The Death Penalty and Cities of Refuge

(10) Speak to the Israelite people and say to them: When you cross the Jordan into the land of Canaan,

(11) you shall provide yourselves with places to serve you as cities of refuge to which a manslayer who has killed a person unintentionally may flee.

(12) The cities shall serve you as a refuge from the avenger, so that the manslayer may not die unless they have stood trial before the assembly.

(13) The towns that you thus assign shall be six cities of refuge in all.

(14) Three cities shall be designated beyond the Jordan, and the other three shall be designated in the land of Canaan: they shall serve as cities of refuge.

(15) These six cities shall serve the Israelites and the resident aliens among them for refuge, so that anyone who kills a person unintentionally may flee there.

(16) Anyone, however, who strikes another with an iron object so that death results is a murderer; the murderer must be put to death.

(17) If one struck them with a stone tool that could cause death, and death resulted, that one is a murderer; the murderer must be put to death.

(18) Similarly, if the object with which one struck them was a wooden tool that could cause death, and death resulted, that one is a murderer; the murderer must be put to death.

(19) The blood-avenger themselves shall put the murderer to death; it is they who shall put them to death upon encounter.

(20) So, too, if one pushed another in hate or hurled something at them on purpose and death resulted,

(21) or if one struck them with their hand in enmity and death resulted, the assailant shall be put to death; they are a murderer. The blood-avenger shall put the murderer to death upon encounter.

(22) But if one pushed them without malice aforethought or hurled any object at them unintentionally,

(23) or inadvertently dropped upon them any deadly object of stone, and death resulted—though that one was not an enemy of theirs and did not seek their harm—

(24) in such cases the assembly shall decide between the slayer and the blood-avenger.

(25) The assembly shall protect the manslayer from the blood-avenger, and the assembly shall restore the manslayer to the city of refuge to which they fled, and there they shall remain until the death of the high priest who was anointed with the sacred oil.

(26) But if the manslayer ever goes outside the limits of the city of refuge to which they have fled,

(27) and the blood-avenger comes upon them outside the limits of their city of refuge, and the blood-avenger kills the manslayer, there is no bloodguilt on their account.

(28) For a manslayer must remain inside their city of refuge until the death of the high priest; after the death of the high priest, the manslayer may return to their land holding.

(29) Such shall be your law of procedure throughout the ages in all your settlements.

(30) If anyone kills a person, the manslayer may be executed only on the evidence of witnesses; the testimony of a single witness against a person shall not suffice for a sentence of death.

(31) You may not accept a ransom for the life of a murderer who is guilty of a capital crime; they must be put to death.

(32) Nor may you accept ransom in lieu of flight to a city of refuge, enabling one to return to live on their land before the death of the priest.

(33) You shall not pollute the land in which you live; for blood pollutes the land, and the land can have no expiation for blood that is shed on it, except by the blood of those who shed it.

(34) You shall not defile the land in which you live, in which I Myself abide, for I the LORD abide among the Israelite people.

(1) When the LORD your God has cut down the nations whose land the LORD your God is assigning to you, and you have dispossessed them and settled in their towns and homes,

(2) you shall set aside three cities in the land that the LORD your God is giving you to possess.

(3) You shall survey the distances, and divide into three parts the territory of the country that the LORD your God has allotted to you, so that any manslayer may have a place to flee to.—

(4) Now this is the case of the manslayer who may flee there and live: one who has killed another unwittingly, without having been their enemy in the past.

(5) For instance, a person goes with their neighbor into a grove to cut wood; as one's hand swings the ax to cut down a tree, the ax-head flies off the handle and strikes the other so that that one dies. That person shall flee to one of these cities and live.—

(6) Otherwise, when the distance is great, the blood-avenger, pursuing the manslayer in hot anger, may overtake them and kill them; yet they did not incur the death penalty, since they had never been the other’s enemy.

(7) That is why I command you: set aside three cities.

(8) And when the LORD your God enlarges your territory, as God swore to your ancestors, and gives you all the land that God promised to give your fathers—

(9) if you faithfully observe all this Instruction that I enjoin upon you this day, to love the LORD your God and to walk in God's ways at all times—then you shall add three more towns to those three.

(10) Thus blood of the innocent will not be shed, bringing bloodguilt upon you in the land that the LORD your God is allotting to you.

(11) If, however, a person who is the enemy of another lies in wait for them and sets upon them and strikes them a fatal blow and then flees to one of these towns,

(12) the elders of the murder's town shall have them brought back from there and shall hand that one over to the blood-avenger to be put to death;

(13) you must show them no pity. Thus you will purge Israel of the blood of the innocent, and it will go well with you.

(1) The following are exiled [to the Ir Miklat]: one who kills a person accidentally. If one was pushing a roller [on a roof] and it fell on them[a bystander] and killed them, or if one was lowering a barrel [from a roof] and it fell and killed them [a bystander], or if one was descending a ladder and fell and killed them[a bystander], all of these cases one [the killer] is exiled. However, if one was pulling a roller and it fell and killed the person, or if one was raising a barrel and the rope tore and it fell and killed a person, or if one was climbing a ladder and fell and killed a person, in these cases one [the killer] would not be exiled. This is the principle: If the killer was involved in a downward movement , they are exiled. If it is not a downward movement they are not exiled. If the blade came off the handle and killed, Rebbi says they are not exiled but the Sages say they are exiled. If it came from the wood being chopped, Rebbi says they are exiled but the Sages say they are not exiled.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks with regard to the principle that one is exiled only if they killed unintentionally through a downward motion: From where are these matters derived? It is derived from a verse, as Shmuel says that the verse states with regard to those exiled to a city of refuge: “And one cast it down upon them and dies” (Numbers 35:23), indicating that one is not liable to be exiled unless the item falls in a downward motion.

The Sages taught in a baraita derivations from verses written with regard to the unintentional murderer: “Unintentionally” (Numbers 35:11); to exclude from exile the one who kills intentionally. “Unawares” (Deuteronomy 19:4); to exclude from exile the one who kills with intent.

The Gemara asks: Why is a derivation necessary to exclude one who kills intentionally? It is obvious that one is not exiled; they are subject to the death penalty. Rather, Rava said: Say that the type of intentional killer referred to is meant to exclude the one who says that it is permitted to kill the victim. The verse teaches that this person is neither executed nor are they exiled. Abaye said to Rava: If the reference is to one who says that it is permitted, they are a victim of circumstances beyond their control, as they did not know any better. How could that be characterized as intentional? Rava said to him: That is not a problem, as I say that with regard to one who says that it is permitted, their action borders on the intentional.

The baraita states: “Unawares”; to exclude from exile the one who kills with intent. The Gemara asks: With intent? It is obvious that one is not exiled; they are subject to the death penalty. Rabba said: The reference is to exclude the one who acted with the intent to kill an animal and they killed a person inadvertently, or one who acted with the intent to kill a gentile and they killed a Jew, or one who acted with the intent to kill a non-viable newborn and they killed a viable newborn.

The Sages taught in a baraita based on the verse written with regard to an unintentional murderer: “And if suddenly, without enmity, one thrust them or cast upon them any vessel without lying in wait” (Numbers 35:22). “If suddenly”; this serves to exclude one who unintentionally kills another that they encounter at a corner. “Without enmity”; this serves to exclude one who unintentionally kills their enemy, as even if the act appears unintentional, the presumption is that it was not. “One thrust them”; this indicates that even if one unintentionally shoved them with one's body and killed them, that one is liable to be exiled. “Or cast upon them”; this serves to include the case of a downward motion that is for the purpose of an upward motion, e.g., if one bent down in order to lift an item from the ground, and in the process of bending down killed another unintentionally, that one is exiled. “Without lying in wait”; this serves to exclude one who had the intent to throw a stone to this side and it went to a different side and killed a person.

And it is written with regard to an unintentional murderer: “And who did not lie in wait” (Exodus 21:13); this serves to exclude one who had intent to throw a stone two cubits and they inadvertently threw it four cubits and killed a person. And it is written concerning an unintentional murderer: “And as one who goes with their neighbor into the forest” (Deuteronomy 19:5), from which it is derived: Just as a forest is ownerless property, and there is permission for the victim and for the assailant to enter there, so too, unintentional murder that occurs in any place where there is permission for the victim and for the assailant to enter there, is punishable with exile. The unintentional murder of one who entered the assailant’s property without their permission is not cause for the murderer to be exiled.

§ The Gemara cites a related discussion. Rabbi Abbahu raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yoḥanan: If one was ascending a ladder and the rung was displaced from beneath them, and the rung fell and killed another, what is the halakha with regard to their being exiled? In a case like this, is it considered killing in an upward motion, as they were climbing the ladder, and therefore they are exempt, or is it considered killing in a downward motion, as when they stepped on the rung they pushed it down, and therefore they are liable? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: In the scenario you described, you already touched upon the case in the baraita cited above, the case of unintentional murder that is performed with a downward motion that is for the purpose of an upward motion. The ruling in the baraita is that one is liable to be exiled in that case.

Rabbi Abbahu raised an objection to the explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan from the mishna, which states: This is the principle: Any murderer who kills unintentionally through their downward motion is exiled, and one who kills not through their downward motion is not exiled. Rabbi Abbahu clarifies: With regard to the phrase in the mishna: One who kills not through their downward motion, what case that was not already specified does this serve to add? Is it not to add a case like this, and to teach that even though the death was caused by the falling rung, since the assailant was ascending the ladder at the time, they are not exiled? Rabbi Yoḥanan replied: And according to your reasoning that this apparently extraneous phrase serves to include a case that is not addressed explicitly, with regard to the previous phrase in the mishna: Any murderer who kills unintentionally through their downward motion, what case that was not already specified does this serve to add?

Rather, one may say that it serves to add the case of a butcher. Here too, in the latter clause, the phrase: One who kills not through their downward motion, serves to add the case of a butcher, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a butcher who was chopping animal limbs with a cleaver, one Sage taught that if they killed a person in front of them, they are liable to be exiled; if they killed a person behind them, they are exempt. And it is taught in another baraita: If they killed a person behind them, they are liable; if they killed a person in front of them, they are exempt. And it is taught in another baraita: Both if they killed a person in front of them and if they killed a person behind them, they are liable. And it is taught in another baraita: Both if they killed a person in front of them and if they killed a person behind them, they are exempt. And although these baraitot appear contradictory, the apparent contradiction is not difficult.

When a butcher is about to cut the meat of an animal, they raise the cleaver and lowers it behind them in order to create momentum that will generate power. Then they raise the cleaver from behind them and brings it down forcefully onto the meat. In that process, the butcher lowers the cleaver in front of them and behind them and raises the cleaver both in front of them and behind them. Each of the four baraitot addresses a different stage of the process. Here, the baraita that says they are liable if they unintentionally murders a person in front of them and exempt if they unintentionally murders a person behind them, is referring to a case where the butcher swings the cleaver with a downward motion in front of them and an upward motion behind them. There, the baraita that says they are exempt if they unintentionally murders a person in front of them and liable if they unintentionally murders a person behind them, is referring to a case where the butcher swings the cleaver with an upward motion in front of them and a downward motion behind them.

In addition, here, the baraita where they are liable in both instances, is referring to a case where the butcher swings the cleaver with a downward motion both in front of them and behind them. There, the baraita where they are exempt in both instances, is referring to a case where the butcher swings the cleaver with an upward motion both in front of them and behind them. The two phrases that constitute the principle in the mishna teach that the determining factor is whether the motion is upward or downward, not whether it is in front of them or behind them. This is Rabbi Yoḥanan’s reply to the objection of Rabbi Abbahu.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rabbi Abbahu’s dilemma with regard to unintentional murder committed by one climbing a ladder is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im: If one was ascending a ladder and its rung was displaced from beneath them, it is taught in one baraita that they are liable, and it is taught in another baraita that they are exempt. What, is it not that the tanna’im disagree with regard to this, as one Sage holds: It is unintentional murder in a downward motion, and therefore they are liable, and one Sage holds: It is unintentional murder in an upward motion, and therefore they are exempt?

The Gemara rejects that parallel: No, that is not the point of contention, as everyone agrees that it is an upward motion, and there is no dispute between the Sages in the baraitot. Nevertheless, the apparent contradiction between them is not difficult, as here, in the baraita that rules them liable, the reference is to payment of damages, as with regard to one’s liability to pay damages, there is no difference between upward and downward motions, or between intentional and unwitting damage; and there, in the baraita that rules them exempt, the reference is to exile, from which one who murders unintentionally in an upward motion is exempt by Torah edict.

If you wish, say instead that in both this baraita and that baraita the reference is to exile, and it is not difficult, as this baraita, where the ruling is that they are liable, is referring to a case where the rung of the ladder was worm infested and they should have been cautious before stepping on it, and that baraita, where the ruling is that they are exempt, is referring to a case where the rung was not worm infested, as in that case it is murder due to circumstances beyond their control, as they could not have anticipated that the rung would be displaced.

And if you wish, say that in both this baraita and that baraita the reference is to a rung that was not worm infested, and it is not difficult, as this baraita, where the ruling is that they are exempt, is referring to a case where the rung was tightly inserted into the ladder, and therefore they could not have foreseen that it would be displaced, and that baraita, where the ruling is that they are liable, is referring to a case where the rung was not tightly inserted and they should have anticipated its displacement.