(ו) כִּ֣י יִקָּרֵ֣א קַן־צִפּ֣וֹר ׀ לְפָנֶ֡יךָ בַּדֶּ֜רֶךְ בְּכָל־עֵ֣ץ ׀ א֣וֹ עַל־הָאָ֗רֶץ אֶפְרֹחִים֙ א֣וֹ בֵיצִ֔ים וְהָאֵ֤ם רֹבֶ֙צֶת֙ עַל־הָֽאֶפְרֹחִ֔ים א֖וֹ עַל־הַבֵּיצִ֑ים לֹא־תִקַּ֥ח הָאֵ֖ם עַל־הַבָּנִֽים׃ (ז) שַׁלֵּ֤חַ תְּשַׁלַּח֙ אֶת־הָאֵ֔ם וְאֶת־הַבָּנִ֖ים תִּֽקַּֽח־לָ֑ךְ לְמַ֙עַן֙ יִ֣יטַב לָ֔ךְ וְהַאֲרַכְתָּ֖ יָמִֽים׃ (ס)
(6) If, along the road, you chance upon a bird’s nest, in any tree or on the ground, with fledglings or eggs and the mother sitting over the fledglings or on the eggs, do not take the mother together with her young. (7) You will surely send away the mother; and take [only] the young, in order that it will be well for you and you will lengthen days.
לא תקח האם. בְּעוֹדָהּ עַל בָּנֶיהָ:
RASHI on Deut. 22:6
Do not take the mother: so long as she is sitting upon the young.
What are the implicit concerns here?
a) Which of the two (mother or young) is most immediately available?
b) Is this availability about even more than just physical proximity? What other factor(s) might be at play? What Torah values might raise concerns about this consideration?
Maimonides (I): Guide of the Perplexed (3, 48)
[This comment is embedded within the larger discussion from RaMBAM below--as an additional understanding of the impact of the commandment.]
The eggs on which the mother nests and the fledglings that need their mother are are generally unfit for food.... In most cases, ... this commandment will cause a person to leave the whole nest untouched, because [the young or the eggs], which one is allowed to take, are, as a rule, unfit for food.
Maimonides (II): Guide of the Perplexed (3, 48)
Since, therefore, the desire of procuring good food necessitates the slaying of animals, the Law enjoins that the death of the animal should be the easiest. One is not allowed to torment the animal by cutting the throat in a clumsy manner, by poleaxing, or by cutting off a limb while the animal is alive. One is forbidden to slaughter a cow and its offspring on the same day (Lev. 22:28), in order to ensure that one does not come to kill the offspring in its mother's presence--for the pain of the animals under such circumstances is very great. There is no difference regarding this pain between humankind and the other animals. For the love and the tenderness of a mother for her child is not guided by the intellect but by the power of imagination, which exists equally in most animals just as it is found in humankind. .... This is also the reason for sending away the mother bird from the nest: ... When the mother is sent away, she is spared the pain of losing her offspring.
If the Law provides that such grief should not be caused to cattle or birds, how much more careful must we be that we should not cause grief to our fellow human beings.
Recognition of the inherent value of life--a subjective, inner experience--for non-human creatures. This view is likely the much more common outlook among today's vegans and vegetarians and animal-welfare activists. One might even say that RaMBaM is laying a foundation for an outlook that would today be captured within the worldview and language of "animal rights."
- Is this view the only one that would motivate ethically-based lifestyle changes or activism on behalf of non-human animals?
- Even if so (as per RaMBAN below), does the overwhelming evidence related to animal sentience and their complex social and emotional lives render any other perspective morally irrelevant (or at least secondary)?
- How do we interpret RaMBAM's closing sentence in this section?
- "Throwing a bone" to those who will be unmoved by appeals to "animal rights" or worried about a rejection of humanity's superiority within creation?
-
Or might he genuinely see the importance of both views and believe the latter one still holds moral significance?
רמב׳׳ן:
כי יקרא קן צפור לפניך גם זו מצוה מבוארת מן "אותו ואת בנו לא תשחטו ביום אחד׳׳ (ויקרא כב כח) כי הטעם בשניהם לבלתי היות לנו לב אכזרי ולא נרחם. .... ויותר נכון בעבור שלא נתאכזר.... כי בכל אחד טעם ותועלת ותקון לאדם.... וכן המצות להוציא מלבנו כל אמונה רעה ולהודיענו האמת ולזוכרו תמיד.... והנה המצות האלה בבהמה ובעוף אינן רחמנות עליהם אלא גזירות בנו להדריכנו וללמד אותנו המדות הטובות.
Nachmanides (I) on Deut. 22:6-7
Also this commandment is explained by "it and its young do not slaughter on one day" (Leviticus 22:28); since the reason in both of them is that we should not have a cruel heart and [then] not be compassionate. .... And more correct [than RaMBAM's approach for the reason behind this commandment] is so that we will not become cruel.... as there is in each [commandment] a reason and a purpose and a refinement for the person.... And thus the commandments [exist] to extract from our hearts every bad belief and to inform us of the truth and to always remind us of it.... And so these commandments [dealing] with animals and birds are not [for the sake of] mercy upon them; rather, [they are] decrees for us, to guide us and to teach us the good character traits.
I. Possible interpretations:
A) Presumably, the "cruelty" we as human beings are supposed to avoid is that which we will inflict on our fellow human beings. Our treatment of non-human animals has nothing (or little) to do inherently with their experience but is simply an educational device, a tool for "practicing ethics" so that when our actions really matter--in our dealings with other people--we will act morally.
B) Or is RaMBAN possibly saying the following? "Yes, there are acts of cruelty we could (or do) commit towards non-human animals. We're just not concerned about them for their own sake but only to the extent that they affect human beings' inner morality and their treatment of each other." After all, even if the primary lesson or concern is still about humanity, why is our treatment of other animate creatures being used as the means to get there? Why would our treatment of other animals matter at all to the question of how cruel we are to our fellow human beings? Isn't there some implicit message about some similarity that exists across the different species in question (i.e. human and all others)--even without the need to claim that we are identical?
II. Ramifications
A) Does "Interpretation A" above pose a greater threat in our time than does "Interpretation B"? Does (B) leave more room for uniting those with different views under a shared commitment to reducing animal suffering in our world?
B) Even if some people might reject any notion of the inherent value of a non-human animal's subjective experience of life, the result of such commandments is still (potentially) pleasing to those who do hold inherent concerns for animal welfare. For those of us in the latter camp, does it matter if our fellow Jews still choose the former view?
- Is it to this question that we might say the former camp will never do enough?
- Is it at this point in the conversation where we are obligated to invoke the scientific evidence about animal suffering?
רמב׳׳ן:
שלא חס האל על קן צפור ולא הגיעו רחמיו על אותו ואת בנו שאין רחמיו מגיעין בבעלי הנפש הבהמית למנוע אותנו מלעשות בהם צרכנו שאם כן היה אוסר השחיטה
Nachmanides (II) on Deut. 22:6-7
God did not worry about the nest of the bird and God's 'mercy did not reach' it and its child, for Divine mercy does not extend to creatures with an animal soul--to prevent us from doing what we need to them. Otherwise, [HaShem] would have forbidden slaughter.
(Not for today's focus, but still worthy of interjection...)
Note his use of the word tzorkeinu (our need), emphasizing the human necessity for consuming animal products. Compare to RaMBAM (above), who qualifies his whole discussion of treatment of non-human animals with the justification that slaughtering animals for food is necessary for humanity (for health and for satisfaction of our desires). Today's two-fold reality--that animals products as food are unnecessary (and potentially even detrimental) for most human beings, coupled with the serious ethical questions regarding our current treatment of animals as sources of food--provides a clear and logical response to both of these comments, potentially leading us to the decision to impose upon ourselves (since Torah itself does not do so explicitly) a prohibition against animal slaughter.
Such a response could even involve accepting RaMBaN's comment about "where Divine mercies extend"--with the theological conclusion that even if Divine mercies reach their limit, we human beings have the choice and the power to extend our own.
רמב׳׳ן:
אבל טעם המניעה ללמד אותנו מדת הרחמנות ושלא נתאכזר כי האכזריות תתפשט בנפש האדם כידוע בטבחים שוחטי השורים הגדולים והחמורים שהם אנשי דמים זובחי אדם אכזרים מאד ומפני זה אמרו (קידושין פב) טוב שבטבחים שותפו של עמלק
Nachmanides (III) on Deut. 22:6-7
But [rather], the reason for the proscription is to teach us the trait of mercy and that we not become cruel. Since cruelty spreads in the human soul, as it is known with butchers who slaughter large oxen and donkeys, that they are 'people of blood,' 'slaughterers of humanity,' 'very cruel.' And because of this they said (Kiddushin 82a), "The best of butchers are the partners of Amalek."
- Given this concern about the moral qualities of those who slaughter animals for a living, could we assume that RaMBaN would prefer that no human being engaged in this profession? If he believed consumption of meat were not necessary for human survival, would he thus advocate for an end to animal slaughter?
- Why the reference to Amalek?
- Compare this outlook to the discussion about the Rashi comment above.