Kal V'Chomer

(2) One may not buy terumah with maaser sheni money, because this reduces the number of those who can eat it. But Rabbi Shimon permits it. Rabbi Shimon said to them: If the law is lenient in the case of wellbeing offerings, though they may become unfit or a remnant or unclean, why should it not also be lenient with regard to terumah? But they said to him: The law was lenient in the case of wellbeing offerings, because they are permitted to non-priests, but should we therefore be lenient with regard to terumah, which is forbidden to non-priests?

(2) Rabbi Eliezer said: is it not logical: if slaughtering, which is [usually forbidden] as a labor, overrides Shabbat, shouldn’t these, which are [only forbidden] as mandated rest (shevut), override Shabbat? Rabbi Joshua said to him: let the festival prove this, for they permitted labor [on the festival] and forbade [activities forbidden because of] shevut. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: what is this, Joshua? What proof is a voluntary act in respect of a commandment! Rabbi Akiva answered and said: let sprinkling [purificatory waters] prove it, which is [performed] because it is a commandment and is [forbidden only] as a shevut, yet it does not override Shabbat; so you too, do not wonder at these, that though they are [required] on account of a commandment and are [forbidden only] as shevut, yet they do not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: but in respect of that I am arguing: if slaughtering, which is a labor, overrides Shabbat, is it not logical that sprinkling, which is [only] a shevut, should override Shabbat! Rabbi Akiva said to him: or the opposite: if sprinkling, which is [forbidden] as a shevut, does not override Shabbat, then slaughtering, which is [normally forbidden] on account of labor, is it not logical that it should not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva! You are uprooting what is written in the Torah, “at twilight, offer it at its set time” (Numbers 9:3), both on week-days and on Shabbat. He said to him: master, give me an appointed time for these as there is an appointed season for slaughtering! Rabbi Akiva stated a general rule: work which could be done on the eve of Shabbat does not override Shabbat; slaughtering, which could not be done on the eve of Shabbat, does override Shabbat.

(5) If the pesah was slaughtered for a different purpose on Shabbat, he [the slaughterer] is liable to a sin-offering on its account. All other sacrifices which he slaughtered as a pesah: if they are not fit [to be a pesah] he is liable; if they are fit [to be a pesah]: Rabbi Eliezer makes him liable to a sin-offering, But Rabbi Joshua exempts him. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: if for the pesah, which it is permitted [to slaughter] for its own purpose, yet when he changes its purpose he is liable; then [other] sacrifices, which are forbidden [to slaughter even] for their own purpose, if he changes their purpose is it not logical that he should be liable. Rabbi Joshua said to him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the pesah, [he is liable] because he changed it to something that is forbidden; will you say [the same] of [other] sacrifices, where he changed them for something that is permitted? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: let the community sacrifices prove it, which are permitted for their own sake, yet he who slaughters [other sacrifices] in their name is liable. Rabbi Joshua said him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the public sacrifices, [that is] because they have a limit; will you say [the same] of the pesah, which has no limit? Rabbi Meir says: he too who slaughters [other sacrifices] in the name of public sacrifice is not liable.

(6) If a woman waits for a yavam, whether for one or for two [yevamim]: Rabbi Eliezer says: he can annul [her vows]. Rabbi Joshua says: [only if she waits] for one, but not for two. Rabbi Akiva says: neither for one nor for two. Rabbi Eliezer said: if a man can annul the vows of a woman whom he himself acquired, isn’t it logical that can he annul those of a woman bequeathed to him by Heaven! Rabbi Akiva said to him: No! If you speak of a woman whom he himself acquires, that is because others have no rights in her; will you say [the same] of a woman given to him by Heaven, in whom others too have rights! Rabbi Joshua said to him: Akiva, your words apply to two yevamim; but what will you answer if there is only one yavam? He (Rabbi Akiva) said to him (Rabbi Joshua): the yevamah is not as completely acquired to the yavam as a betrothed girl is to her [betrothed] husband.

(4) Rabbi Elazar said in the name of Rabbi Joshua: for every defilement [conveyed] by a corpse on account of which a nazirite must shave, people are liable for entering the sanctuary, and for every defilement [conveyed] by a corpse on account of which a nazirite does not shave, people are not liable for one entering the sanctuary. Rabbi Meir said: such [defilement] should not be less serious than [defilement through] a dead creeping thing. Rabbi Akiba said: I argued in the presence of Rabbi Eliezer: Now if on account of a barley-corn’s bulk of bone which does not defile a man by overshadowing, a nazirite shaves should he touch it or carry it, then surely a quarter-log of blood which defiles a man by overshadowing, should cause a nazirite to shave should he touch it or carry it? He replied: What is this Akiva! We do not make here an ‘all the more so’ (a kal vehomer) argument. When I afterwards went and recounted these words to Rabbi Joshua, he said to me, “You spoke well, but thus they have ruled the halakhah.”

(15) All who have incurred [the penalty of] kareth, on being flogged are exempt from their punishment of kareth, for it says, “[He may be given up to forty lashes, but not more] ... lest your brother shall be dishonored before your eyes” (Deut. 25;3) once he has been lashed he is [considered] “your brother”, the words of Rabbi Hananiah ben Gamaliel. Rabbi Hananiah ben Gamaliel said: “Just as one who transgresses one transgression forfeits his life, how much more does one who performs one commandment have his life granted him.” Rabbi Shimon says: “You can learn this from its own passage; as it says: “[All who do any of those abhorrent things] such persons shall be cut off from their people” (Lev. 18:29), and it says: “You shall keep my statutes and my ordinances which if a man do, he shall live by them” (Lev. 18:5), which means that one who desists from transgressing is granted reward like one who performs a precept. Rabbi Shimon bar Rabbi says: Behold [the Torah] says, “But makes sure that you do not partake of the blood; for the blood is the life, and you must not consume the life with the flesh…[that it may go well with you and with your descendents to come..” (Deut. 12:23-25”-- now, if in the case of blood which a person’s soul loathes, anyone who refrains from it receives reward, how much more so in regard to robbery and sexual sin for which a person’s soul craves and longs shall one who refrains from them acquire merit for himself and for generations and generations to come, to the end of all generations!

(6) If he swore to annul a commandment, and did not annul it, he is exempt. [If he swore] to fulfill [a commandment], and did not fulfill it, he is exempt. For it would have been logical [in the second instance] that he should have been liable, as is the opinion of Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra. [For] Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra said, “Now, if for [swearing with regards to] an optional matter, for which he is not adjured from Mount Sinai, he is liable [should he not fulfill his oath], for [swearing with regards to] a commandment, for which he is adjured from Mount Sinai, he should most certainly be liable [should he not fulfill his oath]! They said to him: “No! If you say that for an oath with regards to an optional matter [he is liable], it is because [Scripture] has in that case made negative equal to positive [for liability]; But how can you say that for an oath [to fulfill] a commandment [he is liable], since [Scripture] has not in that case made negative equal to positive, for if he swore to annul [a commandment], and did not annul it, he is exempt!

(4) If one offered an olah of a bird below [the red line] with the rites of a hatat [and] in the name of a hatat: Rabbi Eliezer says: it involves trespass. But Rabbi Joshua says: it does not involve trespass. Rabbi Eliezer said: if a hatat which does not involve trespass when he offers it for its own name, nevertheless when he changes the name [for which it is offered] it does involve trespass, is it not logical that an olah which does involve trespass when he offers it for its own name, would involve trespass when he changes its name? Rabbi Joshua said to him: No, when you speak of a hatat whose name he changed to that of an olah, [it involves trespass] because he changed its name to something that involves trespass; will you say [the same] of an olah whose name he changed to that of a hatat, seeing that he changed its name to something which does not involve trespass? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Behold, most holy sacrifices which he slaughtered in the south and which he slaughtered in the name of lesser sacrifices will prove the matter, for he changed their name to something which does not involve trespass, and yet they involve trespass, so too, do not be surprised that in the case of the olah, although he changed its name to something that does not involve trespass, it still involves trespass. Rabbi Joshua said: No, when you speak of most holy sacrifices which are slaughtered in the south and in the name of lesser sacrifices, [they involve trespass] because he changed their name to something which is partly forbidden and partly permitted; will you say the same of an olah, where he changed its name to something that is altogether permitted?

(6) If one performed melikah, and he found it [the bird] to be a terefah: Rabbi Meir said: it does not defile in the gullet; Rabbi Judah said: it does defile in the gullet. Rabbi Meir said: if with regard to a beast, when it is carrion (a nevelah) it defiles through contact or carrying, yet slaughtering it purifies its terefah from defiling, when it comes to carrion (nevelah) of a bird which does not defile through contact or carriage, is it not logical that slaughtering would cleanse its terefah? Now, just as we have found that slaughtering, which makes it [a bird of hullin] fit for eating, cleanses its terefah from its uncleanness; so melikah (nipping), which makes it [a bird sacrifice] fit for eating, cleanses its terefah. Rabbi Yose says: it is sufficient for it to be like the nevelah of a beast, which is cleansed by slaughtering, but not by melikah (nipping).

(12) If the blood of a hatat was received in two goblets and one of them went outside [the Temple courtyard], the inside one is fit. If one of them entered within [the Sanctuary]: Rabbi Yose the Galilean declares the outer one fit. The sages disqualify it. Rabbi Yose the Galilean: if the place where an intention [directed to it] disqualifies, i.e. without, you do not treat what is left [inside] as what went out; then the place where an intention [directed to it] does not disqualify, i.e. within, is it not logical that we do not treat what is left [outside] as what entered within? If it entered within to make atonement, even if he [the priest] did not make atonement, it is unfit, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Shimon said: [it is not unfit] unless he makes atonement. Rabbi Judah said: if he took it in unwittingly, it is fit. For all unfit blood which was put on the altar, the head plate [of the high priest] does not propitiate, save for the unclean, for the headplate propitiates for that which is unclean, but does not propitiate for what goes out.

(5) The first oil of the first crop, there is none better than it. The second oil of the first crop and the first oil of the second crop are equal. The third oil of the first crop, the second oil of the second crop and the first oil of the third crop are equal. The third oil of the second crop and the second oil of the third crop are equal. As to the third oil of the third crop, there is none worse than it. It would have been logical by the following argument that menahot should also require the purest olive oil: if the candlestick, whose [oil] is not for eating, requires pure olive oil, how much more should menahot, whose oil is for eating, require pure olive oil! But the text states, “Pure olive oil of beaten olives for lighting” (Exodus 27:20), but not “pure olive oil of beaten olives for menahot.”

(1) The law concerning the tithe of cattle is in force in the Land and outside the Land, in the days when the Temple exists and when it does not exist, [It applies] to hullin (non-sacred) animals only but not to consecrated animals. It applies both to cattle and flock animals, but they are not tithed together. To lambs and to goats, and they are tithed together. To the new and the old, but they are not tithed together. Now it might be logical: seeing that new and old animals which are not treated as kilayim in regard to one another are yet not tithed one for the other, lambs and goats which are treated as kilyaim in regard to one another, all the more should not be tithed one for the other. Scripture therefore states: “And of the flock” all kinds of flock are considered one [for purposes of tithing].

(4) A man may proscribe [part] of his flock or of his herd, of his Canaanite slaves or female slaves or of his field of possession. But if he proscribed all of them, they are not considered [validly] proscribed, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah said: just as when it comes to the Highest One, one is not permitted to proscribe all of his possessions, how much more so should one be careful with his property.

(4) If he gave her [a prostitute] money, it is permitted [for use for the altar.] [But if he gave her] wine, oil, flour and anything similar which is offered on the altar, it is forbidden for the altar. If he gave her dedicated [animals] they are permitted [for the altar]. If he gave her birds [of hullin] they are disqualified. For one might have reasoned [as follows]: if in the case of dedicated animals, where a blemish disqualifies them, [the law] of [the prostitute’s] fee and price [of a dog] does not apply to them, in the case of birds, where a blemish does not disqualify, is it not all the more reason that the law of [the prostitute’s] fee and the price [of a dog] should not apply? Scripture says, “For any vow,” (Deuteronomy 23:19) this includes a bird.

(2) Yellow thin hair causes uncleanness whether it is clustered together or dispersed, whether it is encompassed or unencompassed, or whether it came after the scall or before it, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: it causes uncleanness only when it came after the scall. Rabbi Shimon said: Is it not logical: if white hair, against which other hair affords no protection, causes uncleanness only when it comes after the nega, how much more should yellow thin hair, against which other hair does afford protection, cause uncleanness only when it comes after the scall? Rabbi Judah says: Whenever it was necessary to say, "it turns" Scripture says, "it turns." But the scall, since about it Scripture says, "there is no yellow hair in it," it causes uncleanness whether it came before or after it.

(9) If one had a scall the size of a split bean and it spread over all his head he becomes clean. The head and the beard do not prevent [one another], the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: they do prevent. Rabbi Shimon said: Is there not a logical inference: if the skin of the face and the skin of the body, between which something intervenes, do prevent [one another], the head and the beard, between which nothing intervenes, should they not also prevent [one another]? The head and the beard do not combine, nor is a spreading from one to the other effective. What exactly counts as the beard? From the joint of the jaw to the thyroid cartilage.

(6) If a house overshadowed a house with a nega and so also if a tree overshadowed a house with a nega, anyone who enters the outer [of the two] remains clean, the words of Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah. Rabbi Eliezer said: if one stone of it causes uncleanness by entering, should not the house itself cause uncleanness by entering?

(10) If he was standing inside, and he stretched his hands outside, with his rings on his hands, if he stayed [inside] as much time as is required for the eating of half a loaf, they become unclean. If he was standing outside, stretching his hands inside, with his rings on his hands: Rabbi Judah says that they are unclean immediately, But the sages say: only after he leaves them there as much time as is required for the eating of half a loaf. They said to Rabbi Judah: if when all his body is unclean he does not render that which is on him unclean unless he stayed there long enough to eat half a loaf, when all of his body is not unclean, is it not logical that he should not render that which is on him unclean unless he stayed there long enough to eat half a loaf?

(7) The Sadducees say: we complain against you, Pharisees, that you declare an uninterrupted flow of a liquid to be clean. The Pharisees say: we complain against you, Sadducees, that you declare a stream of water which flows from a burial-ground to be clean? The Sadducees say: we complain against you, Pharisees, that you say, my ox or donkey which has done injury is liable, yet my male or female slave who has done injury is not liable. Now if in the case of my ox or my donkey for which I am not responsible if they do not fulfill religious duties, yet I am responsible for their damages, in the case of my male or female slave for whom I am responsible to see that they fulfill mitzvot, how much more so that I should be responsible for their damages? They said to them: No, if you argue about my ox or my donkey which have no understanding, can you deduce from there anything concerning a male or female slave who do have understanding? So that if I were to anger either of them and they would go and burn another person's stack, should I be liable to make restitution?