וְקַיְימָא לַן דְּאֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה וּמְשַׁלֵּם אָמַר עוּלָּא לָא קַשְׁיָא כָּאן בַּאֲחוֹתוֹ נַעֲרָה כָּאן בַּאֲחוֹתוֹ בּוֹגֶרֶת And since we maintain in general that one is not both flogged and liable to pay, if one receives lashes for having relations with his sister, why must he pay the fine as well? Ulla said: This is not difficult; here, the halakha in the mishna is with regard to his sister who is a young woman, for whom one pays a fine and is not flogged, whereas there, the halakha in the mishna is with regard to his sister who is a grown woman, for whom one does not pay a fine.
אֲחוֹתוֹ בּוֹגֶרֶת נָמֵי הָא אִיכָּא בּוֹשֶׁת וּפְגָם בְּשׁוֹטָה וְהָא אִיכָּא צַעֲרָא בִּמְפוּתָּה The Gemara asks: In the case of one who has relations with his sister who is a grown woman, too, although he does not pay a fine, isn’t there compensation for humiliation and degradation? He should be exempt from lashes in that case as well. The Gemara answers: There, the halakha in the mishna is with regard to his sister who is an imbecile, with regard to whom there is no humiliation or degradation beyond her status as an imbecile. The Gemara asks: But isn’t there payment for pain even in the rape of an imbecile? The Gemara responds: The halakha is with regard to a seduced woman, who is not entitled to payment for pain, as she engaged in relations willingly.
הַשְׁתָּא דְּאָתֵית לְהָכִי אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא אֲחוֹתוֹ נַעֲרָה בִּיתוֹמָה וּמְפוּתָּה The Gemara comments: Now that you have arrived at this explanation that the mishna is referring to a seduced woman, the mishna can be understood even if you say it is referring to his sister who is a young woman. The reason that the seducer does not pay the fine is that the halakha is with regard to one who is an orphan and a seduced woman. Were her father alive, he would receive the payment. Because he died, the payment goes to her. Since she willingly participated in the relations, she relinquished her right to the payment, and the seducer is therefore liable to receive lashes.
אַלְמָא קָסָבַר עוּלָּא כָּל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹן וּמַלְקוֹת מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי מְנָא לֵיהּ לְעוּלָּא הָא גָּמַר מֵחוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵירוֹ מָה חוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵירוֹ דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹן וּמַלְקוֹת מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי אַף כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹן וּמַלְקוֹת מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי The Gemara observes: Apparently, Ulla maintains that in any case where there is liability to both pay money and receive lashes, e.g., one who has forced relations with his sister who is a young woman, one pays money but is not flogged. The Gemara asks: From where does Ulla derive this principle? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the halakha of one who injures another. Just as with regard to one who injures another where there is liability to both pay money for the injury and receive lashes for violating the prohibition “Lest he continues to strike him” (Deuteronomy 25:3), the halakha there is that one pays money but is not flogged, so too, in any case where there is liability to both pay money and receive lashes, one pays money but is not flogged.
מָה לְחוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵירוֹ שֶׁכֵּן חַיָּיב בַּחֲמִשָּׁה דְּבָרִים וְאִי מָמוֹנָא לְקוּלָּא שֶׁכֵּן הוּתַּר מִכְּלָלוֹ בְּבֵית דִּין The Gemara asks: What is the basis for the comparison between other cases and the case of one who injures another? One who injures another cannot serve as a paradigm for cases of liability for both money and lashes because the case of one who injures another is particularly stringent, as he is liable to pay five types of indemnity: Injury, pain, medical costs, loss of livelihood, and humiliation. And if payment of money is a more lenient form of punishment than lashes, one could infer a fortiori: If in the stringent case of injuring another, one receives the more lenient punishment, all the more so would he receive the more lenient punishment in less stringent cases; nevertheless, one who injures another cannot serve as a paradigm for cases of liability for both money and lashes. The reason is that there is also a lenient aspect with regard to injuring another, as it is permitted, in departure from its norm, in court. The court administers lashes, injuring those convicted. The leniency is that its application is selective.
אֶלָּא גָּמַר מֵעֵדִים זוֹמְמִין מָה עֵדִים זוֹמְמִין דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹן וּמַלְקוֹת מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי אַף כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹן וּמַלְקוֹת מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי Rather, the Gemara states that Ulla derives this principle from the halakha of false, conspiring witnesses. Just as with regard to conspiring witnesses, where there is liability to both pay money, if they falsely testified to render one liable for payment, and receive lashes, for violating the prohibition “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor” (Exodus 20:12), and the halakha is that one pays money but is not flogged, so too, in any case where there is liability to both pay money and receive lashes, one pays money but is not flogged.
מָה לְעֵדִים זוֹמְמִין שֶׁכֵּן אֵינָן צְרִיכִים הַתְרָאָה וְאִי מָמוֹנָא לְקוּלָּא הוּא שֶׁכֵּן לֹא עָשׂוּ מַעֲשֶׂה The Gemara asks: What is the basis for the comparison of other cases to the case of conspiring witnesses? Conspiring witnesses cannot serve as a paradigm for cases of liability for both money and lashes because the case of conspiring witnesses is particularly stringent, as they do not require forewarning. As a rule, the courts administer punishment only to one who was forewarned not to perform the transgression. The fact that this is not a requirement in the case of conspiring witnesses indicates that it is a particularly stringent prohibition. Therefore, no proof can be cited from the case of conspiring witnesses to other cases with regard to monetary payment instead of lashes. And if payment of money is a more lenient form of punishment than lashes, the case of conspiring witnesses also has a lenient aspect, as they did not perform an action but merely spoke.
אֶלָּא גָּמַר מִתַּרְוַיְיהוּ מָה הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹן וּמַלְקוֹת מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי אַף כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹן וּמַלְקוֹת מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי מָה לְהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן שֶׁכֵּן יֵשׁ בָּהֶן צַד חָמוּר וְאִי מָמוֹנָא לְקוּלָּא הוּא שֶׁכֵּן יֵשׁ בָּהֶן צַד הַקַּל Rather, Ulla derives the principle from both of them, the cases of one who injures another and of conspiring witnesses. The common denominator of both cases is that there is liability to both pay money and receive lashes and the halakha is that one pays money but is not flogged; so too, in any case where there is liability to both pay money and receive lashes, one pays money but is not flogged. The Gemara asks: What is the basis for the comparison of other cases to the common denominator of both cases, as they have an element of stringency that does not exist in other prohibitions in that one who injures another pays five types of indemnity, and conspiring witnesses are flogged without forewarning? And if payment of money is a more lenient form of punishment than lashes, other cases cannot be derived from it, as they have an element of leniency that does not exist in other prohibitions. The prohibition in the case of one who injures another is selectively applied, as it is permitted, in departure from its norm, in court, and the case of conspiring witnesses is lenient because they performed no action.