“And your brother shall live with you” (Leviticus 25:36), from which it is derived: Return the interest to him so that he may live. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yoḥanan, what does he do with this verse: “And your brother shall live with you”? The Gemara answers: He requires the verse for that which is taught in a baraita: If two people were walking on a desolate path and there was a jug [kiton] of water in the possession of one of them, and the situation was such that if both drink from the jug, both will die, as there is not enough water, but if only one of them drinks, he will reach a settled area, there is a dispute as to the halakha. Ben Petora taught: It is preferable that both of them drink and die, and let neither one of them see the death of the other. This was the accepted opinion until Rabbi Akiva came and taught that the verse states: “And your brother shall live with you,” indicating that your life takes precedence over the life of the other.
Just as with regard to a potential murderer the halakha is that if one is being forced to murder someone else, he should allow himself to be killed and not transgress that prohibition, so too, with regard to a betrothed young woman the halakha is that she should allow herself to be killed and not transgress the prohibition of forbidden relations. The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive this halakha with regard to murder itself? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning that one life is not preferable to another. The Gemara relates an incident to demonstrate this: This is similar to a certain man who came before Rava and said to him: A local official said to me: Go kill so-and-so, and if not I will kill you. Rava said to him: It is preferable that he should kill you and you should not kill. What did you think, that your blood is redder and more precious than his? Perhaps that man’s blood is redder. Apparently, one may not save his own life by taking someone else’s. .
Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: The Sages who discussed this issue counted the votes of those assembled and concluded in the upper story of the house of Nitza in the city of Lod: With regard to all other transgressions in the Torah, if a person is told: Transgress this prohibition and you will not be killed, he may transgress that prohibition and not be killed, because the preserving of his own life overrides all of the Torah’s prohibitions. This is the halakha concerning all prohibitions except for those of idol worship, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed. Concerning those prohibitions, one must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress them.
(1) A scoundrel named Sheba son of Bichri, a Benjaminite, happened to be there. He sounded the horn and proclaimed: “We have no portion in David, No share in Jesse’s son! Every man to his tent, O Israel!” (19) I am one of those who seek the welfare of the faithful in Israel. But you seek to bring death upon a mother city in Israel! Why should you destroy the LORD’s possession?” (20) Joab replied, “Far be it, far be it from me to destroy or to ruin! (21) Not at all! But a certain man from the hill country of Ephraim, named Sheba son of Bichri, has rebelled against King David. Just hand him alone over to us, and I will withdraw from the city.” The woman assured Joab, “His head shall be thrown over the wall to you.” (22) The woman came to all the people with her clever plan; and they cut off the head of Sheba son of Bichri and threw it down to Joab. He then sounded the horn; all the men dispersed to their homes, and Joab returned to the king in Jerusalem.
(ה) נָשִׁים שֶׁאָמְרוּ לָהֶם עוֹבְדֵי כּוֹכָבִים תְּנוּ לָנוּ אַחַת מִכֶּן וּנְטַמֵּא אוֹתָהּ וְאִם לָאו נְטַמֵּא אֶת כֻּלְּכֶן יִטָּמְאוּ כֻּלָּן וְאַל יִמְסְרוּ לָהֶם נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל. וְכֵן אִם אָמְרוּ לָהֶם עוֹבְדֵי כּוֹכָבִים תְּנוּ לָנוּ אֶחָד מִכֶּם וְנַהַרְגֶּנּוּ וְאִם לָאו נַהֲרֹג כֻּלְּכֶם. יֵהָרְגוּ כֻּלָּם וְאַל יִמְסְרוּ לָהֶם נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל. וְאִם יִחֲדוּהוּ לָהֶם וְאָמְרוּ תְּנוּ לָנוּ פְּלוֹנִי אוֹ נַהֲרֹג אֶת כֻּלְּכֶם. אִם הָיָה מְחֻיָּב מִיתָה כְּשֶׁבַע בֶּן בִּכְרִי יִתְּנוּ אוֹתוֹ לָהֶם. וְאֵין מוֹרִין לָהֶם כֵּן לְכַתְּחִלָּה. וְאִם אֵינוֹ חַיָּב מִיתָה יֵהָרְגוּ כֻּלָּן וְאַל יִמְסְרוּ לָהֶם נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל:
(5) If idolaters will demand one of a group of women, saying: "Yield us one of among you and we will defile her, if not we will defile you all", let all be defiled, rather than surrender to them one soul in Israel.4Terumot, 8.12. C. G. Likewise, if idolaters will say to a group of men: "Yield us one of you and we will kill him, if not we will kill you all", let all of them be killed rather than surrender to them one soul in Israel. If, however, they single out the one, saying: "Give us that man, if not we will kill you all", if he be guilty of a capital crime, as, for example, Sheba son of Bichri5See Second Samuel; 20. 1. G., they may surrender him to them, but it is not commendable to advise them to do so; if he be not guilty of a capital crime, they all must submit rather than surrender them one soul in Israel.
A traditional Jewish source
Ethical Dilemmas On The Road To
Redemption Rabbi Mois Navon (Yeshiva University)
Having gained a better understanding of the value of the individual via the “one against one” Tunnel Dilemma, let us now approach the “one against many” Trolley Dilemma. The primary source for this discussion is the Jerusalem Talmud (Terumot 8:4): ...A group of people were traveling, and marauders chanced upon them saying,
“Hand over one of your group or we will kill you all.” Even if all will be killed, they may not hand over one soul. This source unequivocally rejects utilitarianism, which leads to uncomfortable implications when applied to a driver on the road confronted with the Trolley Dilemma. In grappling with this issue, the Hazon Ish (San. 25) says that utilitarianism could possibly be applied if we could frame the dilemma as “saving” people as opposed to “killing” people. In the end, he himself remains unconvinced that it is possible to reframe the Trolley Dilemma and thus concludes that the issue needs more investigation (tzarich iyun). R. Asher Weiss (Minhat Asher, Pes. 28) discusses the Hazon Ish’s proposal and, noting that there can be no justification for killing an individual, concludes that the issue needs more investigation (tzarich iyun). Finally, the Tzitz Eliezer (15:70) rejects outright the Hazon Ish’s suggestion referring explicitly to a car driver caught in the Trolley Dilemma, states that “in a case of definite killing we … do not say that the many are preferred.” The weight of halachic opinion, then, is clearly deontological, demanding that one drive straight over the many to avoid actively killing even only one person. While this may be hard for us to swallow, perhaps it helps to know that underpinning this deontological approach is the inviolable and inestimable value of the individual. Indeed, attributing infinite value to the individual is one of the great gifts that Jewish thought brought to a pagan world that was literally sacrificing individuals for the sake of the many. And so Rav Kook explains, “We do not have the wherewithal to estimate the infinite value of the individual against the infinite value of many individuals” (Mishpat Cohen 143).
From Wikipedia:
The trolley problem has been the subject of many surveys in which approximately 90% of respondents have chosen to kill the one and save the five.
A 2009 survey published in a 2013 paper... shows that 69.9% of professional philosophers would switch (sacrifice the one individual to save five lives) in the case of the trolley problem. 8% would not switch, and the remaining 24% had another view or could not answer.