מתני׳ האשה שהלך בעלה למדינת הים ובאו ואמרו לה מת בעליך וניסת ואח"כ בא בעלה תצא מזה ומזה וצריכה גט מזה ומזה ואין לה כתובה ולא פירות ולא מזונות ולא בלאות לא על זה ולא על זה ואם נטלה מזה ומזה תחזיר והולד ממזר מזה ומזה ולא זה וזה מטמא לה...
גמ׳ מדקתני סיפא נשאת שלא ברשות מותרת לחזור לו שלא ברשות ב"ד אלא בעדים מכלל דרישא ברשות ב"ד ובעד אחד אלמא עד אחד נאמן ותנן נמי הוחזקו להיות משיאין עד מפי עד ואשה מפי אשה ואשה מפי עבד ומפי שפחה אלמא עד אחד מהימן...
was empty, and now her body is full with the child, and therefore she is no longer “as in her youth.” But in a situation where “she has no child,” when at the outset her body was empty and now her body is also empty, as she has given birth, you might say that she should not be disqualified. Therefore, it is necessary to write both verses. Parenthetically, the Gemara lists terms signifying the following discussions, to serve as a mnemonic device: Said to him, we should not make, by death, we should make and not make, by a child, yavam and teruma, levirate marriage and teruma. This list of terms, taken from the introductions or key phrases in each of the ensuing discussions, is the mnemonic. Rav Yehuda from De’iskarta said to Rava, in continuation of the discussion of the baraita: Should we not make the halakha concerning dead children like the halakha concerning living children with regard to levirate marriage by an a fortiori inference, and say: And if in a place where the Torah made the halakha with regard to a child from the first husband like the halakha with regard to a child from the second husband, to disqualify her from teruma, for as long as she has a child who is not a priest she is prohibited from partaking of teruma, the Torah nevertheless did not make dead children like living ones; therefore, in a place where the Torah did not make a child from the first husband like a child from the second to exempt her from levirate marriage, is it not right that we should not make the dead like the living? Why, then, is a yevama exempt from levirate marriage if her late husband’s only child dies? The verse states: “Her ways are the ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace” (Proverbs 3:17). In other words, since the ways of Torah are those of pleasantness, the Torah would not obligate a woman who has married in the meantime to subsequently perform ḥalitza, as this might demean her in her husband’s eyes. The Gemara inquires: And let us make the halakha with regard to dead children like the halakha with regard to living ones with regard to teruma, from an a fortiori inference: And if in a place where the Torah did not make a child from the first husband like a child from the second to exempt her from levirate marriage, it nevertheless made the living like the dead, as a woman whose husband died and left a child is exempt from levirate marriage even if that child subsequently dies; then, in a place where the Torah made a child from the first like a child from the second to disqualify her from teruma, is it not right that we should make the living like the dead? The Gemara responds: Therefore, the verse states “and she have no child, she is returned unto her father’s house, as in her youth” (Leviticus 22:13), and here she does not currently have children. The Gemara further suggests: And let us make her child from the first husband like her child from the second one with regard to levirate marriage, again from an a fortiori inference: And if in a place where the Torah did not make the living like the dead with regard to teruma, it still made a child from the first husband like a child from the second, then in a place where it made the living like the dead, with regard to levirate marriage, is it not right that we should make a child from the first husband like a child from the second, and thereby exempt her from levirate marriage? The Gemara answers: The verse states about levirate marriage: “And he has no child” (Deuteronomy 25:5), and in fact he had none at the time of his death. The Gemara offers another possibility: And should we make a child from the first husband not like a child from the second one with regard to teruma, from an a fortiori inference: If in a place where the Torah made the living like the dead to exempt her from levirate marriage, it still did not make a child from the first husband like a child from the second, then in a place where the Torah did not make the living like the dead, with regard to teruma, is it not right that we should not make the child from the first husband like the child from the second? The Gemara responds: Therefore, the verse states: “And she have no child,” but in fact this woman has children. MISHNA: With regard to a woman whose husband went overseas, and witnesses came and they said to her: Your husband is dead, and she married another man on the basis of this testimony, and afterward her husband came back from out of the country, she must leave both this man and that one, as they are both forbidden to her. And she requires a bill of divorce from this one and that one. And furthermore, she has a claim to neither payment of her marriage contract, nor the profits of her property used by either of them, nor sustenance, nor the worn clothes she brought to the marriage. She has rights to these claims neither against this man nor against that one, i.e., she cannot collect these payments from either her first or second husband. And if she took any of these items from this man or from that one, she must return them to him. And the offspring is a mamzer from this one and from that one. Her child from the second husband is a definite mamzer, as she was never divorced from her first husband, and the Sages decreed that if she returned to her first husband, a child born later from him is also a mamzer. And neither this man nor that man may become impure for her upon her death, if they are priests. And neither this one nor that one is entitled to the rights that stem from the marriage bond: Neither to her found articles, nor to her earnings, nor to the nullification of her vows. If she was a regular Israelite woman, she is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood, as her intercourse with the second husband is considered an act of illicit sexual relations, and the daughter of a Levite is disqualified from partaking of the first tithe, and the daughter of a priest is disqualified from partaking of teruma. And neither the heirs of this man nor the heirs of that one inherit her marriage contract, as she is not considered married to either of them. This clause will be explained in the Gemara. And if they both died childless, the brothers of this one and the brothers of this one must perform ḥalitza and they do not enter into levirate marriage. Rabbi Yosei disagrees with the first tanna and says that she does receive payment of her marriage contract, and the obligation of her marriage contract is upon the property of her first husband. Rabbi Elazar says: The first husband is entitled to her found articles, to her earnings, and to the nullification of her vows. Since her second marriage was an error, the first husband does not forfeit his rights. Rabbi Shimon says an even more far-reaching ruling: Her sexual relations or her ḥalitza with the brothers of the first husband exempts her rival wife, as it is considered a proper levirate marriage or ḥalitza, and certainly she does not require ḥalitza from the brother of the second husband. And if she returns to her first husband, the child from him is not a mamzer. All these halakhot refer to a situation when she married with the permission of the court, after hearing that her husband had died. But if she married without the consent of the court, basing herself entirely on the testimony she heard, and her husband returned, it is permitted for her to return to her first husband. The mishna adds another difference between these two scenarios: If she married by permission of the court, she must leave both of them and she is exempt from bringing the offering, i.e., the sin-offering for her unwitting adultery, as she had the authorization of the court and is therefore considered to have acted under duress. If, however, she did not marry by permission of the court, she must leave her second husband and is liable to bring an offering for mistakenly having relations with a man forbidden to her. In this regard, the power of the court is greater, as she is exempt from bringing an offering. If the court instructed her to marry on the basis of inaccurate testimony, and she went and ruined herself by engaging in licentious relations outside matrimony, she is liable to bring an offering, as they permitted her only to marry, and not to engage in licentious relations. GEMARA: From the fact that the latter clause of the mishna teaches: If she married without the consent of the court she is permitted to return to him, this indicates that she did so not by the consent of the court, but rather by witnesses, i.e., as there are two witnesses, she does not require special permission from the court. With this in mind, it may be inferred that the first clause of the mishna, which speaks of one who acted with the consent of the court, is referring to a situation when there was one witness. Apparently, one witness is deemed credible when he testifies about a husband’s death, i.e., the court will permit a wife to marry on the basis of the testimony of a lone witness. And we also learned in a mishna (122a): They established that they would allow a woman to marry if her husband was reported dead by one witness, based solely on what he learned from the mouth of another witness, i.e., hearsay testimony, and also the testimony of a woman who heard from another woman, and even the testimony of a woman who heard from a slave or from a maidservant. Apparently, one witness is deemed credible in this regard, as whenever hearsay testimony is accepted, the testimony of one witness is also valid. And we also learned in a mishna (Karetot 11b) that if one witness says to someone: You ate forbidden fat, and the accused says: I did not eat it, the accused is exempt from bringing an offering. The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt is that the individual in question said: I did not eat it, which indicates that if he had been silent and failed to deny the accusation, the lone witness is deemed credible. Apparently, one witness is deemed credible by Torah law with regard to certain issues. § The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita that the verse states: “Or if his sin be known to him” (Leviticus 4:23, 28). This indicates that he himself must be aware of his sin, and not if it was made known to him by others. In other words, one is not obligated to bring an offering due to the testimony of others, even if they testify that he had transgressed. I might have thought he should be exempt even though he does not contradict the witness’s claim. Therefore, the verse states: If his sin be known to him, which indicates that in any case, however he comes by this knowledge, he is liable. The Gemara clarifies this halakha. What are the circumstances? If we say that two witnesses came and informed him and he does not contradict them, why do I need a verse to teach this ruling? After all, the testimony of two witnesses is always accepted. Rather, is it not referring to one witness, and yet if he does not contradict the sole witness, that witness is deemed credible? One can learn from this that one witness is deemed credible with regard to prohibitions. The Gemara refutes this claim: And from where do you infer that the reason is due to the fact that the one witness is deemed credible? Perhaps the accused must bring an offering because he remains silent, as there is a principle that silence is considered like an admission. And you should know that this is the reason, as the latter clause of that same baraita teaches that if two witnesses said to him: You ate forbidden fat, and he says: I did not eat it, he is exempt, and Rabbi Meir obligates him to bring an offering. Rabbi Meir said that this is an a fortiori inference: If two witnesses can bring him to the severe penalty of death by testifying that he had committed a transgression for which one is liable to receive the death penalty, should they not bring him to the more lenient obligation of an offering? The Rabbis said to him: There is a difference between the two cases, as with regard to an offering, what is the halakha if he would choose to say: I was an intentional sinner? One who sins intentionally is not liable to bring an offering. Since the accused in the latter clause of the baraita can negate the testimony that would have rendered him liable to bring an offering, he can likewise deny the act itself, whereas if witnesses testify that he performed an action that incurs the death penalty, his denial has no bearing on the case. The Gemara clarifies: In the first clause
סברא היא מידי דהוה אחתיכה ספק של חלב ספק של שומן ואתא עד אחד ואמר ברי לי דשומן הוא דמהימן מי דמי התם לא איתחזק איסורא הכא איתחזק איסורא דאשת איש ואין דבר שבערוה פחות משנים ... אמר ר' זירא מתוך חומר שהחמרת עליה בסופה הקלת עליה בתחלה לא ליחמיר ולא ליקיל משום עיגונא אקילו בה רבנן:
of the mishna, what is the reason that when he remains silent, the Rabbis obligate him to bring to an offering based on the testimony of one witness? If we say it is because the witness is deemed credible, but there is the case of an ordinary pair of witnesses, where even though he contradicts their claim they are deemed credible, and yet the Rabbis exempt him from bringing an offering. If so, they would certainly not obligate him to bring an offering due to the testimony of a lone witness. Rather, is it not because he remained silent, and silence is considered like an admission? If this is the reason why he brings an offering, there is no proof from here that the testimony of one witness is accepted. Rather, this is evidently based on logical reasoning: Just as it is in the case of a piece of meat about which it is uncertain if it is forbidden fat and uncertain if it is of permitted fat, and there is no way of clarifying which it is, and one witness comes and says: It is clear to me that it is permitted fat, the halakha is that he is deemed credible. Here too, the testimony of a single witness can resolve the uncertainty. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Is it comparable? There, the presumption of a prohibition has not been established, as there is no proof that the piece was ever forbidden, and one can therefore rely on the witness who permits it, whereas here, the presumption of the prohibition with regard to a married woman is established, and there is a principle that nothing involving those with whom relations are forbidden can be determined by fewer than two witnesses. In fact, this is comparable only to a case involving a piece of meat that is definitely forbidden fat, and one witness comes and says: It is clear to me that it is permitted fat, as the halakha is that he is not deemed credible. The Gemara refutes this claim: Is it comparable? There, when it is established as forbidden fat, even if one hundred witnesses come they are not deemed credible. Here, since if two witnesses come and say the husband is dead they would be deemed credible, let us also deem one witness credible. This is just as it is in the case of untithed produce, i.e., produce from which neither teruma nor tithe has been separated, consecrated property, and konamot, an alternative term for offerings [korbanot] used in vows creating prohibitions. Such vows are called by the generic term: Konamot. The Gemara asks: With regard to this case of untithed produce, what are the circumstances? If it is his, and he testifies that terumot and tithes have been separated from it, he should be deemed credible because it is within his power to prepare the produce for consumption by separating tithes whenever he wishes. Rather, you must say that he testifies with regard to untithed produce of another, but if so, what does the anonymous Sage who cited this example hold in this case? The Gemara elaborates: If he holds that one who separates tithes from his produce for that of another does not require the owner’s knowledge, and he can prepare his friend’s produce for consumption whenever he chooses, in this case too his testimony is deemed credible because it is within his power to prepare it. And if he holds that the owner’s knowledge is required before someone else can separate the gifts, and this is referring to a situation where the witness comes and says: I know with regard to it that it is prepared, in that case, it itself, this very halakha, from where do we derive it? Why is the case of untithed produce more obvious than the testimony with regard to a missing husband? Similarly, with regard to consecrated property too, if it is merely sanctity that inheres in its value, i.e., it is not an actual offering but an item that has been dedicated to the Temple upkeep, then the reason why the testimony of one witness who says it is not consecrated is accepted is due to the fact that it is within his power to redeem it. And if this is referring to inherent sanctity, the matter still remains to be clarified: If it is his offering, then the reason is due to the fact that it is within his power to request from a Sage that the vow be dissolved, like any other vow. Rather, you must say that it is referring to the offering of another, and he said: I know with regard to it that its owner requested from a Sage that his vow be dissolved. However, here too, in this case itself, from where do we derive that he is deemed credible? In the case of konamot too, if he holds that there is misuse of consecrated objects with regard to konamot, i.e., he holds that articles sanctified by a konam have the status of consecrated property, and that the sanctity that inheres in its value applies to them, then his claim is accepted because it is within his power to redeem it. And if he maintains that there is no misuse of consecrated objects in the case of konamot, and it is an ordinary prohibition that rides on its shoulders, i.e., it is forbidden due to its similarity to consecrated property despite the fact that is not fully sacred, even in this case the above argument applies: If the property in question is his, it is permitted because it is within his power to request from a Sage that his vow be dissolved. Rather, you will say that the konam must belong to another, and he said: I know with regard to it that its owner requested from a Sage that his vow be dissolved. However, with regard to this halakha itself, that one witness is deemed credible in this case, from where do we derive it? Consequently, after the Gemara has refuted these attempts to explain why one witness should be deemed credible, the question remains: Why is the testimony of a single witness accepted in the case of a missing husband? Rabbi Zeira said: Due to the stringency that you were stringent with her, the woman who married on the basis of a single witness, at the end, i.e., if it turns out that the testimony was incorrect and the husband is still alive, the halakha is very severe with her and she loses out in all regards, you are lenient with her at the beginning, by accepting the testimony of a single witness to enable the woman to marry. The Gemara suggests: If so, let us not be stringent at the end and not be lenient at the beginning. The Gemara answers: Due to the case of a deserted wife, the Sages were lenient with her. Since it is not always easy to find two witnesses to attest to a husband’s death, the Sages realized that if the testimony of one witness were not accepted, the woman would be likely to remain a deserted wife, unable to remarry. However, to prevent this leniency from causing mistakes and licentiousness, they were very stringent with her in a case where the testimony is found to be erroneous, to ensure that she is very careful not to accept untrustworthy accounts. § The mishna teaches that if she was informed that her husband was dead and she married another man, and her husband later returned, she must leave this one and this one. Rav said: They taught this halakha only if she married by virtue of the testimony of one witness, but if she married on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses, she does not have to leave him. They laughed at him in the West, Eretz Yisrael: The man, the first husband, has come and stands before us, and yet you say she does not have to leave her second husband. The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary in a situation when we do not know the man who comes before us claiming to be the first husband. The Gemara asks: If we do not know him, even if she married by one witness, why should she leave? The testimony of the witness who says the husband is dead should be accepted. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for a case when two others came and said: We were with him from when he left until now, and it is you who do not recognize him, as his appearance has changed over the course of time. This is as it is written: “And Joseph recognized his brothers but they did not recognize him” (Genesis 42:8), and Rav Ḥisda said that this verse teaches that Joseph left his brothers without a full beard, and he came with a full beard, which is why they failed to recognize him. This shows that one’s appearance can change so much over time that even his own family members are unable to identify him. The Gemara asks: Even in this case, ultimately they are two against two. Initially, two witnesses testified that the man was dead, and now another pair arrives saying he is alive. Why should the testimony of the witnesses who say he is dead be accepted, allowing her to remain with the second husband, while other witnesses claim he is still alive?
מתוך חומר שהחמרת עליה בסופה כו' - נראה לר"י דלית לן למימר אנן סהדי דדייקא ומינסבא ונאמן עד אחד בכך מן התורה אלא מתקנת חכמים הוא דנאמן ואין זה עקירת דבר מן התורה כיון שדומה הדבר הגון להאמין כמו שאפרש לקמן בפרקין (יבמות דף פט:) שבדבר שיש קצת טעם וסמך לא חשיב עוקר דבר מן התורה:
כיון דלא ירתי לה קרי ולא ענו לה - משמע דכל היכא דירית לה מטמא לה דהוי מטמא למת מצוה ולפי זה אלמנה לכ"ג גרושה וחלוצה לכהן הדיוט לא ירית לה מדאמר (לקמן יבמות דף צ:) ואין מטמא לאשתו פסולה דאי הוה ירית לה הוה מטמא לה כמו למת מצוה ... ונראה לר"י דמשום דירית לה לא הויא מת מצוה אלא משום דיש כח ביד חכמים לעקור דבר שהוא מן התורה בדבר הדומה כדפירשתי לעיל דכיון דלא ירתי לה דומה למת מצוה ומיהו אינה מת מצוה גמור...
(כט) אַל יִקְשֶׁה בְּעֵינֶיךָ שֶׁהִתִּירוּ חֲכָמִים הָעֶרְוָה הַחֲמוּרָה בְּעֵדוּת אִשָּׁה אוֹ עֶבֶד אוֹ שִׁפְחָה אוֹ עַכּוּ״ם הַמֵּסִיחַ לְפִי תֻּמּוֹ וְעֵד מִפִּי עֵד וּמִפִּי הַכְּתָב וּבְלֹא דְּרִישָׁה וַחֲקִירָה כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ. שֶׁלֹּא הִקְפִּידָה תּוֹרָה עַל הֲעָדַת שְׁנֵי עֵדִים וּשְׁאָר מִשְׁפְּטֵי הָעֵדוּת אֶלָּא בְּדָבָר שֶׁאֵין אַתָּה יָכוֹל לַעֲמֹד עַל בֻּרְיוֹ אֶלָּא מִפִּי הָעֵדִים וּבְעֵדוּתָן כְּגוֹן שֶׁהֵעִידוּ שֶׁזֶּה הָרַג אֶת זֶה אוֹ הִלְוָה אֶת זֶה. אֲבָל דָּבָר שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לַעֲמֹד עַל בֻּרְיוֹ שֶׁלֹּא מִפִּי הָעֵד הַזֶּה וְאֵין הָעֵד יָכוֹל לְהִשָּׁמֵט אִם אֵין הַדָּבָר אֱמֶת. כְּגוֹן זֶה שֶׁהֵעִיד שֶׁמֵּת פְּלוֹנִי. לֹא הִקְפִּידָה תּוֹרָה עָלָיו. שֶׁדָּבָר רָחוֹק הוּא שֶׁיָּעִיד בּוֹ הָעֵד בְּשֶׁקֶר. לְפִיכָךְ הֵקֵלּוּ חֲכָמִים בְּדָבָר זֶה וְהֶאֱמִינוּ בּוֹ עֵד אֶחָד מִפִּי שִׁפְחָה וּמִן הַכְּתָב וּבְלֹא דְּרִישָׁה וַחֲקִירָה כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא תִּשָּׁאַרְנָה בְּנוֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל עֲגוּנוֹת: סְלִיקוּ לְהוּ הִלְכוֹת גֵּרוּשִׁין בְּסִיַּעְתָּא דִּשְׁמַיָּא
(א) אל יקשה בעיניך. זה שכתב שהטעם הוא משום מלתא דעבידא לאיגלויי ומשום עיגונא הוציאו ממה שאמרו בראש פרק האשה צרה במסקנא דסוגיא משום עיגונא אקילו בה רבנן ובכמה מקומות שאלו טעמא דעד אחד משום מלתא דעבידא לאיגלויי הוא א''נ משום דאיהי דייקא ומינסבא, ונראה לו שהטעם הראשון עיקר שעליו סמכו בדברים אחרים בגמרא כגון בהכרת שמות בגיטין ובחליצה שאפילו מפי אשה ומפי קרוב או קטן כמו שנתבאר פרק רביעי מהלכות חליצה ויבום והוא משום דהוי מלתא דעבידא לאיגלויי ולזה הזכיר רבינו בכאן טעם זה. וכבר כתבתי למעלה בראש הפרק דהיכא דנפקא לן דינא בין ב' טעמים אלו שאין רבינו סומך על זה כגון בעד אחד בקטטה כנזכר שם, ובהשגות א''א א''נ דאיהי דייקא ומנסבא (מפני חומר שהחמרת עליה בסופה) ע''כ. וכבר בארתי דעת רבינו: סליקו הלכות גירושין:
(א) אל יקשה בעיניך וכו'. בריש האשה רבה שאלו בגמרא (דף פ"ז:) אלמא עד אחד נאמן מדאורייתא מנ''ל ואמר במסקנא (דף פ"ח) אר''ז מתוך חומר שהחמרת עליה בסופה הקלת עליה בתחלתה לא ליחמיר ולא ליקיל משום עיגונא (דאיתתא) הקילו בה רבנן וכתבו שם התוספות (בד"ה מתוך) נראה לר''י דלית לן למימר אנן סהדי דדייקא ומינסבא ונאמן עד אחד בכך מן התורה אלא מתקנת חכמים הוא דנאמן ואין זה עקירת דבר מן התורה כיון שדומה הדבר הגון להאמין. וקשה בדברי רבינו דמריש לישניה ומסיפיה משמע דהסכים לדברי ר''י שכן כתב בריש לישניה אל יקשה בעיניך שהתירו חכמים וכו' ובסופיה אמר ג''כ לפיכך הקילו חכמים וכו' ובאמצע לישניה משמע איפכא דהוי מן התורה שכן כתב שלא הקפידה תורה וכו' וכן חזר ואמר לא הקפידה תורה עליו. ונ''ל ליישב לשונו דודאי מדרבנן הוא נאמן אלא שהקשה הקושיא שהקשו התוס' ואל יקשה בעיניך איך עקרו חכמים דבר מן התורה ותירץ שלא הקפידה תורה וכו' כלומר לא הקפידה תורה שלא נעקור ממנה אלא בדבר שאינו עשוי להגלות אבל בדבר עשוי להגלות אע''פ שמן התורה צריך שני עדים מ''מ כשנעקור הדבר לא הקפידה התורה על עקירתו כיון שהוא הגון להאמין וכמו שכתבו התוס'. זה נ''ל ליישב דעת רבינו והאל יתברך יצילנו משגיאות ויראנו מתורתו נפלאות: סליקו להו הלכות גירושין בס''ד
מרכבת המשנה
אל יקשה בעיניך וכו'. עיין השגות. אמנם לפי מ"ש רבינו בפרקין הי"ט דעד אחד במלחמה נאמן כשאומר קברתיו תנשא ואפי' לא אמר קברתיו אם ניסת לא תצא אלמא דעד אחד נאמן דבר תורה מטעם מלתא דעבידי לגלויי גרידא אף בלא צירוף טעם דאשה דייקא ומנסבא הילכך אם ניסת לא תצא דבר תורה ומדברי סופרים שלא תנשא עד שיאמר קברתיו דאז לא שייך בדדמי נאמן אף מד"ס. ולפ"ז הא דבעי ביבמות דף קט"ו עד אחד במלחמה היינו אי נאמן אף מדברי סופרים אבל פסיקא ליה דנאמן דבר תורה משום מלתא דעבידי לגלויי גרידא דאלו אינו נאמן דבר תורה מהאי טעמא גרידא לא היה מהני צירוף טעם דייקא ומנסבא דאפי' אומדנות אלף לא מהני להתיר ערוה דאתחזיק איסורא כמבואר ריש גיטין וגם ליכא למימר דטעם אשה דייקא ומנסבא גרידא מהני ד"ת דאין בזה טעם והרי אמרה מת בעלי במלחמה אינה נאמנת אפי' אמרה קברתיו. ועיין בפרקין ה"א מה שכתב הכ"מ בזה. ורבנו רצה ליתן כאן טעם על הנאמנות דבר תורה משו"ה הוצרך לטעם עבידא לגלויי ומ"מ החמירו חז"ל בכל התורה שלא להאמין עד אחד במלתא דעבידי לגלויי כדאתחזק איסורא זולת משום עיגון העמידו על ד"ת ועיין מ"מ ואולי מודה הראב"ד דטעם עבידי לגלויי גרידא סגי ד"ת אלא דמשיג דל"ל לרבנו לומר טעם עיגון להאמין עד אחד לגמרי אפי' מדברי סופרים דהו"ל לומר דלהכי נאמן אף מד"ס מחמת צירוף טעם דייקא ומנסבא מיהו גם הא לק"מ דהא עד אחד נאמן במלחמה בקברתיו אע"ג דלא שייך דייקא ומנסבא ואין זה אלא מחמת צירוף טעם עיגון והאיך נופל לשון הראב"ד א"נ דדייקא ומנסבא דהא ליכא בעולם צירוף דייקא ומנסבא לטעם עבידא לגלויי בלא צירוף טעם עיגון וכששלום מהימן עד אחד מתלת טעמי העיקר דנאמן דבר תורה משום דעבידא לגלויי וצירוף דייקא ומנסבא וגם עיגון. ובעד אחד במלחמה ואמר קברתיו נאמן אף מדברי סופרים מכח צירוף טעם עיגון גרידא אע"ג דליכא צירוף דייקא ומנסבא:
נפש הרב
מכתב הרב שכטר על הרב לאחר פטירתו
אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, כְּשֶׁיָּרַדְתִּי לִנְהַרְדְּעָא לְעַבֵּר הַשָּׁנָה, מָצָאתִי נְחֶמְיָה אִישׁ בֵּית דְּלִי, אָמַר לִי, שָׁמַעְתִּי שֶׁאֵין מַשִּׂיאִין אֶת הָאִשָּׁה בְאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל עַל פִּי עֵד אֶחָד, אֶלָּא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶן בָּבָא. וְנוּמֵתִי לוֹ, כֵּן הַדְּבָרִים. אָמַר לִי, אֱמֹר לָהֶם מִשְּׁמִי, אַתֶּם יוֹדְעִים שֶׁהַמְּדִינָה מְשֻׁבֶּשֶׁת בִּגְיָסוֹת, מְקֻבְּלָנִי מֵרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל הַזָּקֵן, שֶׁמַּשִּׂיאִין אֶת הָאִשָּׁה עַל פִּי עֵד אֶחָד. וּכְשֶׁבָּאתִי וְהִרְצֵיתִי הַדְּבָרִים לִפְנֵי רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, שָׂמַח לִדְבָרַי, וְאָמַר, מָצָאנוּ חָבֵר לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶן בָּבָא. מִתּוֹךְ הַדְּבָרִים נִזְכַּר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, שֶׁנֶּהֶרְגוּ הֲרוּגִים בְּתֵל אַרְזָא, וְהִשִּׂיא רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל הַזָּקֵן נְשׁוֹתֵיהֶם עַל פִּי עֵד אֶחָד, וְהֻחְזְקוּ לִהְיוֹת מַשִּׂיאִין עַל פִּי עֵד אֶחָד. וְהֻחְזְקוּ לִהְיוֹת מַשִּׂיאִין עֵד מִפִּי עֵד, מִפִּי עֶבֶד, מִפִּי אִשָּׁה, מִפִּי שִׁפְחָה. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמְרִים, אֵין מַשִּׂיאִין אֶת הָאִשָּׁה עַל פִּי עֵד אֶחָד. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר, לֹא עַל פִּי אִשָּׁה, וְלֹא עַל פִּי עֶבֶד וְלֹא עַל פִּי שִׁפְחָה, וְלֹא עַל פִּי קְרוֹבִים. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, מַעֲשֶׂה בִבְנֵי לֵוִי שֶׁהָלְכוּ לְצֹעַר עִיר הַתְּמָרִים, וְחָלָה אַחַד מֵהֶם בַּדֶּרֶךְ, וֶהֱבִיאוּהוּ בְפֻנְדָּק, וּבַחֲזָרָתָם אָמְרוּ לַפֻּנְדָּקִית אַיֵּה חֲבֵרֵנוּ, אָמְרָה לָהֶם מֵת וּקְבַרְתִּיו, וְהִשִּׂיאוּ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, וְלֹא תְהֵא כֹהֶנֶת כַּפֻּנְדָּקִית. אָמַר לָהֶם, לִכְשֶׁתְּהֵא פֻּנְדָּקִית נֶאֱמֶנֶת. הַפֻּנְדָּקִית הוֹצִיאָה לָהֶם מַקְלוֹ וְתַרְמִילוֹ וְסֵפֶר תּוֹרָה שֶׁהָיָה בְיָדוֹ:
Rabbi Akiva said: When I went down to Nehardea to intercalate the year, I met Nehemiah of Bet D’li who said to me, “I heard that in the land of Israel no one, permits a [married] woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, except Rabbi Judah ben Bava”. “That is so”, I told him. He said to me, “Tell them in my name: ‘You know that this country is in confusion because of marauders. I have received a tradition from Rabban Gamaliel the Elder: that they allow a [married] woman to remarry on the evidence of one witness’”. And when I came and recounted the conversation in the presence of Rabban Gamaliel he rejoiced at my words and exclaimed, “We have found a match for Rabbi Judah ben Bava!” As a result of this talk Rabban Gamaliel remembered that some men were once killed at Tel Arza, and that Rabban Gamaliel the Elder had allowed their wives to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and the law was established that they allow a woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and on the testimony of one [who states that he has heard] from another witness, from a slave, from a woman or from a female slave. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua say: a woman is not be allowed to remarry on the evidence of one witness. Rabbi Akiva ruled: [a woman is not allowed to marry again] on the evidence of a woman, on that of a slave, on that of a female slave or on that of relatives. They said to him: It once happened that a number of Levites went to Tsoar, the city of palms, and one of them became ill on the way, and they left him in an inn. When they returned they asked the [female] innkeeper, “Where is our friend?” And she replied, “He is dead and I buried him”, and they allowed his wife to remarry. Should not then a priest’s wife [be believed at least as much] as an innkeeper!” He answered them: When she will [give such evidence] as the innkeeper [gave] she will be believed, for the innkeeper had brought out to them [the dead man’s] staff, his bag and the Torah scroll which he had with him.
מה דודך מדוד
מכתב הרב על דודו הגרי׳׳ז לאחר פטירתו
Eliezer Berkovits
Essential Essays in Judaism
The Nature and Function of Jewish Law
Richard Rhodes
The Making of the Atomic Bomb
