מתני׳ כל מצות הבן על האב אנשים חייבין ונשים פטורות...
until he pulls or takes possession of it. Additionally, the Temple treasury has the following advantage: If a commoner pulled a consecrated item for the purpose of acquiring it with one hundred dinars, and he did not manage to redeem it by paying the one hundred dinars to the Temple treasurer before the item’s price stood at two hundred dinars, he gives two hundred dinars. What is the reason for this? It states: He will give the money and it will be assured to him (see Leviticus 27:19). This indicates that one can acquire an item from the Temple treasury only by the actual transfer of money. By contrast, in the reverse case, when the commoner pulled an item when it was worth two hundred dinars, and he did not manage to redeem it before the value of the item stood at one hundred dinars, he gives two hundred dinars. What is the reason for this? The power of a commoner should not be greater than that of the Temple treasury of consecrated property. Since a commoner completes his acquisition by pulling, the item is acquired by him at that price, and the Temple treasury should not suffer a loss in a case where the commoner could not have reneged on his commitment had he been dealing with another commoner. Similarly, if the commoner redeemed it at two hundred dinars, but he did not manage to pull it before its value stood at one hundred dinars, he gives two hundred dinars. What is the reason? It states: He will give the money and it will be assured to him, which indicates that the redemption of consecrated property is effected with money. By contrast, if he redeemed it at one hundred dinars and did not manage to pull it before it stood at two hundred dinars, what he redeemed is redeemed, and he gives only one hundred dinars. The Gemara asks: Why is this the halakha? So too, let us say: The power of a commoner should not be greater than that of the Temple treasury of consecrated property, and if this occurred in a case where he was dealing with another commoner he would need to pay the full two hundred dinars, which was the value of the item when he pulled it. Shouldn’t the Temple treasury have as much power as a common person? The Gemara answers: There is an additional impediment to reneging on an agreement with another commoner. Is that to say that a commoner who gave a seller money and changed his mind before acquiring the item is not forced to accept upon himself the curse of: He Who exacted payment from the generation of the flood (see Genesis, chapter 7) and the generation of the dispersion (see Genesis, chapter 11) will punish one who does not keep his word? Although a commoner can legally renege on his agreement at this stage, the Sages disapproved of such dishonest conduct, and one who did so would be cursed in this manner. Consequently, the power of a commoner is not greater than that of the Temple treasury, as it is not a simple matter to renege on an agreement with another commoner. MISHNA: With regard to all mitzvot of a son with regard to his father, men are obligated to perform them and women are exempt. And with regard to all mitzvot of a father with regard to his son, both men and women are obligated to perform them. The mishna notes an additional difference between the obligations of men and women in the performance of mitzvot: With regard to all positive, time-bound mitzvot, i.e., those which must be performed at specific times, men are obligated to perform them and women are exempt. And with regard to all positive mitzvot that are not time bound, both men and women are obligated to perform them. And with regard to all prohibitions, whether they are time-bound or whether they are not time-bound, both men and women are obligated to observe them, except for the prohibitions of: Do not round the corners of your head, and: Do not destroy the corners of your beard, which are derived from the verse: “You shall not round the corners of your head and you shall not destroy the corners of your beard” (Leviticus 19:27), and a prohibition that concerns only priests: Do not contract ritual impurity from a corpse (see Leviticus 21:1). These mitzvot apply only to men, not women, despite the fact that they are prohibitions. GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: All mitzvot of a son with regard to his father? If we say that it is referring to all mitzvot that the son is obligated to perform with regard to his father, are women exempt from obligations of this kind? But isn’t it taught in a baraita concerning a verse that deals with the mitzva of honoring one’s father and mother: “A man shall fear [tira’u] his mother and his father” (Leviticus 19:3)? I have derived only that a man is obligated in this mitzva. From where do I derive that a woman is also obligated? When it says in the same verse: “A man shall fear [tira’u] his mother and his father” (Leviticus 19:3), employing the plural form of the verb, this indicates that there are two that are obligated here, both a man and a woman. Rav Yehuda said that this is what the mishna is saying: With regard to all mitzvot of a son that are incumbent upon his father to perform for his son, men are obligated in them and women are exempt. The Gemara comments: According to this interpretation, we learn in this mishna that which the Sages taught in a baraita: A father is obligated with regard to his son to circumcise him, and to redeem him if he is a firstborn son who must be redeemed by payment to a priest, and to teach him Torah, and to marry him to a woman, and to teach him a trade. And some say: A father is also obligated to teach his son to swim. Rabbi Yehuda says: Any father who does not teach his son a trade teaches him banditry [listut]. The Gemara expresses surprise at this statement: Can it enter your mind that he actually teaches him banditry? Rather, the baraita means that it is as though he teaches him banditry. Since the son has no profession with which to support himself, he is likely to turn to theft for a livelihood. This baraita accords with Rav Yehuda’s interpretation of the mishna. § The baraita teaches that a father is obligated to circumcise his son. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? The Gemara answers that this is as it is written: “And Abraham circumcised his son Isaac” (Genesis 21:4). The Gemara comments: And in a case where one’s father did not circumcise him the court is obligated to circumcise him, i.e., if this obligation is not fulfilled by the father it applies to the community as a whole, as it is written: “Every male among you shall be circumcised” (Genesis 17:10), in the form of a general mitzva that does not apply only to the father. And in a case where the court did not circumcise him the son is obligated to circumcise himself when he reaches adulthood, as it is written: “And the uncircumcised male, who is not circumcised in the flesh of his foreskin, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Genesis 17:14). From where do we derive that his mother is not obligated to circumcise her son? As it is written: “And Abraham circumcised his son Isaac when he was eight days old, as God commanded him” (Genesis 21:4). The verse emphasizes that God commanded him, and not her. We found a source for this mitzva immediately, i.e., when it was given to Abraham; from where do we derive that this is the halakha for the men of all generations? The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that any place where it is stated: “Command,” it is nothing other than an expression of galvanization both immediately and for generations. The mitzva of circumcision is presented by means of this term. The Gemara elaborates: From where is it derived that the term “command” indicates a galvanization? As it is written: “And command Joshua, and encourage him and strengthen him” (Deuteronomy 3:28). In this context, the term “command” is not referring to a specific command but is a general expression of galvanization. From where is it derived that this applies immediately and for generations? As it is written: “From the day that the Lord commanded and onward throughout your generations” (Numbers 15:23). This shows that whenever the word “command” is used it is referring to that day onward for all generations. § The baraita teaches that a father is obligated to redeem his son. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? The Gemara answers that this is as it is written: “All the firstborn of your sons you shall redeem” (Exodus 34:20). And in a case where one’s father does not redeem him he is obligated to redeem himself, as it is written: “You shall redeem [pado tifde]” (Numbers 18:15). The repetition of the verb indicates that a firstborn is required to be redeemed in any case, even if his father neglects to do so. And from where do we derive that a mother is not commanded to redeem her son? As it is written: “You shall redeem [tifde]” which can be read as: You shall be redeemed [tippadeh]. This indicates that whoever is commanded to redeem himself is commanded to redeem others, and whoever is not commanded to redeem himself is not commanded to redeem others. Since a woman is not commanded to redeem herself, she is not commanded to redeem her son either. The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that she is not obligated to redeem herself? The Gemara answers that this is as it is written: “You shall redeem [tifde],” which can be read as: You shall be redeemed [tippadeh]. This indicates that any person whom others are commanded to redeem is commanded to redeem himself, and any person whom others are not commanded to redeem is not commanded to redeem himself. Since there is no mitzva for a parent to redeem his daughter, there is similarly no mitzva for a daughter to redeem herself. And from where is it derived that others are not commanded to redeem a daughter? As the verse states: “All the firstborn of your sons you shall redeem” (Exodus 34:20), i.e., your sons and not your daughters. The Sages taught: If a firstborn has not yet been redeemed and he himself has a firstborn son, he is obligated to redeem himself and he is also obligated to redeem his firstborn son, and he takes precedence over his son. If he does not have enough money to redeem both of them, he redeems himself. Rabbi Yehuda says: His son takes precedence over him. Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning is that with regard to this one, the father, the mitzva of his redemption was upon his father, and only when his father did not observe the mitzva did it apply to the adult son. And that mitzva of the redemption of his firstborn son applies to him directly. Consequently, he should first fulfill the mitzva that applies to him by redeeming his son. Rabbi Yirmeya says: Everyone agrees
גמ׳ מאי כל מצות הבן על האב?
אילימא כל מצות דמיחייב ברא למיעבד לאבא נשים פטורות...
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: All mitzvot of a son with regard to his father? If we say that it is referring to all mitzvot that the son is obligated to perform with regard to his father, are women exempt from obligations of this kind? But isn’t it taught in a baraita concerning a verse that deals with the mitzva of honoring one’s father and mother: “A man shall fear [tira’u] his mother and his father” (Leviticus 19:3)? I have derived only that a man is obligated in this mitzva. From where do I derive that a woman is also obligated? When it says in the same verse: “A man shall fear [tira’u] his mother and his father” (Leviticus 19:3), employing the plural form of the verb, this indicates that there are two that are obligated here, both a man and a woman.
תנינא להא דת"ר האב חייב בבנו למולו ולפדותו וללמדו תורה ולהשיאו אשה וללמדו אומנות וי"א אף להשיטו במים וכו'
The Gemara comments: According to this interpretation, we learn in this mishna that which the Sages taught in a baraita: A father is obligated with regard to his son to circumcise him, and to redeem him if he is a firstborn son who must be redeemed by payment to a priest, and to teach him Torah, and to marry him to a woman, and to teach him a trade. And some say: A father is also obligated to teach his son to swim. Rabbi Yehuda says: Any father who does not teach his son a trade teaches him banditry [listut]. The Gemara expresses surprise at this statement: Can it enter your mind that he actually teaches him banditry? Rather, the baraita means that it is as though he teaches him banditry. Since the son has no profession with which to support himself, he is likely to turn to theft for a livelihood. This baraita accords with Rav Yehuda’s interpretation of the mishna.
ללמדו תורה: מנלן? דכתיב:(דברים יא, יט) "ולמדתם אותם את בניכם" והיכא דלא אגמריה אבוה? מיחייב איהו למיגמר נפשיה, דכתיב: "ולמדתם" איהי מנלן דלא מיחייבא? דכתיב: "ולימדתם ולמדתם" כל שמצווה ללמוד מצווה ללמד, וכל שאינו מצווה ללמוד אינו מצווה ללמד. ואיהי מנלן דלא מיחייבה למילף נפשה? דכתיב: "ולימדתם ולמדתם" כל שאחרים מצווין ללמדו מצווה ללמד את עצמו, וכל שאין אחרים מצווין ללמדו אין מצווה ללמד את עצמו, ומנין שאין אחרים מצווין ללמדה? דאמר קרא "ולמדתם אותם" את בניכם ולא בנותיכם.
that anywhere that there are only five sela available, i.e., enough to redeem only one man, and one is obligated to redeem both himself and his son, he, the father, takes precedence over his son. What is the reason? It is that his own mitzva is preferable to one that he performs on behalf of others. When they disagree is in a case where there is land worth five sela that is liened property that has been sold, i.e., he sold this land to other people but it can be reclaimed by his prior creditor, and five sela which is entirely unsold property. And the reasoning behind the dispute is as follows: Rabbi Yehuda maintains that a loan that is written in the Torah, i.e., any financial obligation that applies by Torah law, is considered as though it is written in a document, and therefore it can be collected from liened property, like any loan recorded in a document. This means that the liened property worth five sela is available for one’s own redemption, but not for that of his son, as the sale of the property occurred before the birth of his firstborn. Consequently, with these five sela upon which there is no lien he redeems his son, and the priest goes and repossesses the land worth five sela that is liened property for his own redemption. In this manner one can fulfill both mitzvot. And the Rabbis maintain: A loan that is written in the Torah is not considered as though it is written in a document, since buyers will not be aware of this obligation, so that they should be aware that the land may be repossessed. And therefore there is no advantage for this man to redeem his son with the five sela upon which there is no lien, and his own mitzva is preferable, which means he redeems himself with the free land. With the liened property that is left he cannot redeem his son, as the land was sold before the birth of his firstborn. The Sages taught: If one has money to redeem his son and to ascend to Jerusalem on the pilgrimage Festival, he redeems his son and then ascends to Jerusalem on the pilgrimage Festival. Rabbi Yehuda says: He ascends to Jerusalem on the pilgrimage Festival and then redeems his son. His reasoning is that this trip to Jerusalem for the pilgrimage Festival is a mitzva whose time soon passes, and this, the redemption of the firstborn son, is a mitzva whose time does not soon pass, as it can be fulfilled later. The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, it is as he stated in his reasoning, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda provided the rationale for his opinion. But what is the reasoning of the Rabbis, who say that he should first redeem his son? The Gemara answers that the reason is that the verse states: “All the firstborn of your sons you shall redeem” (Exodus 34:20), and it then states, in the same verse: “And none shall appear before me empty,” referring to the pilgrimage Festival in Jerusalem. The order of the verse indicates that one should redeem his firstborn son before traveling to Jerusalem on the pilgrimage Festival. The Sages taught: From where is it derived that if one had five firstborn sons, from five different women, he is obligated to redeem them all? The verse states: “All the firstborn of your sons you shall redeem” (Exodus 34:20), and the emphasis of “all” includes any of one’s firstborn sons. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious this is the case? After all, the Merciful One made this mitzva dependent upon the opening of the womb, as it states: “Sanctify to Me all the firstborn, whoever opens the womb” (Exodus 13:2). Since each of these sons is the firstborn of his mother, it is clear that the father is required to redeem each of them. The Gemara answers that this ruling is necessary lest you say that we should derive a verbal analogy between “firstborn” stated here and “firstborn” from the verses dealing with inheritance: Just as there, the verse describes a firstborn who receives a double portion of the inheritance as: “The first fruit of his strength” (Deuteronomy 21:17), i.e., he is the firstborn son to his father, and not the first child born to his mother; so too here, with regard to the redemption of the firstborn son, it is referring to the first fruit of his strength, which would mean that the father need redeem only his oldest child. Therefore, this baraita teaches us that this is not the case. Rather, every firstborn son to his mother must be redeemed. § The baraita teaches that a father is obligated to teach his son Torah. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this requirement? As it is written: “And you shall teach them [velimadtem] to your sons” (Deuteronomy 11:19). And in a case where his father did not teach him he is obligated to teach himself, as it is written, i.e., the verse can be read with a different vocalization: And you shall study [ulmadtem]. From where do we derive that a woman is not obligated to teach her son Torah? As it is written: “And you shall teach [velimadtem],” which can be read as: And you shall study [ulmadtem]. This indicates that whoever is commanded to study Torah is commanded to teach, and whoever is not commanded to study is not commanded to teach. Since a woman is not obligated to learn Torah, she is likewise not obligated to teach it. The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that she is not obligated to teach herself? The Gemara answers: As it is written: “And you shall teach [velimadtem],” which can be read as: And you shall study [ulmadtem], which indicates that whoever others are commanded to teach is commanded to teach himself, and whoever others are not commanded to teach is not commanded to teach himself. And from where is it derived that others are not commanded to teach a woman? As the verse states: “And you shall teach them to your sons” (Deuteronomy 11:19), which emphasizes: Your sons and not your daughters. The Sages taught: If one wishes to study Torah himself and his son also wants to study, he takes precedence over his son. Rabbi Yehuda says: If his son is diligent and sharp, and his study will endure, his son takes precedence over him. This is like that anecdote which is told about Rav Ya’akov, son of Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov, whose father sent him to Abaye to study Torah. When the son came home, his father saw that his studies were not sharp, as he was insufficiently bright. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said to his son: I am preferable to you, and it is better that I go and study. Therefore, you sit and handle the affairs of the house so that I can go and study. Abaye heard that Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov was coming. There was a certain demon in the study hall of Abaye, which was so powerful that when two people would enter they would be harmed, even during the day. Abaye said to the people of the town: Do not give Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov lodging [ushpiza] so that he will be forced to spend the night in the study hall. Since Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov is a righteous man, perhaps a miracle will occur on his behalf and he will kill the demon. Rav Aḥa found no place to spend the night, and he entered and spent the night in that study hall of the Sages. The demon appeared to him like a serpent with seven heads. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov began to pray, and with every bow that he bowed one of the demon’s heads fell off, until it eventually died. The next day Rav Aḥa said to the townspeople: If a miracle had not occurred, you would have placed me in danger. The Sages taught: If one has to decide whether to study Torah or to marry a woman, which should he do first? He should study Torah and afterward marry a woman. And if it is impossible for him to be without a wife, he should marry a woman and then study Torah. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is that one should marry a woman and afterward study Torah. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: How can one do this? With a millstone hanging from his neck, i.e., with the responsibility of providing for his family weighing upon him, can he engage in Torah study? The Gemara comments: And the amora’im do not disagree; this is for us and that is for them. In other words, one statement applies to the residents of Babylonia, whereas the other is referring to those living in Eretz Yisrael. § With regard to marriage, the Gemara relates: Rav Ḥisda would praise Rav Hamnuna to Rav Huna by saying that he is a great man. Rav Huna said to him: When he comes to you, send him to me. When Rav Hamnuna came before him, Rav Huna saw that he did not cover his head with a cloth, as Torah scholars did. Rav Huna said to him: What is the reason that you do not cover your head with a cloth? Rav Hamnuna said to him: The reason is that I am not married, and it was not customary for unmarried men to cover their heads with a cloth. Rav Huna turned his face away from him in rebuke, and he said to him: See to it that you do not see my face until you marry. The Gemara notes: Rav Huna conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he says: If one is twenty years old and has not yet married a woman, all of his days will be in a state of sin concerning sexual matters. The Gemara asks: Can it enter your mind that he will be in a state of sin all of his days? Rather, say that this means the following: All of his days will be in a state of thoughts of sin, i.e., sexual thoughts. One who does not marry in his youth will become accustomed to thoughts of sexual matters, and the habit will remain with him the rest of his life. Rava said, and similarly, the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Until one reaches the age of twenty years the Holy One, Blessed be He, sits and waits for a man, saying: When will he marry a woman. Once he reaches the age of twenty and has not married, He says: Let his bones swell, i.e., he is cursed and God is no longer concerned about him. Rav Ḥisda said: The fact that I am superior to my colleagues is because I married at the age of sixteen, and if I would have married at the age of fourteen,
עד היכן חייב אדם ללמד את בנו תורה... ולמדתם אותם את בניכם אין לי אלא בניכם, בני בניכם מנין ת"ל והודעתם לבניך ולבני בניך א"כ מה ת"ל בניכם בניכם ולא בנותיכם.
I would say to the Satan: An arrow in your eye, i.e., I would not be afraid of the evil inclination at all. Rava said to Rabbi Natan bar Ami: While your hand is still on your son’s neck, i.e., while you still have authority and control over him, find him a wife. What is the appropriate age? From sixteen until twenty-two, and some say from eighteen until twenty-four. The Gemara notes that this is like a dispute between tanna’im, based on the verse: “Train a child in the way that he should go” (Proverbs 22:6). Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Neḥemya disagreed about the age in which the verse instructs the parent to educate his child: One said that the verse is referring to the ages from sixteen until twenty-two, and one said it is referring to the ages from eighteen until twenty-four. The dispute concerning the correct age for marriage and the dispute about educating a child are the same, as while a father still has a large measure of influence over his son, he must both teach him and find him a wife. § The Gemara continues its discussion of a father’s obligation to teach his son Torah. To what extent is a person obligated to teach his son Torah? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: One should emulate the education of, for example, Zevulun ben Dan, a contemporary of Shmuel, whose father’s father taught him Bible, Mishna, Talmud, halakhot, and aggadot. The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: If a father taught his son Bible, he is not required to teach him Mishna. And Rava said in explanation of this baraita: Bible is the Torah, not the Prophets or Writings, i.e., he is not required to teach him anything else, including Mishna. The Gemara answers that Shmuel’s statement should be understood as follows: One should teach his son like Zevulun ben Dan was taught in certain aspects, but not like Zevulun ben Dan in other respects. One should teach his son like Zevulun ben Dan in that his father’s father taught him; but not like Zevulun ben Dan, as there he was taught Bible, Mishna, Talmud, halakhot, and aggadot, while here, in this baraita, one is required to teach his son Bible alone. The Gemara asks: But is one’s father’s father obligated to teach him Torah? But isn’t it taught in a baraita, that the verse: “And you shall teach them to your sons” (Deuteronomy 11:19), indicates: But not your sons’ sons? And how do I realize, i.e., understand, the meaning of the verse: “But make them known to your sons and to your sons’ sons” (Deuteronomy 4:9)? This serves to say to you that whoever teaches his son Torah, the verse ascribes him credit as though he taught him, and his son, and his son’s son, until the end of all generations. The Gemara answers that the tanna of this baraita stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of that tanna, as it is taught in another baraita: From the verse “And you shall teach them to your sons” I have derived only that you must teach your sons. From where do I derive that there is an obligation to teach your sons’ sons? The verse states: “But make them known to your sons and to your sons’ sons.” If so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “Your sons” (Deuteronomy 11:19), which implies only sons? This limitation teaches: Your sons, but not your daughters. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: Anyone who teaches his son’s son Torah, the verse ascribes him credit as though he received it from Mount Sinai, as it is stated: “But make them known to your sons and to your sons’ sons,” and juxtaposed to it is the phrase in the verse: “The day when you stood before the Lord your God in Horeb” (Deuteronomy 4:10), as Horeb is Mount Sinai. The Gemara relates: Once Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba encountered Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, and saw that he had placed an inexpensive covering on his head and brought his child to the synagogue to study. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him: What is the reason for all this fuss, as you are in such a hurry that you do not have time to dress yourself properly? Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said to him: Is it insignificant, that which is written: “But make them known to your sons,” and juxtaposed to it is the phrase in the verse that states: “The day when you stood before the Lord your God in Horeb”? The Gemara comments: From this moment onward, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba would not taste meat [umtza], meaning he would not eat breakfast, before he had read to his child and added to the child’s studies from the day before. Similarly, Rabba bar Rav Huna would not taste meat before he had brought his child to the study hall. § Rav Safra says in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥananya: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And you shall teach them diligently [veshinnantam] to your sons” (Deuteronomy 6:7)? Do not read this as “veshinnantam,” with the root shin, nun, nun, which indicates a repetition. Rather, read it as veshillashtam, with the root shin, lamed, shin, related to the word three, shalosh. This means that one must study, review, and study again, thereby dividing one’s studies into three parts. In light of this statement, the Sages said that a person should always divide his years into three parts, as follows: A third for Bible, a third for Mishna, and a third for Talmud. The Gemara asks: How can a person divide his life this way? Who knows the length of his life, so that he can calculate how long a third will be? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for one’s days, i.e., one should divide each day of his life in this manner. Therefore, because they devoted so much time to the Bible, the first Sages were called: Those who count [soferim], because they would count all the letters in the Torah, as they would say that the letter vav in the word “belly [gaḥon]” (Leviticus 11:42) is the midpoint of the letters in a Torah scroll. The words: “Diligently inquired [darosh darash]” (Leviticus 10:16), are the midpoint of the words in a Torah scroll. And the verse that begins with: “Then he shall be shaven” (Leviticus 13:33), is the midpoint of the verses. Similarly, in the expression: “The boar out of the wood [miya’ar] ravages it” (Psalms 80:14), the ayin in the word wood [ya’ar] is the midpoint of Psalms, with regard to its number of letters. The verse: “But He, being full of compassion, forgives iniquity” (Psalms 78:38), is the midpoint of verses in the book of Psalms. Rav Yosef raises a dilemma: Does the vav of the word “belly [gaḥon]” belong to this side or to this side? Is it part of the first or second half of the Torah? The Sages said to him: Let us bring a Torah scroll and count the letters. Didn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say with regard to a different issue: They did not move from there until they brought a Torah scroll and counted the letters? Therefore we can do the same. Rav Yosef said to them: They were experts in the deficient and plene forms of words and therefore could count the letters precisely. We are not experts in this regard, and therefore we would be unable to resolve the question even if we were to count the letters. Similarly, Rav Yosef raises a dilemma: Does the midpoint of the verses in the Torah, which is “then he shall be shaven,” belong to this side or to this side? Abaye said to him: Even if we cannot count the letters, we can at least bring a Torah scroll to count the verses. Rav Yosef explained: We are not experts about verses either, as when Rav Aḥa bar Adda came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said: In the West, i.e., Eretz Yisrael, they divide this following verse into three separate verses: “And the Lord said to Moses, behold I come to you in a thick cloud, that the people may hear when I speak with you, and may also believe you forever; And Moses told the words of the people to the Lord” (Exodus 19:9). Perhaps there are other verses that we do not know how to divide properly. The Sages taught: Five thousand eight hundred and eighty-eight verses are the verses in a Torah scroll. Psalms has eight more verses than that, and Chronicles has eight fewer verses than that. § The Sages taught: The verse states: “And you shall teach them diligently [veshinnantam]” (Deuteronomy 6:7). The root shin, nun, nun, of veshinnantam should be understood as meaning sharp, i.e., that matters of Torah should be sharp and clear in your mouth, so that if a person asks you something, do not stutter in uncertainty and say an uncertain response to him. Rather, answer him immediately, as it is stated:
נָשִׁים וַעֲבָדִים וּקְטַנִּים פְּטוּרִים מִתַּלְמוּד תּוֹרָה. אֲבָל קָטָן אָבִיו חַיָּב לְלַמְּדוֹ תּוֹרָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים יא יט) "וְלִמַּדְתֶּם אֹתָם אֶת בְּנֵיכֶם לְדַבֵּר בָּם". וְאֵין הָאִשָּׁה חַיֶּבֶת לְלַמֵּד אֶת בְּנָהּ. שֶׁכָּל הַחַיָּב לִלְמֹד חַיָּב לְלַמֵּד:
Women, slaves, and infants are absolved from the study of the Torah; but the father is obliged to instruct his infant son in the Torah, for it is said: "And ye shall teach them your children, talking of them" (Deut. 11.19); but a woman is not charged to teach her son, for only one obliged to study is obliged to instruct.1Sukkah, 42a; Kiddushin, 29; Ketubot, 28. G. C.
אומר בן עזאי חייב אדם ללמד את וכו' ר' אליעזר אומר כל המלמד את בתו תורה מלמדה תיפלות. תיפלות ס"ד? אלא אימא כאילו למדה תיפלות.
א"ר אבהו מ"ט(מה טעמו) דר"א(רבי אליעזר) ? דכתיב: (משלי ח, יב) "אני חכמה שכנתי ערמה" כיון שנכנסה חכמה באדם נכנסה עמו ערמומית.
שו"ת באתר כיפה:
מדברי הרב משה מלכה:
ידועה הבעיה שאין מעמד האשה שבזמנינו דומה כלל למעמד האשה לפני 70 שנה וק"ו לפני 1700 שנה בזמן האמוראים והתנאים, ולכן דברים שנאמרו לפני שנים רבות מיוחסים דווקא למעמד האשה שהיה נהוג באותם זמנים. בזמנים הקדומים מעמד האשה היה נמוך מאוד ולעיתים גרוע ממעמד של עבד ללא זכויות. על כן יש לראות את דברי המשנה שאומרת שכל המלמד את בתו תורה- מלמדה תיפלות, ברקע של מעמד האשה באותם זמנים. כך כותב הרב חיים דוד הלוי "נראה שבזמנים ראשונים, כאשר הייתה האשה עקרת בית גרידא, והבנות לא למדו כל עיקר, היה קיים חשש שלימוד התורה, שכולה חכמה...תגרום אולי נזק לאותן נשים שהיו מרוחקות מכל חכמה אחרת, ולא תירו ללמדן אלא דינים הנחוצים להן בלבד. אבל בזמנינו, שלומדות לימודים כלליים בכל הרצינות, למה ייגרעו דברי תורה".
ובנוסף על כך כותב הרב: "בימינו אלה שהנשים לוקחות חלק גדול מאורחות חיים, חודרות אל מעמקי החכמה ... בדאי יודה גם ר' אליעזר שאין שום איסור ללמד גם תושב"ע...ולא זו בלבד, אלא החיוב מוטל עלינו ללמדה ולהלעיטה כל מה שאפשר."