בְּאוֹנֶס כָּאן בְּרָצוֹן וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא הָא וְהָא בְּאוֹנֶס וְלָא קַשְׁיָא כָּאן בְּאֵשֶׁת כֹּהֵן כָּאן בְּאֵשֶׁת יִשְׂרָאֵל with a rape, in which case it is not prohibited for the woman to return to her husband. There, it is referring to a woman who had relations willfully, and therefore she is forbidden to her husband. And if you wish, say that this and that are both dealing with a rape, and it is still not difficult. Here, where the transgression cannot be rectified, it is referring to one who raped the wife of a priest, as it is forbidden for a priest to have relations with his wife once she has intercourse with any other man, even unwillingly. There, it is referring to one who raped the wife of an Israelite, in which case there is no prohibition against her returning to her husband.
וְלַיּוֹצֵא וְלַבָּא אֵין שָׁלוֹם אָמַר רַב כֵּיוָן שֶׁיּוֹצֵא אָדָם מִדְּבַר הֲלָכָה לִדְבַר מִקְרָא שׁוּב אֵין לוֹ שָׁלוֹם Since the Gemara mentioned a Torah scholar who abandons the study of Torah, it cites a relevant verse: “Neither was there any peace to him that went out or came in due to the adversary” (Zechariah 8:10). Rav said: Once a person leaves the study of halakha, i.e., Mishna and Gemara, even for the study of the Torah itself, he will no longer have peace. The verses of the Torah are often obscure and it is difficult to learn halakha directly from them without the aid of the interpretations of the Talmud.
וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר זֶה הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מִתַּלְמוּד לְמִשְׁנָה וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר אֲפִילּוּ מִתַּלְמוּד לְתַלְמוּד: And Shmuel said: This is referring to one who leaves the study of Talmud to learn Mishna. Whereas the reasoning of the Talmud is relatively clear, the Mishna cites legal rulings without explaining their reasoning. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The verse applies even to one who leaves the study of one Talmud for the other Talmud, i.e., who leaves off his study of the Jerusalem Talmud to begin the Babylonian Talmud, as he will encounter difficulties with the new style of learning.
מַתְנִי׳ הֶיתֵּר נְדָרִים פּוֹרְחִין בָּאֲוִיר וְאֵין לָהֶם עַל מָה שֶׁיִּסָּמֵכוּ MISHNA: Incidental to the Festival peace-offering, the mishna describes the nature of various areas of Torah study. The halakhot of the dissolution of vows, when one requests from a Sage to dissolve them, fly in the air and have nothing to support them, as these halakhot are not mentioned explicitly in the Torah. There is only a slight allusion to the dissolution of vows in the Torah, which is taught by the Sages as part of the oral tradition.
הִלְכוֹת שַׁבָּת חֲגִיגוֹת וְהַמְּעִילוֹת הֲרֵי הֵם כַּהֲרָרִים הַתְּלוּיִן בִּשְׂעָרָהּ שֶׁהֵן מִקְרָא מוּעָט וַהֲלָכוֹת מְרוּבּוֹת הַדִּינִין וְהָעֲבוֹדוֹת הַטְּהָרוֹת וְהַטְּמָאוֹת וַעֲרָיוֹת יֵשׁ לָהֶן עַל מָה שֶׁיִּסָּמֵכוּ וְהֵן הֵן גּוּפֵי תוֹרָה: The halakhot of Shabbat, Festival peace-offerings, and misuse of consecrated property are like mountains suspended by a hair, as they have little written about them in the Torah, and yet the details of their halakhot are numerous. The details of monetary law, sacrificial rites, ritual purity and impurity, and the halakhot of those with whom relations are forbidden all have something to support them, i.e., there is ample basis in the Torah for these halakhot, and these are the essential parts of Torah.
גְּמָ׳ תַּנְיָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר יֵשׁ לָהֶם עַל מָה שֶׁיִּסָּמֵכוּ שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר כִּי יַפְלִיא כִּי יַפְלִיא שְׁתֵּי פְּעָמִים אַחַת הַפְלָאָה לְאִיסּוּר וְאַחַת הַפְלָאָה לְהֶיתֵּר GEMARA: It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer said: The halakhot of the dissolution of vows have something to support them, as it is stated: “When a man shall clearly utter a vow” (Leviticus 27:2), and: “When either man or woman shall clearly utter a vow” (Numbers 6:2), i.e., the words “clearly utter” appear twice. One clear utterance is for prohibition, i.e., when one states his intention to accept the vow, and one clear utterance is for dissolution, when he provides the Sage with a reason why the vow should no longer apply. This is an allusion in the Torah to the annulment of vows.
רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר יֵשׁ לָהֶם עַל מָה שֶׁיִּסָּמֵכוּ שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר אֲשֶׁר נִשְׁבַּעְתִּי בְאַפִּי בְּאַפִּי נִשְׁבַּעְתִּי וְחָזַרְתִּי בִּי Rabbi Yehoshua likewise says: These halakhot have something to support them, as it is stated: “Wherefore I swore in My wrath” (Psalms 95:11), meaning: In my wrath I swore, and I retracted. This is the basis for the dissolution of vows, in which the one who uttered the vow tells the Sage that he regrets it, as he did so in a moment of anger.
רַבִּי יִצְחָק אוֹמֵר יֵשׁ לָהֶם עַל מָה שֶׁיִּסָּמֵכוּ שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר כֹּל נְדִיב לִבּוֹ חֲנַנְיָה בֶּן אֲחִי רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר יֵשׁ לָהֶם עַל מָה שֶׁיִּסָּמֵכוּ שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר נִשְׁבַּעְתִּי וָאֲקַיֵּימָה לִשְׁמוֹר מִשְׁפְּטֵי צִדְקֶךָ Rabbi Yitzḥak says: These halakhot have something to support them, as it is stated: “Whoever is of a willing heart, let him bring it” (Exodus 35:5). This verse indicates that as long as one retains the same desire to fulfill the vow, he must continue to fulfill it, but if he regrets taking the vow he may arrange for it to be dissolved. Ḥananya, son of Rabbi Yehoshua’s brother, also says: They have something to support them, as it is stated: “I have sworn, and have fulfilled it, to observe your righteous ordinances” (Psalms 119:106). This verse indicates that certain oaths need not be fulfilled, i.e., those that have been dissolved.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל אִי הֲוַאי הָתָם אָמְרִי לְהוּ דִּידִי עֲדִיפָא מִדִּידְכוּ שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ הוּא אֵינוֹ מוֹחֵל אֲבָל אֲחֵרִים מוֹחֲלִין לוֹ אָמַר רָבָא לְכוּלְּהוּ אִית לְהוּ פִּירְכָא לְבַר מִדִּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּלֵית לֵיהּ פִּירְכָא Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: If I had been there, sitting with those Sages, I would have said to them: My source is better than yours, as it is stated: “He shall not nullify his word” (Numbers 30:3), from which it may be inferred: He himself cannot nullify his word; however, others, i.e., a Sage, may nullify it for him by dissolving his vow. Rava said: For all of the suggested sources for the dissolution of vows there is a possible refutation, except for that of Shmuel, for which there is no refutation.
דְּאִי מִדְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר דִּלְמָא כִּדְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה שֶׁאָמַר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן דְּתַנְיָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן לְעוֹלָם אֵין אֶחָד מֵהֶם נָזִיר שֶׁלֹּא נִיתְּנָה נְזִירוּת אֶלָּא לְהַפְלָאָה Rava elaborates. As, if it is derived from the statement of Rabbi Eliezer, perhaps the phrase: “Clearly utter” should be understood in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said an alternative interpretation in the name of Rabbi Tarfon. As it is taught in a baraita with regard to two people who are arguing whether or not someone who passed before them is a nazirite, each of them declaring that if he is correct he himself will become a nazirite, Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Tarfon: Actually, neither of them is a nazirite, as naziriteship is effected only by means of a clear utterance and neither party is certain they will be a nazirite at the time of their utterance. He derives this halakha from this phrase: “Clearly utter.”
אִי מִדְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ דִּלְמָא הָכִי קָאָמַר בְּאַפִּי נִשְׁבַּעְתִּי וְלָא הָדַרְנָא בִּי אִי מִדְּרַבִּי יִצְחָק דִּלְמָא לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִדִּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל גָּמַר בְּלִבּוֹ צָרִיךְ שֶׁיּוֹצִיא בִּשְׂפָתָיו וְהָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּלֹא הוֹצִיא בִּשְׂפָתָיו Similarly, if it is derived from the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua, perhaps this is what the verse is saying: In my wrath I swore and I do not take it back, despite the fact that it was stated in a moment of anger. If it is derived from the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, perhaps the phrase “a willing heart” comes to exclude the statement of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: If one decided in his heart but did not verbalize a vow, it is insufficient, as he must verbally express it. And therefore this phrase teaches us that even though he did not verbally express the vow he is still obligated to fulfill it.
אִי מִדַּחֲנַנְיָה בֶּן אֲחִי רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ דִּלְמָא כְּרַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב דְּאָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב מִנַּיִן שֶׁנִּשְׁבָּעִין לְקַיֵּים אֶת הַמִּצְוָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר נִשְׁבַּעְתִּי וָאֲקַיֵּימָה לִשְׁמוֹר מִשְׁפְּטֵי צִדְקֶךָ Finally, if it is derived from the statement of Rabbi Ḥananya, son of Rabbi Yehoshua’s brother, perhaps the phrase “and fulfilled it” should be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rav Giddel, who said that Rav said a different interpretation of this verse. As Rav Giddel said that Rav said: From where is it derived that although one is already obligated to fulfill all mitzvot one may take an oath to fulfill a mitzva, and this is not considered an oath taken in vain? As it is stated: “I have sworn, and have fulfilled it, to observe Your righteous ordinances” (Psalms 119:106).
אֶלָּא דִּשְׁמוּאֵל לֵית לֵיהּ פִּירְכָא אָמַר רָבָא וְאִיתֵּימָא רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק הַיְינוּ דְּאָמְרִי אִינָשֵׁי טָבָא חֲדָא פִּלְפַּלְתָּא חֲרִיפְתָּא מִמְּלֵי צַנָּא דְקָרֵי: Rav concludes. However, for Shmuel’s source there is no refutation. Rava said, and some say it was Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak who said: This explains the folk saying that people say: One spicy pepper is better than a basketful of squash, as the single pepper has more flavor than all the squash combined.
הִלְכוֹת שַׁבָּת מִיכְתָּב כְּתִיבָן לָא צְרִיכָא לְכִדְרַבִּי אַבָּא דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא הַחוֹפֵר גּוּמָּא בְּשַׁבָּת וְאֵין צָרִיךְ אֶלָּא לַעֲפָרָהּ פָּטוּר עָלֶיהָ § The mishna stated that the halakhot of Shabbat are like mountains suspended by a hair. The Gemara asks: But the halakhot of Shabbat are written, i.e., the prohibition against performing labor is explicit in the Torah. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to say this in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Abba. As Rabbi Abba said: One who digs a hole on Shabbat only because he needs its dirt and not for the hole itself is exempt from liability for that act, as this is not the labor of digging prohibited on Shabbat by Torah law.
כְּמַאן כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דְּאָמַר מְלָאכָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה לְגוּפָהּ פָּטוּר עָלֶיהָ The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion did Rabbi Abba issue this ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said: One who performs on Shabbat a labor that is not necessary for its own sake, i.e., he performs the labor for a purpose other than the direct result of the action, is exempt from liability for it.
אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה הָתָם מְתַקֵּן הָכָא מְקַלְקֵל הוּא The Gemara offers an alternative possibility. This ruling can be explained even if you say that Rabbi Abba holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, that one is liable for a labor that is not necessary for its own sake. There, in other cases, Rabbi Yehuda deems one liable because his purpose is creative. Here, where one is digging the hole for the dirt, the purpose is destructive, as the action damages the ground. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda concedes that in this case he is exempt.
מַאי כַּהֲרָרִין הַתְּלוּיִין בִּשְׂעָרָה The Gemara returns to the mishna. What then does the mishna mean by the phrase: Like mountains suspended by a hair?