוֹלָם הַזֶּה, מִשְּׂחוֹק שֶׁמְּשַׂחֵק הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא עַל הָרְשָׁעִים בָּעוֹלָם הַזֶּה. וְ״לִשְׁחוֹק אָמַרְתִּי מְהוֹלָל״ — זֶה שְׂחוֹק שֶׁמְּשַׂחֵק הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא עִם הַצַּדִּיקִים בָּעוֹלָם הַבָּא. ״וְשִׁבַּחְתִּי אֲנִי אֶת הַשִּׂמְחָה״ — שִׂמְחָה שֶׁל מִצְוָה. ״וּלְשִׂמְחָה מַה זֹּה עוֹשָׂה״ — זוֹ שִׂמְחָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ שֶׁל מִצְוָה. לְלַמֶּדְךָ שֶׁאֵין שְׁכִינָה שׁוֹרָה לֹא מִתּוֹךְ עַצְבוּת וְלֹא מִתּוֹךְ עַצְלוּת וְלֹא מִתּוֹךְ שְׂחוֹק וְלֹא מִתּוֹךְ קַלּוּת רֹאשׁ וְלֹא מִתּוֹךְ שִׂיחָה וְלֹא מִתּוֹךְ דְּבָרִים בְּטֵלִים, אֶלָּא מִתּוֹךְ דְּבַר שִׂמְחָה שֶׁל מִצְוָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְעַתָּה קְחוּ לִי מְנַגֵּן וְהָיָה כְּנַגֵּן הַמְנַגֵּן וַתְּהִי עָלָיו יַד ה׳״. אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: וְכֵן לִדְבַר הֲלָכָה. אָמַר רָבָא: וְכֵן לַחֲלוֹם טוֹב. אִינִי, וְהָאָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב: כׇּל תַּלְמִיד חָכָם שֶׁיּוֹשֵׁב לִפְנֵי רַבּוֹ וְאֵין שִׂפְתוֹתָיו נוֹטְפוֹת מָר, תִּכָּוֶינָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״שִׂפְתוֹתָיו שׁוֹשַׁנִּים נוֹטְפוֹת מוֹר עוֹבֵר״: אַל תִּקְרֵי ״מוֹר עוֹבֵר״, אֶלָּא ״מָר עוֹבֵר״. אַל תִּקְרֵי ״שׁוֹשַׁנִּים״, אֶלָּא ״שֶׁשּׁוֹנִים״. לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא בְּרַבָּה וְהָא בְּתַלְמִידָא. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא הָא וְהָא בְּרַבָּה, וְלָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא מִקַּמֵּי דְּלִפְתַּח, הָא לְבָתַר דִּפְתַח. כִּי הָא דְּרַבָּה מִקַּמֵּי דְּפָתַח לְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן אָמַר מִילְּתָא דִּבְדִיחוּתָא וּבָדְחִי רַבָּנַן, לְסוֹף יָתֵיב בְּאֵימְתָא וּפָתַח בִּשְׁמַעְתָּא. וְאַף סֵפֶר מִשְׁלֵי בִּקְּשׁוּ לִגְנוֹז שֶׁהָיוּ דְּבָרָיו סוֹתְרִין זֶה אֶת זֶה. וּמִפְּנֵי מָה לֹא גְּנָזוּהוּ? אָמְרִי: סֵפֶר קֹהֶלֶת לָאו עַיְינִינַן וְאַשְׁכְּחִינַן טַעְמָא? הָכָא נָמֵי לִיעַיֵּין. וּמַאי דְּבָרָיו סוֹתְרִים זֶה אֶת זֶה? — כְּתִיב ״אַל תַּעַן כְּסִיל כְּאִוַּלְתּוֹ״, וּכְתִיב: ״עֲנֵה כְסִיל כְּאִוַּלְתּוֹ״. לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא בְּדִבְרֵי תוֹרָה, הָא בְּמִילֵּי דְעָלְמָא. כִּי הָא דְּהָהוּא דַּאֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִשְׁתְּךָ אִשְׁתִּי, וּבָנֶיךָ בָּנַי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: רְצוֹנֶךָ שֶׁתִּשְׁתֶּה כּוֹס שֶׁל יַיִן? שָׁתָה וּפָקַע. הָהוּא דַּאֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִמְּךָ אִשְׁתִּי, וְאַתָּה בְּנִי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: רְצוֹנֶךָ שֶׁתִּשְׁתֶּה כּוֹס שֶׁל יַיִן? שָׁתָה וּפָקַע. אֲמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא: אַהְנְיָא לֵיהּ צְלוֹתֵיהּ לְרַבִּי דְּלָא לְשַׁוּוֹיֵיהּ בְּנֵי מַמְזֵירֵי. דְּרַבִּי כִּי הֲוָה מְצַלֵּי אֲמַר: ״יְהִי רָצוֹן מִלְּפָנֶיךָ ה׳ אֱלֹהֵינוּ, שֶׁתַּצִּילֵנִי הַיּוֹם מֵעַזֵּי פָּנִים וּמֵעַזּוּת פָּנִים״. בְּדִבְרֵי תוֹרָה מַאי הִיא? — כִּי הָא דְּיָתֵיב רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וְקָא דָרֵישׁ: עֲתִידָה אִשָּׁה שֶׁתֵּלֵד בְּכָל יוֹם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״הָרָה וְיוֹלֶדֶת יַחְדָּיו״. לִיגְלֵג עָלָיו אוֹתוֹ תַּלְמִיד, אָמַר: ״אֵין כׇּל חָדָשׁ תַּחַת הַשָּׁמֶשׁ״! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בֹּא וְאַרְאֶךָּ דּוּגְמָתָן בָּעוֹלָם הַזֶּה. נְפַק אַחְוִי לֵיהּ תַּרְנְגוֹלֶת. וְתוּ, יָתֵיב רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וְקָא דָרֵישׁ: עֲתִידִים אִילָנוֹת שֶׁמּוֹצִיאִין פֵּירוֹת בְּכָל יוֹם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְנָשָׂא עָנָף וְעָשָׂה פֶרִי״ — מֶה עָנָף בְּכָל יוֹם אַף פְּרִי בְּכָל יוֹם. לִיגְלֵג עָלָיו אוֹתוֹ תַּלְמִיד, אָמַר: וְהָכְתִיב ״אֵין כׇּל חָדָשׁ תַּחַת הַשָּׁמֶשׁ״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בֹּא וְאַרְאֶךָּ דּוּגְמָתָם בָּעוֹלָם הַזֶּה. נְפַק אַחְוִי לֵיהּ צָלָף. וְתוּ, יָתֵיב רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וְקָא דָרֵישׁ: עֲתִידָה אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁתּוֹצִיא גְּלוּסְקָאוֹת וּכְלֵי מֵילָת שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״יְהִי פִסַּת בַּר בָּאָרֶץ״. לִיגְלֵג עָלָיו אוֹתוֹ תַּלְמִיד וְאָמַר: ״אֵין כׇּל חָדָשׁ תַּחַת הַשָּׁמֶשׁ״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בֹּא וְאַרְאֶךָּ דּוּגְמָתָן בָּעוֹלָם הַזֶּה. נְפַק אַחְוִי לֵיהּ כְּמֵיהִין וּפִטְרִיּוֹת. וְאַכְּלֵי מֵילָת — נְבָרָא בַּר קוֹרָא. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: לְעוֹלָם יְהֵא אָדָם עַנְוְותָן כְּהִלֵּל וְאַל יְהֵא קַפְּדָן כְּשַׁמַּאי. מַעֲשֶׂה בִּשְׁנֵי בְּנֵי אָדָם
What did David do? Every Shabbat he would sit and learn all day long to protect himself from the Angel of Death. On that day on which the Angel of Death was supposed to put his soul to rest, the day on which David was supposed to die, the Angel of Death stood before him and was unable to overcome him because his mouth did not pause from study. The Angel of Death said: What shall I do to him? David had a garden [bustana] behind his house; the Angel of Death came, climbed, and shook the trees. David went out to see. As he climbed the stair, the stair broke beneath him. He was startled and was silent, interrupted his studies for a moment, and died. Since David died in the garden, Solomon sent the following question to the study hall: Father died and is lying in the sun, and the dogs of father’s house are hungry. There is room for concern lest the dogs come and harm his body. What shall I do? They sent an answer to him: Cut up an animal carcass and place it before the dogs. Since the dogs are hungry, handling the animal carcass to feed them is permitted. And with regard to your father, it is prohibited to move his body directly. Place a loaf of bread or an infant on top of him, and you can move him into the shade due to the bread or the infant. And is it not appropriate what Solomon said: “For a living dog is better than a dead lion.” The ultimate conclusion of this discussion is that life is preferable to death. And now, with regard to the question that I asked before you; Rav Tanḥum spoke modestly, as, actually, they had asked him the question. A lamp is called ner and a person’s soul is also called ner, as it is written: “The spirit of man is the lamp [ner] of the Lord” (Proverbs 20:27). It is preferable that the lamp of a being of flesh and blood, an actual lamp, will be extinguished in favor of the lamp of the Holy One, Blessed be He, a person’s soul. Therefore, one is permitted to extinguish a flame for the sake of a sick person. Since contradictions in Ecclesiastes were mentioned, the Gemara cites additional relevant sources. Rav Yehuda, son of Rav Shmuel bar Sheilat, said in the name of Rav: The Sages sought to suppress the book of Ecclesiastes and declare it apocryphal because its statements contradict each other and it is liable to confuse its readers. And why did they not suppress it? Because its beginning consists of matters of Torah and its end consists of matters of Torah. The ostensibly contradictory details are secondary to the essence of the book, which is Torah. The Gemara elaborates: Its beginning consists of matters of Torah, as it is written: “What profit has man of all his labor which he labors under the sun?” (Ecclesiastes 1:3), and the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai said: By inference: Under the sun is where man has no profit from his labor; however, before the sun, i.e., when engaged in the study of Torah, which preceded the sun, he does have profit. Its ending consists of matters of Torah, as it is written: “The end of the matter, all having been heard: Fear God, and keep His mitzvot; for this is the whole man” (Ecclesiastes 12:13). With regard to this verse, the Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: For this is the whole man? Rabbi Eliezer said: The entire world was only created for this person. Rabbi Abba bar Kahana said: This person is equivalent to the entire world. Shimon ben Azzai says and some say that Shimon ben Zoma says: The entire world was only created as companion to this man, so that he will not be alone. And to the essence of the matter, the Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: Its statements that contradict each other? It is written: “Vexation is better than laughter” (Ecclesiastes 7:3), and it is written: “I said of laughter: It is praiseworthy” (Ecclesiastes 2:2), which is understood to mean that laughter is commendable. Likewise in one verse it is written: “So I commended mirth” (Ecclesiastes 8:15), and in another verse it is written: “And of mirth: What does it accomplish?” (Ecclesiastes 2:2). The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as the contradiction can be resolved. Vexation is better than laughter means: The vexation of the Holy One, Blessed be He, toward the righteous in this world is preferable to the laughter which the Holy One, Blessed be He, laughs with the wicked in this world by showering them with goodness. I said of laughter: It is praiseworthy, that is the laughter which the Holy One, Blessed be He, laughs with the righteous in the World-to-Come. Similarly, “So I commended mirth,” that is the joy of a mitzva. “And of mirth: What does it accomplish?” that is joy that is not the joy of a mitzva. The praise of joy mentioned here is to teach you that the Divine Presence rests upon an individual neither from an atmosphere of sadness, nor from an atmosphere of laziness, nor from an atmosphere of laughter, nor from an atmosphere of frivolity, nor from an atmosphere of idle conversation, nor from an atmosphere of idle chatter, but rather from an atmosphere imbued with the joy of a mitzva. As it was stated with regard to Elisha that after he became angry at the king of Israel, his prophetic spirit left him until he requested: “But now bring me a minstrel; and it came to pass, when the minstrel played, that the hand of the Lord came upon him” (II Kings 3:15). Rav Yehuda said: And, so too, one should be joyful before stating a matter of halakha. Rava said: And, so too, one should be joyful before going to sleep in order to have a good dream. The Gemara asks: Is that so, that one should introduce matters of halakha joyfully? Didn’t Rav Giddel say that Rav said: Any Torah scholar who sits before his teacher and his lips are not dripping with myrrh due to fear of his teacher, those lips shall be burnt, as it is stated: “His lips are as lilies, dripping with flowing myrrh [shoshanim notefot mor over]” (Song of Songs 5:13)? He interpreted homiletically: Do not read mor over, flowing myrrh; rather, read mar over, flowing bitterness. Likewise, do not read shoshanim, lilies; rather, read sheshonim, that are studying, meaning that lips that are studying Torah must be full of bitterness. The Gemara explains: This is not difficult, there is no contradiction here, as this, where it was taught that one should introduce matters of halakha joyfully, is referring to a rabbi, and that, where it was taught that one must be filled with bitterness, is referring to a student, who must listen to his teacher with trepidation. And if you wish, say instead that this and that are referring to a rabbi, and it is not difficult. This, where it was taught that he must be joyful, is before he begins teaching, whereas that, where it was taught that he must be filled with bitterness and trepidation, is after he already began teaching halakha. That explanation is like that which Rabba did. Before he began teaching halakha to the Sages, he would say something humorous and the Sages would be cheered. Ultimately, he sat in trepidation and began teaching the halakha. And, the Gemara continues, the Sages sought to suppress the book of Proverbs as well because its statements contradict each other. And why did they not suppress it? They said: In the case of the book of Ecclesiastes, didn’t we analyze it and find an explanation that its statements were not contradictory? Here too, let us analyze it. And what is the meaning of: Its statements contradict each other? On the one hand, it is written: “Answer not a fool according to his folly, lest you also be like him” (Proverbs 26:4), and on the other hand, it is written: “Answer a fool according to his folly, lest he be wise in his own eyes” (Proverbs 26:5). The Gemara resolves this apparent contradiction: This is not difficult, as this, where one should answer a fool, is referring to a case where the fool is making claims about Torah matters; whereas that, where one should not answer him, is referring to a case where the fool is making claims about mundane matters. The Gemara relates how Sages conducted themselves in both of those circumstances. As in the case of that man who came before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and said to him: Your wife is my wife and your children are my children, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: Would you like to drink a cup of wine? He drank and burst and died. Similarly, the Gemara relates: There was that man who came before Rabbi Ḥiyya and said to him: Your mother is my wife, and you are my son. He said to him: Would you like to drink a cup of wine? He drank and burst and died. Rabbi Ḥiyya said with regard to the incident involving Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s prayer that his children will not be rendered mamzerim, children of illicit relations, was effective for him. As when Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would pray, he said after his prayer: May it be Your will, O Lord, my God, that You will deliver me today from impudent people and from insolence. Insolence, in this case, refers to mamzerut. It was due to his prayer that that man burst and was unsuccessful in disparaging Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s children. In matters of Torah, what is the case with regard to which the verse said that one should respond to a fool’s folly? As in the case where Rabban Gamliel was sitting and he interpreted a verse homiletically: In the future, in the World-to-Come, a woman will give birth every day, as it says: “The woman with child and her that gives birth together” (Jeremiah 31:7), explaining that birth will occur on the same day as conception. A certain student scoffed at him and said: That cannot be, as it has already been stated: “There is nothing new under the sun” (Ecclesiastes 1:9). Rabban Gamliel said to him: Come and I will show you an example of this in this world. He took him outside and showed him a chicken that lays eggs every day. And furthermore: Rabban Gamliel sat and interpreted a verse homiletically: In the future, in the World-to-Come, trees will produce fruits every day, as it is stated: “And it shall bring forth branches and bear fruit” (Ezekiel 17:23); just as a branch grows every day, so too, fruit will be produced every day. A certain student scoffed at him and said: Isn’t it written: There is nothing new under the sun? He said to him: Come and I will show you an example of this in this world. He went outside and showed him a caper bush, part of which is edible during each season of the year. And furthermore: Rabban Gamliel sat and interpreted a verse homiletically: In the future, the World-to-Come, Eretz Yisrael will produce cakes and fine wool garments that will grow in the ground, as it is stated: “Let abundant grain be in the land.” A certain student scoffed at him and said: There is nothing new under the sun. He said to him: Come and I will show you an example in this world. He went outside and showed him truffles and mushrooms, which emerge from the earth over the course of a single night and are shaped like a loaf of bread. And with regard to wool garments, he showed him the covering of a heart of palm, a young palm branch, which is wrapped in a thin net-like covering. Since the Gemara discussed the forbearance of Sages, who remain silent in the face of nonsensical comments, it cites additional relevant examples. The Sages taught in a baraita: A person should always be patient like Hillel and not impatient like Shammai. The Gemara related: There was an incident involving two people
שֶׁהִמְרוּ זֶה אֶת זֶה, אָמְרוּ: כׇּל מִי שֶׁיֵּלֵךְ וְיַקְנִיט אֶת הִלֵּל יִטּוֹל אַרְבַּע מֵאוֹת זוּז. אָמַר אֶחָד מֵהֶם: אֲנִי אַקְנִיטֶנּוּ. אוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם עֶרֶב שַׁבָּת הָיָה, וְהִלֵּל חָפַף אֶת רֹאשׁוֹ. הָלַךְ וְעָבַר עַל פֶּתַח בֵּיתוֹ, אָמַר: מִי כָּאן הִלֵּל, מִי כָּאן הִלֵּל? נִתְעַטֵּף וְיָצָא לִקְרָאתוֹ. אָמַר לוֹ: בְּנִי, מָה אַתָּה מְבַקֵּשׁ? אָמַר לוֹ: שְׁאֵלָה יֵשׁ לִי לִשְׁאוֹל. אָמַר לוֹ: שְׁאַל בְּנִי. שְׁאַל: מִפְּנֵי מָה רָאשֵׁיהֶן שֶׁל בַּבְלִיִּים סְגַלְגַּלּוֹת? אָמַר לוֹ: בְּנִי, שְׁאֵלָה גְּדוֹלָה שָׁאַלְתָּ. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵין לָהֶם אֲחָיוֹת פִּקְּחוֹת. הָלַךְ וְהִמְתִּין שָׁעָה אַחַת, חָזַר וְאָמַר: מִי כָּאן הִלֵּל, מִי כָּאן הִלֵּל? נִתְעַטֵּף וְיָצָא לִקְרָאתוֹ. אָמַר לוֹ: בְּנִי, מָה אַתָּה מְבַקֵּשׁ? אָמַר לוֹ: שְׁאֵלָה יֵשׁ לִי לִשְׁאוֹל. אָמַר לוֹ: שְׁאַל בְּנִי. שְׁאַל: מִפְּנֵי מָה עֵינֵיהֶן שֶׁל תַּרְמוֹדִיִּין תְּרוּטוֹת? אָמַר לוֹ: בְּנִי, שְׁאֵלָה גְּדוֹלָה שָׁאַלְתָּ. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁדָּרִין בֵּין הַחוֹלוֹת. הָלַךְ וְהִמְתִּין שָׁעָה אַחַת, חָזַר וְאָמַר: מִי כָּאן הִלֵּל, מִי כָּאן הִלֵּל? נִתְעַטֵּף וְיָצָא לִקְרָאתוֹ, אָמַר לוֹ: בְּנִי, מָה אַתָּה מְבַקֵּשׁ? אָמַר לוֹ: שְׁאֵלָה יֵשׁ לִי לִשְׁאוֹל. אָמַר לוֹ: שְׁאַל בְּנִי. שְׁאַל: מִפְּנֵי מָה רַגְלֵיהֶם שֶׁל אַפְרִקִיִּים רְחָבוֹת? אָמַר לוֹ: בְּנִי שְׁאֵלָה גְּדוֹלָה שָׁאַלְתָּ — מִפְּנֵי שֶׁדָּרִין בֵּין בִּצְעֵי הַמַּיִם. אָמַר לוֹ: שְׁאֵלוֹת הַרְבֵּה יֵשׁ לִי לִשְׁאוֹל, וּמִתְיָרֵא אֲנִי שֶׁמָּא תִּכְעוֹס. נִתְעַטֵּף וְיָשַׁב לְפָנָיו. אָמַר לוֹ: כׇּל שְׁאֵלוֹת שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָךְ לִשְׁאוֹל שְׁאַל. אָמַר לוֹ אַתָּה הוּא הִלֵּל שֶׁקּוֹרִין אוֹתְךָ ״נְשִׂיא יִשְׂרָאֵל״? אָמַר לוֹ: הֵן. אָמַר לוֹ: אִם אַתָּה הוּא, לֹא יִרְבּוּ כְּמוֹתְךָ בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל. אָמַר לוֹ: בְּנִי, מִפְּנֵי מָה? אָמַר לוֹ מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאִבַּדְתִּי עַל יָדְךָ אַרְבַּע מֵאוֹת זוּז. אָמַר לוֹ: הֱוֵי זָהִיר בְּרוּחֲךָ כְּדַי הוּא הִלֵּל שֶׁתְּאַבֵּד עַל יָדוֹ אַרְבַּע מֵאוֹת זוּז וְאַרְבַּע מֵאוֹת זוּז, וְהִלֵּל לֹא יַקְפִּיד. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּגוֹי אֶחָד שֶׁבָּא לִפְנֵי שַׁמַּאי. אָמַר לוֹ: כַּמָּה תּוֹרוֹת יֵשׁ לָכֶם? אָמַר לוֹ: שְׁתַּיִם, תּוֹרָה שֶׁבִּכְתָב וְתוֹרָה שֶׁבְּעַל פֶּה. אָמַר לוֹ: שֶׁבִּכְתָב אֲנִי מַאֲמִינְךָ, וְשֶׁבְּעַל פֶּה — אֵינִי מַאֲמִינְךָ. גַּיְּירֵנִי עַל מְנָת שֶׁתְּלַמְּדֵנִי תּוֹרָה שֶׁבִּכְתָב. גָּעַר בּוֹ וְהוֹצִיאוֹ בִּנְזִיפָה. בָּא לִפְנֵי הִלֵּל, גַּיְירֵיהּ. יוֹמָא קַמָּא אֲמַר לֵיהּ: א״ב ג״ד. לִמְחַר אֲפֵיךְ לֵיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְהָא אֶתְמוֹל לָא אֲמַרְתְּ לִי הָכִי! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָאו עֲלַי דִּידִי קָא סָמְכַתְּ? דְּעַל פֶּה נָמֵי סְמוֹךְ עֲלַי. שׁוּב מַעֲשֶׂה בְּגוֹי אֶחָד שֶׁבָּא לִפְנֵי שַׁמַּאי. אָמַר לוֹ: גַּיְּירֵנִי עַל מְנָת שֶׁתְּלַמְּדֵנִי כׇּל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ כְּשֶׁאֲנִי עוֹמֵד עַל רֶגֶל אַחַת! דְּחָפוֹ בְּאַמַּת הַבִּנְיָן שֶׁבְּיָדוֹ. בָּא לִפְנֵי הִלֵּל, גַּיְירֵיהּ. אָמַר לוֹ: דַּעֲלָךְ סְנֵי לְחַבְרָךְ לָא תַּעֲבֵיד — זוֹ הִיא כׇּל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ, וְאִידַּךְ פֵּירוּשַׁהּ הוּא, זִיל גְּמוֹר. שׁוּב מַעֲשֶׂה בְּגוֹי אֶחָד שֶׁהָיָה עוֹבֵר אֲחוֹרֵי בֵּית הַמִּדְרָשׁ, וְשָׁמַע קוֹל סוֹפֵר שֶׁהָיָה אוֹמֵר: ״וְאֵלֶּה הַבְּגָדִים אֲשֶׁר יַעֲשׂוּ חוֹשֶׁן וְאֵפוֹד״. אָמַר: הַלָּלוּ לְמִי? אָמְרוּ לוֹ: לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל. אָמַר אוֹתוֹ גּוֹי בְּעַצְמוֹ: אֵלֵךְ וְאֶתְגַּיֵּיר בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁיְּשִׂימוּנִי כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל. בָּא לִפְנֵי שַׁמַּאי, אָמַר לוֹ: גַּיְּירֵנִי עַל מְנָת שֶׁתְּשִׂימֵנִי כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל. דְּחָפוֹ בְּאַמַּת הַבִּנְיָן שֶׁבְּיָדוֹ. בָּא לִפְנֵי הִלֵּל, גַּיְירֵיהּ. אָמַר לוֹ: כְּלוּם מַעֲמִידִין מֶלֶךְ אֶלָּא מִי שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ טַכְסִיסֵי מַלְכוּת, לֵךְ לְמוֹד טַכְסִיסֵי מַלְכוּת. הָלַךְ וְקָרָא. כֵּיוָן שֶׁהִגִּיעַ ״וְהַזָּר הַקָּרֵב יוּמָת״, אָמַר לֵיהּ: מִקְרָא זֶה עַל מִי נֶאֱמַר? אָמַר לוֹ: אֲפִילּוּ עַל דָּוִד מֶלֶךְ יִשְׂרָאֵל. נָשָׂא אוֹתוֹ גֵּר קַל וָחוֹמֶר בְּעַצְמוֹ: וּמַה יִּשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁנִּקְרְאוּ בָּנִים לַמָּקוֹם וּמִתּוֹךְ אַהֲבָה שֶׁאֲהָבָם קְרָא לָהֶם: ״בְּנִי בְּכוֹרִי יִשְׂרָאֵל״, כְּתִיב עֲלֵיהֶם ״וְהַזָּר הַקָּרֵב יוּמָת״ — גֵּר הַקַּל שֶׁבָּא בְּמַקְלוֹ וּבְתַרְמִילוֹ, עַל אַחַת כַּמָּה וְכַמָּה. בָּא לִפְנֵי שַׁמַּאי, אָמַר לוֹ: כְּלוּם רָאוּי אֲנִי לִהְיוֹת כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל? וַהֲלֹא כְּתִיב בַּתּוֹרָה: ״וְהַזָּר הַקָּרֵב יוּמָת״. בָּא לִפְנֵי הִלֵּל, אָמַר לוֹ: עַנְוְותָן הִלֵּל, יָנוּחוּ לְךָ בְּרָכוֹת עַל רֹאשְׁךָ, שֶׁקֵּרַבְתַּנִי תַּחַת כַּנְפֵי הַשְּׁכִינָה. לְיָמִים נִזְדַּוְּוגוּ שְׁלָשְׁתָּן לִמְקוֹם אֶחָד, אָמְרוּ: קַפְּדָנוּתוֹ שֶׁל שַׁמַּאי בִּקְּשָׁה לְטוֹרְדֵנוּ מִן הָעוֹלָם, עִנְוְותָנוּתוֹ שֶׁל הִלֵּל קֵרְבַתְנוּ תַּחַת כַּנְפֵי הַשְּׁכִינָה. אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: מַאי דִכְתִיב ״וְהָיָה אֱמוּנַת עִתֶּיךָ חוֹסֶן יְשׁוּעוֹת חׇכְמַת וָדָעַת וְגוֹ׳״. ״אֱמוּנַת״ — זֶה סֵדֶר זְרָעִים. ״עִתֶּיךָ״ — זֶה סֵדֶר מוֹעֵד. ״חוֹסֶן״ — זֶה סֵדֶר נָשִׁים. ״יְשׁוּעוֹת״ — זֶה סֵדֶר נְזִיקִין. ״חׇכְמַת״ — זֶה סֵדֶר קׇדָשִׁים. ״וָדָעַת״ — זֶה סֵדֶר טְהָרוֹת. וַאֲפִילּוּ הָכִי, ״יִרְאַת ה׳ הִיא אוֹצָרוֹ״. אָמַר רָבָא: בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁמַּכְנִיסִין אָדָם לְדִין, אוֹמְרִים לוֹ: נָשָׂאתָ וְנָתַתָּ בָּאֱמוּנָה? קָבַעְתָּ עִתִּים לַתּוֹרָה? עָסַקְתָּ בִּפְרִיָּה וּרְבִיָּה? צָפִיתָ לִישׁוּעָה? פִּלְפַּלְתָּ בְּחׇכְמָה? הֵבַנְתָּ דָּבָר מִתּוֹךְ דָּבָר? וַאֲפִילּוּ הָכִי, אִי יִרְאַת ה׳ הִיא אוֹצָרוֹ — אִין, אִי לָא — לָא. מָשָׁל לְאָדָם שֶׁאָמַר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ: הַעֲלֵה לִי כּוֹר חִיטִּין לָעֲלִיָּיה. הָלַךְ וְהֶעֱלָה לוֹ. אָמַר לוֹ: עֵירַבְתָּ לִי בָּהֶן קַב חוֹמְטוֹן? אָמַר לוֹ: לָאו. אָמַר לוֹ: מוּטָב אִם לֹא הֶעֱלֵיתָה. תָּנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: מְעָרֵב אָדָם קַב חוֹמְטוֹן בְּכוֹר שֶׁל תְּבוּאָה, וְאֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ. אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא: כׇּל אָדָם שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ תּוֹרָה וְאֵין בּוֹ
who wagered with each other and said: Anyone who will go and aggravate Hillel to the point that he reprimands him, will take four-hundred zuz. One of them said: I will aggravate him. That day that he chose to bother Hillel was Shabbat eve, and Hillel was washing the hair on his head. He went and passed the entrance to Hillel’s house and in a demeaning manner said: Who here is Hillel, who here is Hillel? Hillel wrapped himself in a dignified garment and went out to greet him. He said to him: My son, what do you seek? He said to him: I have a question to ask. Hillel said to him: Ask, my son, ask. The man asked him: Why are the heads of Babylonians oval? He was alluding to and attempting to insult Hillel, who was Babylonian. He said to him: My son, you have asked a significant question. The reason is because they do not have clever midwives. They do not know how to shape the child’s head at birth. That man went and waited one hour, a short while, returned to look for Hillel, and said: Who here is Hillel, who here is Hillel? Again, Hillel wrapped himself and went out to greet him. Hillel said to him: My son, what do you seek? The man said to him: I have a question to ask. He said to him: Ask, my son, ask. The man asked: Why are the eyes of the residents of Tadmor bleary [terutot]? Hillel said to him: My son, you have asked a significant question. The reason is because they live among the sands and the sand gets into their eyes. Once again the man went, waited one hour, returned, and said: Who here is Hillel, who here is Hillel? Again, he, Hillel, wrapped himself and went out to greet him. He said to him: My son, what do you seek? He said to him: I have a question to ask. He said to him: Ask, my son, ask. The man asked: Why do Africans have wide feet? Hillel said to him: You have asked a significant question. The reason is because they live in marshlands and their feet widened to enable them to walk through those swampy areas. That man said to him: I have many more questions to ask, but I am afraid lest you get angry. Hillel wrapped himself and sat before him, and he said to him: All of the questions that you have to ask, ask them. The man got angry and said to him: Are you Hillel whom they call the Nasi of Israel? He said to him: Yes. He said to him: If it is you, then may there not be many like you in Israel. Hillel said to him: My son, for what reason do you say this? The man said to him: Because I lost four hundred zuz because of you. Hillel said to him: Be vigilant of your spirit and avoid situations of this sort. Hillel is worthy of having you lose four hundred zuz and another four hundred zuz on his account, and Hillel will not get upset. The Sages taught: There was an incident involving one gentile who came before Shammai. The gentile said to Shammai: How many Torahs do you have? He said to him: Two, the Written Torah and the Oral Torah. The gentile said to him: With regard to the Written Torah, I believe you, but with regard to the Oral Torah, I do not believe you. Convert me on condition that you will teach me only the Written Torah. Shammai scolded him and cast him out with reprimand. The same gentile came before Hillel, who converted him and began teaching him Torah. On the first day, he showed him the letters of the alphabet and said to him: Alef, bet, gimmel, dalet. The next day he reversed the order of the letters and told him that an alef is a tav and so on. The convert said to him: But yesterday you did not tell me that. Hillel said to him: You see that it is impossible to learn what is written without relying on an oral tradition. Didn’t you rely on me? Therefore, you should also rely on me with regard to the matter of the Oral Torah, and accept the interpretations that it contains. There was another incident involving one gentile who came before Shammai and said to Shammai: Convert me on condition that you teach me the entire Torah while I am standing on one foot. Shammai pushed him away with the builder’s cubit in his hand. This was a common measuring stick and Shammai was a builder by trade. The same gentile came before Hillel. He converted him and said to him: That which is hateful to you do not do to another; that is the entire Torah, and the rest is its interpretation. Go study. There was another incident involving one gentile who was passing behind the study hall and heard the voice of a teacher who was teaching Torah to his students and saying the verse: “And these are the garments which they shall make: A breastplate, and an efod, and a robe, and a tunic of checkered work, a mitre, and a girdle” (Exodus 28:4). The gentile said: These garments, for whom are they designated? The students said to him: For the High Priest. The gentile said to himself: I will go and convert so that they will install me as High Priest. He came before Shammai and said to him: Convert me on condition that you install me as High Priest. Shammai pushed him with the builder’s cubit in his hand. He came before Hillel; he converted him. Hillel said to him, to the convert: Is it not the way of the world that only one who knows the protocols [takhsisei] of royalty is appointed king? Go and learn the royal protocols by engaging in Torah study. He went and read the Bible. When he reached the verse which says: “And the common man that draws near shall be put to death” (Numbers 1:51), the convert said to Hillel: With regard to whom is the verse speaking? Hillel said to him: Even with regard to David, king of Israel. The convert reasoned an a fortiori inference himself: If the Jewish people are called God’s children, and due to the love that God loved them he called them: “Israel is My son, My firstborn” (Exodus 4:22), and nevertheless it is written about them: And the common man that draws near shall be put to death; a mere convert who came without merit, with nothing more than his staff and traveling bag, all the more so that this applies to him, as well. The convert came before Shammai and told him that he retracts his demand to appoint him High Priest, saying: Am I at all worthy to be High Priest? Is it not written in the Torah: And the common man that draws near shall be put to death? He came before Hillel and said to him: Hillel the patient, may blessings rest upon your head as you brought me under the wings of the Divine Presence. The Gemara relates: Eventually, the three converts gathered together in one place, and they said: Shammai’s impatience sought to drive us from the world; Hillel’s patience brought us beneath the wings of the Divine Presence. The Gemara continues discussing the conduct of the Sages, citing that Reish Lakish said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And the faith of your times shall be a strength of salvation, wisdom, and knowledge, the fear of the Lord is his treasure” (Isaiah 33:6)? Faith; that is the order of Zera’im, Seeds, in the Mishna, because a person has faith in God and plants his seeds (Jerusalem Talmud). Your times; that is the order of Moed, Festival, which deals with the various occasions and Festivals that occur throughout the year. Strength; that is the order of Nashim, Women. Salvations; that is the order of Nezikin, Damages, as one who is being pursued is rescued from the hands of his pursuer. Wisdom; that is the order of Kodashim, Consecrated Items. And knowledge; that is the order of Teharot, Purity, which is particularly difficult to master. And even if a person studies and masters all of these, “the fear of the Lord is his treasure,” it is preeminent. With regard to the same verse, Rava said: After departing from this world, when a person is brought to judgment for the life he lived in this world, they say to him in the order of that verse: Did you conduct business faithfully? Did you designate times for Torah study? Did you engage in procreation? Did you await salvation? Did you engage in the dialectics of wisdom or understand one matter from another? And, nevertheless, beyond all these, if the fear of the Lord is his treasure, yes, he is worthy, and if not, no, none of these accomplishments have any value. There is a parable that illustrates this. A person who said to his emissary: Bring a kor of wheat up to the attic for me to store there. The messenger went and brought it up for him. He said to the emissary: Did you mix a kav of ḥomton, a preservative to keep away worms, into it for me? He said to him: No. He said to him: If so, it would have been preferable had you not brought it up. Of what use is worm-infested wheat? Likewise, Torah and mitzvot without the fear of God are of no value. On a related note, the Gemara cites a halakha that was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael: A person who sells wheat may, ab initio, mix a kav of ḥomton into a kor of grain and need not be concerned that by selling it all at the price of grain he will be guilty of theft, as the kav of ḥomton is essential for the preservation of the wheat. Rabba bar Rav Huna said: Any person who has Torah in him but does not have
דאי לא תימא הכי (ירמיהו כט, ה) בנו בתים ושבו ונטעו גנות ואכלו את פרין מאי קאמר אלא עצה טובה קמ"ל הכא נמי עצה טובה קמ"ל תדע דכתיב (ירמיהו לב, יד) ונתתם בכלי חרש למען יעמדו ימים רבים אלא אמר רבא שתא קמייתא מחיל איניש תרתי מחיל תלת לא מחיל אמר ליה אביי אלא מעתה כי הדרא ארעא תיהדר לבר מפירי אלמה אמר רב נחמן הדרא ארעא והדרי פירי אלא אמר רבא שתא קמייתא לא קפיד איניש תרתי לא קפיד תלת קפיד א"ל אביי אלא מעתה כגון הני דבי בר אלישיב דקפדי אפילו אמאן דחליף אמיצרא דידהו הכי נמי דלאלתר הוי חזקה וכי תימא הכי נמי אם כן נתת דבריך לשיעורין אלא אמר רבא שתא קמייתא מיזדהר איניש בשטריה תרתי ותלת מיזדהר טפי לא מיזדהר אמר ליה אביי אלא מעתה מחאה שלא בפניו לא תיהוי מחאה דאמר ליה אי מחית באפאי הוה מיזדהרנא בשטראי דאמר ליה חברך חברא אית ליה וחברא דחברך חברא אית ליה אמר רב הונא שלש שנים שאמרו הוא שאכלן רצופות מאי קמ"ל תנינא חזקתן שלש שנים מיום ליום מהו דתימא מיום ליום לאפוקי מקוטעות ולעולם אפילו מפוזרות קמ"ל אמר רב חמא ומודי רב הונא באתרי דמוברי באגי פשיטא לא צריכא דאיכא דמובר ואיכא דלא מובר והאי גברא מוברה מהו דתימא א"ל אם איתא דדידך הואי איבעי לך למיזרעה קמ"ל דאמר ליה חדא ארעא בכוליה באגא לא מצינא לינטר ואי נמי בהכי ניחא לי דעבדא טפי תנן חזקת הבתים והא בתים דביממא ידעי בליליא לא ידעי אמר אביי מאן מסהיד אבתים שיבבי שיבבי מידע ידעי ביממא ובליליא רבא אמר כגון דאתו בי תרי ואמרי אנן אגרינן מיניה ודרינן ביה תלת שנין ביממא ובליליא אמר ליה רב יימר לרב אשי הני נוגעין בעדותן הן דאי לא אמרי הכי אמרינן להו זילו הבו ליה אגר ביתא להאי א"ל דייני דשפילי הכי דאיני מי לא עסקינן כגון דנקיטי אגר ביתא ואמרי למאן ליתביה אמר מר זוטרא ואי טעין ואמר ליתו תרי סהדי לאסהודי ליה דדר ביה תלת שני ביממא ובליליא טענתיה טענה
Because if you do not say so, then when he states: “Build houses, and dwell in them, and plant gardens, and eat the fruit of them” (Jeremiah 29:5), what halakhic statement was he saying? Rather, he teaches us good advice, and here too he teaches us good advice. The Gemara comments: Know that this was mere advice, as it is written: “And put them in an earthen vessel; that they may continue many days” (Jeremiah 32:14). This is obviously good advice to preserve the items properly, and is not a halakhic statement. Therefore, this is not a proof that the presumption of ownership cannot be established in under three years. Rather, Rava said a different reason: A person who sees another profiting from his field might waive his rights during the first year, and he might waive his rights for two years, but he will not waive his rights for three years. Therefore, if one does not lodge a protest by the end of the third year, it is tantamount to a concession that the land is not his. Abaye said to him: If that is so, when it becomes clear that the land is in fact owned by another and it is returned to its owner, it should be returned, save for the produce that the possessor consumed during the first two years, as the owner waived his rights to it. Why did Rav Naḥman say: The land is returned and the produce is returned? Rather, Rava said a different reason: A person is not particular the first year to lodge a protest, and he is not particular for two years, even though he does not waive his rights to the pro-duce. He is particular to lodge a protest when he sees another profiting from his field for three years. Therefore, if one does not lodge a protest by the end of the third year, it is tantamount to a concession that the land is not his. Abaye said to him: If that is so, for people such as those of the bar Elyashiv household, who are particular even with regard to one who goes on the boundary of their field, here too, will you say that presumptive ownership is established immediately, as soon as one makes use of their property without their lodging a protest? And if you would say that is indeed the halakha, if so, you have subjected your statement to the varying circumstances of each case, as there will be a different length of time needed to establish the presumption of ownership depending on who the prior owner is. This is untenable. Rather, Rava said a different reason: A person is careful with his document detailing his purchase of land for the first year after the purchase, and he is also careful for two and three years. For more time than that, he is not careful and might discard the document if no one has lodged a protest concerning his possession of the land. Therefore, the Sages ruled that after three years have passed, he can prove his ownership by means of presumptive ownership. Abaye said to him: If that is so, a protest that is lodged not in his presence should not be a valid protest, and if three years pass with no protest in his presence, presumptive ownership should be established even if there was a protest lodged before other people. This is because the one possessing the land can say to the claimant: If you had protested in my presence, I would have been careful with my document and would not have discarded it. The Gemara explains that this claim would not be accepted, be-cause the claimant can say to him: Your friend has a friend, and your friend’s friend has a friend, and the assumption is that word of the protest reached you. § Rav Huna says: The three years that the Sages said are required to establish the presumption of ownership is referring to when he worked and profited from the field in consecutive years. The Gemara asks: What is Rav Huna teaching us with this statement? We learned this in the mishna: Their presumption of ownership is established by use for a duration of three years from day to day. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that the phrase: From day to day, serves to exclude partial years and to teach that each of the three years must be full, and actually even scattered, i.e., non-consecutive, years are sufficient, therefore, Rav Huna teaches us that the years must be consecutive. Rav Ḥama says: And Rav Huna concedes with regard to locations where they leave fields [bagei] to lie fallow by planting in alternate years, that the three years combine despite not being consecutive, as that is the manner in which owners profit from the land. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that this is the halakha? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state this with regard to locations where there are some people who leave the fields to lie fallow and there are some people who do not leave the fields to lie fallow, and this man left the field to lie fallow. Lest you say that the claimant can say to him: If it is so that the land is yours, you should have sown it, therefore, Rav Ḥama teaches us that the possessor can say to the claimant: I am not able to hire someone to guard one parcel of land within an entire field, and I acted like those who own other land in this location and let the field lie fallow. And alternatively, the possessor can say to the claimant: In this manner of farming it is beneficial for me to farm, because the land produces more later, and I do not wish to plant year after year and weaken the soil. The Gemara clarifies Rav Huna’s statement that the presumption of ownership can be established only by consecutive use. We learned in the mishna about the presumptive ownership of houses. But with regard to the use of houses, where the witnesses attesting to its use know who uses the house only in the day, but they do not know who uses the house in the night, how then can one establish the presumption of ownership in the case of a house? The possessor’s use is not consecutive, as it is continually interrupted by the nights. Abaye said: Who testifies about houses? Neighbors, and neighbors know who is inside in the day and in the night. Rava said that there is another scenario in which one can bring witnesses with regard to the use of a house. This is such as when two people come and say: We rented the house from him and we lived in it for three years, in the day and in the night. This testimony substantiates that the house was used under the authority of the one who is attempting to prove that he has established the presumption of ownership. Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi: How can their testimony be relied upon? These witnesses are biased in their testimony, because if they do not say this testimony, that they rented the house from the possessor for three consecutive years, we say to them: Go and give payment for the rental of the house to that one who is claiming ownership, as the one you paid has not established that he is the true owner. Rav Ashi said to him: Low-level judges rule this way. In other words, only a court composed of ignorant judges would accept the testimony of the renters of the house in a case where they are biased in their testimony. Nevertheless, Rava’s scenario is still possible, as, are we not dealing with a case where they are holding the money for the payment for the rental of the house, and they are saying to the court: To whom shall we give it? Therefore, they are not biased in their testimony, because they will pay the same amount, regardless of who the actual owner is. The Gemara quotes a related statement. Mar Zutra said: And if the claimant claims and says: Let two witnesses come to testify for the possessor that he lived in the house three years in the day and in the night, his claim is a legitimate claim.
אמר לו רבי עקיבא או חלוף מה אם הזאה שהיא משום שבות אינה דוחה את השבת שחיטה שהיא משום מלאכה אינו דין שלא תדחה את השבת אמר לו רבי אליעזר עקיבא עקרת מה שכתוב בתורה במועדו בין בחול בין בשבת אמר לו רבי הבא לי מועד לאלו כמועד לשחיטה כלל אמר רבי עקיבא כל מלאכה שאפשר לעשותה מערב שבת אינה דוחה את השבת שחיטה שאי אפשר לעשותה מערב שבת דוחה את השבת: גמ׳ תנו רבנן הלכה זו נתעלמה מבני בתירא פעם אחת חל ארבעה עשר להיות בשבת שכחו ולא ידעו אם פסח דוחה את השבת אם לאו אמרו כלום יש אדם שיודע אם פסח דוחה את השבת אם לאו אמרו להם אדם אחד יש שעלה מבבל והלל הבבלי שמו ששימש שני גדולי הדור שמעיה ואבטליון ויודע אם פסח דוחה את השבת אם לאו שלחו וקראו לו אמרו לו כלום אתה יודע אם הפסח דוחה את השבת אם לאו אמר להם וכי פסח אחד יש לנו בשנה שדוחה את השבת והלא הרבה יותר ממאתים פסחים יש לנו בשנה שדוחין את השבת אמרו לו מנין לך אמר להם נאמר מועדו בפסח ונאמר מועדו בתמיד מה מועדו האמור בתמיד דוחה את השבת אף מועדו האמור בפסח דוחה את השבת ועוד קל וחומר הוא ומה תמיד שאין ענוש כרת דוחה את השבת פסח שענוש כרת אינו דין שדוחה את השבת מיד הושיבוהו בראש ומינוהו נשיא עליהם והיה דורש כל היום כולו בהלכות הפסח התחיל מקנטרן בדברים אמר להן מי גרם לכם שאעלה מבבל ואהיה נשיא עליכם עצלות שהיתה בכם שלא שמשתם שני גדולי הדור שמעיה ואבטליון אמרו לו רבי שכח ולא הביא סכין מערב שבת מהו אמר להן הלכה זו שמעתי ושכחתי אלא הנח להן לישראל אם אין נביאים הן בני נביאים הן למחר מי שפסחו טלה תוחבו בצמרו מי שפסחו גדי תוחבו בין קרניו ראה מעשה ונזכר הלכה ואמר כך מקובלני מפי שמעיה ואבטליון אמר מר נאמר מועדו בפסח ונאמר מועדו בתמיד מה מועדו האמור בתמיד דוחה את השבת אף מועדו האמור בפסח דוחה שבת ותמיד גופיה מנלן דדחי שבת אילימא משום דכתיב ביה במועדו פסח נמי הא כתיב ביה מועדו אלא מועדו לא משמע ליה הכא נמי מועדו לא משמע ליה אלא אמר קרא עולת שבת בשבתו על עולת התמיד מכלל [עולה] דתמיד קרבה בשבת אמר מר ועוד קל וחומר ומה תמיד שאין ענוש כרת דוחה את השבת פסח שענוש כרת אינו דין שדוחה את השבת איכא למיפרך מה לתמיד שכן תדיר וכליל קל וחומר אמר להו ברישא ופרכוה והדר אמר להו גזירה שוה וכי מאחר דגמר גזירה שוה קל וחומר למה לי אלא לדידהו קאמר להו בשלמא גזירה שוה לא גמריתו דאין אדם דן גזירה שוה מעצמו אלא קל וחומר דאדם דן מעצמו איבעי לכו למידן אמרו ליה קל וחומר פריכא הוא: אמר מר למחר מי שפסחו טלה תוחב לו בצמרו גדי תוחב לו בין קרניו
Rabbi Akiva said to Rabbi Eliezer: Or perhaps we can reverse the order of your argument and say the opposite: If, as we know by accepted tradition, sprinkling the purifying water on Shabbat, which is prohibited only due to rabbinic decree, does not override Shabbat, then with regard to slaughter, which is prohibited as a biblically prohibited labor, is it not right that it should not override Shabbat? Therefore, it should be prohibited to slaughter the Paschal lamb when the eve of Passover occurs on Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva, how can you say this? You have thus uprooted what is written in the Torah: “Let the children of Israel offer the Paschal lamb in its appointed time” (Numbers 9:2); the phrase “at its appointed time” indicates that the offering must be brought on that day, whether it is a weekday or Shabbat. Rabbi Akiva said to Rabbi Eliezer: My teacher, bring me an appointed time stated in the Torah for these tasks, namely, carrying the animal or bringing it from outside the Shabbat limits, like the appointed time stated with respect to slaughter. The Paschal lamb must be slaughtered on the fourteenth of Nisan, but there is no fixed time when the animal must be brought to the Temple, and it is therefore possible to transport it before Shabbat. Rabbi Akiva stated a principle: Any prohibited labor required for the offering of the sacrifice that can be performed on the eve of Shabbat does not override Shabbat; slaughter, which cannot be performed on the eve of Shabbat, overrides Shabbat. GEMARA: The Sages taught a baraita with regard to the basic halakha governing the eve of Passover that occurs on Shabbat: This law was forgotten by the sons of Beteira, who were the leaders of their generation. The fourteenth of Nisan once occurred on Shabbat, and they forgot and did not know whether the Paschal lamb overrides Shabbat or not. They said: Is there any person who knows whether the Paschal lamb overrides Shabbat or not? They said to them: There is a certain man in Jerusalem who came up from Babylonia, and Hillel the Babylonian is his name. At one point, he served the two most eminent scholars of the generation, Shemaya and Avtalyon, and he certainly knows whether the Paschal lamb overrides Shabbat or not. The sons of Beteira sent messengers and called for him. They said to him: Do you know whether the Paschal lamb overrides Shabbat or not? He said to them: Have we but one Paschal lamb during the year that overrides Shabbat? Do we not have many more than two hundred Paschal lambs, i.e., sacrifices, during the year that override Shabbat? They said to him: From where do you know this? He said to them: “Its appointed time” is stated with regard to the Paschal lamb and “its appointed time” is also stated with regard to the daily offering, for the verse says: “Command the children of Israel and say to them, My offering, the provision of My sacrifice made with fire, for a sweet savor to Me, shall you observe to offer Me at its appointed time” (Numbers 28:2). From here we learn that the daily offering is brought even on Shabbat. Thus, the daily morning and afternoon offerings are brought on more than fifty Shabbatot over the course of the year, and two sheep are offered every Shabbat as additional offerings, for a total of more than two hundred sacrifices a year that override Shabbat. Just as the expression “its appointed time,” which is stated with regard to the daily offering, indicates that it overrides Shabbat, so too “its appointed time,” which is stated with regard to the Paschal lamb, indicates that it overrides Shabbat. And furthermore, it is an a fortiori inference: If the daily offering, the neglect of which is not punishable by karet, overrides Shabbat, is it not right that the Paschal lamb, the neglect of which is punishable by karet, should override Shabbat? After Hillel brought these proofs, they immediately seated him at the head and appointed him Nasi over them, and he expounded the laws of Passover that entire day. In the course of his teaching, he began rebuking them [mekanteran] them with words. He said to them: What caused this to happen to you, that I should come up from Babylonia and become Nasi over you? It was the laziness in you that you did not serve the two most eminent scholars of the generation living in Eretz Yisrael, Shemaya and Avtalyon. They said to Hillel: Our teacher, if one forgot and did not bring a knife on the eve of Shabbat and cannot slaughter his Paschal lamb, what is the law? Since he could have brought the knife before Shabbat, he cannot bring it on Shabbat; but what should he do in this situation? He said to them: I once heard this halakha from my teachers but I have forgotten it. But leave it to the Jewish people; if they are not prophets to whom God has revealed His secrets, they are the sons of prophets, and will certainly do the right thing on their own. The next day, on Shabbat that was the eve of Passover, one whose Paschal offering was a lamb took the knife and stuck it in its wool; and one whose Paschal offering was a goat, which does not have wool, stuck it between its horns. Hillel saw the incident and remembered the halakha that he had once learned and said: This is the tradition I received from the mouths of Shemaya and Avtalyon, meaning that this is in fact the proper course of action. This concludes the text of the baraita and the Gemara will begin to elucidate it. The Master said above: “Its appointed time” is stated with regard to the Paschal lamb and “its appointed time” is stated with regard to the daily offering. Just as “its appointed time,” which is stated with regard to the daily offering, indicates that it overrides Shabbat, so too “its appointed time,” which is stated with regard to the Paschal lamb, indicates that it overrides Shabbat. And from where do we derive that the daily offering itself overrides Shabbat? If we say because “in its appointed time” is written in its regard, “in its appointed time” is also written with regard to the Paschal lamb. Were it possible to derive from this expression that the sacrifice is offered even on Shabbat, it would not be necessary to derive the law governing the Paschal lamb from a verbal analogy between the daily offering and the Paschal lamb. Rather, you must conclude that the expression “its appointed time,” which is stated with regard to the Paschal lamb, does not indicate to Hillel that the Torah was so particular about the timing of the Paschal lamb that its slaughter overrides Shabbat. Here too, with regard to the daily offering, you must say that “its appointed time” does not indicate to him that it is brought on Shabbat, and so this expression is not the source of this law. Rather, the law is derived from the verse that states: “The burnt-offering of Shabbat on its Shabbat, beside the continual burnt-offering and its libation” (Numbers 28:10), from which it may be inferred that the daily burnt-offering is brought even on Shabbat. The Gemara raises another question: The Master said in that same baraita: And furthermore, it is an a fortiori inference: If the daily offering, the neglect of which is not punishable by karet, overrides Shabbat, is it not right that the Paschal lamb, the neglect of which is punishable by karet, should override Shabbat? The Gemara points out that there is room to refute the logic of this argument: What is unique about the daily offering that enables it to override Shabbat? That it is frequent, and something that is frequent always takes precedence; and also that it is totally consumed on the altar, unlike the Paschal lamb, most of which is eaten by human beings. The Gemara explains that this is what happened: Hillel first told them the a fortiori inference, but they refuted it and proved that it was not reliable, as explained above; and then he told them the verbal analogy, and a verbal analogy is based on an oral tradition originating from Moses at Sinai and must be accepted. The Gemara asks: But since Hillel learned this verbal analogy from his teachers, why do I need an a fortiori inference? Why did he add a logical argument of his own if he had an explicit verbal tradition that this was the halakha? The Gemara answers: Rather, he said it for them, to show that they had not sufficiently exerted themselves in clarifying this halakha: Granted, you did not learn the verbal analogy on your own, because you acted according to the principle that one may not expound a verbal analogy on one’s own. Since there is no limit to the laws that one can extract using this method of derivation, such a derivation is only legitimate if it has been transmitted as part of the oral tradition, and apparently they did not learn this verbal analogy from their teachers. But an a fortiori inference, which one can derive on one’s own, you should have derived and you would then have known how to resolve this question. They said to him: It is a faulty a fortiori inference, as we have shown that it can be easily refuted. The Master said further in the baraita: The next day, one whose Paschal offering was a lamb stuck the knife in its wool, and one whose Paschal offering was a goat stuck it between its horns so as to avoid carrying the knife on Shabbat.
(יב) הִלֵּל וְשַׁמַּאי קִבְּלוּ מֵהֶם. הִלֵּל אוֹמֵר, הֱוֵי מִתַּלְמִידָיו שֶׁל אַהֲרֹן, אוֹהֵב שָׁלוֹם וְרוֹדֵף שָׁלוֹם, אוֹהֵב אֶת הַבְּרִיּוֹת וּמְקָרְבָן לַתּוֹרָה:
(12) Hillel and Shammai received [the oral tradition] from them. Hillel used to say: be of the disciples of Aaron, loving peace and pursuing peace, loving mankind and drawing them close to the Torah.
(יד) הוּא הָיָה אוֹמֵר, אִם אֵין אֲנִי לִי, מִי לִי. וּכְשֶׁאֲנִי לְעַצְמִי, מָה אֲנִי. וְאִם לֹא עַכְשָׁיו, אֵימָתָי:
(14) He [also] used to say: If I am not for myself, who is for me? But if I am for my own self [only], what am I? And if not now, when?
(ד) הוּא הָיָה אוֹמֵר, עֲשֵׂה רְצוֹנוֹ כִרְצוֹנְךָ, כְּדֵי שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה רְצוֹנְךָ כִרְצוֹנוֹ. בַּטֵּל רְצוֹנְךָ מִפְּנֵי רְצוֹנוֹ, כְּדֵי שֶׁיְּבַטֵּל רְצוֹן אֲחֵרִים מִפְּנֵי רְצוֹנֶךָ. הִלֵּל אוֹמֵר, אַל תִּפְרֹשׁ מִן הַצִּבּוּר, וְאַל תַּאֲמִין בְּעַצְמְךָ עַד יוֹם מוֹתְךָ, וְאַל תָּדִין אֶת חֲבֵרְךָ עַד שֶׁתַּגִּיעַ לִמְקוֹמוֹ, וְאַל תֹּאמַר דָּבָר שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר לִשְׁמֹעַ, שֶׁסּוֹפוֹ לְהִשָּׁמַע. וְאַל תֹּאמַר לִכְשֶׁאִפָּנֶה אֶשְׁנֶה, שֶׁמָּא לֹא תִפָּנֶה:
(4) He used to say: do His will as though it were your will, so that He will do your will as though it were His. Set aside your will in the face of His will, so that he may set aside the will of others for the sake of your will. Hillel said: do not separate yourself from the community, Do not trust in yourself until the day of your death, Do not judge your fellow man until you have reached his place. Do not say something that cannot be understood [trusting] that in the end it will be understood. Say not: ‘when I shall have leisure I shall study;’ perhaps you will not have leisure.