"מלאכת מחשבת אסרה תורה"

The [number of] principal Melakhot is forty minus one. [The forbidden Melakhot are]: Sowing, plowing, reaping, binding sheaves, threshing, winnowing, sorting, grinding, sifting, kneading, baking, shearing wool, whitening it, combing it, dyeing it, spinning, weaving, making two loops, weaving two threads, separating two threads, tying [a knot], untying [a knot], sewing two stitches, tearing for the purpose of sewing two stitches, hunting a deer, slaughtering it, skinning it, salting it, curing its hide, scraping it, cutting it, writing two letters, erasing for the purpose of writing two letters, building, demolishing, extinguishing a flame, lighting a flame, striking with a hammer, carrying from one domain to another. These are the principal Melakhot - [they number] forty minus one.

All categories of work they learned from the Tabernacle. What kind of ploughing was in the Tabernacle? They ploughed to plant dyestuff. How much does one have to plough to become liable? Rebbi Mattaniah said, enough to plant a leek. Rebbi Aḥa bar Rav said, enough to plant a wheat sprout. There, we have stated: “Two green melon seeds make liable, two squash seeds, two Egyptian bean seeds.” It was stated, two Median wheat kernels. Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: Since wheat was so much appreciated they treated it like garden vegetables that are not eaten. For everything which improves the soil one is liable because of ploughing: One who digs, who cuts, who inserts, who deposits dung, who hoes, who fertilizes, who sweeps, who sprinkles, who splits blocks, who clears forests, who sets fire to reed thickets or palm swamps, and following Rebbi Zeˋira a water canal prepares its banks for sowing, who removes stones, who builds terraces, who fills the rifts under olive trees, and who makes depressions for vines, and for anything which improves the soil one is liable because of ploughing. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He who cooks carcass meat on a holiday is not flogged, because the category of cooking is permitted on a holiday. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he is flogged, for the category of cooking is permitted only for food. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected to this [statement] by Rebbi Joḥanan. Then one who ploughs on a holiday should not be flogged since actions of the category of ploughing are permitted on a holiday. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ila: ordinary ploughing was not permitted. Rebbi Shammai said before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ila, this is Rebbi Simeon’s, for Rebbi Simeon said, only if he needs the essence of the matter. Rebbi Yose met Rebbi Aḥa. He said to him, did you say this? But did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, the words of Rebbi Meïr are that in 24 matters the House of Shammai are lenient and the House of Hillel restrictive, and this is one of them. Should we say 23? But Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon both said the same. But were we not of the opinion that Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon both said the same? Should we say, Rebbi Meïr, Rebbi Yose, and Rebbi Simeon all three said the same? But matters which are problematic for the rabbis are obvious for you; are those which are obvious for the rabbis [problematic for you]? If one harvested for grasses he is liable for harvesting but is not liable for improving the soil. There is only the problem if he harvested in order to improve the soil. Is he liable for harvesting and for improving the soil? Even if you say it follows Rebbi Simeon, but for the rabbis in any case he ploughed, in any case he harvested. Rebbi Mana said, the words of the rabbis support Rebbi Yose, for Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if one compressed a fish, if for its body he is not liable, but if to produce fish sauce he is liable. Even if you say that he said this following Rebbi Simeon, but for the rabbis in any case he compressed, in any case he produced fish sauce.

For any activity which quickens a fruit to ripen one is liable because of sowing. One who plants, who sinks, who grafts, who prunes, who trains, who removes dead branches, who dirties, who removes leaves, who dusts, who smokes, who removes worms, who sprinkles with ashes, who oils, who waters, who drills holes, who makes houses, and for anything which quickens a fruit to ripen one is liable because of sowing.

Rather, is it not that the first clause of the baraita is dealing with the contrast between Shabbat and idolatry, and the latter clause of the baraita is dealing with contrasting Shabbat and other mitzvot? And what are the circumstances of: Unwitting without intent, with regard to other mitzvot? It is in a case where one thought that it was permitted fat, and ate it, and later discovered that it was forbidden fat. This is one example of other mitzvot where one is liable. That is not the case with regard to Shabbat, where he is exempt, as one who intended to cut a detached plant and unwittingly severed a plant still attached to the ground is exempt. And according to Abaye, who holds that he is liable in that case, what are the circumstances of: Unwitting without intent, with regard to other mitzvot? It is in a case where one had something in his mouth and he thought it was spittle and swallowed it with no intention to eat it, and it turned out to be forbidden fat that he swallowed. This is one example of other mitzvot, where he is liable. That is not the case with regard to Shabbat, where the phrase: He is exempt, is referring to the case of one who intended to lift a plant detached from the ground and mistakenly severed a plant still attached to the ground. In that case, even Abaye agrees that he is exempt. However, one who intended to cut a detached plant and unwittingly severed a plant still attached to the ground is liable since he intended to perform a standard act of cutting. Therefore, no proof can be cited from this baraita. A similar dispute between Abaye and Rava was stated. In the case of one who intended to throw an object two cubits in the public domain, for which he would not be liable by Torah law, and it turned out that he threw it four cubits, in violation of the prohibition by Torah law against carrying an object four cubits in the public domain, Rava said: He is exempt. Abaye said: He is liable. The Gemara elaborates: Rava said: He is exempt, as he does not intend to execute a throw of four cubits, and, consequently, does not intend to perform a prohibited act. Abaye said: He is liable, as he intends to execute a standard throw, and ultimately a throw that traveled a prohibited distance was executed. Another dispute between them was stated. In the case of one who thought that he was in the private domain and threw an object more than four cubits, and, ultimately, it was found to be the public domain, Rava said: He is exempt. And Abaye said: He is liable. The Gemara elaborates: Rava said: He is exempt, as he does not intend to execute a prohibited throw. In a private domain, he may throw an object as far as he chooses. And Abaye said: He is liable, as he intends to execute a standard throw. The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to mention these three disputes, despite their similarities, because each one teaches a unique element. As, had the Gemara taught us only the first, the case of one who intended to lift a plant detached from the ground and mistakenly severed a plant still attached to the ground, we would have said that it was only in that case that Rava said he is exempt, as he does not intend to perform an act of prohibited severing. He had no intention to perform an action that entails desecration of Shabbat. However, the ruling in the case of one who intended to throw an object two cubits in the public domain and he threw it four cubits would be more stringent, as an object cannot be thrown four cubits without being thrown two cubits. A throw of two cubits is a component part of the four-cubit throw. Consequently, say that in that case Rava agrees with Abaye, as he performed an act that has a prohibited dimension to it. And, had the Gemara taught us the dispute in this case of throwing two cubits as well, we would have said that it is only in that case that Rava says that he is exempt, as he does not intend to execute a throw of four cubits. A throw of fewer than four cubits does not constitute a transgression. However, in the case of one who thought that he was in the private domain, and ultimately it was found to be the public domain where the individual intends to execute a throw of four cubits, which is a prohibited distance, say that Rava agrees with Abaye that he is liable. Therefore, it is necessary to mention all three cases in which they disagree. We learned in a mishna: The primary categories of labor are forty-less-one, and we discussed it and asked: Why do I need this tally of forty-less-one? And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tally was included to teach that if one performed all of the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one. Granted, according to Abaye, who said that in a case like that one mentioned above, where one intended to throw an object two cubits and it traveled four cubits he is liable, you find that circumstance in a case where he was aware that the prohibition of Shabbat applies to certain labors, and he was aware that particular labors were prohibited, and was mistaken with regard to measures. He intended to perform an act involving less than the prohibited measure, and it turned out that the action he performed involved an amount equal to or greater than the prohibited measure. That is an unwitting act that renders him liable to bring a sin-offering, according to Abaye. However, according to Rava, who said that he is exempt in a case where one intended to throw an object two cubits and it traveled four cubits, in what circumstances do you find that he would be liable for each and every one? Is it in a case where, with regard to Shabbat, his actions were intentional, and, with regard to the prohibited labors, his actions were unwitting? It works out well if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: Once he was unwitting with regard to the fact that the punishment for his transgression is karet, even though he was aware that his action was in violation of a Torah prohibition and performed the transgression intentionally, he is considered to have sinned unwittingly. If he holds in accordance with that opinion, you find a case where one could be liable for each and every prohibited labor when he was aware that performing labor on Shabbat involves violation of a Torah prohibition, but he was unaware that the punishment for violating that prohibition is karet. However, if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who said: It is not considered unwitting until he was unwitting with regard to both the prohibition and karet, the result is that he is completely unaware of all the prohibited labors of Shabbat. The question then arises: With regard to what aspect of Shabbat was he aware? If he was completely unaware of all the labors prohibited on Shabbat, in what sense were his actions intentional with regard to Shabbat? The Gemara answers: He was aware of the halakhot of the prohibition of Shabbat boundaries, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who holds that this prohibition is by Torah law. MISHNA: This fundamental mishna enumerates those who perform the primary categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat, which number forty-less-one. They are grouped in accordance with their function: One who sows, and one who plows, and one who reaps, and one who gathers sheaves into a pile, and one who threshes, removing the kernel from the husk, and one who winnows threshed grain in the wind, and one who selects the inedible waste from the edible, and one who grinds, and one who sifts the flour in a sieve, and one who kneads dough, and one who bakes. Additional primary categories of prohibited labor are the following: One who shears wool, and one who whitens it, and one who combs the fleece and straightens it, and one who dyes it, and one who spins the wool, and one who stretches the threads of the warp in the loom, and one who constructs two meshes, tying the threads of the warp to the base of the loom, and one who weaves two threads, and one who severs two threads for constructive purposes, and one who ties a knot, and one who unties a knot, and one who sews two stitches with a needle, as well as one who tears a fabric in order to sew two stitches. One who traps a deer, or any living creature, and one who slaughters it, and one who flays it, and one who salts its hide, a step in the tanning process, and one who tans its hide, and one who smooths it, removing hairs and veins, and one who cuts it into measured parts. One who writes two letters and one who erases in order to write two letters. One who builds a structure, and one who dismantles it, one who extinguishes a fire, and one who kindles a fire. One who strikes a blow with a hammer to complete the production process of a vessel (Rabbeinu Ḥananel), and one who carries out an object from domain to domain. All these are primary categories of labor, and they number forty-less-one. GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that the primary categories of labor number forty-less-one. The Gemara asks: Why do I need this tally? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tally was included to teach that if he performed all of the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness, during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one. We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who sows, and one who plows. The Gemara asks: Since, after all, in terms of plowing, one plows first and only then sows, let the tanna teach first one who plows, and afterward let him teach one who sows. The Gemara answers: The tanna ordered the mishna based on the practice in Eretz Yisrael, where they sow first and then plow. In Eretz Yisrael, the practice was to plow a second time after sowing to cover the seeds. A baraita is taught with regard to the prohibited labor of sowing: One who sows, and one who prunes the branches of vines to accelerate their growth, and one who plants, and one who bends the branch of a vine or a tree into the ground so that it takes root while still attached to the trunk, and one who grafts the branch of one tree onto another have all performed one type of labor, as they all stimulate plant growth. The Gemara asks: What is the baraita teaching us? The Gemara explains: This teaches us that one who unwittingly performs numerous prohibited labors subsumed under a single primary category of labor, like those listed in the baraita, is liable to bring only one sin-offering, since they are considered aspects of the same labor. Rabbi Aḥa said that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rabbi Ami said: One who prunes is liable for the labor of planting. And one who plants, and one who bends, and one who grafts is liable for the labor of sowing. The Gemara is surprised at this: Is that to say that one who bends and one who grafts a branch, for sowing, yes, he is liable; for planting, no, he is not liable? These labors, performed on trees, are more similar to planting. Rather, say as follows: One is liable even for sowing, as with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat there is no difference between sowing and planting. Rav Kahana said: One who prunes a tree and needs the wood that he hewed from the tree for fuel or some other purpose is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One sin-offering due to the labor of reaping, like anyone who severs an item from the ground for the purpose of harvesting the detached object, and one sin-offering due to the labor of planting, since he thereby stimulates growth of the plant. Similarly, Rav Yosef said: One who reaps alfalfa is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to reaping, since he is cutting the plant for animal feed, and one due to planting, since cutting stimulates the growth of the alfalfa. Similarly, Abaye said: One who cuts beet leaves is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to reaping and one due to sowing. We learned in the mishna among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who plows. A tanna taught in a baraita with regard to the labor of plowing: One who plows, and one who digs, and one who makes a furrow in the ground have all performed one type of labor. Rav Sheshet said: One who had a mound of earth and removed it in the house, thereby evening the surface, is liable due to the labor of building, as he thereby engages in construction of the house. In the field, he is liable due to the labor of plowing. Similarly, Rava said: One who had a hole and filled it, in the house he is liable due to the labor of building. In the field, he is liable due to the labor of plowing. Rabbi Abba said: One who digs a hole on Shabbat and digs the hole only because he needs its dirt is exempt for that act, which is not the labor of digging prohibited on Shabbat by Torah law. And even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who said that in general one who performs labor that is not necessary for its own sake, i.e., he performs the labor for a purpose other than the direct result of that action, is liable for it; that ruling applies only to a purpose that is constructive. However, this purpose is destructive, as one performs an act that unnecessarily mars the surface of the ground. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda would agree that in this case he is exempt. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who reaps. It was taught in a Tosefta with regard to the labor of reaping: One who reaps, and one who picks grapes, and one who harvests dates, and one who collects olives, and one who gathers figs have all performed one type of labor, as they all involve picking fruit. Rav Pappa said: One who threw a clod of earth at a palm tree and severed dates is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to severing, which is a subcategory of the primary category of reaping; and one for extracting, which is a subcategory of the primary category of threshing, as he removes something edible, the date, from its cover, its cluster. Rav Ashi said: In that case, one is exempt, since that is not the typical manner of severing, and that is not the typical manner of extracting, and one who performs a labor in an atypical manner is exempt. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who gathers. Rava said: One who gathers salt from salt pools is liable due to the labor of gathering, as he gathers a substance from the field into a pile. Abaye said: That is not so, as the prohibition of gathering by Torah law applies only to produce that grows from the ground. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who threshes. A tanna taught in a Tosefta: One who threshes, and one who beats flax to remove it from the hard cover of its stalk, and one who strikes a cotton plant to remove the cotton seeds have all performed one type of labor. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who winnows, and one who selects, and one who grinds, and one who sifts. The Gemara asks: The prohibited labor of winnowing is the same as the prohibited labor of selecting, which is the same as the prohibited labor of sifting. They are all identical in the manner in which they are performed and have the same objective: Separating food from the accompanying waste. Why was it necessary to list them all? An answer was provided by Abaye and Rava, who both said and established a principle: Any manner of labor that was performed in the Tabernacle, for the purposes of the Tabernacle,

even though there is a different labor that is similar to it, the mishna enumerated it. Every labor that was performed in the Tabernacle is significant. The Gemara asks: And let him enumerate the labor of pounding as well, as wheat was pounded to remove its outer kernel in the Tabernacle. Abaye said: The labor of pounding is not one of the essential stages in the baking of bread, as paupers eat their bread without pounding the wheat to remove the bran. Therefore, since the tanna enumerated threshing, there was no need to include pounding among the labors enumerated in the breadmaking process. Rava said a different explanation: Who is the tanna of this mishna? It is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said: The primary categories of labor are forty-less-one, a number derived from a textual allusion. Therefore, the list cannot be expanded. And had the tanna enumerated pounding, there would be forty labors rather than thirty-nine. The Gemara asks: And let him take out one of these, selecting or winnowing, and insert pounding, thereby leaving the number intact. Rather, the reason that the tanna did not include pounding is clear, according to the explanation of Abaye. The Sages taught in a baraita with regard to the laws of selecting: If there were several types of food before him, and he wants to remove one or more from the mixture, one selects and eats, selects and puts aside. And one may not select, and if one did select, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara asks: What is the baraita saying? The end of this baraita contradicts the beginning. Ulla said: It is saying as follows: One selects and eats if he is doing so for the purpose of that day, Shabbat. And he selects and puts aside food for the purpose of that day. And one may not select for the purpose of the next day. And if one did select for the next day, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Rav Ḥisda strongly objects to this explanation: And is it permitted to bake for that day, and is it permitted to cook for that day? No other labor prohibited on Shabbat may be performed for the purpose of Shabbat, and the same should hold true for selecting. Rather, Rav Ḥisda said it is to be understood as follows: One selects and eats less than the measure of a dried fig-bulk, which is the smallest amount for which one is liable by Torah law. One selects and puts aside less than that measure. And one may not select the measure of a dried fig-bulk, and if one did select that measure, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Rav Yosef strongly objects to this explanation: And is it permitted to bake less than the measure for liability ab initio? Although performing a prohibited labor on a minute measure does not engender liability, it is prohibited. Therefore, the baraita cannot be interpreted as saying that one may ab initio select an amount that is less than the measure for liability. Rather, Rav Yosef said: One selects and eats by hand, selects and put aside by hand. However, with a basket [kanon] or with a plate, both of which are large, flat vessels used for sorting sizeable quantities, one may not select ab initio. And if he did select, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering if he did so unwittingly. If he did so intentionally he is exempt from stoning. However, it is prohibited. And one may not select with a sieve or with a sifter. And if he did select with those utensils, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Rav Hamnuna strongly objects to this: Does the mishna teach anything about a basket or a plate? Rav Yosef’s explanation is based on the addition of details that do not appear in the baraita either. Rather, Rav Hamnuna said: One selects and eats if he is removing food from the waste, and similarly, selects and puts aside if he is removing food from the waste. However, one may not select waste from food, and if he did select in that manner, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. The typical method of selecting is the removal of waste from the food. An individual who alters the procedure is not liable. Abaye strongly objects to this: Does the mishna teach anything about food from waste? That detail is not mentioned in the baraita either. Rather, Abaye said: One selects and eats if he is removing food for immediate use, and similarly one selects and puts aside for immediate use. However, one may not select for use later that same day. And if he did select, he is considered like one who selects for storage, and he is liable to bring a sin-offering. This explanation requires no emendation of the mishna. It is merely an interpretation of the phrase: One selects and eats, as referring to selecting for immediate use. The Gemara relates that the Sages stated Abaye’s explanation of the baraita before Rava. He said to them: Naḥmani, Abaye, spoke well. Until this point, the Gemara discussed selecting food from waste. The Gemara proceeds to discuss a different case. If there were two types of foods before him, and he selected and ate one type, and selected and put aside one type, Rav Ashi taught: He is exempt. Rav Yirmeya from Difti taught: He is liable. Rav Ashi taught: He is exempt. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that in that case he is liable? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult: This, where Rav Ashi said that he is exempt, is referring to a case where he selects by means of a basket or a plate, as that method of selecting is not considered expert work; and that, where the baraita said he is liable, is in a case where he selects by means of a sieve or a sifter, as that method of selecting is considered expert work. The Gemara relates that when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said: It was the Shabbat of Rav Beivai to serve food to the students, and Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi happened to come to his house. He placed before them a basket of fruits without removing the leaves and the stems. And I do not know whether he did so because he holds that it is prohibited to select food from waste when it is not for immediate consumption, or whether he did so because he intended to show generosity to his guests by creating the impression that the basket was full. A fruit-filled basket conveys to the guests that there is plenty and that they may take as much as they wish. Therefore, there is no clear proof from this incident. Ḥizkiya said: One who selects lupines from their waste after boiling them is liable for performing the prohibited labor of selecting. The Gemara asks: Let us say, based on this statement, that Ḥizkiya holds that even selecting food from waste is prohibited. The Gemara rejects this proof: Lupines are different,

5) "And all work you shall not do": I might think he should not clean greens, and not spread beds, and not rinse cups; but it follows (that this is not so, viz.:) It is written here "work," and it is written in respect to the work of the tabernacle "work." Just as "work" there involves (prior) deliberation, so, "work" here.

with a rape, in which case it is not prohibited for the woman to return to her husband. There, it is referring to a woman who had relations willfully, and therefore she is forbidden to her husband. And if you wish, say that this and that are both dealing with a rape, and it is still not difficult. Here, where the transgression cannot be rectified, it is referring to one who raped the wife of a priest, as it is forbidden for a priest to have relations with his wife once she has intercourse with any other man, even unwillingly. There, it is referring to one who raped the wife of an Israelite, in which case there is no prohibition against her returning to her husband. Since the Gemara mentioned a Torah scholar who abandons the study of Torah, it cites a relevant verse: “Neither was there any peace to him that went out or came in due to the adversary” (Zechariah 8:10). Rav said: Once a person leaves the study of halakha, i.e., Mishna and Gemara, even for the study of the Torah itself, he will no longer have peace. The verses of the Torah are often obscure and it is difficult to learn halakha directly from them without the aid of the interpretations of the Talmud. And Shmuel said: This is referring to one who leaves the study of Talmud to learn Mishna. Whereas the reasoning of the Talmud is relatively clear, the Mishna cites legal rulings without explaining their reasoning. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The verse applies even to one who leaves the study of one Talmud for the other Talmud, i.e., who leaves off his study of the Jerusalem Talmud to begin the Babylonian Talmud, as he will encounter difficulties with the new style of learning. MISHNA: Incidental to the Festival peace-offering, the mishna describes the nature of various areas of Torah study. The halakhot of the dissolution of vows, when one requests from a Sage to dissolve them, fly in the air and have nothing to support them, as these halakhot are not mentioned explicitly in the Torah. There is only a slight allusion to the dissolution of vows in the Torah, which is taught by the Sages as part of the oral tradition. The halakhot of Shabbat, Festival peace-offerings, and misuse of consecrated property are like mountains suspended by a hair, as they have little written about them in the Torah, and yet the details of their halakhot are numerous. The details of monetary law, sacrificial rites, ritual purity and impurity, and the halakhot of those with whom relations are forbidden all have something to support them, i.e., there is ample basis in the Torah for these halakhot, and these are the essential parts of Torah. GEMARA: It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer said: The halakhot of the dissolution of vows have something to support them, as it is stated: “When a man shall clearly utter a vow” (Leviticus 27:2), and: “When either man or woman shall clearly utter a vow” (Numbers 6:2), i.e., the words “clearly utter” appear twice. One clear utterance is for prohibition, i.e., when one states his intention to accept the vow, and one clear utterance is for dissolution, when he provides the Sage with a reason why the vow should no longer apply. This is an allusion in the Torah to the annulment of vows. Rabbi Yehoshua likewise says: These halakhot have something to support them, as it is stated: “Wherefore I swore in My wrath” (Psalms 95:11), meaning: In my wrath I swore, and I retracted. This is the basis for the dissolution of vows, in which the one who uttered the vow tells the Sage that he regrets it, as he did so in a moment of anger. Rabbi Yitzḥak says: These halakhot have something to support them, as it is stated: “Whoever is of a willing heart, let him bring it” (Exodus 35:5). This verse indicates that as long as one retains the same desire to fulfill the vow, he must continue to fulfill it, but if he regrets taking the vow he may arrange for it to be dissolved. Ḥananya, son of Rabbi Yehoshua’s brother, also says: They have something to support them, as it is stated: “I have sworn, and have fulfilled it, to observe your righteous ordinances” (Psalms 119:106). This verse indicates that certain oaths need not be fulfilled, i.e., those that have been dissolved. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: If I had been there, sitting with those Sages, I would have said to them: My source is better than yours, as it is stated: “He shall not nullify his word” (Numbers 30:3), from which it may be inferred: He himself cannot nullify his word; however, others, i.e., a Sage, may nullify it for him by dissolving his vow. Rava said: For all of the suggested sources for the dissolution of vows there is a possible refutation, except for that of Shmuel, for which there is no refutation. Rava elaborates. As, if it is derived from the statement of Rabbi Eliezer, perhaps the phrase: “Clearly utter” should be understood in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said an alternative interpretation in the name of Rabbi Tarfon. As it is taught in a baraita with regard to two people who are arguing whether or not someone who passed before them is a nazirite, each of them declaring that if he is correct he himself will become a nazirite, Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Tarfon: Actually, neither of them is a nazirite, as naziriteship is effected only by means of a clear utterance and neither party is certain they will be a nazirite at the time of their utterance. He derives this halakha from this phrase: “Clearly utter.” Similarly, if it is derived from the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua, perhaps this is what the verse is saying: In my wrath I swore and I do not take it back, despite the fact that it was stated in a moment of anger. If it is derived from the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, perhaps the phrase “a willing heart” comes to exclude the statement of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: If one decided in his heart but did not verbalize a vow, it is insufficient, as he must verbally express it. And therefore this phrase teaches us that even though he did not verbally express the vow he is still obligated to fulfill it. Finally, if it is derived from the statement of Rabbi Ḥananya, son of Rabbi Yehoshua’s brother, perhaps the phrase “and fulfilled it” should be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rav Giddel, who said that Rav said a different interpretation of this verse. As Rav Giddel said that Rav said: From where is it derived that although one is already obligated to fulfill all mitzvot one may take an oath to fulfill a mitzva, and this is not considered an oath taken in vain? As it is stated: “I have sworn, and have fulfilled it, to observe Your righteous ordinances” (Psalms 119:106). Rav concludes. However, for Shmuel’s source there is no refutation. Rava said, and some say it was Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak who said: This explains the folk saying that people say: One spicy pepper is better than a basketful of squash, as the single pepper has more flavor than all the squash combined. § The mishna stated that the halakhot of Shabbat are like mountains suspended by a hair. The Gemara asks: But the halakhot of Shabbat are written, i.e., the prohibition against performing labor is explicit in the Torah. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to say this in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Abba. As Rabbi Abba said: One who digs a hole on Shabbat only because he needs its dirt and not for the hole itself is exempt from liability for that act, as this is not the labor of digging prohibited on Shabbat by Torah law. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion did Rabbi Abba issue this ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said: One who performs on Shabbat a labor that is not necessary for its own sake, i.e., he performs the labor for a purpose other than the direct result of the action, is exempt from liability for it. The Gemara offers an alternative possibility. This ruling can be explained even if you say that Rabbi Abba holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, that one is liable for a labor that is not necessary for its own sake. There, in other cases, Rabbi Yehuda deems one liable because his purpose is creative. Here, where one is digging the hole for the dirt, the purpose is destructive, as the action damages the ground. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda concedes that in this case he is exempt. The Gemara returns to the mishna. What then does the mishna mean by the phrase: Like mountains suspended by a hair?

The Gemara explains: It is found in a case where a pocketlike protrusion impedes sewing. Therefore, one tears the garment and tucks the protruding portion under the seam. MISHNA: One who rends his garment in his anger or in anguish over his dead relative is exempt. And anyone else who performs labors destructively on Shabbat is exempt. And one who performs a labor destructively in order to repair is liable, and his measure for liability is equivalent to the measure for one who performs that labor constructively. The measure that determines liability for one who whitens, or one who combs, or one who dyes, or one who spins wool is the full width of a double sit, which is the distance between the forefinger and the middle finger. And for one who weaves two threads, the measure that determines liability is one sit. GEMARA: We learned in the mishna: One who rends his garment in anger or in anguish over his dead relative is exempt. The Gemara raises a contradiction to this based on a baraita: One who rends his garment in his anger or in his mourning or in his anguish over his dead relative is liable for performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat. And even though he desecrates Shabbat by tearing his garment, he nevertheless fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment in mourning. Apparently, one is liable for rending his garment in anguish over the dead. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as this mishna, which states one is liable for rending his garment, is referring to his own dead relative for whom he is obligated to tear his garment. And that mishna, which states one is exempt for rending his garment, is referring to any unrelated dead person. The Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn in the mishna: Over his dead relative? The Gemara answers: Actually, the mishna, which says that he is exempt, is referring to his own dead; however, it is referring to those relatives who are not subject to the obligation of mourning by Torah law. The Gemara asks: And even so, if the dead person is a Torah scholar, one is obligated to rend one’s garment in anguish over his death, as it was taught in a baraita: When a Torah scholar dies, everyone is his relative. The Gemara asks: Does it enter your mind that everyone is his relative? Rather, say: Everyone is considered to be like his relative, in the sense that everyone rends his garment in anguish over him, and everyone bares his shoulder over him in mourning, and everyone eats the mourner’s meal over him in the public square as mourners do. The death of a Torah scholar is a personal loss for every Jew. The Gemara answers: It was only necessary for the mishna to teach this halakha in a case where the dead person is not a Torah scholar. The Gemara asks: And if he was an upright person, aren’t all those present at his death obligated to rend their garments over his death? As it was taught in a baraita: Why do a person’s sons and daughters die when they are young? They die so that he will cry and mourn over the death of an upright worthy person. The Gemara asks: They die so that he will cry? Is security taken from him in advance to ensure that he fulfills his obligation? Rather, emend the statement and say: It is because he did not cry or mourn over an upright person who died, as anyone who cries over an upright person who died, they forgive him for all his transgressions because of the honor he accorded to the deceased. Nevertheless, it is difficult, as one is required to rend his clothing over the death of an upright person. The Gemara answers: It was only necessary for the mishna to teach this halakha in a case where the deceased was not an upright person. The Gemara asks: And if one is standing close to the deceased when the soul leaves the body, he is obligated to rend his garment, as it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: One who is standing over the deceased at the time of the departure of the soul is obligated to rend his garment. To what is this similar? It is similar to a Torah scroll that was burned. The Gemara answers: It was only necessary for the mishna to teach this halakha in a case where he is not standing there at the time of the departure of the soul. The Gemara asks further: This works out well in terms of resolving the contradiction with regard to his dead relative. However, the contradiction between the ruling in the mishna that one who rends his garment in his anger is not liable, and the ruling in the baraita that one who rends his garment in his anger is liable, is still difficult. The mishna exempts one who rends garments in anger, while the baraita deems him liable. The Gemara answers: The contradiction between his anger in the mishna and his anger in the baraita is also not difficult, as this ruling in the baraita that deems him liable is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and that ruling in the mishna that exempts him is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara elaborates: This ruling in the baraita follows Rabbi Yehuda, who said that one who performs a prohibited labor on Shabbat that is not needed for its own sake is liable for performing it. Therefore, one who rends his garment in anger is liable. That ruling in the mishna which exempts him is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that one who performs a labor that is not needed for its own sake is exempt for performing it. The Gemara asks: Say that you heard that Rabbi Yehuda rules that one is liable for performing a labor not needed for its own sake in the case of a constructive act; did you hear him deem one liable in the case of a destructive act? Rabbi Avin said: This case, where one rends his garment in anger, is also constructive, because in doing so he assuages his anger. Rending his garment calms him; therefore, it can be said that he derives benefit from the act of rending, and it is consequently a constructive act. The Gemara asks: And is it at all permitted to tear in that manner? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Ḥilfa bar Agra, who said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: One who rends his garments in his anger, or who breaks his vessels in his anger, or who scatters his money in his anger, should be like an idol worshipper in your eyes, as that is the craft of the evil inclination. Today it tells him do this, and tomorrow it tells him do that, until eventually, when he no longer controls himself, it tells him worship idols and he goes and worships idols. Rabbi Avin said: What verse alludes to this? “There shall not be a strange god within you, and you shall not bow to a foreign god” (Psalms 81:10). What is the strange god that is within a person’s body? Say that it is the evil inclination. One may not rend his garments in anger, because in doing so he is deriving pleasure from satisfying the evil inclination. The Gemara answers: It is only necessary to discuss this in a case where one does so to instill fear in the members of his household. In order to show them that he is very angry, he tears and breaks objects even though he is not that angry. In that case he maintains control of himself and is not in danger of succumbing to the evil inclination. It is like the incident where Rav Yehuda sought to display his anger and he pulled threads off his garment. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov smashed broken vessels, Rav Sheshet threw small fish on his maidservant’s head, and Rabbi Abba broke the lid of a jug. All of these Sages caused minimal damage in creating the impression that they were angry. Apropos the laws of mourning for an upright person and a Torah scholar, the Gemara cites that which Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of Bar Kappara: Anyone who sheds tears over an upright person, the Holy One, Blessed be He, counts his tears and places them in His treasury, as it is stated: “You have counted my wanderings, put my tears into your bottle, are they not in your book?” (Psalms 56:9). Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Anyone who is lazy in eulogizing a Torah scholar, it is fitting to bury him alive, as it is stated: “And they buried him in the border of his inheritance in Timnat-seraḥ, which is in the hill-country of Ephraim, on the north of the mountain of Ga’ash” (Joshua 24:30). This teaches that the mountain raged against them to kill them because they did not eulogize him appropriately. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Whoever is lazy in eulogizing a Sage does not live a long life, and his punishment is measure for measure. Since he was unconcerned with the death of the Sage, in the heavens they will be unconcerned with his death. The Holy One, Blessed be He, conducts Himself in this manner, as it is stated: “In full measure [besase’a], when You send her away You contend with her” (Isaiah 27:8), and the Sages derived that God punishes from the words: “You contend with her,” and He does so measure for measure, se’a for se’a, from the word sase’a in the verse above. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba raised an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan: It is stated: “And the nation worshipped the Lord all the days of Joshua and all the days of the Elders, who lived many days after Joshua” (Judges 2:7), indicating that the Elders lived long lives even though they did not eulogize Joshua properly. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Babylonian, you should be more precise in your reading. They indeed lived many days; however, they did not live many years. In fact, they did not live to the end of that year. Again he asked: But then with regard to the verse “So that your days and the days of your children will multiply on the land which the Lord your God swore to give to your fathers, as the days of the heavens over the earth” (Deuteronomy 11:21), would you also say that here the reward is to live many days but not years? He answered him: A blessing is different and should be interpreted in its most expansive sense. And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one of the brothers dies,