המבעית את חברו

The Gemara rejects this: One can not necessarily derive from the wording of the mishna that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Perhaps the mishna specifically uses the case of sheep to teach the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, because if it would have used an example of an ox here, one might have thought that it also includes damage caused by Goring, about which it is not written in the Torah that reduced supervision is sufficient. Therefore, the mishna specifically uses the example of sheep, to indicate damage caused by Eating and Trampling, about which it is written that reduced supervision is sufficient. And it teaches us that only with regard to Eating and Trampling, for which animals are considered forewarned from the outset, is reduced supervision sufficient according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara concludes that this is a valid reading of the mishna and one may learn from it that the mishna may even be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. § It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehoshua said: There are four matters in which one who commits an offense concerning them is exempt from liability according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven and it would be proper for him to pay compensation, and the cases are as follows: One who breaches a fence that stood before another’s animal, thereby allowing the animal to escape; and one who bends another’s standing grain before a fire so that it catches fire; and one who hires false witnesses to testify; and one who knows testimony in support of another but does not testify on his behalf. The Gemara clarifies each of the cases listed in the baraita. The Master says: With regard to the case of one who breaches a fence that stood before another’s animal, what are the circumstances? If we say it is speaking of a stable wall that would not have fallen by itself, the one who breached it should also be liable according to human laws, at least for the damage caused to the wall. Rather, here

the baraita is speaking of an unstable wall that was about to fall and break in any event, and so his action did not actually cause any loss to the owner. The Master says: With regard to the case mentioned in the baraita of one who bends another’s standing grain before a fire, what are the circumstances? If we say that the baraita is referring to a case where the fire would reach the bent grain in a typical wind, let him also be liable for the damage according to human laws. Rather, it must be a case where the fire could reach the bent grain only in an atypical wind. Therefore, he is exempt according to human laws, and, since the grain was destroyed due to his action, he is liable according to the laws of Heaven. And Rav Ashi offered an alternative explanation and said: The baraita was stated in the case of a concealed item; in other words, this person did not bend the grain toward the fire but bent it over another item in order to conceal it. One is not liable to pay restitution for concealed items damaged by fire. Therefore, when this person bent the grain over an item, he caused indirect damage to the owner of that item because he made it into a concealed item that was subsequently damaged by fire, and the owner cannot reclaim his loss. The Master says: With regard to the case mentioned in the baraita of one who hires false witnesses, what are the circumstances? If we say that he hired them for his own benefit, in order to extract payment from another, he is required to reimburse that person with money, and he is liable according to human laws for receiving money under false circumstances. Rather, the case is one where he hired false witnesses for the benefit of another. In such a case the injured party cannot sue the other litigant, since the latter did not hire the witnesses, nor can he sue the person who hired them, since that person received no personal benefit. The baraita teaches: And one who knows testimony in support of another but does not testify on his behalf is exempt from liability according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. With what circumstances are we dealing? If we say that the case involves two people who could testify, and their evidence would render the other party liable to pay, it is obvious that each of them is liable according to the laws of Heaven; he has committed a transgression by Torah law: “If he does not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1). Therefore, it is unnecessary for the baraita to mention this case. Rather, the case of the baraita concerns a single witness, whose testimony is not sufficient to render another liable, and to which the transgression of Torah law consequently does not apply. Nevertheless, a litigant can be forced to take an oath based on the testimony of a single witness, and refusal to take this oath would obligate the litigant to pay. Therefore, the witness has caused an indirect loss and is liable according to the laws of Heaven. The Gemara asks: And is there nothing else, i.e., is there no other case in which one is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven? But there is such a case. And before citing several cases that are not written in the baraita the Gemara presents a mnemonic device: One who performs; with poison; and an agent; another; is broken. The Gemara returns to the first case: One who performs labor with water of purification, which was meant to be used to purify one rendered ritually impure by a corpse, thereby rendering the water unfit for use, or who performs labor with the red heifer of purification, invalidating the animal for use as an element of the purification ritual, is exempt according to human laws, since the damage he caused is not evident, but liable according to the laws of Heaven, as he caused a financial loss. The Gemara adds: But there is the following halakha: With regard to one who places poison before another’s animal, and the animal eats it and dies, he is exempt according to human laws, since the animal caused its own death, but liable according to the laws of Heaven. The Gemara adds: But there is the case of one who sends an exposed flame in the hand of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, and the fire spreads, causing damage; he is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. The Gemara adds: But there is the case of one who frightens another without touching him, but causes him injury; he is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. The Gemara adds: But there is the case of one whose jug broke in the public domain and he did not remove the broken pieces, or one whose camel fell and he did not stand it up again. Rabbi Meir deems the owner of jug or of the camel liable for the damage thereby caused to others, and the Rabbis say that he is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. Since there are so many other cases, why did Rabbi Yehoshua claim in the baraita that there are only four cases when one is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven? The Gemara answers: Yes, there are, in any event, many other cases, but Rabbi Yehoshua held that it was necessary for him to state the halakha of these four cases. The reason he stated them is lest you say that in these cases one should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua teaches us that in these cases one is liable according to the laws of Heaven. The Gemara explains why one might have thought that there is no liability at all for each case in the baraita: Rabbi Yehoshua taught that one who breaches a fence that stood before another’s animal, thereby allowing the animal to escape, is liable according to the laws of Heaven, lest you say: Since the fence is about to collapse even without this person’s intervention, what did he really do? Based on that logic, one might have thought that he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua teaches us that in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven. Rabbi Yehoshua taught that one who bends another’s standing grain is liable according to the laws of Heaven, lest you say: Let the one who bent the grain say to the owner: Did I know that an atypical wind would come and cause the fire to spread? Based on that logic, one might have thought that he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua teaches us that in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven. And according to Rav Ashi, who said that Rabbi Yehoshua’s ruling was stated with regard to the case of a concealed item, Rabbi Yehoshua mentioned liability according to the laws of Heaven lest you say that the one who concealed the item could say: I covered it for you in order to protect it from the fire. Based on that logic, one might have thought that he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua teaches us that in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven. And Rabbi Yehoshua taught that there is liability also in the case of one who hires false witnesses, lest you say: Let the one who hired them say: If the witnesses hear the statement of the teacher, i.e., God, Who prohibited giving false testimony, and the statement of the student, i.e., the one who hired them, to whose statement should they listen? Although the one who hired them encouraged these witnesses to sin, ultimately it was they who transgressed by not adhering to the instructions of God. And based on this logic one might have thought that he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua teaches us that in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven. Finally, Rabbi Yehoshua taught that one who knows testimony in support of another but does not testify on his behalf is liable according to the laws of Heaven, lest you say that the witness could claim: Who says that had I come forward and testified on behalf of one litigant, the other litigant would admit liability? Perhaps he would have chosen to take a false oath and absolve himself. Based on that logic one might have thought that he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua teaches us that in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

The Gemara adds: But there is the case of one who frightens another without touching him, but causes him injury; he is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven.