Jewish Value: The Primacy of Preserving and Protecting Human Life

And Abaye said to Rabba: In breaking the bench, didn’t the Master violate the prohibition, “Do not destroy” (Deuteronomy 20:19)? It is prohibited to destroy objects of value. Rabba said to him: Do not destroy also with regard to destruction of my body. Preventing illness and danger is preferable to me.

And Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said that Rav said: The Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yosei with regard to the umbilical cord attached to twin babies that one may cut it on Shabbat. What is the reason for this? In that case, leaving the cord attached is dangerous. Since the attached twins will try to disengage from each other, they could potentially rip each other’s cords.

And it is similar to the halakhot of a bandage and cumin stated in the mishna. Just as in the case of a bandage and cumin, failure to do what is necessary with these items poses a danger to the child, here too, if he does not perform the sucking after circumcision, it poses a danger to the child; Shabbat is overridden in cases of danger.

MISHNA: One may wash the baby on Shabbat, both before the circumcision and after the circumcision. And one may sprinkle hot water on him by hand but not with a vessel, in order to depart from the usual manner in which this is done. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: One may wash the baby on the third day following his circumcision, even if that third day occurs on Shabbat. On the third day following circumcision, the baby is considered to be in danger, as it is stated with regard to the men of Shekhem, who were circumcised: “And it came to pass on the third day, when they were in pain” (Genesis 34:25). This teaches us that on the third day the pain of circumcision poses a danger.

One of the Sages, named Rabbi Ya’akov, said to them: It stands to reason that it is referring to washing his entire body, as if it should enter your mind that the dispute is with regard to washing the place of the circumcision, is this washing any worse than placing hot water on a wound? Rav said: One does not prevent placing hot water and oil on a wound on Shabbat. Therefore, it should certainly be permissible to wash the place of the circumcision.

It was also stated that when Ravin came to Babylonia from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Elazar said, and others say that Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, both with regard to hot water heated on Shabbat and with regard to hot water heated on Shabbat eve; both with regard to washing the entire body and with regard to washing the place of the circumcision alone, because failure to do so poses a danger for the baby.

The mishna states another halakha: With regard to a sick child, one does not circumcise him until he becomes healthy.

GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that one does not circumcise a sick baby until he becomes healthy. Shmuel said: A baby that was sick and had a high fever, and subsequently the fever left him, one gives him a full seven days to heal before circumcising him.

But one may put a chip of mulberry wood and shards of glass in the pot so it will cook quickly, as doing so is effective and not merely superstition. And the Rabbis prohibit shards of glass not due to superstition; rather, due to the danger involved if the glass is not strained out completely.

With regard to swollen meat that began to putrefy, it is permitted to move it because it is food for non-domesticated animals. With regard to exposed water, from which a snake might have drunk and into which it injected its venom, it is permitted to move it because it is suitable for a cat, which is somewhat immune to snake venom. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Exposed water itself may not be kept due to the danger that one may inadvertently drink it.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: With regard to a woman in childbirth, as long as the womb is open, whether she said: I need Shabbat to be desecrated, or whether she did not say: I need Shabbat to be desecrated, one desecrates Shabbat for her. Generally, a woman in childbirth is in danger, and prohibited labors may be performed in life-threatening circumstances.

Ravina said to Mareimar: Since Mar Zutra teaches leniently, and Rav Ashi teaches stringently, in accordance with whose opinion is the halakha? Mareimar said to him: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Mar Zutra, based on the following principle: In cases of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation, the halakha is lenient.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: One builds a fire for a woman in childbirth on Shabbat during the rainy season. The Sages thought to infer from here the following: For a woman in childbirth, yes, one builds a fire; for sick people, no, he does not build a fire. In the rainy season, yes, one builds a fire; in the summer, no, he does not build a fire. And the Gemara concludes: That is not the case. There is no difference between a woman in childbirth and a sick person, and there is no difference between the rainy season and the summer. In all of these cases one may build a fire on Shabbat. This conclusion emerges from that which was stated: Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said that Shmuel said: With regard to one who let blood and caught cold, one makes a fire for him even during the season of Tammuz, i.e., the summer. Failure to do so could result in serious illness.

And Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said that Rav said: The Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yosei with regard to the umbilical cord attached to twin babies that one may cut it on Shabbat. What is the reason for this? In that case, leaving the cord attached is dangerous. Since the attached twins will try to disengage from each other, they could potentially rip each other’s cords.

The Gemara asks: Was Rav’s ruling according to the opinion of the one who permitted soaking asafoetida in cold water? The Gemara answers: His ruling could be even according to the opinion of the one who prohibited doing so; this prohibition applies only when he had not drunk asafoetida at all; however, here, since he drank it on Thursday and on Shabbat eve, if he does not drink on Shabbat he would thereby be endangered. Therefore, he is permitted even to soak the asafoetida.

And Rav Ḥisda also said: One who is able to eat barley bread and nevertheless eats wheat bread violates the prohibition against wanton destruction. One who wastes resources is comparable to one who destroys items of value. And Rav Pappa said: One who is able to drink beer and nevertheless drinks wine violates the prohibition against wanton destruction. The Gemara comments: And this is not a correct matter, as the prohibition against destruction of one’s body takes precedence. It is preferable for one to care for his body by eating higher quality food than to conserve his money.

We learned in the mishna: A person may take his son in his hands on Shabbat; and this is permitted even though there is a stone in the child’s hand. As it can be inferred from this mishna that the stone is negated relative to the child, why, then, is he liable in the case of a purse hanging around a live baby’s neck? Let the purse be negated relative to the baby. The Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai say: You cannot infer from this mishna that the stone is negated and therefore it is permitted to move it. Rather, the mishna is referring to a baby who has longings for his father. It is permitted for the father to move the stone because if the father does not lift him, the baby might take ill.

The Gemara addresses the basis of the halakha mentioned above: And is it speaking about proscribed activities prohibited on Shabbat? But Rav Ḥisda and Rav Hamnuna both said: It is permitted to make calculations pertaining to a mitzva on Shabbat, and Rabbi Elazar said that this means that one may apportion charity for the poor on Shabbat. And Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One may attend to activities necessary for saving a life or for communal needs on Shabbat, and one may go to a synagogue to attend to communal affairs on Shabbat.

Incidental to the Gemara’s discussion of corpses, it cites that which was taught in a baraita: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: For a living day-old baby, one desecrates Shabbat to save his life. Yet for the deceased David, king of Israel, one does not desecrate Shabbat. For a day-old baby we desecrate Shabbat because the Torah says: Desecrate one Shabbat for him so that he can observe many Shabbatot. But for the deceased David, king of Israel, one does not desecrate Shabbat, as once a person dies he is idle from mitzvot. And this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said with regard to the verse: “Set apart among the dead [bametim ḥofshi], like the slain that lie in the grave, whom You remember no more” (Psalms 88:6). Once a person dies, he becomes free [ḥofshi] from the mitzvot.

Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said: For what reason did the Sages say that the final waters are an obligation? It is due to the fact that there is the presence of Sodomite salt, which blinds the eyes even in a small amount. Since Sodomite salt could remain on one’s hands, one must wash them after eating. This obligation is binding even in a camp because soldiers are also obligated to maintain their health.

However, Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that they should have two thousand cubits in each direction, so that witnesses not refrain from coming to testify. And it is not only these whom the Sages said are given two thousand cubits in the place that they have reached, but even a midwife who comes to deliver a child, and one who comes to rescue Jews from an invasion of gentile troops or from a river or a collapsed building or a fire; they are like the inhabitants of the town at which they arrive, and they have two thousand cubits in each direction.

That was also taught in a baraita, with a caveat: With regard to gentiles who besieged, etc. In what case is this said? It is said in a case where the gentiles came and besieged the town with regard to monetary matters, i.e., banditry. However, if they came with regard to lives, i.e., there is concern that the gentiles will attack, they may go out against them with their weapons, and they may desecrate Shabbat due to them.

The Gemara adds that which was stated: Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said that Shmuel said: With regard to one who let blood and caught cold, one builds a fire for him on Shabbat, even during the season of Tammuz, i.e., the summer. Clearly, Rav Yehuda’s ruling is limited neither to a woman in childbirth nor to the rainy season.

And in a time of danger, when it is dangerous to tarry outside town, he covers the phylacteries and proceeds on his way.

Rabba said to him: The Sages prohibited only a pleasant musical sound on Shabbat, not the rasping sound of knocking on a door. Abaye raised an objection to Rabba from a baraita: One may draw up wine from a barrel with a siphon [diyofei], and one may drip water from a vessel that releases water in drops [miarak], for an ill person on Shabbat.

From the fact that the end of the verse states: “And in the night he is as a thief,” apparently the word or at the beginning of the verse is a reference to day, as the verse contrasts between night and or. The Gemara rejects this contention. There, this is what the verse is saying: If the matter is as clear to you as light, that the thief has come into the house prepared to take a life, he is a murderer; and the owner of the house may save himself by taking the life of the intruder. In that case, one may protect himself from a thief who breaks into his house, even by killing the intruder if necessary. And if the matter is as unclear to you as the night, he should be nothing more than a thief in your eyes and not a murderer; and therefore one may not save himself by taking the life of the thief. This verse is not referring to actual day and night; rather, it uses these terms as metaphors for certainty and uncertainty.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But didn’t Rabbi Elazar say that those on the path to perform a mitzva are not susceptible to harm throughout the process of performing the mitzva? The Gemara responds: In a place where danger is commonplace it is different, as one should not rely on a miracle, as it is stated with regard to God’s command to Samuel to anoint David as king in place of Saul: “And Samuel said: How will I go, and Saul will hear and kill me; and God said: Take in your hand a calf and say: I have come to offer a sacrifice to God” (I Samuel 16:2). Even when God Himself issued the command, there is concern with regard to commonplace dangers.

If one was traveling to save Jews from an attack by gentiles, from a flooding river, from bandits, from a fire, or from a collapsed building, he should not even attempt to return, and instead he should nullify the leaven in his heart. This applies even if he could remove his leaven and still return to his previous activity. If he went to establish his Shabbat residence in order to adjust his Shabbat limit for an optional purpose, rather than in order to fulfill a commandment, he should return immediately to remove his leaven.

MISHNA: The mishna discusses additional differences between local customs. In a place where people were accustomed to kindle a lamp in the house on Yom Kippur evenings, one kindles it. In a place where people were accustomed not to kindle a lamp, one does not kindle it. However, even in a place where the custom is not to kindle lamps in houses, one kindles in synagogues and study halls, in deference to these places. Similarly, lamps should be kindled in dark alleyways, so people will not be hurt, and next to the sick.

The Gemara continues to analyze the baraita. Until here it is clear why the Sabbatical Year should not be intercalated, as it extends the prohibitions of the Sabbatical year. However, what is the reason that the year after the Sabbatical Year should not be intercalated? Rabbi Bun said: The reason is so as not to increase the period of the prohibition of new grain. In the year after the seventh year people are still relying on the produce of the sixth year until the new crop sprouts in the spring of the eighth year. Since the food supply is liable to run out, the sooner the new grain can be eaten, the better. It is only permitted after the bringing of the omer offering on the sixteenth of Nisan, and therefore it is preferable not to extend the year, which would delay the beginning of Nisan.

Initially, that was the procedure; however, an incident occurred where both of them were equal as they were running and ascending on the ramp, and one of them shoved another and he fell and his leg was broken. And once the court saw that people were coming to potential danger, they instituted that priests would remove ashes from the altar only by means of a lottery. There were four lotteries there, in the Temple, on a daily basis to determine the priests privileged to perform the various services, and this, determining which priest would remove the ashes, was the first lottery.

Rather, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s question was: Is it permitted to grind and drink cress on Shabbat? The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If it involves a situation where there is danger to life, and this is the prescribed cure, it is certainly permitted; and if it is a case where there is no danger, it is prohibited as labor on Shabbat. The Gemara answers: Actually, the question concerns a case where there is a life-threatening danger, and this is the dilemma that he raised before him: Does this drink heal, which would mean that it is appropriate to violate Shabbat for it, or does it not heal, and therefore one should not violate Shabbat for it?

Rav Yosef strongly objects to this: And on a weekday is it permitted to walk in such deep water that it presents a danger of drowning? But isn’t it written with regard to the river that, in the future, will issue forth from the Holy of Holies: “He measured a thousand cubits, and he led me through the water; the water was ankle deep” (Ezekiel 47:3); from here it is derived that one is permitted to pass through water that reaches up to the ankles.

Rav Yosef continues explaining the verse: “Again he measured a thousand and he led me through the water, the water was knee deep” (Ezekiel 47:4); from here it is derived that one is permitted to pass through water that reaches up to the knees. “He measured a thousand and led me through the water up to the waist” (Ezekiel 47:4); from here it is derived that one is permitted to pass through water that reaches up to the waist. From this point forward: “And he measured a thousand, a river that I could not pass through” (Ezekiel 47:5). This implies that one is never permitted to pass through water that is more than waist high, because it is dangerous.

A new mother may wear shoes. What is the reason for this? Due to the cold there is concern that she will become ill, as she is weak from the birth.

Shmuel said: If a man is worried about walking barefoot on Yom Kippur due to the danger of scorpions, he is permitted to wear shoes, since one need not put himself in danger.

MISHNA: With regard to a pregnant woman who smelled food and was overcome by a craving to eat it, one feeds her until she recovers, as failure to do so could lead to a life-threatening situation. If a person is ill and requires food due to potential danger, one feeds him according to the advice of medical experts who determine that he indeed requires food. And if there are no experts there, one feeds him according to his own instructions, until he says that he has eaten enough and needs no more.

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to a pregnant woman who smelled consecrated meat or pig meat and craved those specific foods, one inserts a thin reed into the juice of that item and places it on her mouth. If her mind become settled with that, it is well. And if not, one feeds her the gravy itself of that forbidden food. If her mind becomes settled with that, it is well. And if not, one feeds her the fat of the forbidden food itself, as there is no halakha that stands in the way of saving a life except for the prohibitions against idol worship, and forbidden sexual relationships, and bloodshed.

The Gemara asks: If so, this is obvious, since it is a case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation, and in all cases of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation, the halakha is lenient. The Gemara answers: No, this halakha is necessary in a case where there are two other doctors who, along with the ill person, say that he does not need food. And although Rav Safra said that two witnesses are like one hundred witnesses, and one hundred witnesses are like two witnesses, that rule applies specifically to the matter of testimony; however, in the matter of assessing a situation, we follow the majority of opinions. Therefore, one might think in this case that the ill person should not be fed because the opinion of two doctors plus the ill person should override the opposing opinion of two other doctors.

Generally speaking, two or more witnesses constitute complete testimony, and there is no difference between the testimony of two and the testimony of a large number of people. However, this principle of following the majority applies specifically to assessing monetary issues, but here it is a case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation. Therefore, although it is the opinion of two doctors against the opinion of two doctors and the ill person, the ill person must eat.

Generally speaking, two or more witnesses constitute complete testimony, and there is no difference between the testimony of two and the testimony of a large number of people. However, this principle of following the majority applies specifically to assessing monetary issues, but here it is a case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation. Therefore, although it is the opinion of two doctors against the opinion of two doctors and the ill person, the ill person must eat.

Generally speaking, two or more witnesses constitute complete testimony, and there is no difference between the testimony of two and the testimony of a large number of people. However, this principle of following the majority applies specifically to assessing monetary issues, but here it is a case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation. Therefore, although it is the opinion of two doctors against the opinion of two doctors and the ill person, the ill person must eat.

And furthermore, Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash said: With regard to one who suffers pain in his throat, one may place medicine inside his mouth on Shabbat, although administering a remedy is prohibited on Shabbat. This is because there is uncertainty whether or not it is a life-threatening situation for him, as it is difficult to ascertain the severity of internal pain. And a case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation overrides Shabbat.

Similarly, with regard to one upon whom a rockslide fell, and there is uncertainty whether he is there under the debris or whether he is not there; and there is uncertainty whether he is still alive or whether he is dead; and there is uncertainty whether the person under the debris is a gentile or whether he is a Jew, one clears the pile from atop him. One may perform any action necessary to rescue him from beneath the debris. If they found him alive after beginning to clear the debris, they continue to clear the pile until they can extricate him. And if they found him dead, they should leave him, since one may not desecrate Shabbat to preserve the dignity of the dead.

Let us say that Rabba’s view is one side of a dispute between tanna’im, as it was taught in a baraita: In the case of one whom a snake bit on Shabbat and who is in danger, one calls a doctor for him to come from one place to another; and one tears a chicken apart for him if he needs its meat for healing; and one harvests leeks from the ground and feeds them to him for healing purposes, and one need not separate tithes; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: He should not eat it unless it has been tithed.

What are the circumstances in which uncertainty would arise as to whether or not his life will be in danger in the future? They are a case where doctors assess that an ill person needs a certain treatment for eight days, and the first day of his illness is Shabbat. Lest you say: He should wait until evening and begin his treatment after Shabbat so they will not need to desecrate two Shabbatot for his sake, therefore it teaches us that one must immediately desecrate Shabbat for his sake. This is the halakha, despite the fact that an additional Shabbat will be desecrated as a result, because there is uncertainty about whether his life is in danger.

That was also taught in a baraita: One heats water for an ill person on Shabbat, whether to give him to drink or to wash him, since it might help him recover. And they did not say it is permitted to desecrate only the current Shabbat for him, but even a different, future Shabbat. And one must not say: Let us wait and perform this labor for him after Shabbat, perhaps he will get well in the meantime. Rather, one heats it for him immediately because any case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation overrides Shabbat. And this is so not only with regard to uncertainty whether his life is in danger on the current Shabbat, but even in a case of uncertainty with regard to danger on a different Shabbat.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: One engages in saving a life on Shabbat, and one who is vigilant to do so is praiseworthy. And one need not take permission from a court but hurries to act on his own. How so? If one sees a child who fell into the sea, he spreads a fisherman’s net and raises him from the water. And one who is vigilant and acts quickly is praiseworthy, and one need not seek permission from a court, although in doing so he catches fish in the net as well. Similarly, if one sees a child fall into a pit and the child cannot get out, he digs part of the ground out around the edge of the pit to create a makeshift step and raises him out. And one who is vigilant and acts quickly is praiseworthy, and one need not seek permission from a court, although in doing so he fashions a step.

Similarly, if one sees that a door is locked before a child and the child is scared and crying, he breaks the door and takes the child out. And one who is vigilant and acts quickly is praiseworthy, and one need not seek permission from a court, although he intends to break it into boards to be used later. Similarly, one may extinguish a fire by placing a barrier of metal or clay vessels filled with water in front of it on Shabbat when life is endangered. And one who is vigilant and acts quickly is praiseworthy, and one need not seek permission from a court, although he leaves the coals, which can be used for cooking after Shabbat.

How is the mitzva of lulav fulfilled in the Temple when the first day of the Festival occurs on Shabbat? If the first day of the Festival occurs on Shabbat, all the people bring their lulavim to the Temple Mount on Friday. The attendants receive the lulavim from them and arrange them on a bench [itztaba], while the Elders place their lulavim in the chamber. They were given permission to do so due to the concern that they would be injured the following morning in the rush of people in search of their lulavim. And the court teaches the people to say: With regard to anyone whom my lulav reaches his possession, it is his as a gift. They did so to avoid the likely situation where people would inadvertently take lulavim that did not belong to them, as on the first day of the Festival one does not fulfill his obligation with a lulav that does not belong to him.

The next day everyone rises early and comes to the Temple, and the attendants throw the lulavim before them. And in the confusion, the people snatch the lulavim and in the process strike one another. And when the court saw that they came to potential danger, they instituted that each and every person will take his lulav in his house and fulfill the mitzva there.

§ It was taught in the mishna: With regard to one upon whom a rockslide fell, and there is uncertainty whether he is there under the debris or whether he is not there; and there is uncertainty whether he is still alive or whether he is dead; and there is uncertainty whether the person under the debris is a gentile or whether he is Jew, one clears the pile from atop him. The Gemara asks: What is the mishna saying? Why does it bring three different uncertainties to illustrate the principle that one violates Shabbat to save a life even in a case of uncertainty?

The Gemara explains: It is speaking using the style of: Needless to say, and the mishna should be understood as follows: Needless to say, in a case where it is uncertain whether he is there or not there, one removes the debris, since if he is there and he is alive, one must clear the debris. But even if it is uncertain whether he is alive or dead, one must clear the debris. And needless to say, when there is uncertainty whether he is alive or dead, but it is certain that he is a Jew, one must clear the debris. Rather, one must clear the debris even if there is uncertainty whether he is a gentile or a Jew.

§ The mishna taught: If they found him alive, they continue to remove the debris. The Gemara is surprised at this: If they find him alive, it is obvious that they remove the debris, since that is saving a life. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach that one must desecrate Shabbat for his sake even if it is clear that he will live only a short while and will die soon after.

The Rabbis taught: If a person is buried under a collapsed building, until what point does one check to clarify whether the victim is still alive? Until what point is he allowed to continue clearing the debris? They said: One clears until the victim’s nose. If there is no sign of life, i.e., if he is not breathing, he is certainly dead. And some say: One clears until the victim’s heart to check for a heartbeat. If several people are buried and one checked and found the upper ones under the debris dead, he should not say: The lower ones are likely also already dead, and there is no point in continuing to search. There was an incident where they found the upper ones dead and the lower ones alive.

but to preserve a life, e.g., if the priest can testify to the innocence of one who is sentenced to death, one removes him even from on top of My altar, even while he is sacrificing an offering. Just as this priest, about whom there is uncertainty whether there is substance to his words of testimony or whether there is no substance to his words, is taken from the Temple service in order to save a life, and Temple service overrides Shabbat, so too, a fortiori, saving a life overrides Shabbat. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya answered and said: Just as the mitzva of circumcision, which rectifies only one of the 248 limbs of the body, overrides Shabbat, so too, a fortiori, saving one’s whole body, which is entirely involved in mitzvot, overrides Shabbat.

Other tanna’im debated this same issue. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says that it is stated: “But keep my Shabbatot” (Exodus 31:13). One might have thought that this applies to everyone in all circumstances; therefore, the verse states “but,” a term that restricts and qualifies. It implies that there are circumstances where one must keep Shabbat and circumstances where one must desecrate it, i.e., to save a life. Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef says that it is stated: “For it is sacred to you” (Exodus 31:14). This implies that Shabbat is given into your hands, and you are not given to it to die on account of Shabbat.

Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya said: It is stated: “And the children of Israel shall keep Shabbat, to observe Shabbat” (Exodus 31:16). The Torah said: Desecrate one Shabbat on his behalf so he will observe many Shabbatot. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: If I would have been there among those Sages who debated this question, I would have said that my proof is preferable to theirs, as it states: “You shall keep My statutes and My ordinances, which a person shall do and live by them” (Leviticus 18:5), and not that he should die by them. In all circumstances, one must take care not to die as a result of fulfilling the mitzvot.

Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya said: It is stated: “And the children of Israel shall keep Shabbat, to observe Shabbat” (Exodus 31:16). The Torah said: Desecrate one Shabbat on his behalf so he will observe many Shabbatot. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: If I would have been there among those Sages who debated this question, I would have said that my proof is preferable to theirs, as it states: “You shall keep My statutes and My ordinances, which a person shall do and live by them” (Leviticus 18:5), and not that he should die by them. In all circumstances, one must take care not to die as a result of fulfilling the mitzvot.

Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav Huna said: And this ruling applies only where the skewer has an olive-bulk of meat on it; in such a case he may move the skewer on account of the meat and drag it into the corner in an unusual manner. However, if it does not have an olive-bulk of meat on it, he may not move it at all. Ravina said: Although it does not have an olive-bulk of meat on it, it is permitted to move it in the regular manner and place it in a corner, just as in the case of a thorn lying in the public domain. For the sake of public safety, it is permitted to remove such a thorn by moving it in increments, each less than four cubits. The same applies to this skewer; since it might harm someone where it is, it may be moved to a corner.

MISHNA: With regard to one who saw the new moon but is unable to go to Jerusalem by foot because he is sick or has difficulty walking, others may bring him on a donkey or even in a bed, even on Shabbat if necessary. And if the witnesses are concerned that bandits may be lying in wait for them along the road, they may take clubs or other weapons in their hands, even on Shabbat.

§ It is taught in one baraita: Pregnant and nursing women fast with the community on the first fasts, but they do not fast on the last fasts. And it was taught in another baraita: Pregnant and nursing women fast on the last set of fasts but they do not fast on the first set of fasts. And it was taught in yet another baraita: They do not fast either on the first fast days or on the last fast days.

Rav Ashi said: Take the mention of the middle fasts in your hand as the decisive matter, as this resolves all three baraitot. The halakha is that pregnant and nursing women fast only on the middle fasts, as they are stricter than the first fasts but less taxing than the last seven fasts. Consequently, when the first baraita is referring to the first fasts, it in fact means the middle set, which is the first of the last two sets. Similarly, when the second baraita mentions the last fasts, it means the middle set, which is the last of the two sets. In the third baraita, the first and last fasts are literally the first three and last seven fasts, respectively. In this manner all three baraitot follow the same halakha.

§ The Gemara relates another story about the righteous deeds of the Sages involving a dilapidated wall. Rava said to Rafram bar Pappa: Let the Master tell us some of those fine deeds that Rav Huna performed. He said to him: I do not remember what he did in his youth, but the deeds of his old age I remember. As on every cloudy day they would take him out in a golden carriage [guharka], and he would survey the entire city. And he would command that every unstable wall be torn down, lest it fall in the rain and hurt someone. If its owner was able to build another, Rav Huna would instruct him to rebuild it. And if he was unable to rebuild it, Rav Huna would build it himself with his own money.

§ The mishna taught: Rabbi Yehuda obligates one to overturn the bed, but the Rabbis did not agree with him. It is taught in a baraita that the Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: According to your statement, pregnant women and nursing women, who cannot sleep on the floor, what will become of them? Rabbi Yehuda said to them: I, too, spoke only with regard to those who are able.

§ The mishna taught: Rabbi Yehuda obligates one to overturn the bed, but the Rabbis did not agree with him. It is taught in a baraita that the Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: According to your statement, pregnant women and nursing women, who cannot sleep on the floor, what will become of them? Rabbi Yehuda said to them: I, too, spoke only with regard to those who are able.

This is also taught in another baraita: Rabbi Yehuda concedes to the Rabbis with regard to one who is unable to sleep on the floor, and the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehuda with regard to one who is able to do so. The Gemara asks: If so, what is the practical difference between them? The Gemara explains: The practical difference between them is the status of other beds.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following baraita supports Rav Ḥisda’s statement: With regard to a wall that is leaning [goḥeh] toward the public domain and is likely to fall, one may demolish and rebuild it in his usual manner on the intermediate days of a Festival, due to the danger that it poses to passersby. The Gemara rejects this opinion: There, the reason is as the baraita explicitly teaches, i.e., it is due to the danger that the wall poses to passersby, and not due to the protection that it affords the courtyard.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following baraita supports Rav Ḥisda’s statement: With regard to a wall that is leaning [goḥeh] toward the public domain and is likely to fall, one may demolish and rebuild it in his usual manner on the intermediate days of a Festival, due to the danger that it poses to passersby. The Gemara rejects this opinion: There, the reason is as the baraita explicitly teaches, i.e., it is due to the danger that the wall poses to passersby, and not due to the protection that it affords the courtyard.

The Gemara asks: There too, in the case of the leaning wall, let us say that he is permitted to demolish it and thereby remove the danger, but not to rebuild it until after the Festival. The Gemara answers: If so, he might refrain even from demolishing it, as demolishing the wall would leave his courtyard unprotected. Therefore, to eliminate the danger posed by the leaning wall, he is permitted not only to demolish it, but to rebuild it as well.

MISHNA: One may not write bills of debt on the intermediate days of a Festival. But if the lender does not trust the borrower, and he is concerned that the borrower will later deny the loan, or if the scribe has nothing to eat, then he may write a bill of debt during the Festival week.

The Sages taught the following baraita: When a relative of a sick person dies, those around him do not inform him that this relative died, lest he lose control of his mind due to his emotional state and his grief exacerbate his physical health. And other people may not rend their garments in his presence, so that he will not know that one of his relatives passed away. And we silence the women who weep in his presence, so that he will not know that his relative is no longer alive.

The Sages taught a baraita: One who stomps his foot on the ground as a sign of mourning should not stomp with a sandal, but rather he should do so wearing a shoe, due to the danger of being hurt. Because a sandal is easily torn, it is possible that something sharp on the ground will puncture his foot, or that he will suffer some other injury.

§ Incidental to the case of refusal, the Gemara cites a related halakha. Rav Beivai taught a baraita before Rav Naḥman: Three women may engage in relations with a contraceptive resorbent, a soft fabric placed at the entrance to their wombs to prevent conception, despite the fact that this practice is generally prohibited. They are as follows: A minor, a woman who is already pregnant, and a nursing woman. The baraita specifies the reason for each exception: A minor may do so lest she become pregnant and perhaps die; a pregnant woman, lest she be impregnated a second time and her previous fetus becomes deformed into the shape of a sandal fish by being squashed by the pressure of the second fetus. As for a nursing woman, she does so lest she become pregnant and her milk dry up, in which case she will wean her son too early, thereby endangering him, and he will die.

The Gemara suggests a different reason for the prohibition against marrying a woman who is pregnant with the child of another man: Rather, it is due to the damage that could be caused to the fetus by the pressure applied to it at the time of intercourse. The Gemara asks: If so, even if his wife his pregnant with his own child, the same concern applies. The Gemara explains: When it is his own child, he has mercy upon it and tries not to apply too much pressure. The Gemara asks: But here, too, when it is the child of another man, he will have mercy upon it, as certainly one is careful not to cause harm to any human life and will be careful not to press down too hard.

The Gemara comments: Who is the tanna of the mishna? It is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who holds that a legal presumption [ḥazaka] is established after two occurrences. As it is taught in a baraita: If a woman circumcised her first son and he died as a result of the circumcision, and she circumcised her second son and he also died, she should not circumcise her third son, as the deaths of the first two produce a presumption that this woman’s sons die as a result of circumcision. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: She should circumcise her third son, as there is not considered to be a legal presumption that her sons die from circumcision, but she should not circumcise her fourth son if her first three sons died from circumcision.

Abaye said to Rav Yitzḥak: See to it that your report is accurate, as you are permitting an action that would otherwise constitute a prohibition and a danger. If the third baby should not be circumcised, doing so would be a prohibited labor and would endanger the life of the child.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If the case is one of a child recovering from an illness, let us give him the full seven days that he needs to recuperate properly. As Shmuel said: In the case of a baby that was sick with a high fever, and subsequently the fever left him, one gives him a full seven days to heal and only then is he circumcised, but not before. The Gemara answers: The case is in fact one where we already gave him a full seven days to heal, but they culminated on the eve of Passover. The Gemara asks: But if the seven-day recovery period ended on the eve of Passover, why did the father wait until the time of eating the Paschal lamb, i.e., the first night of Passover? He should have circumcised him already in the morning, before the time of the preparation of the Paschal lamb. The Gemara answers: We require

that during the recovery period one must wait from the time the seven days began to the exact same time seven days later, i.e., seven complete twenty-four-hour periods. Therefore, if the child recovered in the afternoon of a particular day, one is required to wait until that same time of day a week later, and only then is he circumcised.

The Gemara suggests other circumstances where a male child may be present at the time of the eating of the Paschal lamb but absent at the time of its preparation. Rav Pappa said: This would take place, for example, if the baby’s eye hurt him on the eighth day following his birth, which occurred on the eve of Passover, and he recovered in the meantime between the time of the preparation of the Paschal lamb and the time of its eating. In the case of a minor ailment such as eye pain, circumcision is not performed as long as the pain persists, but it may be performed as soon as the child has recovered, without first waiting seven days.

It is stated in the baraita under discussion: And with regard to all of them, one may send teruma to them, to their homes, with the exception of a ritually impure man and one who marries a woman unfit for him. The Gemara infers: However, to an uncircumcised man one may send it. What is the reason? How does he differ from an impure man?

The Gemara answers: One may send him teruma. It is because of circumstances beyond his control, i.e., the death of his brothers from their circumcision, that he was not circumcised. The Gemara asks: Isn’t an impure man also in his state due to circumstances beyond his control? Why is teruma not sent to him? The Gemara answers: This man is uncircumcised because of circumstances entirely beyond his control, as circumcision is considered life-threatening for him, whereas that impure man is not under circumstances entirely beyond his control, as one can protect himself from ritual impurity.

The Gemara asks: Can a girl who refuses her husband give birth? Didn’t Rav Beivai teach before Rav Naḥman that women in three situations may engage in intercourse with a contraceptive resorbent, despite the fact that this practice is generally prohibited: A minor girl, a pregnant woman, and a nursing woman? A minor girl may do so lest she become pregnant and die, as the fetus might endanger her life. A pregnant woman may do so lest she get pregnant a second time and her previous fetus becomes a sandal, i.e., it is squashed by the pressure of the second fetus. A nursing woman may do so lest she wean her child prematurely, as pregnancy will cause her milk to dry up, and he will die of hunger. And who is considered a minor girl in this context? A girl from the age of eleven years and one day until the age of twelve years and one day. If she is younger than this or older than this, she should go ahead and engage in intercourse in her usual manner. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

And the Rabbis say: Both this one and that one, i.e., women in any cases, should go ahead and engage in intercourse in their usual manner, and Heaven will have mercy and prevent them from getting pregnant, as it is stated: “The Lord preserves the simple” (Psalms 116:6). Evidently, a girl who is a minor and therefore young enough to refuse her husband cannot become pregnant without endangering her health.

In any event, this tanna teaches that one need not be concerned that he might be considered one who suckles from a detestable creature, which indicates that a child may be left to eat forbidden food. The Gemara rejects this: There, permission is granted due to a danger, because a child must eat. The Gemara asks: If so, it should also be permitted for an adult, as saving a human life supersedes these prohibitions.

The Gemara answers: An adult requires consultation, i.e., doctors or other experts must examine him and establish that he is dangerously ill. The Gemara retorts: A minor should also require consultation as to whether he is in danger. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: There is no need for a special consultation, as in an unspecified case a child is in danger with regard to milk. It can be assumed that a child needs milk, and if he does not get it, he will be in danger.

The Gemara answers: An adult requires consultation, i.e., doctors or other experts must examine him and establish that he is dangerously ill. The Gemara retorts: A minor should also require consultation as to whether he is in danger. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: There is no need for a special consultation, as in an unspecified case a child is in danger with regard to milk. It can be assumed that a child needs milk, and if he does not get it, he will be in danger.

In any event, this tanna teaches that one need not be concerned that he might be considered one who suckles from a detestable creature, which indicates that a child may be left to eat forbidden food. The Gemara rejects this: There, permission is granted due to a danger, because a child must eat. The Gemara asks: If so, it should also be permitted for an adult, as saving a human life supersedes these prohibitions.

The Gemara asks: And did Shmuel say that? But didn’t Rav Yosef say that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: One does not follow the majority in matters involving saving a life? Even if there is the slightest concern that the life of a Jew may be in danger, one takes all steps necessary to save him, even on Shabbat. Rather, when the statement of Shmuel was stated with regard to saving a life it was stated concerning the first clause of the mishna: If there is a majority of gentiles in the city the baby is deemed a gentile. Shmuel said: And with regard to creating an opening in a heap of debris on his behalf [lefake’aḥ alav et hagal] on Shabbat, that is not so. Even if there is a gentile majority in the city, one does not follow the majority in cases involving the saving of a life.

Rava said to him: Now, if the witnesses came before us to consult with the Sages, we say to them: Go sign the document and you should not be killed, as the Master said: You have no matter that stands before saving a life, other than idol worship, forbidden sexual relations, and murder. Now that they signed, do we say to them: Why did you sign? Only in those three cases, when faced with a choice between violating the prohibition and being killed, must one be killed rather than violate the prohibition. Signing a false document does not fall into that category. Why then, according to Rabbi Meir, is their testimony that they were compelled to sign the document not accepted?

The Gemara adds: Either way, whether or not he agrees to go to Eretz Yisrael, if he keeps the cause of the damage, we in Babylonia excommunicate him, as we say to him: Remove your cause of damage, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says: From where is it derived that a person may not raise a vicious dog in his house, and may not place an unsteady ladder in his house? It is as it is stated: “And you shall make a parapet for your roof that you shall not place blood in your house” (Deuteronomy 22:8). It is prohibited to leave a potentially dangerous object in one’s house, and one who refuses to remove it is excommunicated.

The Gemara relates: Ulla, on his ascent to Eretz Yisrael, had two residents of Ḥozai join him. Because of a brawl between them, one arose and slaughtered the other. The assailant said to Ulla: Did I act properly? He said to him: Yes, and open the place of the slaughter, i.e., cut it more so that he will die faster. When Ulla came before Rabbi Yoḥanan, Ulla said to him: Perhaps, Heaven forbid, I strengthened the hands of sinners by commending him, although I did so merely because I was afraid that he would kill me. He said to him: You saved yourself by doing so, as it is permitted for one to say words like this in order to save his own life.

MISHNA: One may take a vow to murderers, i.e., people suspected of killing others over monetary matters; or to robbers [ḥaramin]; or to tax collectors who wish to collect tax, that the produce in his possession is teruma although it is not teruma. One may also take a vow to them that the produce in his possession belongs to the house of the king, although it does not belong to the house of the king. One may take a false vow to save himself or his possessions, as a statement of this sort does not have the status of a vow. Beit Shammai say: One may vow in such a case, although he has no intention that his words be true, using every means of taking a vow or making a prohibition in order to mislead those people,

except for by taking of an oath, due to its more stringent nature. And Beit Hillel say: One may mislead them even by taking an oath.

Beit Shammai say: When negotiating with a robber, one should not initiate by taking a vow for him unless the robber does not believe his claim, in which case he may take a vow to reinforce his words. And Beit Hillel say: He may even initiate by taking a vow to him. Beit Shammai say: One may take a vow only about that which the robber compels him to take a vow but may not add to it. And Beit Hillel say: One may take a vow even about that which he does not compel him to take a vow.

§ The Gemara raises a contradiction between this statement of Rabbi Yosei and another statement of Rabbi Yosei. It was taught in a baraita: In the case of a spring belonging to the residents of a city, if the water was needed for their own lives, i.e., the city’s residents required the spring for drinking water, and it was also needed for the lives of others, their own lives take precedence over the lives of others. Likewise, if the water was needed for their own animals and also for the animals of others, their own animals take precedence over the animals of others. And if the water was needed for their own laundry and also for the laundry of others, their own laundry takes precedence over the laundry of others. However, if the spring water was needed for the lives of others and their own laundry, the lives of others take precedence over their own laundry.

The Gemara answers: This means that he did not say the halakha in their names. He did not transmit the ruling in the name of those who went in the time of battle to ask the Sages what the halakha is. David said to himself: This is the tradition that I received from the court of Samuel of Rama: With regard to anyone who hands himself over to die for the sake of words of Torah, the Sages do not say a matter of halakha in his name, so that others will not follow this ruling and endanger their lives.

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that with regard to one who pursues another in order to kill him, the pursued party may be saved at the cost of the pursuer’s life? The verse states: “You shall not stand idly by the blood of another” (Leviticus 19:16); rather, you must save him from death. The Gemara asks: But does this verse really come to teach us this? This verse is required for that which is taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that one who sees another drowning in a river, or being dragged away by a wild animal, or being attacked by bandits [listin], is obligated to save him? The Torah states: “You shall not stand idly by the blood of another.” The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so that this verse relates to the obligation to save one whose life is in danger.

§ The Gemara now considers which prohibitions are permitted in times of mortal danger. Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: The Sages who discussed this issue counted the votes of those assembled and concluded in the upper story of the house of Nitza in the city of Lod: With regard to all other transgressions in the Torah, if a person is told: Transgress this prohibition and you will not be killed, he may transgress that prohibition and not be killed, because the preserving of his own life overrides all of the Torah’s prohibitions. This is the halakha concerning all prohibitions except for those of idol worship, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed. Concerning those prohibitions, one must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress them.

The Gemara asks: And should one not transgress the prohibition of idol worship to save his life? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael said: From where is it derived that if a person is told: Worship idols and you will not be killed, from where is it derived that he should worship the idol and not be killed? The verse states: “You shall keep My statutes and My judgments, which a person shall do, and he shall live by them” (Leviticus 18:5), thereby teaching that the mitzvot were given to provide life, but they were not given so that one will die due to their observance.

The baraita continues: One might have thought that it is permitted to worship the idol in this circumstance even in public, i.e., in the presence of many people. Therefore, the verse states: “Neither shall you profane My holy name; but I will be hallowed among the children of Israel: I am the Lord Who sanctifies you” (Leviticus 22:32). Evidently, one is not required to allow himself to be killed so as not to transgress the prohibition of idol worship when in private; but in public he must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress.

The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha with regard to a murderer himself, that one must allow himself to be killed rather than commit murder? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning that one life is not preferable to another, and therefore there is no need for a verse to teach this halakha. The Gemara relates an incident to demonstrate this: As when a certain person came before Rabba and said to him: The lord of my place, a local official, said to me: Go kill so-and-so, and if not I will kill you, what shall I do? Rabba said to him: It is preferable that he should kill you and you should not kill. Who is to say that your blood is redder than his, that your life is worth more than the one he wants you to kill? Perhaps that man’s blood is redder. This logical reasoning is the basis for the halakha that one may not save his own life by killing another.

Rava says that there is another justification for Esther’s behavior: When gentiles order the transgression of a prohibition not in order to persecute the Jews or to make them abandon their religion, but for their own personal pleasure, it is different. In such a situation there is no obligation to sacrifice one’s life, even when the sin is committed in public.

Rava explains: As if you do not say so, then how do we give them coal shovels [kevakei vedimonikei]? The Persian priests would take coal shovels from every house, fill them with coals, and use them to heat their temples on their festival days. Although this involved assisting idol worship in public, Jews would not sacrifice their lives in order not to do so. Rather, the reason they cooperated is certainly that a measure enacted for the gentiles’ personal pleasure is different. Here too, concerning Esther, Ahasuerus engaged in intercourse with her for his personal pleasure, and a measure enacted for a gentile’s personal pleasure is different, and there is no obligation to sacrifice one’s life to avoid it.