Essential Talmud: The Right to Privacy

(7) One may not open a window into a jointly owned courtyard. If one bought a house in another [and adjoining] courtyard, that person may not open it into a jointly held courtyard. If one built an upper story over one's house, one may not make it open into the jointly held courtyard. However, one may, if one wishes, build another room within one's house or build an upper room over one's house and make it open into one's own house. One may not open a door into a jointly held courtyard directly opposite another’s door, or a window directly opposite another’s window. If the window was small one may not make it larger; if it was a single window one may not make it into two. But one may open a door into the public domain opposite another’s door, or a window opposite another’s window. If the window was small one may make it larger; if it was a single window one may make it into two.

The reason that they build a wall is that they both wished to make a partition in their jointly owned courtyard. But if they did not both wish to do so, the court does not obligate the reluctant partner to build such a wall, although his neighbor objects to the fact that the partner can see what he is doing in his courtyard. Apparently, it may be concluded that damage caused by sight, that is, the discomfort suffered by someone because he is exposed to the gaze of others while he is in his own private domain, is not called damage. The Gemara objects to this conclusion: ...Come and hear a proof, as Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says: If one’s roof is adjacent to another’s courtyard, he must make a parapet around the roof four cubits high so that he will not be able to see into his neighbor’s courtyard. This indicates that the damage of being exposed to the eyes of others even in a courtyard is called damage. The Gemara refutes this proof: The situation is different there, as the owner of the courtyard can say to the owner of the roof: I make use of my courtyard on a regular basis. You, by contrast, do not make use of your roof on a regular basis, but only infrequently. Consequently, I do not know when you will go up to the roof,

so that I can hide from you at that time and avoid coming under your gaze.

§ MISHNA: A person may not open an entrance opposite another entrance or a window opposite another window toward a courtyard belonging to partners, so as to ensure that the residents will enjoy a measure of privacy. If there was a small entrance he may not enlarge it. If there was one entrance he may not fashion it into two. But one may open an entrance opposite another entrance or a window opposite another window toward the public domain. Similarly, if there was a small entrance he may enlarge it, and if there was one entrance he may fashion it into two. GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where are these matters, i.e., that one may not open an en-trance opposite another entrance, or a window opposite another window, derived? Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the verse states: “And Balaam lifted up his eyes, and he saw Israel dwelling tribe by tribe; and the spirit of God came upon him” (Numbers 24:2). The Gemara explains: What was it that Balaam saw that so inspired him? He saw that the entrances of their tents were not aligned with each other, ensuring that each family enjoyed a measure of privacy. And he said: If this is the case, these people are worthy of having the Divine Presence rest on them. The mishna teaches that if there was a small entrance he may not enlarge it. Rami bar Ḥama thought to say this means that if the entrance was the width of four cubits, one may not fashion it to the width of eight cubits, as he would then be allowed to take eight corresponding cubits in the courtyard. The halakha is that one is entitled to utilize the area of the courtyard up to a depth of four cubits along the width of the opening. But if the entrance was the width of two cubits and one wishes to fashion it to the width of four cubits, one may well do so, as in any event he already had the right to use an area of four cubits by four cubits in front of the entrance. Rava said to him: This is not so, as his neighbor can say to him: I can conceal myself from you with there being a small entrance, but I cannot conceal myself from you with there being a large entrance. The mishna teaches that if there was one entrance he may not fashion it into two. In this case as well, Rami bar Ḥama thought to say that this means if the entrance was the width of four cubits he may not make it into two openings, each the width of two cubits, as he would then be allowed to take eight corresponding cubits in the courtyard, four for each entrance. But if it was the width of eight cubits and he wishes to make it into two openings, each the width of four cubits, he may well do so, as in any event he already had the right to use an area of eight cubits by four cubits in front of his entrance. Rava said to him: This is not so, as his neighbor can say to him: I can conceal myself from you with there being one entrance, but I cannot conceal myself from you with there being two entrances. The mishna teaches: But one may open an entrance opposite another entrance or a window opposite another window toward the public domain. Why is this so? Because he can say to the one who wishes to protest: Ultimately, you must conceal yourself from the people of the public domain. Since you cannot stop them from passing by and therefore cannot engage in behavior that requires privacy with your entrance open, it is of no consequence to you if I open an entrance as well.

Rabbi Chanina ben Chachina, and Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai went to learn Torah at the house of Rabbi Akiva in Bnai' Brak.. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai said "there are four things that God hates that I hate as well: One who uses the relieves themselves in a lude manner, One who has sex inappropriatly, One who speaks about matters between husband and wife in public, and One who enters suddenly to his own home, needless to say one who enters suddenly to the home of his neighbor. Rav said, do not enter even a new city suddenly, and do not enter any home suddenly, your home, your worker's quarters, you must inform them. Rabbi Yochanan when he was going to Rabbi Chaninia's house he would pause and clear his throat in the doorway so that those inside could hear his voice.

MISHNA: With regard to one who lends money to another and the debtor fails to repay it at the end of the term of the loan, the creditor may take collateral from him to ensure payment only by means of an agent of the court, not of his own accord. And he may not enter the debtor’s house to take his collateral, as it is stated: “When you lend your neighbor any manner of loan, you shall not go into his house to take his collateral. You shall stand outside, and the man to whom you lend shall bring forth the collateral to you outside” (Deuteronomy 24:10–11). If the debtor had two utensils of the same kind, the creditor takes one and leaves the other one in the debtor’s possession. And in addition, the creditor must return a pillow at night, as the debtor requires it for sleeping, and a plow, which is needed for his daytime work, by day. If the debtor died, he is not required to return it to the debtor’s heirs. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even to the debtor himself he needs to return the collateral each day only until thirty days have passed, and from thirty days onward, the creditor can sell them in court, with the proceeds going toward payment of the debt. GEMARA: Shmuel says: An agent of the court who was granted permission to appropriate items from a debtor up to the sum of the loan may seize these items from him in the marketplace, but is not permitted to enter the debtor’s house and take collateral. The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that one who lends money to another may take collateral from him only by means of an agent of the court, which proves by inference that when it is taken by means of an agent of the court the agent of the court may enter the debtor’s house and take collateral? The Gemara responds: Shmuel could have said to you: Say that the mishna meant as follows: He may seize it forcibly from him only by means of an agent of the court. The Gemara adds: So, too, it is reasonable that this is correct, as the latter clause of the mishna teaches: And he may not enter the debtor’s house to take his collateral. Who is the tanna referring to here? If we say it is referring to the creditor, this clause is not needed, as this halakha can be concluded from the first clause of the mishna, which states that a creditor has no right to take collateral himself. Rather, is it not referring to the court agent? Accordingly, this teaches that even an agent of the court may not enter the debtor’s house to take the collateral. The Gemara refutes the above claim: If the argument to understand the mishna in that manner is due to that reason, there is no conclusive argument, as it is possible that this is what the mishna is saying: One who lends money to another may take collateral from him by entering the debtor’s house only by means of an agent of the court, which proves by inference that it is permitted to take collateral by entering the debtor’s house by means of an agent of the court. One can then infer: But as for the creditor himself, he may not even seize collateral outside the debtor’s house. This is a rabbinic decree so that he should not enter the debtor’s house to take his collateral.

(7) When the matter is finished, they bring in [the litigants]. The greatest of the judges says, "So-and-so, you are innocent," or, "So-and-so, you are guilty." And from where [do we derive that] when one of the judges leaves he may not say, "I acquitted him and my fellows convicted him, but what was I to do, as my fellows were in the majority." Regarding this it is said, "Do not go about as a talebearer among your people," (Leviticus 19:16) and it says, "He who gossips reveals secrets." (Proverbs 11:13)

One who has a window in his wall and his neighbor comes and builds a door on the side of his house, you cannot say to the owner of the window "block up your window" in order that you may not gaze upn me, since the window was there first. And if one comes to build a wall opposite someone's window in order to have privacy, he needs to distance that wall from the window by at least four amot, in order not to shade him.

The Master said in that baraita cited above that when the Torah says: “And He called to Moses,” it means that Moses and all of the Jewish people were standing and listening. The Gemara suggests that this supports the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, as Rabbi Elazar said that when the Torah says: “And He called to Moses,” it means that Moses and all of the Jewish people were standing and listening and the verse comes only to accord deference to Moses. From Rabbi Elazar’s statement it is clear that all of Israel heard the voice of God. The Gemara raises an objection: The Torah states: “And when Moses went into the Tent of Meeting that He might speak with him, then he heard the voice speaking unto him from above the Ark cover that was upon the Ark of the Testimony, from between the two cherubs; and He spoke unto him” (Numbers 7:89). The Torah could have said: He heard the voice speaking to him; however, instead the verse said: He heard the voice speaking unto him, indicating that the voice reached him alone. Moses alone heard God’s voice and all of the Jewish people did not hear it. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This case, where everyone heard God’s voice, was at Sinai. That case, where Moses alone heard God’s voice, was at the Tent of Meeting. Or if you wish, say instead an alternative resolution. This is not difficult; when God addressed Moses by calling to him, everyone heard; that which God subsequently communicated by speaking, Moses alone heard. Rabbi Zerika raised a contradiction between verses before Rabbi Elazar, and some say that Rabbi Zerika said that Rabbi Elazar raised a contradiction: It is written in one place: “And Moses was not able to enter into the Tent of Meeting because the cloud dwelt on it” (Exodus 40:35), as Moses was unable to enter the cloud. And it is written elsewhere: “And Moses came into the cloud” (Exodus 24:18). This teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, grabbed Moses and brought him into the cloud since he could not enter on his own. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: There is a verbal analogy that resolves this contradiction. It is stated here: “And Moses came into the cloud,” and it is stated below, in another verse: “And the children of Israel went into the sea on dry land” (Exodus 14:22); Just as below, there was a path within the sea, as it is written: “And the water was a wall for them” (Exodus 14:22), here too, there was a path through the cloud, but Moses did not actually enter the cloud. The verse says: “And He called unto Moses, and the Lord spoke unto him from within the Tent of Meeting, saying” (Leviticus 1:1). Why does the verse mention calling before speaking, and God did not speak to him at the outset? The Torah is teaching etiquette: A person should not say anything to another unless he calls him first. This supports the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina, as Rabbi Ḥanina said: A person should not say anything to another unless he calls him first. With regard to the term concluding the verse: “Saying,” Rabbi Musya, grandson of Rabbi Masya, said in the name of Rabbi Musya the Great: From where is it derived with regard to one who tells another some matter, that it is incumbent upon the latter not to say it to others until the former explicitly says to him: Go and tell others? As it is stated: “And the Lord spoke to him from within the Tent of Meeting, saying [lemor].” Lemor is a contraction of lo emor, meaning: Do not say. One must be given permission before transmitting information.