Pesachim 25b:4פסחים כ״ה ב:ד
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25bכ״ה ב

ושפיכות דמים

or bloodshed.

עבודה זרה הא דאמרן גילוי עריות ושפיכות דמים דתניא רבי אומר כי כאשר יקום איש על רעהו ורצחו נפש כן הדבר הזה וכי מה ענין רוצח אצל נערה המאורסה

That one may not heal oneself with idolatry even when his life is in danger is learned from that which we just said, based on the verse: “With all your soul and with all your might.” From where is this halakha derived with regard to forbidden sexual relations and murder? As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The verse says about one who rapes a betrothed woman: “But you shall do nothing to the young woman; the young woman has committed no sin worthy of death; for as when a man rises against his neighbor, and slays him, so too with this matter” (Deuteronomy 22:26). What does a murderer have to do with a betrothed young woman who was raped? Why would the verse mention murder in this context?

הרי זה בא ללמד ונמצא למד מקיש רוצח לנערה המאורסה מה נערה המאורסה ניתן להצילה בנפשו אף רוצח ניתן להצילו בנפשו ונערה המאורסה מרוצח מה רוצח יהרג ואל יעבור אף נערה המאורסה תהרג ואל תעבור

Rather, the mention of murder comes in order to teach a halakha about the betrothed young woman, and it turns out that, in addition, it derives a halakha from that case. The Torah juxtaposes a murderer to a betrothed young woman to indicate that just as in the case of a betrothed young woman one may save her by taking the rapist’s life, so too, one may save a potential murder victim by taking the pursuer’s life. Conversely, it is possible to learn about the case of a young betrothed woman from the case of a murderer. Just as with regard to a potential murderer the halakha is that if one is being forced to murder someone else, he should allow himself to be killed and not transgress that prohibition, so too, with regard to a betrothed young woman the halakha is that she should allow herself to be killed and not transgress the prohibition of forbidden relations.

ושפיכות דמים גופיה מנלן סברא הוא כי ההוא דאתא לקמיה דרבא אמר ליה מרי דוראי אמר לי זיל קטליה לפלניא ואי לא קטלינא לך אמר ליה ליקטלוך ולא תיקטול מאי חזית דדמא דידך סומק טפי דילמא דמא דההוא גברא סומק טפי

The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive this halakha with regard to murder itself? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning that one life is not preferable to another. The Gemara relates an incident to demonstrate this: This is similar to a certain man who came before Rava and said to him: A local official said to me: Go kill so-and-so, and if not I will kill you. Rava said to him: It is preferable that he should kill you and you should not kill. What did you think, that your blood is redder and more precious than his? Perhaps that man’s blood is redder. Apparently, one may not save his own life by taking someone else’s.

מר בר רב אשי אשכחיה לרבינא דשייף לה לברתיה בגוהרקי דערלה אמר ליה אימור דאמור רבנן בשעת הסכנה שלא בשעת הסכנה מי אמור

The Gemara relates: Mar bar Rav Ashi found Ravina rubbing his daughter with unripe olives [guharkei] of orla for medicinal purposes. Mar bar Rav Ashi said to him: Say that the Sages said that one may derive benefit from such a prohibited item at a time of danger; however, who says that one is permitted to do so when it is not a time of danger?

אמר ליה האי אישתא צמירתא נמי כשעת הסכנה דמיא איכא דאמרי אמר ליה מידי דרך הנאה קא עבידנא

Ravina said to him: A high fever is also deemed a time of danger, and one may derive benefit from a prohibited item it such a situation. Some say that Ravina said to him as follows: Am I deriving benefit in a usual manner? The usual way to derive benefit from these olives is to use them after they have become ripe, so that their oil can be drawn out. Since Ravina was not deriving benefit in the usual manner, he was permitted to do so, although his daughter’s life was not in danger.

איתמר הנאה הבאה לו לאדם בעל כרחו אביי אמר מותרת ורבא אמר אסורה

The Gemara continues to discuss various halakhot that apply to prohibited items. It was stated: With regard to deriving benefit from a prohibited item that comes to a person against his will, i.e., one’s circumstance results in his deriving benefit although he did not place himself in that circumstance in order to derive benefit, Abaye said: Deriving benefit in this manner is permitted, and Rava said: It is prohibited.

אפשר וקא מיכוין לא אפשר וקמיכוין כולי עלמא לא פליגי דאסור לא אפשר ולא מיכוין כולי עלמא לא פליגי דשרי כי פליגי דאפשר ולא מיכוין

The Gemara explains: In a case where it is possible to avoid deriving benefit and he intends to derive benefit from the prohibited object, or where it is not possible to avoid it and he intends to derive benefit, everyone agrees that it is prohibited, because he intended to derive benefit that was prohibited. And when it is not possible to avoid it and he does not intend to derive benefit, everyone agrees that it is permitted, as one had no choice in the matter. Where they disagree is in a case where it is possible for him to avoid the prohibition, and he does not intend to derive benefit from it.

ואליבא דרבי יהודה דאמר דבר שאין מתכוין אסור כולי עלמא לא פליגי דאסור כי פליגי אליבא דרבי שמעון דאמר דבר שאין מתכוין מותר אביי כרבי שמעון ורבא אמר עד כאן לא קא אמר רבי שמעון אלא היכא דלא אפשר אבל היכא דאפשר לא

The Gemara limits the dispute further: And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who said that an unintentional prohibited act is prohibited, everyone agrees that it is prohibited, as Rabbi Yehuda maintains that one’s action is more significant than his intent. Where they disagree is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that an unintentional prohibited act is permitted. Apparently, Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. And Rava would say: Rabbi Shimon stated his opinion only with regard to a case where it is not possible to avoid the prohibition. However, in a case where it is possible to avoid the prohibition, no, he did not permit one to derive benefit from such a prohibition even unintentionally. This is one version of the dispute.

איכא דאמרי אפשר ולא מיכוין היינו פלוגתייהו דרבי יהודה ורבי שמעון לא אפשר ולא קא מיכוין כולי עלמא לא פליגי דשרי כי פליגי דלא אפשר וקא מיכוין ואליבא דרבי שמעון דאזיל בתר כוונה כולי עלמא לא פליגי דאסור כי פליגי אליבא דרבי יהודה דאמר לא שנא מתכוין ולא שנא שאין מתכוין אפשר אסור

Some say that the dispute should be understood as follows: In a case where it is possible to avoid deriving benefit and he does not intend to derive benefit, this is the case of dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon. Where it is not possible to avoid it and he does not intend to derive benefit from the prohibited item, everyone agrees that it is permitted to do so. Where they disagree is in a case where it is not possible to avoid deriving benefit and he intends to derive benefit from it. The Gemara limits the dispute further: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who follows one’s intent, everyone agrees that it is prohibited. Where they disagree is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: There is no difference whether one intends or does not intend; the issue is whether he can avoid it or not. Therefore, if it is possible to avoid deriving benefit, it is prohibited.

אביי כרבי יהודה

Based on this understanding of the dispute, Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. In other words, in a case where it is not possible to avoid the situation completely, even if one has intent it is permitted.