שאלה - דיון הסוגיה :
שלום - אני יוסי,
תלמיד בכיתה ז' ואני רוצה להתנדב בגמ"ח (גמילות חסדים) שעוזר לאנשים נזקקים במושב, לדעתי זו מצווה חשובה מאוד לעזור בגמילות חסדים ועומדת לפני התלבטות האם להקשיב להוריי, שאומרים שזו מצווה גדולה, אבל יש לימודים שבהם צריך להשקיע ולפעמים שעות הגמ"ח חורגות לשעות הלילה המאוחרות וזה פוגע בלימודים.
האם ללכת לגמ"ח ולעשות את "המצווה הזו בניגוד לדעת ההורים"
או להקשיב להוריי, מה אתם מציעים לי לעשות ?
אשמח לתשובה - יוסי.
אלעזר בן מתיא אומר :
אבא אומר השקיני מים, ומצוה לעשות.
מניח אני כבוד אבא ועושה את המצוה,
למה? שאני ואבא חייבים במצוה.
איסי בן יהודה אומר: אם אפשר למצוה ליעשות ע"י אחרים תיעשה על ידי אחרים, וילך הוא בכבוד אביו.
אמר רב מתנה : הלכה כאיסי בן יהודה.
From whose funds must one give his father food and drink? Rav Yehuda says: From the money of the son. Rav Natan bar Oshaya said: From the money of the father. The Sages gave this following ruling to Rav Yirmeya, and some say they gave this following ruling to the son of Rav Yirmeya: The halakha is like the one who says it must be paid from the money of the father. The Gemara raises an objection from the following baraita: It is stated: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:11), and it is stated: “Honor the Lord with your wealth” (Proverbs 3:9), which teaches the following verbal analogy: Just as there one honors God “with your wealth,” i.e., through monetary loss, so too here one must honor his father through monetary loss. And if you say that one honors him from the money of the father, what difference does it make to the son, i.e., what monetary loss does he suffer? The Gemara answers: It makes a difference to him with regard to the neglect of his work. Although he is not required to spend his own money, the son must leave aside his work to honor his father, which will cause him some financial loss. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: Two brothers, or two partners in the ownership of produce, or a father and son, or a rabbi and his student, may redeem the second tithe for each other without adding one-fifth, as one who redeems the tithe of another, including these individuals, is not required to add one-fifth. And they may feed each other the poor man’s tithe. If one of them is poor, the other may give him the poor man’s tithe that he separated from his produce, and it is not considered as though the pauper ate the poor man’s tithe from his own produce. The Gemara explains the proof from this baraita. And if you say that the obligation to honor one’s father is from the money of the son, one finds that this son repays his obligation from the produce of the poor, as he is taking care of his father with produce that should go to the poor. The Gemara rejects this proof: No, it is necessary to state this halakha in a case where he has covered all of his father’s basic needs with his own money. At this stage, if his father needs surplus money, he may give it to him from the poor man’s tithe. The Gemara asks: If so, consider that which is taught with regard to this baraita. Rabbi Yehuda says: May a curse come upon one who feeds his father the poor man’s tithe. And if this halakha, that one may feed his father the poor man’s tithe, was said with regard to a surplus, what difference is there? Since the son has fulfilled his obligation and simply adds something so that his father will have more, why is this person cursed? The Gemara answers: Even so, it is a disrespectful matter for one to feed his father with money that has been designated as charity for the poor. The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear: They asked Rabbi Eliezer how far one must go in honoring his father and mother. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: Such that the father takes a purse and throw it into the sea in front of his son, and the son does not embarrass him. And if you say that the son honors him from the money of the father, what difference does it make to the son? Why would the son care if his father throws away his own purse? The Gemara answers: This is referring to a son who is fit to inherit from him. Since the son thinks that the money will eventually belong to him, he has cause for anger. And this is as reflected in an incident involving Rabba bar Rav Huna, when Rav Huna tore silk garments in front of his son Rabba. Rav Huna had said to himself: I will go and see if he becomes angry or does not become angry, i.e., he wanted to test him and see whether his son Rabba would honor him. The Gemara asks: But perhaps his son would become angry and Rav Huna would thereby violate the prohibition of: “Nor put a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14), as by testing his son Rav Huna would have caused him to sin. The Gemara answers: It was a case where the father had forgone his honor from the outset. Consequently, even if the son grew angry with him, he would not have violated the mitzva. The Gemara asks: But by tearing his clothes, he violates the prohibition: Do not destroy (see Deuteronomy 20:19). The Gemara answers that Rav Huna made a tear at the seam, so that the garment could be repaired. The Gemara asks: Perhaps it was due to that reason that the son did not become angry, because he saw that his father caused no actual damage? The Gemara answers: He did this when the son was already angry for some other reason, so that he would not notice this detail. The Gemara cites another story involving the mitzva of honoring one’s father and mother. Rav Yeḥezkel taught his son Rami: If people sentenced to be burned became mingled with those sentenced to be stoned Rabbi Shimon says: All of them are judged with the punishment of stoning, as the punishment of burning is more severe. Since the death penalty of each is uncertain, all of them are treated leniently. Rav Yehuda, who was also Rav Yeḥezkel’s son, said to him: Father, do not teach the mishna this way, as, according to this version, why is this the halakha specifically because burning is more severe than stoning? Let him derive it from the fact that the majority are sentenced to be stoned. The wording of the baraita, which states that those who were supposed to be burned became mixed up with those who were to be stoned, indicates that the people sentenced to stoning are the majority. If so, one should simply follow the majority. Rather, I will teach it this way: If those who are sentenced to be stoned became mixed up with those who are sentenced to be burned, they are all judged with the punishment of stoning even though this is the minority, as they are all treated leniently. Rav Yeḥezkel said to him: If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: And the Rabbis say that they should be judged with the punishment of burning, as the punishment of stoning is more severe. According to your version, why is this the halakha specifically because stoning is more severe? Let him derive it due to the fact that the majority of people are sentenced to be burned, and one follows the majority. His son Rav Yehuda said to him: The statement of the Rabbis is not difficult, as there the Rabbis are saying to Rabbi Shimon as follows: That which you said, that burning is more severe, is not the case; rather, stoning is more severe. In other words, the Rabbis were specifically responding to Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning, and therefore they stated the opposite claim and ignored the issue of which group is in the majority. Later, Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: Big-toothed one, do not speak to your father like that, as it is disrespectful. As it is taught in a baraita: If one’s father was transgressing a Torah matter, he should not say to him explicitly: Father, you transgressed a Torah matter. Rather, he should say to him: Father, so it is written in the Torah. The Gemara asks: If he says to him directly: This is what is written in the Torah, he will cause him suffering. Rather, he should say to him: Father, this verse is written in the Torah, and he should proceed to quote the verse, from which his father will understand on his own that he has acted improperly. § Elazar ben Matya says: If my father says: Give me water, and there is a mitzva for me to perform at the same time, I set aside the honor of my father and perform the mitzva, as my father and I are both obligated in the mitzva. Isi ben Yehuda says: If it is possible for this mitzva to be performed by others, let it be performed by others, and he should go and attend to the honor due to his father, as the honor of his father is his obligation alone. Rav Mattana says: The halakha with regard to this matter is in accordance with the opinion of Isi bar Yehuda. Rav Yitzḥak bar Sheila says that Rav Mattana says that Rav Ḥisda says: With regard to a father who forgoes his honor, his honor is forgone, and his son does not transgress if he does not treat him in the proper manner. By contrast, with regard to a rabbi who forgoes his honor, his honor is not forgone. And Rav Yosef says: Even with regard to a rabbi who forgoes his honor, his honor is forgone, as it is stated: “And the Lord went before them by day” (Exodus 13:21). God Himself, the Teacher of the Jewish people, had forgone the honor due Him and took the trouble to guide the people. Rava said: How can these cases be compared? There, with regard to the Holy One, Blessed be He, the world is His and the Torah is His, and therefore He can forgo His honor.
אמר לו אביו השקני מים ויש לפניו לעשות מצוה עוברת כגון: קבורת מת או לויה,
אם אפשר למצוה שתעשה ע"י אחרים, יעסוק בכבוד אביו (ואם התחיל במצוה תחלה יגמור דהעוסק במצוה פטור מן המצוה) ואם אין שם אחרים לעשות יעסוק במצוה ויניח כבוד אביו. (מיהו אם אין זמן המצוה עוברת יעסוק בכבוד אביו ואח"כ יעשה המצוה).
תלמוד תורה גדול מכבוד אב ואם.
בבית הקברות לא יטמא לה:
ת"ר מנין ?(שנו חכמים, מניין לנו?) שאם אמר לו אביו היטמא (למת), או שאמר לו אל תחזיר (אבידה), שלא ישמע לו ?
שנאמר: (ויקרא יט, ג) " איש אמו ואביו תיראו ואת שבתותי תשמרו אני ה' ".
כולכם חייבין בכבודי.
טעמא דכתב רחמנא? (מה טעם הכתוב) את שבתותי תשמרו.
הא לאו הכי הוה אמינא צייתא ליה (אם כך, הייתי אומר להקשיב לו - לאביו)
ואמאי? (למה?)
האי עשה והאי לא תעשה ועשה (זה עשה, וזה לא תעשה ועשה)
ולא אתי עשה ודחי את לא תעשה ועשה (ולא בא עשה ודוחה את לא תעשה ועשה)
איצטריך ס"ד אמינא הואיל והוקש כיבוד אב ואם - לכבודו של מקום
(צריך, אם יעלה על דעתך להשוות בינהם)
שנאמר כאן: (שמות כ, יא) "כבד את אביך ואת אמך" ונאמר להלן "כבד את ה' מהונך" הלכך לציית ליה (הואיל וכך לשמוע לו.)
קמ"ל (בא ומשמיע לנו) דלא לשמע ליה.(לא לשמוע לו).
two of the three of them to testify that you dissolved the partnership before them. Or alternatively, bring two witnesses to testify that you dissolved the partnership before a court of three. Rav Safra said to Rabba bar Rav Huna: From where do you know this halakha, that dissolution of the partnership may be accomplished only before a court? Rabba bar Rav Huna said to him: It is as we learned in the mishna: If there are three men there who can convene as a court, he may stipulate before the court that he will undertake to return the item provided that he receives full compensation for lost income. But if there is no court there, before whom can he stipulate his condition? Rather, in that case, his financial interests take precedence, and he need not return the lost item. Apparently, one stipulates binding conditions with regard to another’s property only before a court. Rav Safra said to Rabba bar Rav Huna: Is that case in the mishna comparable to this case? There, where he is removing property from the possession of this person and giving it to that person, we require a court. But here, referring to himself in the third person, he is merely taking his own property, and not the property of any other person. There is no transaction effected here. It is mere disclosure of the matter that he divided the joint property equitably, and two witnesses are sufficient for him to disclose that fact. Rav Safra cites proof. Know that this is so, as we learned in a mishna (Ketubot 97a) that a widow owed sustenance from her husband’s estate sells the property of the estate when not before a court. Apparently, one need not involve the court when reclaiming property that belongs to him. Abaye said to him: But wasn’t it stated with regard to that mishna that Rav Yosef bar Minyumi says that Rav Naḥman says: The court before which a widow sells the property of the estate need not be a court of experts, but is required to be at least a court of laymen. Therefore, as in the parallel case of the widow, even when disclosing that one took property belonging to him, two witnesses are not sufficient and a court is required. MISHNA: If one found an animal in a stable belonging to its owner, he is not obligated to return it to its owner. If he found it in a public area, he is obligated to return it. And if the animal was lost in a graveyard and a priest found it, he may not become impure to return it. If his father said to him: Become impure; or in a case where one was obligated to return the animal and his father said to him: Do not return it, he may not listen to his father, as one may not violate Torah law to honor his father. If one unloaded a burden from an animal collapsing under its weight and then later loaded it onto the animal, and later unloaded and loaded it again, even if this scenario repeats itself four or five times, he is obligated to continue unloading and loading, as it is stated: “If you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden, you shall forgo passing him by; you shall release it [azov ta’azov] with him” (Exodus 23:5). It is derived from the verse that one is obligated to perform the action as needed, even several times. If the owner went, and sat, and said to a passerby: Since there is a mitzva incumbent upon you to unload the burden, if it is your wish to unload the burden, unload it, in such a case the passerby is exempt, as it is stated: “You shall release it with him,” with the owner of the animal. If the failure of the owner to participate in unloading the burden was due to the fact he was old or infirm, the passerby is obligated to unload the burden alone. There is a mitzva by Torah law to unload a burden, but there is no mitzva to load it. Rabbi Shimon says: There is even a mitzva to load the burden. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If there was a burden upon the animal greater than its typical burden, one need not attend to it, as it is stated: “Under its burden,” i.e., the obligation is with regard to a burden that the animal can bear. GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if one found an animal in a stable, he need not return it to its owner. Rava said: The stable that the Sages mentioned in the mishna is one that neither encourages the animal to stray nor secures the animal so it will not flee. The Gemara explains Rava’s statement. That it does not encourage the animal to stray is learned from the fact that the tanna teaches: He is not obligated in its return. The fact that it does not secure the animal is learned from the fact that it was necessary for the tanna to teach: He is not obligated in its return. The Gemara continues its explanation of Rava’s statement: As, if it enters your mind to say that it is a stable that secures the animal, that ruling would be extraneous. Now that in a case where one found the animal outside a stable he brings it inside a stable of that type and thereby returns the animal to its owner, in a case where he found the animal inside the stable is it necessary to teach that he is not obligated to return it to its owner? Rather, learn from it that the stable mentioned in the mishna does not secure the animal and therefore there is a possibility that one must return it. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, learn from it that it is a stable that neither encourages the animal to stray nor secures the animal. § The mishna teaches: If one found an animal in a stable belonging to its owner, he is not obligated to return it. Rabbi Yitzḥak says: And that is the halakha only in a case where the animal is standing within the city limits. The Gemara concludes by inference that if the animal was found in a public area he is obligated to return it, and even if it was within the city limits, he is also obligated to return it. There are those who teach this statement with regard to the latter clause of the mishna: If he found it in a public area, he is obligated to return it. Rabbi Yitzḥak says: And that is the halakha only in a case where the animal is standing beyond the city limits. The Gemara concludes by inference that in a case where the animal was found in the stable, even if the animal is standing beyond the city limits, he is also not obligated in its return. § The mishna teaches: And if the animal was lost in a graveyard and was found by a priest, he may not become impure to return it. In a case where a priest’s father said to him: Become impure, or in a case where one was obligated to return the animal and his father said to him: Do not return it, he may not listen to his father. The Gemara cites a baraita in which the Sages taught: From where is it derived that if a priest’s father said to him: Become impure, or that if one’s father said to him: Do not return a lost item that you found; he should not listen to him? It is derived from the verse, as it is stated: “Every man shall fear his mother and his father, and you shall observe My Shabbatot; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 19:3). From the fact that the verse concludes: “I am the Lord,” it is derived that: You are all, parent and child alike, obligated in My honor. Therefore, if a parent commands his child to refrain from observing a mitzva, he must not obey the command. The Gemara infers: The reason that a priest must not obey his father’s command to become impure is because the Merciful One writes: “You shall observe My Shabbatot; I am the Lord”; but if it were not so, I would say that the child must obey him. The Gemara asks: But why? This obligation to obey a parent is a positive mitzva, as it is written: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:12), and that obligation of a priest to refrain from becoming impure is both a prohibition: “To the dead among his people he shall not defile himself” (Leviticus 21:1), and a positive mitzva: “You shall be holy” (Leviticus 19:2); and the principle is that a positive mitzva does not come and override a prohibition and a positive mitzva. The Gemara answers that the derivation from “You shall observe My Shabbatot; I am the Lord” was necessary, as it might enter your mind to say: Since honoring one’s father and mother is equated to the honor of the Omnipresent, as it is stated here: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:12), and it is stated elsewhere: “Honor the Lord with your wealth” (Proverbs 3:9), therefore, one might have thought that the priest must obey his father’s command to become impure. Therefore the Torah teaches us that the priest is commanded not to listen to him. § The mishna teaches: There is a mitzva by Torah law to unload a burden, but there is no mitzva to load it. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: But there is no mitzva to load it? If we say that it means: But there is no mitzva to load it at all; what is different about unloading, with regard to which it is written: “You shall release it with him” (Exodus 23:5)? With regard to loading as well, isn’t it written: “You shall lift them with him” (Deuteronomy 22:4)? The Gemara answers: Rather, there is a mitzva by Torah law to unload the burden for free, but there is no mitzva to load it for free; rather, the mitzva is performed with remuneration. Rabbi Shimon says: There is also a mitzva to load it for free. The Gemara states: We learn by inference from the mishna that which the Sages taught explicitly in a baraita: Unloading is performed for free, and loading is performed with remuneration. Rabbi Shimon said: Both this and that are performed for free. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis that there is a distinction between unloading and loading with regard to remuneration? The reason is that if it enters your mind that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, let the Merciful One write only the mitzva of loading, and then He would need not write the mitzva of unloading, and I would say: Just as with regard to loading, where there is no potential suffering of animals and there is no potential monetary loss for the owner, one is obligated to load the burden, with regard to unloading, where there is potential suffering of animals and there is potential monetary loss for the owner, is it not all the more so clear that one is required to unload the burden? Rather, with regard to what halakha did the Merciful One write the mitzva of unloading? It is to tell you: The mitzva of unloading the burden is performed for free, but the mitzva of loading is performed with remuneration. The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that even loading is performed for free, what is the reason that the Torah writes the mitzva of unloading? The Gemara answers: It is because the verses are not clearly defined, and it is unclear which of the verses refers to loading and which refers to unloading. Had the Torah written one verse, it would have been interpreted with regard to unloading, and there would be no source that one needs to load an animal. And the Rabbis could ask: Why does Rabbi Shimon say that the verses are not clearly defined? Here it is written: “Collapsed under its burden” (Exodus 23:5), clearly referring to the case of a burden that needs unloading, and there it is written: “Fallen down by the way” (Deuteronomy 22:4), indicating that both the animals and their burdens are lying on the way and are in need of loading. And Rabbi Shimon explains that the verses are not defined because the phrase “fallen down by the way” could be understood as indicating that the animals are fallen with their burdens upon them, and referring to unloading. Rava says:
אני ה' - אע"פ שאמרתי לך ירא את אביך, אני אדון לשניכם ואם אמר לך אביך עבור על דברי לחלל שבת אל תשמע לו.
אמר לו אביו לעבור על דברי תורה, בין מצות עשה, בין מצות לא תעשה ואפילו מצוה של דבריהם לא ישמע לו.
האב שצוה את בנו שלא ידבר עם פלוני ושלא ימחול לו עד זמן קצוב והבן היה רוצה להתפייס מיד, לולי צוואת אביו אין לו לחוש לצואתו. (אין להקשיב לדברי אביו).
שאלה :
חייל מצטיין מעוניין להתנדב לקצונה, אולם ההורים חוששים, בגלל הסיכון
שבתפקיד זה, ומתנגדים לכך. האם חייב החייל לשמוע בקול הוריו, או לא?
תשובה :
כל מצות מורא פירושה להימנע מלפגוע בכבוד האב, ע"י מעשה הסותר זאת, כגון הסותר את דבריו וכדו'. ולכן, רק כאשר הוא מתכוון לזלזל בכבוד אביו, רק אז הוא עובר על מורא. אולם כאשר כוונתו לשם שמים, אין הוא עושה זאת מתוך זלזול באביו, אלא מתוך רצון לעשות את רצון אביו שבשמים, שגם אביו חייב בכבודו, לכן אין בכך משום ביטול מצות מורא.
כאשר אב ואם דורשים מבנם להימנע מלקיים דבר, הנחשב בעיניו להידור מצוה, כגון בנידון דידן - התנדבות לקצונה - עלינו לבדוק את שני מרכיבי המצוה. מצד מורא אין כאן, שהרי אין כוונתו לזלזל בכבודם, אלא שהרצון לשרת את העם וללחום את מלחמות ה' הוא הגורם לכך שהוא נאלץ לא לציית להם. ומצד כבוד גם אין כאן, שהרי מצות כבוד היא התועלת שיש להורים, ואילו כאן ההורים חוששים לשלומו של הבן, והתועלת היא עבורו ולא עבורם, ואין כאן מצות כבוד. הדין יהיה שונה כמובן, אם ההורים עושים זאת לתועלת עצמם - דהיינו, שהם זקוקים לו מאוד, שישרתם ויסעדם, ולכן רוצים שישרת שירות קצר יותר וקרוב לבית. אם אכן זוהי מטרתם, יש כאן מצות כבוד.
(הרב יעקב אריאל, "התנדבות לקצונה בניגוד לרצון ההורים".)