עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה — הָא דַּאֲמַרַן. גִּילּוּי עֲרָיוֹת וּשְׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים, דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: ״כִּי כַּאֲשֶׁר יָקוּם אִישׁ עַל רֵעֵהוּ וּרְצָחוֹ נֶפֶשׁ כֵּן הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה״. וְכִי מָה עִנְיַן רוֹצֵחַ אֵצֶל נַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה?
That one may not heal oneself with idolatry even when his life is in danger is learned from that which we just said, based on the verse: “With all your soul and with all your might.” From where is this halakha derived with regard to forbidden sexual relations and murder? As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The verse says about one who rapes a betrothed woman: “But you shall do nothing to the young woman; the young woman has committed no sin worthy of death; for as when a man rises against his neighbor, and slays him, so too with this matter” (Deuteronomy 22:26). What does a murderer have to do with a betrothed young woman who was raped? Why would the verse mention murder in this context?
הֲרֵי זֶה בָּא לְלַמֵּד, וְנִמְצָא לָמֵד. מַקִּישׁ רוֹצֵחַ לְנַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה: מָה נַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה — נִיתָּן לְהַצִּילָהּ בְּנַפְשׁוֹ, אַף רוֹצֵחַ — נִיתָּן לְהַצִּילוֹ בְּנַפְשׁוֹ. וְנַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה מֵרוֹצֵחַ: מָה רוֹצֵחַ — יֵהָרֵג וְאַל יַעֲבוֹר, אַף נַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה — תֵּהָרֵג וְאַל תַּעֲבוֹר.
Rather, the mention of murder comes in order to teach a halakha about the betrothed young woman, and it turns out that, in addition, it derives a halakha from that case. The Torah juxtaposes a murderer to a betrothed young woman to indicate that just as in the case of a betrothed young woman one may save her by taking the rapist’s life, so too, one may save a potential murder victim by taking the pursuer’s life. Conversely, it is possible to learn about the case of a young betrothed woman from the case of a murderer. Just as with regard to a potential murderer the halakha is that if one is being forced to murder someone else, he should allow himself to be killed and not transgress that prohibition, so too, with regard to a betrothed young woman the halakha is that she should allow herself to be killed and not transgress the prohibition of forbidden relations.
וּשְׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים גּוּפֵיהּ מְנָלַן? סְבָרָא הוּא: כִּי הָהוּא דַּאֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מָרֵי דּוּרַאי אֲמַר לִי: זִיל קַטְלֵיהּ לִפְלָנְיָא, וְאִי לָא — קָטְלִינָא לָךְ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לִיקְטְלוּךְ וְלָא תִּיקְטוֹל, מַאי חָזֵית דִּדְמָא דִידָךְ סוּמָּק טְפֵי? דִּילְמָא דְּמָא דְּהָהוּא גַּבְרָא סוּמָּק טְפֵי.
The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive this halakha with regard to murder itself? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning that one life is not preferable to another. The Gemara relates an incident to demonstrate this: This is similar to a certain man who came before Rava and said to him: A local official said to me: Go kill so-and-so, and if not I will kill you. Rava said to him: It is preferable that he should kill you and you should not kill. What did you think, that your blood is redder and more precious than his? Perhaps that man’s blood is redder. Apparently, one may not save his own life by taking someone else’s.
מָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ לְרָבִינָא דְּשָׁיֵיף לַהּ לִבְרַתֵּיהּ בְּגוּהַרְקֵי דְעׇרְלָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֵימוֹר דַּאֲמוּר רַבָּנַן בִּשְׁעַת הַסַּכָּנָה, שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁעַת הַסַּכָּנָה מִי אֲמוּר?
The Gemara relates: Mar bar Rav Ashi found Ravina rubbing his daughter with unripe olives [guharkei] of orla for medicinal purposes. Mar bar Rav Ashi said to him: Say that the Sages said that one may derive benefit from such a prohibited item at a time of danger; however, who says that one is permitted to do so when it is not a time of danger?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הַאי אִישָּׁתָא צְמִירְתָּא נָמֵי כִּשְׁעַת הַסַּכָּנָה דָּמְיָא. אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִידֵּי דֶּרֶךְ הֲנָאָה קָא עָבֵידְנָא?
Ravina said to him: A high fever is also deemed a time of danger, and one may derive benefit from a prohibited item it such a situation. Some say that Ravina said to him as follows: Am I deriving benefit in a usual manner? The usual way to derive benefit from these olives is to use them after they have become ripe, so that their oil can be drawn out. Since Ravina was not deriving benefit in the usual manner, he was permitted to do so, although his daughter’s life was not in danger.
אִיתְּמַר: הֲנָאָה הַבָּאָה לוֹ לְאָדָם בְּעַל כׇּרְחוֹ, אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: מוּתֶּרֶת, וְרָבָא אָמַר: אֲסוּרָה.
The Gemara continues to discuss various halakhot that apply to prohibited items. It was stated: With regard to deriving benefit from a prohibited item that comes to a person against his will, i.e., one’s circumstance results in his deriving benefit although he did not place himself in that circumstance in order to derive benefit, Abaye said: Deriving benefit in this manner is permitted, and Rava said: It is prohibited.
אֶפְשָׁר וְקָא מִיכַּוֵּין, לָא אֶפְשָׁר וְקָמִיכַּוֵין — כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּאָסוּר. לָא אֶפְשָׁר וְלָא מִיכַּוֵּין — כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דִּשְׁרֵי. כִּי פְּלִיגִי דְּאֶפְשָׁר וְלָא מִיכַּוֵּין.
The Gemara explains: In a case where it is possible to avoid deriving benefit and he intends to derive benefit from the prohibited object, or where it is not possible to avoid it and he intends to derive benefit, everyone agrees that it is prohibited, because he intended to derive benefit that was prohibited. And when it is not possible to avoid it and he does not intend to derive benefit, everyone agrees that it is permitted, as one had no choice in the matter. Where they disagree is in a case where it is possible for him to avoid the prohibition, and he does not intend to derive benefit from it.
וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דְּאָמַר: דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין אָסוּר — כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּאָסוּר. כִּי פְּלִיגִי אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּאָמַר: דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין מוּתָּר. אַבָּיֵי כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, וְרָבָא אָמַר: עַד כָּאן לָא קָא אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן — אֶלָּא הֵיכָא דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר, אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּאֶפְשָׁר — לָא.
The Gemara limits the dispute further: And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who said that an unintentional prohibited act is prohibited, everyone agrees that it is prohibited, as Rabbi Yehuda maintains that one’s action is more significant than his intent. Where they disagree is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that an unintentional prohibited act is permitted. Apparently, Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. And Rava would say: Rabbi Shimon stated his opinion only with regard to a case where it is not possible to avoid the prohibition. However, in a case where it is possible to avoid the prohibition, no, he did not permit one to derive benefit from such a prohibition even unintentionally. This is one version of the dispute.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: אֶפְשָׁר וְלָא מִיכַּוֵּין — הַיְינוּ פְּלוּגְתַּיְיהוּ דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. לָא אֶפְשָׁר וְלָא קָא מִיכַּוֵּין — כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דִּשְׁרֵי. כִּי פְּלִיגִי, דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר וְקָא מִיכַּוֵּין. וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דְּאָזֵיל בָּתַר כַּוּוֹנָה — כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּאָסוּר, כִּי פְּלִיגִי אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דְּאָמַר: לָא שְׁנָא מִתְכַּוֵּין וְלָא שְׁנָא שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין, אֶפְשָׁר אָסוּר.
Some say that the dispute should be understood as follows: In a case where it is possible to avoid deriving benefit and he does not intend to derive benefit, this is the case of dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon. Where it is not possible to avoid it and he does not intend to derive benefit from the prohibited item, everyone agrees that it is permitted to do so. Where they disagree is in a case where it is not possible to avoid deriving benefit and he intends to derive benefit from it. The Gemara limits the dispute further: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who follows one’s intent, everyone agrees that it is prohibited. Where they disagree is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: There is no difference whether one intends or does not intend; the issue is whether he can avoid it or not. Therefore, if it is possible to avoid deriving benefit, it is prohibited.
אַבָּיֵי כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.
Based on this understanding of the dispute, Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. In other words, in a case where it is not possible to avoid the situation completely, even if one has intent it is permitted.