Gittin 34aגיטין ל״ד א
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34aל״ד א

יתומין שבאו לחלוק בנכסי אביהן בית דין מעמידין להן אפוטרופוס ובוררים להן חלק יפה הגדילו יכולין למחות ורב נחמן דידיה אמר הגדילו אין יכולין למחות דאם כן מה כח בית דין יפה

with regard to the halakhot of a steward who cares for the estate of orphans: In the case of orphans who came to divide their father’s property, the court appoints a steward [apotropos] for them, and they select for them, i.e., for each of the orphans, a fine portion. When the orphans have grown up, they can protest the division and demand the redistribution of the property. And Rav Naḥman said his own statement: When they have grown up, they cannot protest, for if so, what advantage does the court have? This demonstrates that Rav Naḥman agrees with the principle of: If so, what advantage does the court have?

התם ממונא הכא איסורא

The Gemara answers: There is no contradiction between Rav Naḥman’s statement concerning the inheritance of orphans and his statement with regard to rendering a bill of divorce void. There, in the former case, it is in the realm of monetary matters, and the preservation of the court’s honor is more important than the accurate distribution of the property. Here, in the case of divorce, it is in the realm of matters of prohibition, and one would not permit a married woman to remarry in order to strengthen the authority of the court.

גידול בר רעילאי שדר לה גיטא לדביתהו אזל שליחא אשכחה דהוה יתבה ונוולה אמר לה הא גיטיך אמרה ליה זיל השתא מיהא ותא למחר אזל לגביה וא"ל פתח ואמר ברוך הטוב והמטיב

§ The Gemara relates: A man named Giddul bar Re’ilai sent a bill of divorce to his wife. The agent went and found that she was sitting and weaving [navla]. He said to her: This is your bill of divorce. She said to him: At least go away from here now and come tomorrow to give me the bill of divorce. The agent went to Giddul bar Re’ilai and told him what had occurred. Giddul bar Re’ilai opened his mouth and said: Blessed is He Who is good and does good, as he was happy that the bill of divorce was not delivered.

אביי אמר ברוך הטוב והמטיב ולא בטל גיטא רבא אמר ברוך הטוב והמטיב ובטל גיטא

The Sages disagreed with regard to the status of this bill of divorce. Abaye said that he said: Blessed is He Who is good and does good, as he was happy that it was not delivered, but the bill of divorce is not rendered void through this statement. Rava said that he said: Blessed is He Who is good and does good, and the bill of divorce is rendered void.

במאי קמיפלגי בגלוי דעתא בגיטא קמיפלגי דאביי סבר גלוי דעתא בגיטא לאו מלתא היא ורבא סבר גלוי דעתא בגיטא מילתא היא

The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? The Gemara answers: They disagree in their understanding of disclosure of intent with regard to a bill of divorce, i.e., when the husband demonstrates that he does not desire the bill of divorce to be delivered, but does not render it void explicitly. As Abaye holds: Disclosure of intent with regard to a bill of divorce is not a significant matter and does not render it void, and Rava holds: Disclosure of intent with regard to a bill of divorce is a significant matter, and does render it void.

אמר רבא מנא אמינא לה דרב ששת אשקליה גיטא לההוא גברא בעל כרחיה ואמר להו לסהדי הכי אמר לכו רב ששת לבטל גיטא ואצרכיה רב ששת גיטא אחרינא

Rava said: From where do I say this halakha? From a case where Rav Sheshet extracted the authorization to write a bill of divorce from a certain man against his will, and that man then said to the witnesses: This is what Rav Sheshet said to you: Let the bill of divorce be rendered void, and Rav Sheshet required him to write another bill of divorce. Evidently, though the man did not explicitly render the bill of divorce void with his statement, but only demonstrated that he did not want the bill of divorce to be given, Rav Sheshet considered the bill of divorce to be rendered void.

ואביי אטו רב ששת מבטל גיטא דאינשי הוה איהו בטלה והאי דקאמר להו הכי משום דפנוי

And Abaye would respond: Is that to say Rav Sheshet would render void the bills of divorce of other people? Rather, the husband rendered void the bill of divorce himself. And the reason why he told them this, that it was Rav Sheshet’s instructions that the bill of divorce be rendered void, was due to the lashes that he would have received from the court appointees if he said that he was rendering the bill of divorce void against the wishes of Rav Sheshet.

ואמר אביי מנא אמינא לה דרב יהודה אשקליה גיטא לחתניה דר' ירמיה ביראה ובטליה תנא אשקליה ובטליה הדר תנא ואשקליה על כרחיה ואמר להו לסהדי אותיבו קרי באוניכו וכתובו ליה ואי סלקא דעתך גלוי דעתא בגיטא מילתא היא הא חזו ליה דקא רהיט בתרייהו

And Abaye said: From where do I say that disclosure of intent with regard to bills of divorce is disregarded? From the case where Rav Yehuda extracted the authorization to write a bill of divorce from the son-in-law of Rabbi Yirmeya Bira’a, and the man rendered the bill of divorce void. Rav Yehuda again extracted the authorization to write a bill of divorce, and the man rendered the bill of divorce void. Rav Yehuda returned and again extracted the authorization to write a bill of divorce against his will, and said to the witnesses: Place pieces of gourd in your ears and write the bill of divorce for him, so that you will not hear if he renders the bill of divorce void again. Abaye states his proof: And if it enters your mind that disclosure of intent with regard to bills of divorce is a significant matter, in this case the witnesses see that he is running after them even though they do not hear him, so the bill of divorce should be rendered void.

ורבא האי דקא רהיט בתרייהו דאמר להו אשור הבו לה הייא כי היכא דמשלם צערא דההוא גברא

And Rava would respond: Since they cannot hear him, his intent is not disclosed; this, that he is running after them, does not prove that he wishes to render the bill of divorce void, as it could be that he wishes to say to them: Make haste [ashur], give her the bill of divorce speedily [hayya] in order to end the pain of that man, i.e., my pain, that I am divorcing my wife.

ואמר אביי מנא אמינא לה דההוא דאמר להו אי לא אתינא עד תלתין יומין ליהוי גיטא אתא ופסקיה מברא אמר להו חזו דאתאי חזו דאתאי ואמר שמואל לא שמיה מתיא

And Abaye said further: From where do I say that disclosure of intent with regard to bills of divorce is disregarded? From the case where there was a certain man who said to the agents with whom he entrusted the bill of divorce: If I do not arrive from now until thirty days have passed, let this be a bill of divorce. He came after thirty days had passed, but was prevented from crossing the river by the ferry that was located on the other side of the river, so he did not arrive within the designated time. He said to the people across the river: See that I have arrived, see that I have arrived, and Shmuel said: It is not considered to be an arrival, even though it is clear that this was his intention, and the bill of divorce is not void.

ורבא אטו התם לבטולי גיטא בעי התם לקיומי תנאיה קא בעי והא לא איקיים תנאיה

And Rava said: This case cannot serve as a proof; is that to say that there he desires to render the bill of divorce void? There, in that case, he desires to fulfill his stipulation, and he did not fulfill his condition, as he did not arrive. Therefore, the bill of divorce remains valid.

ההוא דאמר להו אי לא נסיבנא עד תלתין יומין ליהוי גיטא כי מטו תלתין יומין אמר להו הא טרחנא

The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who said to witnesses when he gave a bill of divorce to his betrothed: If I do not marry her within up to thirty days, then this will be a bill of divorce. When thirty days arrived, he said to them: I took the trouble but I did not succeed in marrying her.

למאי ניחוש לה אי משום אונסא אין אונס בגיטין אי משום גלויי דעתא בגיטא פלוגתא דאביי ורבא הוא

The Gemara asks: With regard to what need we be concerned in the case of this bill of divorce? If we are concerned because he attempted to marry her and there were circumstances beyond his control that prevented him from doing so, isn’t there a principle that unavoidable circumstances have no legal standing with regard to bills of divorce? If the concern is due to disclosure of intent with regard to bills of divorce, and the husband demonstrated that he does not want the bill of divorce to take effect, then this is a dispute of Abaye and Rava, and, as the Gemara explains later, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye.

ההוא דאמר להו אי לא נסיבנא לריש ירחא דאדר ליהוי גיטא כי מטא ריש ירחא דאדר אמר להו אנא לריש ירחא דניסן אמרי למאי ניחוש לה אי משום אונס אין אונס בגיטין אי משום גלויי דעתא פלוגתא דאביי ורבא

The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who said to witnesses: If I do not marry my betrothed by the New Moon of Adar then this will be a bill of divorce. When the New Moon of Adar arrived, he said to them: I said by the New Moon of Nisan. With regard to what need we be concerned? If we are concerned because he attempted to marry her and there were circumstances beyond his control that prevented him from doing so, isn’t there a principle that unavoidable circumstances have no legal standing with regard to bills of divorce? If the concern is due to disclosure of intent with regard to bills of divorce, and the husband demonstrated that he does not want the bill of divorce to take effect, then this is a dispute of Abaye and Rava, and, as the Gemara explains later, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye.

והלכתא כנחמן והלכתא כנחמן

The Gemara states several conclusions: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman, who ruled that one can render a bill of divorce void in the presence of two people. And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman, who ruled that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in both of his disputes with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.