(ב) וְהָיָ֛ה אִם־בִּ֥ן הַכּ֖וֹת הָרָשָׁ֑ע וְהִפִּיל֤וֹ הַשֹּׁפֵט֙ וְהִכָּ֣הוּ לְפָנָ֔יו כְּדֵ֥י רִשְׁעָת֖וֹ בְּמִסְפָּֽר׃
(2) if the guilty one is to be flogged, the magistrate shall have him lie down and be given lashes in his presence, by count, as his guilt warrants.
(ג) אַרְבָּעִ֥ים יַכֶּ֖נּוּ לֹ֣א יֹסִ֑יף פֶּן־יֹסִ֨יף לְהַכֹּת֤וֹ עַל־אֵ֙לֶּה֙ מַכָּ֣ה רַבָּ֔ה וְנִקְלָ֥ה אָחִ֖יךָ לְעֵינֶֽיךָ׃ (ס)
(3) He may be given up to forty lashes, but not more, lest being flogged further, to excess, your brother be degraded before your eyes.
ת"ש א"ר אלעזר בן יעקב שמעתי שב"ד מכין ועונשין שלא מן התורה ולא לעבור על דברי תורה אלא לעשות סייג לתורה ומעשה באדם אחד שרכב על סוס בשבת בימי יונים והביאוהו לב"ד וסקלוהו לא מפני שראוי לכך אלא שהשעה צריכה לכך
The Gemara cites yet another relevant source. Come and hear, as Rabbi Elazar ben Ya’akov said: I have heard that the reason why the court may administer lashes and punish not by Torah law, i.e., in response to actions for which one is not liable to receive punishment by Torah law, is not so as to transgress matters of Torah, but to establish a safeguard for the Torah. And an example of this is an incident involving a certain person who rode on a horse on Shabbat in the days of the Greeks, an act that is prohibited by rabbinic law, and they brought him to the court and they stoned him as a desecrator of Shabbat. They did so not because he was deserving of this, as riding a horse is not punishable by stoning by Torah law, but because the hour required it, as at that time Jews were negligent with regard to Shabbat observance.
מתני׳ כמה מלקין אותו ארבעים חסר אחת שנא' (דברים כה, ב) במספר ארבעים מנין שהוא סמוך לארבעים ר' יהודה אומר ארבעים שלימות הוא לוקה והיכן הוא לוקה את היתירה בין כתפיו
MISHNA: With how many lashes does one flog a person sentenced to receive lashes? One flogs him with forty lashes less one, as it is stated: “And he shall strike him before him, in accordance with his wickedness, by number. Forty he shall strike him, he shall not add” (Deuteronomy 25:2–3). The mishna joins the end of the first verse and the beginning of the second, forming the phrase: “By number, forty,” which is interpreted as: A sum adjacent to forty. Rabbi Yehuda says: He is flogged with a full forty lashes. And where is he flogged the extra lash? As the mishna proceeds to explain, the thirty-nine lashes are divided into three and administered in three places on the body of the person being flogged; according to Rabbi Yehuda there is one lash that remains. That lash is administered between his shoulders.
אין אומדין אותו אלא במכות ראויות להשתלש אמדוהו לקבל ארבעים ולוקה מקצת
One assesses the number of lashes that the one being punished is capable of withstanding only with a number of lashes fit to be divided into three equal groups. If the assessment was that he can survive twenty lashes, he is flogged with eighteen. Likewise, if doctors assessed concerning him that he is able to receive forty lashes and survive, and he is then flogged some of those forty lashes,
גמ׳ מ"ט אי כתיב ארבעים במספר הוה אמינא ארבעים במניינא השתא דכתיב במספר ארבעים מנין שהוא סוכם את הארבעים אמר רבא כמה טפשאי שאר אינשי דקיימי מקמי ספר תורה ולא קיימי מקמי גברא רבה דאילו בס"ת כתיב ארבעים ואתו רבנן בצרו חדא:
GEMARA: The Gemara begins with a discussion of the number of lashes. What is the reason that the Rabbis said that he receives forty lashes less one? If it had been written: Forty by number, I would say that it means forty as a precise sum; now that it is written: “By number, forty,” the reference is to a sum that approaches forty. Likewise, Rava said: How foolish are the rest of the people who stand before a Torah scroll that passes before them, and yet they do not stand before a great man, when a Sage passes before them; as in a Torah scroll, forty is written and the Sages came and subtracted one, establishing the number of lashes as thirty-nine. Apparently, the authority of the Sages is so great that they are able to amend an explicit Torah verse.
ואמדו שאין יכול לקבל ארבעים פטור אמדוהו לקבל שמונה עשרה ומשלקה אמדו שיכול הוא לקבל ארבעים פטור:
and then they assessed him again and concluded that he cannot receive forty lashes and survive, he is exempt from the additional lashes. If the doctors initially assessed concerning him that he is able to receive only eighteen lashes, and once he was flogged eighteen times they assessed that he is able to receive forty, he is exempt from receiving additional lashes.
אין אומדין אלא במכות הראויות וכו': לקה אין לא לקה לא
The mishna teaches: One assesses the number of lashes that the one being punished is capable of withstanding only with a number of lashes fit to be divided into three equal groups. If doctors assessed concerning him that he is able to receive forty lashes and survive, and he is then flogged some of those forty lashes, and they then assessed him again and concluded that he cannot receive forty lashes and survive, he is exempt from any additional lashes. If the doctors initially assessed concerning him that he is able to receive only eighteen lashes, and once he was flogged with eighteen lashes they assessed that he is able to receive forty, he is exempt from receiving further lashes. The Gemara infers: If he was flogged in practice, yes, he is exempt; if he was not flogged, no, he is not exempt from the rest of the forty lashes.
רבי יהודה אומר ארבעים שלימות וכו' [בין כתפיו]: אמר ר' יצחק מאי טעמא דרבי יהודה דכתיב (זכריה יג, ו) מה המכות האלה בין ידיך ואמר אשר הכתי בית מאהבי ורבנן ההוא בתינוקות של בית רבן הוא דכתיב:
The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yehuda says: He is flogged with a full forty lashes, with the additional lash administered between his shoulders. Rabbi Yitzḥak says: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? It is as it is written: “And one shall say to him: What are these wounds between your arms? Then he shall answer: Those with which I was wounded in the house of my friends” (Zechariah 13:6). Rabbi Yehuda understands that this verse is referring to one with wounds from lashes administered between his arms, indicating that there is one lash administered between the shoulders. And how do the Rabbis, who hold that one is flogged only thirty-nine lashes, explain this verse? They explain that this verse is written with regard to schoolchildren struck by their teacher for laxity in their studies, and is not referring to lashes administered by the court.
אמר רב ששת משום רבי אלעזר בן עזריה מנין לרצועה שהיא של עגל דכתיב (דברים כה, ג) ארבעים יכנו וסמיך ליה (דברים כה, ד) לא תחסום שור בדישו
Rav Sheshet says in the name of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya: From where is it derived with regard to the strap used for flogging that it is a strap from the hide of a calf? It is as it is written: “Forty he shall flog him,” and juxtaposed to it is written: “You shall not muzzle an ox in its threshing” (Deuteronomy 25:4), indicating that the strap is from the hide of an ox.
המכה מכה בידו: תנו רבנן אין מעמידין חזנין אלא חסירי כח ויתירי מדע רבי יהודה אומר אפילו חסירי מדע ויתירי כח
§ The mishna teaches: And the attendant flogging the one receiving lashes flogs him with one hand with all his strength. The Sages taught: For the administration of lashes, the court appoints only attendants who are lacking in strength and are exceedingly knowledgeable in Torah. Rabbi Yehuda says: The court may appoint even those who are lacking in knowledge and are exceedingly strong.
(א) כְּשֵׁם שֶׁמִּצְוָה לְהָמִית אֶת הַמְחֻיָּב מִיתָה כָּךְ מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה לְהַלְקוֹת אֶת הַמְחֻיָּב מַלְקוֹת. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כה ב) "וְהִפִּילוֹ הַשֹּׁפֵט וְהִכָּהוּ לְפָנָיו". וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁמַּלְקוֹת בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה בִּמְקוֹם מִיתָה הִיא עוֹמֶדֶת:
There is a chiyuv to kill a killer, therefore, there is a mitzvah to lash someone who is chayav for lashes. As it says, 'And the judge should cause him to fall and will have him beaten in his presence.' Although transgressions punishable by lashes are adjudicated by three judges, lashes are equivalent to execution.
מַלְקִין בַּזְּמַן הַזֶּה בְּכָל מָקוֹם מִן הַתּוֹרָה בִּפְנֵי שְׁלֹשָׁה סְמוּכִין אֲבָל לֹא בִּפְנֵי הֶדְיוֹטוֹת:
Nowadays, we can still do malkot if we have 3 dayanim.
וְכָל מַלְקִיּוֹת שֶׁמַּלְקִין דַּיָּנֵי חוּצָה לָאָרֶץ בְּכָל מָקוֹם אֵינָהּ אֶלָּא מַכַּת מַרְדּוּת:
All the lashes that are administered by the judges of the diaspora in every place are makkot mardut, aka rabbinic.
אֵין אָדָם לוֹקֶה אֶלָּא בְּעֵדִים וְהַתְרָאָה וּבוֹדְקִין הָעֵדִים בִּדְרִישָׁה וּבַחֲקִירָה כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁעוֹשִׂים בְּדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת. עָבַר עַל לָאו שֶׁנִּתַּק לַעֲשֵׂה וְהִתְרוּ בּוֹ וְאָמְרוּ לוֹ אַל תַּעֲשֶׂה דָּבָר זֶה שֶׁאִם תַּעֲשֶׂנּוּ וְלֹא תְּקַיֵּם עֲשֵׂה שֶׁבּוֹ תִּלְקֶה. וְעָבַר וְלֹא קִיֵּם הָעֲשֵׂה הֲרֵי זֶה לוֹקֶה. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהַתְרָאָה בְּסָפֵק הִיא שֶׁאִם יְקַיֵּם יִפָּטֵר הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק הַתְרָאָה הִיא:
A person is liable to lashes only when there have been witnesses and a due warning. The witnesses are subjected to an examination and searching inquiry, as it is practiced in capital cases.
עָבַר עֲבֵרָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ מַלְקוֹת וּמִיתַת בֵּית דִּין כְּאַחַת כְּגוֹן שֶׁשָּׁחַט אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. אִם הִתְרוּ בּוֹ לְמִיתָה סוֹקְלִין אוֹתוֹ וְאֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה שֶׁהֲרֵי נִתְחַיֵּב בְּדִין גָּדוֹל מִזֶּה. וְאִם הִתְרוּ בּוֹ לְמַלְקוֹת בִּלְבַד לוֹקֶה:
The following rules apply when a person performs a prohibited act that is punishable both by lashes and execution by the court, e.g., he slaughtered an animal and its offspring on the same day as a sacrifice to a false divinity. If he was warned that his act is punishable by execution, he is stoned to death and is not given lashes, for he is obligated for a more severe judgment. If he was given a warning only for lashes, he receives lashes.
אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ שְׁנֵי עֵדִים לְמַלְקוֹת אֶלָּא בִּשְׁעַת מַעֲשֶׂה אֲבָל הָאִסּוּר עַצְמוֹ בְּעֵד אֶחָד יֻחְזַק. כֵּיצַד. אָמַר עֵד אֶחָד חֵלֶב כְּלָיוֹת הוּא זֶה. כִּלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם הֵם פֵּרוֹת אֵלּוּ. גְּרוּשָׁה אוֹ זוֹנָה אִשָּׁה זוֹ. וְאָכַל אוֹ בָּעַל בְּעֵדִים אַחַר שֶׁהִתְרָה בּוֹ. הֲרֵי זֶה לוֹקֶה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁעִקַּר הָאִסּוּר בְּעֵד אֶחָד. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים שֶׁלֹּא הִכְחִישׁ הָעֵד בְּעֵת שֶׁקָּבַע הָאִסּוּר. אֲבָל אִם אָמַר אֵינוֹ חֵלֶב זֶה. וְזוֹ אֵינָהּ גְּרוּשָׁה. וְאָכַל אוֹ בָּעַל אַחַר שֶׁהִכְחִישׁ. אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה עַד שֶׁיִּקְבְּעוּ הָאִסּוּר שְׁנֵי עֵדִים:
There is no need for the two witnesses who obligate a person for lashes, to observe other than at the time the transgression is committed. The prohibition itself, by contrast, can be established on the basis of one witness.
What is implied? One witness said: 'This substance is fat from the kidneys, 'These grapes were grown together with grain in a vineyard, 'This woman is a divorcee or a zonah." If a person partook of this food or had relations with these women after he was warned, he receives lashes, despite the fact that the essence of the prohibition was established by one witness.
When does the above apply? When he did not contradict the witness when he established the prohibition. If, however, he said: "This is not fat," "She is not a divorcee," and then he partook of the food or had relations with the woman after his denial, he does not receive lashes until the prohibition was established through the testimony of two witnesses.
הָאִישׁ הַמַּכֶּה צָרִיךְ לִהְיוֹת יָתֵר בְּדֵעָה וְחָסֵר בְּכֹחַ. וּמַגְבִּיהַּ אֶת הָרְצוּעוֹת בִּשְׁתֵּי יָדָיו וּמַכֶּה בְּיָדוֹ אַחַת בְּכָל כֹּחוֹ. וּמַלְקֵהוּ שְׁלִישׁ מִלְּפָנָיו [עַל חָזֵהוּ] בֵּין דָּדָיו וּשְׁנֵי שְׁלִישִׁים מֵאֲחוֹרָיו. שְׁלִישׁ עַל כָּתֵף זֶה וּשְׁלִישׁ עַל כָּתֵף זֶה:
The man administering the lashes should be heavily endowed with knowledge and minimally endowed with physical power. He should lift up the strap with both his hands and strike him with one hand, with all his power.
He should strike him with a third of the lashes on his front, i.e., on his breast, between his nipples, and the second third of the lashes on his back, one third on one shoulder and the other third on the other shoulder.
הַמֻּכֶּה אֵינוֹ עוֹמֵד וְלֹא יוֹשֵׁב אֶלָּא מֻטֶּה. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כה ב) "וְהִפִּילוֹ הַשֹּׁפֵט וְהִכָּהוּ לְפָנָיו" שֶׁיְּהוּ עֵינָיו שֶׁל שׁוֹפֵט בּוֹ לֹא שֶׁיִּהְיֶה מַבִּיט בְּדָבָר אַחֵר וּמַכֵּהוּ מִכָּאן שֶׁאֵין מַכִּים שְׁנַיִם כְּאֶחָד:
The person receiving the lashes should not stand, nor should he sit. Instead, he should bend over as it states: "The judge shall cast him down." The verse continues: "And he shall strike him before him." This implies that the attention of the judge should be focused upon him. He should not look at other matters while having him lashed. From this, we learn that two people are never lashed at the same time.
(יא) הַגָּדוֹל שֶׁבַּדַּיָּנִים קוֹרֵא כָּל זְמַן שֶׁזֶּה לוֹקֶה (דברים כח נח) "אִם לֹא תִשְׁמֹר לַעֲשׂוֹת". (דברים כח נט) "וְהִפְלָא ה' אֶת מַכֹּתְךָ". וּמִתְכַּוֵּן שֶׁיִּגְמֹר הַפְּסוּקִים עִם הַמַּלְקִיּוֹת. וְאִם לֹא גָּמַר חוֹזֵר לִתְחִלַּת הַמִּקְרָא וְקוֹרֵא וְחוֹזֵר וְקוֹרֵא עַד שֶׁתִּגָּמֵר כָּל הַהַכָּאָה. וְהַשֵּׁנִי שֶׁבַּדַּיָּנִים מוֹנֶה וְהַשְּׁלִישִׁי אוֹמֵר לַחַזָּן הַכֵּה. כָּל זְמַן שֶׁמַּכֶּה עַל פִּיו הוּא מַכֶּה:
Through the time the person is being lashed, the judge of the highest stature reads the passage, "If you are not careful to heed and to perform... in an extraordinary way, God will increase the blows against you and your offspring...." He should have the intent to complete the passage with the lashes. If the lashes are not completed, he should return to the beginning of the passage and read it again - and again if necessary until all the lashes are administered.
The judge of intermediate stature counts the lashes and the third judge tells the attendant before each blow: "Strike him." Throughout the entire time he administers the lashes, he does so following the judge's instruction.
(יב) מֵת תַּחַת יָדוֹ פָּטוּר. וְאִם הוֹסִיף רְצוּעָה אַחַת עַל הָאֹמֶד וּמֵת הֲרֵי הַחַזָּן גּוֹלֶה. וְאִם לֹא מֵת הֲרֵי הַחַזָּן עָבַר עַל מִצְוַת לֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כה ג) "לֹא יֹסִיף". וְהוּא הַדִּין לְכָל מַכֶּה אֶת חֲבֵרוֹ שֶׁהוּא בְּלֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה. וּמָה אִם זֶה שֶׁנָּתְנָה תּוֹרָה רְשׁוּת לְהַכּוֹתוֹ צִוָּה הַכָּתוּב שֶׁלֹּא לְהַכּוֹתוֹ עַל רִשְׁעוֹ קַל וָחֹמֶר לִשְׁאָר כָּל הָאָדָם. לְפִיכָךְ כָּל הַמַּכֶּה אֶת חֲבֵרוֹ אֲפִלּוּ הִכָּה עֶבֶד הַכָּאָה שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ שְׁוֵה פְּרוּטָה לוֹקֶה. אֲבָל אִם יֵשׁ בָּהּ שְׁוֵה פְּרוּטָה הוֹאִיל וְהוּא חַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם מָמוֹן אֵין אָדָם מְשַׁלֵּם וְלוֹקֶה כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ בְּכַמָּה מְקוֹמוֹת:
If the person receiving the lashes dies while receiving them, the attendant administering them is not liable. If he added another blow to the estimate arrived at by the judges and the person receiving the lashes dies, the attendant is exiled. If he does not die, the attendant is held liable for transgressing a negative commandment, as itstates: "Do not add."
Similarly, any other person who strikes a colleague violates a negative commandment. If a person who was given permission by the Torah to strike a colleague is warned not to strike him more than is required to punish his wickedness, certainly, this applies with regard to other people. For this reason, whenever a person strikes a colleague - even a servant - with a blow for which the victim would not receive a p'rutah in damages, the offender should be lashed. If, however, the blow is worth a p'rutah in damages, the offender is not lashed. The rationale is that he is obligated to make financial restitution, and a person never both receives lashes and is required to make financial restitution, as explained previously in several places.
(ד) יֵשׁ לְבֵית דִּין לְהַלְקוֹת מִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְחֻיַּב מַלְקוֹת וְלַהֲרֹג מִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְחֻיַּב מִיתָה וְלֹא לַעֲבֹר עַל דִּבְרֵי תּוֹרָה אֶלָּא לַעֲשׂוֹת סְיָג לַתּוֹרָה. וְכֵיוָן שֶׁרוֹאִים בֵּית דִּין שֶׁפָּרְצוּ הָעָם בַּדָּבָר יֵשׁ לָהֶן לִגְדֹּר וּלְחַזֵּק הַדָּבָר כְּפִי מַה שֶּׁיֵּרָאֶה לָהֶם הַכּל הוֹרָאַת שָׁעָה לֹא שֶׁיִּקְבַּע הֲלָכָה לְדוֹרוֹת. מַעֲשֶׂה וְהִלְקוּ אָדָם שֶׁבָּעַל אִשְׁתּוֹ תַּחַת אִילָן. וּמַעֲשֶׂה בְּאֶחָד שֶׁרָכַב עַל סוּס בְּשַׁבָּת בִּימֵי יְוָנִים וֶהֱבִיאוּהוּ לְבֵית דִּין וּסְקָלוּהוּ. וּמַעֲשֶׂה וְתָלָה שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן שֶׁטַח שְׁמוֹנִים נָשִׁים בְּיוֹם אֶחָד בְּאַשְׁקְלוֹן וְלֹא הָיוּ שָׁם כָּל דַּרְכֵי הַדְּרִישָׁה וַחֲקִירָה וְהַהַתְרָאָה וְלֹא בְּעֵדוּת בְּרוּרָה אֶלָּא הוֹרָאַת שָׁעָה כְּפִי מַה שֶּׁרָאָה:
A court has the authority to administer lashes to a person who is not required to receive lashes and to execute a person who is not liable to be executed. This license was not granted to overstep the words of the Torah, but rather to create a fence around the words of the Torah. When the court sees that the people have broken the accepted norms with regard to a matter, they may establish safeguards to strengthen the matter according to what appears necessary to them. All the above applies with regard to establishing directives for the immediate time, and not with regard to the establishment of halachah for all time.
An incident occurred where they had a man lashed for engaging in relations with his wife under a tree. And an incident occurred concerning a person who rode on a horse on the Sabbath in the era of the Greeks and they brought him to the court and had him stoned to death. And an incident occurred and Shimon ben Shetach hung 80 women on one day in Ashkelon. All of the required processes of questioning, cross-examination, and warnings were not followed, nor was the testimony unequivocal. Instead, their execution was a directive for that immediate time according to what he perceived as necessary.
וְכֵן יֵשׁ לְבֵית דִּין בְּכָל מָקוֹם וּבְכָל זְמַן לְהַלְקוֹת אָדָם שֶׁשְּׁמוּעָתוֹ רָעָה וְהָעָם מְרַנְּנִים עָלָיו שֶׁהוּא עוֹבֵר עַל הָעֲרָיוֹת וְהוּא שֶׁיִּהְיֶה קוֹל שֶׁאֵינוֹ פּוֹסֵק כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ וְלֹא יִהְיוּ אֵלּוּ אוֹיְבִים יְדוּעִים שֶׁמּוֹצִיאִין עָלָיו שְׁמוּעָה רָעָה. וְכֵן מְבַזִּין אֶת זֶה שֶׁשְּׁמוּעָתוֹ רָעָה וּמְחָרְפִין אֶת יוֹלַדְתּוֹ בְּפָנָיו:
Similarly, at any time, and in any place, a court has the license to give a person lashes if he has a reputation for immorality and people gossip about him, saying that he acts licentiously. This applies provided the rumor is heard continuously, as we explained, and he does not have any known enemies who would spread this unfavorable report. Similarly, a person with such an unsavory reputation may be humiliated and scorn may be heaped on his mother in his presence.
מדיני המצוה. מה שאמרו זכרונם לברכה (סנהדרין טז ב), כשאומדין את החוטא כמה מכות הוא יכול לסבול אין אומדין אותו אלא במכות הראויות להשתלש, אמדוהו שהוא יכול לקבל עשרים אין אומרין ילקה אחת ועשרים שהן משלשות, אלא ילקה שמנה עשרה. ומי שאמדוהו ללקות וכשהתחילו להלקות נתקלקל ברעי או במי רגלים, אין מלקין אותו יותר, שנאמר (דברים כה ג) ונקלה אחיך לעיניך מכיון שנקלה נפטר. נפסקה הרצועה קודם שגמרו להלקותו ואפילו במכה הראשונה פטור. כפתוהו על העמוד ונתק המיתרים בכחו וברח פטור. כל מי שחטא ולקה חוזר לכשרותו, שנאמר ונקלה אחיך, כיון שנקלה אחיך הוא. ואף כל מחיבי כריתות שלקו אמרו זכרונם לברכה (מכות כג א) שנפטר מידי כריתתן. ויתר פרטי המצוה, מבארין במסכת מכות [פרק שלישי].
From the laws of the commandment is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (see Mishneh Torah, The Sanhedrin and the Penalties within their Jurisdiction 16:2) [that] when we estimate how many strikes the sinner can withstand, we only estimate with [a number] of strikes that is divisible by three. If they estimated about him that he could take twenty, we do not say to lash him twenty-one - since they are divisible by three - but rather we lash him eighteen. And [regarding] one who was estimated for lashes, and when they began to lash him, he broke down and defecated or urinated, we do not lash him any more, as it states (Deuteronomy 25:3), "and your brother be degraded before your eyes" - from when he is degraded, he is exempted. If the strap split before they finished lashing him - even after the first strike - he is exempted. [If] they tied him to the column and he took off the strings with his strength and ran away, he is exempt. Anyone who has sinned and is lashed goes back to being [considered] proper, as it states, "and your brother be degraded" - once he is degraded, he is your brother. And even [about] all those obligated in excision that received lashes, they, may their memory be blessed, said (Makkot 23a) that [they are] exempted from their excisions. And the rest of the details of the commandment are explained in Tractate Makkot [in the third chapter].
הכהו מכה שאין בה שוה פרוטה לוקה כיון שאין בה חיוב ממון ואפי' הכה עבד כנעני לוקה הוא שהרי חייב במצות:
אף ע"פ שלא הי' דנין בחוצה לארץ דיני נפשות ודיני מכות ולא קנסות אם ראו בית דין שצורך שעה הוא שהעם פרוצים בעבירות דנין בין מיתה בין ממון בין כל מיני עונש. ואם הוא אלם חובטים אותו על ידי עכו"ם ואומרים לו עשה מה שישראל אומר לך: וכתב רב אלפס בפרק הגוזל בהא דקנסיה רב נחמן לההוא גברא דגזלן עתיקא הוה ש"מ דקנסינן בכי האי גוונא אפילו בח"ל. ודוקא גדול הדור כמו רב נחמן דחתניה דבי נשיאה הוה וממונה לדון ע"פ הנשיא או טובי העיר שהמחום רבים עליהם אבל דייני דעלמא לא ע"כ. ונראה שאפי' אין בדבר עדות גמורה שהיה מתחייב על פיהם בדין בשעה שהיו דנין דיני נפשות אלא שיש רגלים לדבר וקלא דלא פסיק אם נראה לדיין שיש צורך השעה לדונו בכך הרשות בידו:
בית דין מכין ועונשין לצורך שעה ובו סעיף א:
כל ב"ד אפילו אינם סמוכים בא"י אם רואים שהעם פרוצים בעבירות (ושהוא צורך שעה) (טור) דנין בין מיתה בין ממון בין כל דיני עונש ואפילו אין בדבר עדות גמורה ואם הוא אלם חובטים אותו ע"י עכו"ם (ויש להם כח להפקיר ממונו ולאבדו כפי מה שרואים לגדור פרצת הדור) (טור בשם הרמב"ם בפרק כ"ד מסנהדרין) וכל מעשיהם יהיו לשם שמים ודוקא גדול הדור או טובי העיר שהמחום ב"ד עליהם: הגה וכן נוהגין בכל מקום שטובי העיר בעירן כב"ד הגדול ומכין ועונשין והפקרן הפקר כפי המנהג אע"פ שיש חולקין וס"ל דאין כח ביד טובי העיר באלה רק להכריח הציבור במה שהיה מנהג מקדם או שקבלו עליהם מדעת כולם אבל אינן רשאין לשנות דבר במידי דאיכא רווחא להאי ופסידא להאי או להפקיע ממון שלא מדעת כולם (מרדכי פרק הגוזל בתרא) מ"מ הולכין אחר מנהג העיר וכ"ש אם קבלום עליהם לכל דבר כן נ"ל (וע' בי"ד סי' רכ"ח דיני תקנות וחרמי צבור) כתבו האחרונים בתשובותיהם דמי שנתחייב מלקות יתן ארבעים זהובים במקום מלקות (מהרי"ו סי' קמ"ז ומהר"ם מריזבורג) ולאו דינא קאמר אלא שהם פסקו כך לפי שעה אבל ביד הב"ד להלקותו או ליטול ממון כפי ראות עיניהם לפי הענין למיגדר מלתא (וע"ל ריש סי' תכ"ה בהג"ה):
כל ב"ד אפילו אינם סמוכים בא"י אם רואים שהעם פרוצים בעבירות (ושהוא צורך שעה) (טור) דנין בין מיתה בין ממון בין כל דיני עונש ואפילו אין בדבר עדות גמורה ואם הוא אלם חובטים אותו ע"י עכו"ם (ויש להם כח להפקיר ממונו ולאבדו כפי מה שרואים לגדור פרצת הדור) (טור בשם הרמב"ם בפרק כ"ד מסנהדרין) וכל מעשיהם יהיו לשם שמים ודוקא גדול הדור או טובי העיר שהמחום ב"ד עליהם: הגה וכן נוהגין בכל מקום שטובי העיר בעירן כב"ד הגדול ומכין ועונשין והפקרן הפקר כפי המנהג אע"פ שיש חולקין וס"ל דאין כח ביד טובי העיר באלה רק להכריח הציבור במה שהיה מנהג מקדם או שקבלו עליהם מדעת כולם אבל אינן רשאין לשנות דבר במידי דאיכא רווחא להאי ופסידא להאי או להפקיע ממון שלא מדעת כולם (מרדכי פרק הגוזל בתרא) מ"מ הולכין אחר מנהג העיר וכ"ש אם קבלום עליהם לכל דבר כן נ"ל (וע' בי"ד סי' רכ"ח דיני תקנות וחרמי צבור) כתבו האחרונים בתשובותיהם דמי שנתחייב מלקות יתן ארבעים זהובים במקום מלקות (מהרי"ו סי' קמ"ז ומהר"ם מריזבורג) ולאו דינא קאמר אלא שהם פסקו כך לפי שעה אבל ביד הב"ד להלקותו או ליטול ממון כפי ראות עיניהם לפי הענין למיגדר מלתא (וע"ל ריש סי' תכ"ה בהג"ה):
Every Court of Law,2Even a Court of Law outside the Land of Israel — M.E. even [one whose members] are not duly ordained in the Land of Israel,3 supra § 1, n. 14. — if they see that the people are unrestrained in [committing] sins,4Even if there is one individual who is in the habit of violating the law, he may be penalized by the Court of Law, although the punishment meted out is not in accordance with Biblical law, only that when the people as a whole are unrestrained in transgressing laws, they may enact measures as a safeguard and they may inflict penalties on any one person for the infringement of their rules even if they did not see that person committing sins unrestrainably — M.E. and [provided] that the exigencies of the hour demand it,5Tur — G. It may, however, be asked (in accordance with the interpretation of M.E.), why should an individual transgressor be considered as falling under the category of ‘exigencies of the hour?’ This should, therefore, be understood as follows: If we withhold punishment from an habitual individual sinner, others will learn from his evil ways and will likewise become unrestrained in the commission of sins. Hence, the exigencies of the hour apply here too (Tummim). Others, however, maintain that the individual may be penalized even when the foregoing reason is not applicable (Shebuth Ya‘akob) — P.Tesh. may pass judgment both [with respect to] death6Derived from San. 46a, Yeb. 90b: ‘It was taught, R. Eliezer b. Jacob stated: I heard that the Court of Law may (whenever necessary) administer punishment by lashes and impose (capital) sentences, even though not (warranted) by Biblical law; not for the purpose of disregarding the Torah but in order to make a fence around the Torah. It once happened that a man rode on horseback on the Sabbath during the Greek period and was brought before the Court of Law and was stoned, not because he was liable to this penalty, but because the needs of the hour demanded it. It also happened that a man had intercourse with his wife under a fig tree and was brought before the Court of Law and was flogged, not because he deserved it, but because the needs of the hour demanded it.’ N.Yos., however, writes that the above penalties were imposed by the Great Sanhedrin but any other Court of Law does not have the authority to administer such punishment. He adduces the following text to prove his point: San. 52b: ‘Immarta, the daughter of Tali, a Kohen, committed adultery. In consequence of that, R. Ḥama b. Tobiah had her surrounded by faggots and burnt. R. Joseph said: He (R. Ḥama) was unaware of two laws. He was unaware of R. Mathna’s statement (that burning was executed by pouring molten lead down the culprit’s throat) and was ignorant of the following Baraitha: And thou shalt come unto the priests, the Levites, and unto the judge that shall be in those days (Deut. XVII, 9). This teaches that when the priesthood operates (in the Temple), the Judge operates (with respect to capital punishment) ; but when the priesthood does not operate, the Judge may not function.’ Hence, R. Ḥama, who flourished after the destruction of the Temple had no authority to impose capital punishment. N.Yos. cites additional cases to corroborate his viewpoint: Nid. 13b, San. 58b: ‘R. Ḥama had the hand of one who was accustomed to strike other people cut off.’ San. 27a: ‘The Exilarch (Resh Galutha) said to R. Abba b. Jacob, Go and investigate the matter; if he is definitely the murderer, dim his eyes.’ In these latter cases only partial punishment was administered but not full punishment in accordance with Biblical law. However, N.Yos. is opposed by the Codifiers (v. also D.M.) who hold that if the needs of the hour demand it even full punishment may be meted out including capital sentences although it would not be in accordance with Biblical law where legal warning and valid witnesses are required which would be difficult to obtain nowadays as a result of which the world would become full of violence and ultimately destroyed. Cf. ‘Jerusalem was destroyed because judgments were rendered in accordance with strict Biblical law’ (B.M. 30b). Thus RaShBA, N, and Asheri in Resp. Hence, Caro’s ruling here. , also the case of Simeon b. Shetaḥ in Mishna San. 45b who hanged eighty women at Ashkelon. and monetary [penalties]7M.K. 16a; B.K. 96b. as well as [to administer] all laws of punishment,8Ibid. even if in the case [in question] there is no valid evidence [available].9Kid. 81a; San. 26b and Tosaf. s.v. החשוד; Tur citing Yad, Sanhedrin XXIV, 4. This means that there was no legal warning given by witnesses to the offender immediately before committing the offense. For witnesses and legal warning are required only when adjudicating a Biblical law, but one who disobeys the ordinances of the country may be penalized according to the needs of the hour (N in Resp.) — M.E., ShaK. In capital cases the consent of the town Elders is required after due deliberation (B.Yos. citing RaShBA) — M.E. And if he is a stern individual, they may flog him by means of heathen authorities.10Derived from Mishna Git. 88b: ‘A heathen court may impose flogging upon a man and say to him, Do whatever the Israelite (authorities) tell you.’ Since Caro does not record here the latter statement of the Mishna (as found in Tur), viz., ‘and say to him, Do whatver the Israelite (authorities) tell you,’ it follows that even the final legal proceedings may be carried out by the heathen authorities since the offender is a very harsh person and the penalty is not in accordance with Biblical law — M.E. For only in the case of a Get (as in Git. ibid.) must the final legal proceedings be executed by Israelite authorities in order that it be considered valid — Nethiboth. , also infra § 26. And they have authority to expropriate his property and to forfeit it according to whatever they see fit in order to fence in the lawlessness of the generation.11Tur on the authority of Yad, Sanhedrin XXIV, 4-10 — G. Derived from M.K. 16a where Scriptural verses are adduced whence we derive that we have the authority to excommunicate persons refusing to obey the summons of the Court, to pronounce the Ḥerem (v. Glos.), to forfeit property, to curse, to smite, to pluck one’s hair, to adjure (so that one desists from malpractices), to fetter, to arrest and to prosecute. ‘We administer flogging on account of an evil rumour, because it is said, Nay (al), my sons; for it is no good report that I hear’ (I Sam. II, 24) — Kid. 81a. This has reference to an uninterrupted rumour not due to intimidation and where no enemies are about who might have published the rumour — Yeb. 25a. Cf. Tur. O.Ḥ. § 1 , also Git. 36b on the Rabbis’ power to expropriate one’s property; also Meg. 25b where it is stated that it is permissible to abuse a person of ill fame. The latter statement refers to an ordinary person but not to a scholar (RaN). Cf. Men. 99b: ‘Resh Lakish said, A scholar-disciple who has committed a misdeed should not be reproached in public because it is said, Therefore shalt thou stumble in the day and the prophet also shall stumble with thee in the night (Hos. IV, 5), that is to say, Keep it dark like night.’ The par. passage in M.K. 17a reads that ‘they do not place him under the ban.’ Some Later Authorities rule that the Court of Law has the power only to declare a debt cancelled but they cannot take possession of the money or the like on behalf of a person before it reaches the latter’s hand (Birke Yosef). Others (on the basis of Git. 36b) hold that the Court of Law does have this authority even before it reaches the latter’s hand — P.Tesh. All their acts, however, should be [done] for the sake of Heaven.12Cf. San. 46a: ‘Not with the purpose of disregarding the Torah, but in order to safeguard it.’ And [this should be executed] only [by] a great personage of the generation13Derived from B.K. 96b regarding the man who misappropriated a pair of oxen and was penalized by R. Naḥman, whence we see that only a distinguished personage like R. Naḥman who was the son-in-law of the Nasi’s house had the power to impose penalties. or [by] the representatives of the town14 B.B. 8b. whom they [i.e., the people] have recognized as the Court of Law over them.15Tur has שהמחום רבים עליהם ‘whom the public recognized as authorities over themselves.’ Gloss: And thus is the accepted practice everywhere, [viz.,] that the representatives of the town are regarded in their [own] town [as authoritative] as the [former] Great Sanhedrin.16Mord. (B.M. II beg.) on the authority of R. Gershon states: ‘Whosoever is appointed a leader of the community is regarded like the mightiest of the mighty and Jepthah in his generation is like Samuel in his generation (R.H. 25b) and whatever he does is considered binding.’ Thus also RaShBA — M.E. They may administer flogging and impose [death] penalties and their expropriation [of one's property] is considered valid according to the adopted custom,17MaHaRIK (Rt. I, XIV) writes that even according to the opinion that the representatives of the town have the power to enact measures as they see fit, it applies only to communal needs but not with respect to cancelling a debt of one individual for the benefit of another which does not fall under the category of communal needs. Thus also Isserlein in his Decisions. Furthermore, only one who is a distinguished personage in his generation may expropriate property — M.E. Cf. supra n. 13. If the custom in the community is to submit the matter to arbitration by one litigant choosing one person and the other litigant choosing another person and the Head of the Court of Law acting as the third, — this practice should not be altered — P.Tesh. although there are some who differ and are of the opinion that the representatives of the town have no power in these [matters] save that they [have the authority] to compel the community in [observing] whatever was an adopted practice heretofore,18B.B. 8b: ‘The townspeople have a right to stipulate meassures, prices of food and wages of labourers and to remove (place outside of the protection of the law — Rashi) those who disregard the terms fixed by the authorities (ולהסיע על קיצתן). The dissenting opinion takes ולהסיע as referring to ‘measures etc.,’ i.e., just as in the latter case it must be with the consent of all, so too in the case of ‘terms fixed by the authorities,’ the consent of all is required. The first opinion takes ולהסיע as a separate measure. Hence, the consent of all is not required — W.G. Cf. also Y. Meg. III, 2(74a) : ‘The seven representatives of the town are regarded as the (entire) town. What are we treating of? If they (the townspeople) accepted them, then even if one (was appointed his decision should be binding upon all the townspeople) ; if they did not accept them, then even many (i.e., more than seven cannot enforce their rulings upon the townspeople). We, therefore, deal here with an undefined case (i.e., the townspeople appointed them to look after the communal matters, without specifying which matter they delegated to them, and the town representatives sold aught without consulting the people, we are therefore, informed that their transaction is binding).’ or they accepted upon themselves [a new measure] with the consent of all [the townspeople],19e., by mere speech the matter becomes binding even in a matter concerning which no adopted practice existed formerly — M.E. but they may change naught in any matter that would involve a gain for one person and a loss for another20For this does not come under the category of safeguarding a cause — M.E. , also Ḥid. Hag. P. Tesh cites the case of the controversy around the Sulzbach edition of the Talmud. The latter was forbidden to be printed until a certain period would elapse after the Amsterdam edition of the Talmud was published. Certain authorities ruled that the purchasers of the Sulzbach ed. were prohibited to study in it. Zikron Ya‘akob, however, on the basis of the present ruling, held that since this prohibition would involve a gain for one (i.e., the Amsterdam publisher) and a loss for the other (i.e., the Sulzbach publisher), the law is that those who had already bought the Sulzbach edition were permitted to use it. , also P.Tesh. to Y.D. § 208, 5; § 236, or to declare a debt cancelled without the consent of all [the townspeople].21Mord. to B.K. X — G. Nevertheless, [in these matters] we follow the adopted custom of the town, especially if the [townspeople] accepted them [to render decisions] in every matter.22 infra § 23 Thus seems to me [to be the correct view].23 Y.D. § 228 on the laws pertaining to ordinances and Ḥerem for the sake of the public welfare — G. The later authorities state in their Responsa that one who has been sentenced to flogging may give forty gold coins instead of the flogging.24MaHaRIW s. 147 and R. Menaḥem of Merseburg — G. , Ket. 46a where a monetary fine is designated as flogging. This is, however, not stated as a law, only that they decided thus because [of the needs of the] hour, but [in reality] the Court of Law has the authority to flog him or to confiscate [his] property as they see fit according to the matter [in hand] in order to safeguard a cause.25 infra § 425 Gloss — G. On the significance of the principle ‘to safeguard a cause’ (למיגדר מילתא), v. Yeb. 90b.
בית דין מכין ועונשין לצורך שעה ובו סעיף א:
כל ב"ד אפילו אינם סמוכים בא"י אם רואים שהעם פרוצים בעבירות (ושהוא צורך שעה) (טור) דנין בין מיתה בין ממון בין כל דיני עונש ואפילו אין בדבר עדות גמורה ואם הוא אלם חובטים אותו ע"י עכו"ם (ויש להם כח להפקיר ממונו ולאבדו כפי מה שרואים לגדור פרצת הדור) (טור בשם הרמב"ם בפרק כ"ד מסנהדרין) וכל מעשיהם יהיו לשם שמים ודוקא גדול הדור או טובי העיר שהמחום ב"ד עליהם: הגה וכן נוהגין בכל מקום שטובי העיר בעירן כב"ד הגדול ומכין ועונשין והפקרן הפקר כפי המנהג אע"פ שיש חולקין וס"ל דאין כח ביד טובי העיר באלה רק להכריח הציבור במה שהיה מנהג מקדם או שקבלו עליהם מדעת כולם אבל אינן רשאין לשנות דבר במידי דאיכא רווחא להאי ופסידא להאי או להפקיע ממון שלא מדעת כולם (מרדכי פרק הגוזל בתרא) מ"מ הולכין אחר מנהג העיר וכ"ש אם קבלום עליהם לכל דבר כן נ"ל (וע' בי"ד סי' רכ"ח דיני תקנות וחרמי צבור) כתבו האחרונים בתשובותיהם דמי שנתחייב מלקות יתן ארבעים זהובים במקום מלקות (מהרי"ו סי' קמ"ז ומהר"ם מריזבורג) ולאו דינא קאמר אלא שהם פסקו כך לפי שעה אבל ביד הב"ד להלקותו או ליטול ממון כפי ראות עיניהם לפי הענין למיגדר מלתא (וע"ל ריש סי' תכ"ה בהג"ה):
כל ב"ד אפילו אינם סמוכים בא"י אם רואים שהעם פרוצים בעבירות (ושהוא צורך שעה) (טור) דנין בין מיתה בין ממון בין כל דיני עונש ואפילו אין בדבר עדות גמורה ואם הוא אלם חובטים אותו ע"י עכו"ם (ויש להם כח להפקיר ממונו ולאבדו כפי מה שרואים לגדור פרצת הדור) (טור בשם הרמב"ם בפרק כ"ד מסנהדרין) וכל מעשיהם יהיו לשם שמים ודוקא גדול הדור או טובי העיר שהמחום ב"ד עליהם: הגה וכן נוהגין בכל מקום שטובי העיר בעירן כב"ד הגדול ומכין ועונשין והפקרן הפקר כפי המנהג אע"פ שיש חולקין וס"ל דאין כח ביד טובי העיר באלה רק להכריח הציבור במה שהיה מנהג מקדם או שקבלו עליהם מדעת כולם אבל אינן רשאין לשנות דבר במידי דאיכא רווחא להאי ופסידא להאי או להפקיע ממון שלא מדעת כולם (מרדכי פרק הגוזל בתרא) מ"מ הולכין אחר מנהג העיר וכ"ש אם קבלום עליהם לכל דבר כן נ"ל (וע' בי"ד סי' רכ"ח דיני תקנות וחרמי צבור) כתבו האחרונים בתשובותיהם דמי שנתחייב מלקות יתן ארבעים זהובים במקום מלקות (מהרי"ו סי' קמ"ז ומהר"ם מריזבורג) ולאו דינא קאמר אלא שהם פסקו כך לפי שעה אבל ביד הב"ד להלקותו או ליטול ממון כפי ראות עיניהם לפי הענין למיגדר מלתא (וע"ל ריש סי' תכ"ה בהג"ה):
Every Court of Law,2Even a Court of Law outside the Land of Israel — M.E. even [one whose members] are not duly ordained in the Land of Israel,3 supra § 1, n. 14. — if they see that the people are unrestrained in [committing] sins,4Even if there is one individual who is in the habit of violating the law, he may be penalized by the Court of Law, although the punishment meted out is not in accordance with Biblical law, only that when the people as a whole are unrestrained in transgressing laws, they may enact measures as a safeguard and they may inflict penalties on any one person for the infringement of their rules even if they did not see that person committing sins unrestrainably — M.E. and [provided] that the exigencies of the hour demand it,5Tur — G. It may, however, be asked (in accordance with the interpretation of M.E.), why should an individual transgressor be considered as falling under the category of ‘exigencies of the hour?’ This should, therefore, be understood as follows: If we withhold punishment from an habitual individual sinner, others will learn from his evil ways and will likewise become unrestrained in the commission of sins. Hence, the exigencies of the hour apply here too (Tummim). Others, however, maintain that the individual may be penalized even when the foregoing reason is not applicable (Shebuth Ya‘akob) — P.Tesh. may pass judgment both [with respect to] death6Derived from San. 46a, Yeb. 90b: ‘It was taught, R. Eliezer b. Jacob stated: I heard that the Court of Law may (whenever necessary) administer punishment by lashes and impose (capital) sentences, even though not (warranted) by Biblical law; not for the purpose of disregarding the Torah but in order to make a fence around the Torah. It once happened that a man rode on horseback on the Sabbath during the Greek period and was brought before the Court of Law and was stoned, not because he was liable to this penalty, but because the needs of the hour demanded it. It also happened that a man had intercourse with his wife under a fig tree and was brought before the Court of Law and was flogged, not because he deserved it, but because the needs of the hour demanded it.’ N.Yos., however, writes that the above penalties were imposed by the Great Sanhedrin but any other Court of Law does not have the authority to administer such punishment. He adduces the following text to prove his point: San. 52b: ‘Immarta, the daughter of Tali, a Kohen, committed adultery. In consequence of that, R. Ḥama b. Tobiah had her surrounded by faggots and burnt. R. Joseph said: He (R. Ḥama) was unaware of two laws. He was unaware of R. Mathna’s statement (that burning was executed by pouring molten lead down the culprit’s throat) and was ignorant of the following Baraitha: And thou shalt come unto the priests, the Levites, and unto the judge that shall be in those days (Deut. XVII, 9). This teaches that when the priesthood operates (in the Temple), the Judge operates (with respect to capital punishment) ; but when the priesthood does not operate, the Judge may not function.’ Hence, R. Ḥama, who flourished after the destruction of the Temple had no authority to impose capital punishment. N.Yos. cites additional cases to corroborate his viewpoint: Nid. 13b, San. 58b: ‘R. Ḥama had the hand of one who was accustomed to strike other people cut off.’ San. 27a: ‘The Exilarch (Resh Galutha) said to R. Abba b. Jacob, Go and investigate the matter; if he is definitely the murderer, dim his eyes.’ In these latter cases only partial punishment was administered but not full punishment in accordance with Biblical law. However, N.Yos. is opposed by the Codifiers (v. also D.M.) who hold that if the needs of the hour demand it even full punishment may be meted out including capital sentences although it would not be in accordance with Biblical law where legal warning and valid witnesses are required which would be difficult to obtain nowadays as a result of which the world would become full of violence and ultimately destroyed. Cf. ‘Jerusalem was destroyed because judgments were rendered in accordance with strict Biblical law’ (B.M. 30b). Thus RaShBA, N, and Asheri in Resp. Hence, Caro’s ruling here. , also the case of Simeon b. Shetaḥ in Mishna San. 45b who hanged eighty women at Ashkelon. and monetary [penalties]7M.K. 16a; B.K. 96b. as well as [to administer] all laws of punishment,8Ibid. even if in the case [in question] there is no valid evidence [available].9Kid. 81a; San. 26b and Tosaf. s.v. החשוד; Tur citing Yad, Sanhedrin XXIV, 4. This means that there was no legal warning given by witnesses to the offender immediately before committing the offense. For witnesses and legal warning are required only when adjudicating a Biblical law, but one who disobeys the ordinances of the country may be penalized according to the needs of the hour (N in Resp.) — M.E., ShaK. In capital cases the consent of the town Elders is required after due deliberation (B.Yos. citing RaShBA) — M.E. And if he is a stern individual, they may flog him by means of heathen authorities.10Derived from Mishna Git. 88b: ‘A heathen court may impose flogging upon a man and say to him, Do whatever the Israelite (authorities) tell you.’ Since Caro does not record here the latter statement of the Mishna (as found in Tur), viz., ‘and say to him, Do whatver the Israelite (authorities) tell you,’ it follows that even the final legal proceedings may be carried out by the heathen authorities since the offender is a very harsh person and the penalty is not in accordance with Biblical law — M.E. For only in the case of a Get (as in Git. ibid.) must the final legal proceedings be executed by Israelite authorities in order that it be considered valid — Nethiboth. , also infra § 26. And they have authority to expropriate his property and to forfeit it according to whatever they see fit in order to fence in the lawlessness of the generation.11Tur on the authority of Yad, Sanhedrin XXIV, 4-10 — G. Derived from M.K. 16a where Scriptural verses are adduced whence we derive that we have the authority to excommunicate persons refusing to obey the summons of the Court, to pronounce the Ḥerem (v. Glos.), to forfeit property, to curse, to smite, to pluck one’s hair, to adjure (so that one desists from malpractices), to fetter, to arrest and to prosecute. ‘We administer flogging on account of an evil rumour, because it is said, Nay (al), my sons; for it is no good report that I hear’ (I Sam. II, 24) — Kid. 81a. This has reference to an uninterrupted rumour not due to intimidation and where no enemies are about who might have published the rumour — Yeb. 25a. Cf. Tur. O.Ḥ. § 1 , also Git. 36b on the Rabbis’ power to expropriate one’s property; also Meg. 25b where it is stated that it is permissible to abuse a person of ill fame. The latter statement refers to an ordinary person but not to a scholar (RaN). Cf. Men. 99b: ‘Resh Lakish said, A scholar-disciple who has committed a misdeed should not be reproached in public because it is said, Therefore shalt thou stumble in the day and the prophet also shall stumble with thee in the night (Hos. IV, 5), that is to say, Keep it dark like night.’ The par. passage in M.K. 17a reads that ‘they do not place him under the ban.’ Some Later Authorities rule that the Court of Law has the power only to declare a debt cancelled but they cannot take possession of the money or the like on behalf of a person before it reaches the latter’s hand (Birke Yosef). Others (on the basis of Git. 36b) hold that the Court of Law does have this authority even before it reaches the latter’s hand — P.Tesh. All their acts, however, should be [done] for the sake of Heaven.12Cf. San. 46a: ‘Not with the purpose of disregarding the Torah, but in order to safeguard it.’ And [this should be executed] only [by] a great personage of the generation13Derived from B.K. 96b regarding the man who misappropriated a pair of oxen and was penalized by R. Naḥman, whence we see that only a distinguished personage like R. Naḥman who was the son-in-law of the Nasi’s house had the power to impose penalties. or [by] the representatives of the town14 B.B. 8b. whom they [i.e., the people] have recognized as the Court of Law over them.15Tur has שהמחום רבים עליהם ‘whom the public recognized as authorities over themselves.’ Gloss: And thus is the accepted practice everywhere, [viz.,] that the representatives of the town are regarded in their [own] town [as authoritative] as the [former] Great Sanhedrin.16Mord. (B.M. II beg.) on the authority of R. Gershon states: ‘Whosoever is appointed a leader of the community is regarded like the mightiest of the mighty and Jepthah in his generation is like Samuel in his generation (R.H. 25b) and whatever he does is considered binding.’ Thus also RaShBA — M.E. They may administer flogging and impose [death] penalties and their expropriation [of one's property] is considered valid according to the adopted custom,17MaHaRIK (Rt. I, XIV) writes that even according to the opinion that the representatives of the town have the power to enact measures as they see fit, it applies only to communal needs but not with respect to cancelling a debt of one individual for the benefit of another which does not fall under the category of communal needs. Thus also Isserlein in his Decisions. Furthermore, only one who is a distinguished personage in his generation may expropriate property — M.E. Cf. supra n. 13. If the custom in the community is to submit the matter to arbitration by one litigant choosing one person and the other litigant choosing another person and the Head of the Court of Law acting as the third, — this practice should not be altered — P.Tesh. although there are some who differ and are of the opinion that the representatives of the town have no power in these [matters] save that they [have the authority] to compel the community in [observing] whatever was an adopted practice heretofore,18B.B. 8b: ‘The townspeople have a right to stipulate meassures, prices of food and wages of labourers and to remove (place outside of the protection of the law — Rashi) those who disregard the terms fixed by the authorities (ולהסיע על קיצתן). The dissenting opinion takes ולהסיע as referring to ‘measures etc.,’ i.e., just as in the latter case it must be with the consent of all, so too in the case of ‘terms fixed by the authorities,’ the consent of all is required. The first opinion takes ולהסיע as a separate measure. Hence, the consent of all is not required — W.G. Cf. also Y. Meg. III, 2(74a) : ‘The seven representatives of the town are regarded as the (entire) town. What are we treating of? If they (the townspeople) accepted them, then even if one (was appointed his decision should be binding upon all the townspeople) ; if they did not accept them, then even many (i.e., more than seven cannot enforce their rulings upon the townspeople). We, therefore, deal here with an undefined case (i.e., the townspeople appointed them to look after the communal matters, without specifying which matter they delegated to them, and the town representatives sold aught without consulting the people, we are therefore, informed that their transaction is binding).’ or they accepted upon themselves [a new measure] with the consent of all [the townspeople],19e., by mere speech the matter becomes binding even in a matter concerning which no adopted practice existed formerly — M.E. but they may change naught in any matter that would involve a gain for one person and a loss for another20For this does not come under the category of safeguarding a cause — M.E. , also Ḥid. Hag. P. Tesh cites the case of the controversy around the Sulzbach edition of the Talmud. The latter was forbidden to be printed until a certain period would elapse after the Amsterdam edition of the Talmud was published. Certain authorities ruled that the purchasers of the Sulzbach ed. were prohibited to study in it. Zikron Ya‘akob, however, on the basis of the present ruling, held that since this prohibition would involve a gain for one (i.e., the Amsterdam publisher) and a loss for the other (i.e., the Sulzbach publisher), the law is that those who had already bought the Sulzbach edition were permitted to use it. , also P.Tesh. to Y.D. § 208, 5; § 236, or to declare a debt cancelled without the consent of all [the townspeople].21Mord. to B.K. X — G. Nevertheless, [in these matters] we follow the adopted custom of the town, especially if the [townspeople] accepted them [to render decisions] in every matter.22 infra § 23 Thus seems to me [to be the correct view].23 Y.D. § 228 on the laws pertaining to ordinances and Ḥerem for the sake of the public welfare — G. The later authorities state in their Responsa that one who has been sentenced to flogging may give forty gold coins instead of the flogging.24MaHaRIW s. 147 and R. Menaḥem of Merseburg — G. , Ket. 46a where a monetary fine is designated as flogging. This is, however, not stated as a law, only that they decided thus because [of the needs of the] hour, but [in reality] the Court of Law has the authority to flog him or to confiscate [his] property as they see fit according to the matter [in hand] in order to safeguard a cause.25 infra § 425 Gloss — G. On the significance of the principle ‘to safeguard a cause’ (למיגדר מילתא), v. Yeb. 90b.