Bava Kamma 58aבבא קמא נ״ח א
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
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58aנ״ח א

לא מבעיא קאמר לא מבעיא אכלה דמשלמת מה שנהנית אבל נחבטה אימא מבריח ארי מנכסי חבירו הוא ומה שנהנית נמי לא משלם קמ"ל

one cannot make such an inference from Rav’s statement. Rav is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary, and this is how to understand his statement: It is not necessary to state that if the animal fell into the garden and ate from its produce, that the owner pays for the benefit that it derives. But if the produce softened the blow of striking the ground and thereby the animal avoided injury, one might say that the owner of the animal should not pay, on the grounds that the owner of the garden may be viewed, analogously, to one who repels a lion from another’s property. In such a case, although the latter benefited from his action, he is not obligated to pay for it. Similarly in this case, one might think that the owner of the animal does not pay even for the benefit that the animal derived. For this reason Rav teaches us that the owner of the animal must pay for this benefit as well.

ואימא ה"נ

The Gemara asks: But why not say that this is indeed the halakha, and the owner of the animal should be exempt for paying for the benefit of his animal not being injured?

מבריח ארי מנכסי חבירו מדעתו הוא האי לאו מדעתו אי נמי מבריח ארי מנכסי חבירו לית ליה פסידא האי אית ליה פסידא

The Gemara answers: One who repels a lion from another’s property does so with intent, knowing that he would be ineligible for payment. By contrast, this owner of the garden did not act with intent and would have preferred for the incident not to have happened. Alternatively, one could say that one who repels a lion from another’s property does not thereby have any loss himself. By contrast, this owner of the garden has a loss, in that his produce is damaged.

היכי נפל רב כהנא אמר שהוחלקה במימי רגליה רבא אמר שדחפתה חברתה

The Gemara asks: How did the animal fall? In which case does this halakha apply? Rav Kahana says: It slipped on its own urine. Rava says: Another animal belonging to the same owner pushed it, causing it to fall there.

מ"ד שדחפתה חברתה כל שכן שהוחלקה במימי רגליה ומאן דאמר שהוחלקה במימי רגליה אבל דחפתה חברתה פשעה ומשלמת מה שהזיקה דא"ל איבעי לך עבורי חדא חדא

The Gemara explains: Rava, the one who says that the mishna is referring to a case where another animal pushed it, in which case the owner pays only for the benefit that the animal derived and is exempt from paying for the damage caused, holds that all the more so this halakha would apply in a case where it slipped on its urine, which is beyond the owner’s control. But Rav Kahana, the one who says that the mishna is referring to a case where the animal slipped on its urine, holds that if, however, another animal pushed it, this indicates that the owner was negligent and should have prevented this happening. Therefore, in such a case, the owner pays for what his animal damaged, since the owner of the garden can say to the owner of the animal: You should have led your animals across one by one, so that they would not be able to push each other.

אמר רב כהנא לא שנו אלא באותה ערוגה אבל מערוגה לערוגה משלמת מה שהזיקה ורבי יוחנן אמר אפי' מערוגה לערוגה ואפילו כל היום כולו עד שתצא ותחזור לדעת

Rav Kahana says: They taught only that the owner pays for the benefit that it derives in the same garden bed into which it fell, but if it went from one garden bed to another garden bed and ate from that one, the owner pays for what it damaged. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even if the animal goes from one garden bed to another garden bed and eats, and even if the animal continues going from one bed to another and eating for the entire day, the owner pays only for the benefit that the animal derived and not for what it damaged, unless it leaves the garden entirely and returns with the owner’s knowledge.

א"ר פפא לא תימא עד שתצא לדעת ותחזור לדעת אלא כיון שיצתה לדעת אע"פ שחזרה שלא לדעת מ"ט דא"ל כיון דילפא כל אימת דמשתמטא להתם רהטא:

Rav Pappa said, explaining Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement: Do not say this means: Unless the animal leaves with the owner’s knowledge and returns with his knowledge; rather, once it leaves the garden with the owner’s knowledge, even if it returned without his knowledge, the owner is liable to pay for what it damaged. What is the reason for this? It is that the owner of the garden can say to the owner of the animal: Since the animal has now learned that the garden is there with food to eat, every time it strays it will run to there.

ירדה כדרכה והזיקה משלמת מה שהזיקה: בעי רבי ירמיה ירדה כדרכה והזיקה במי לידה מהו

§ The mishna teaches: If the animal descended into the garden in its usual manner and caused damage there, the owner pays for what it damaged. Rabbi Yirmeya asks: If the animal descended in its usual manner and gave birth to a calf there and damaged the produce with amniotic fluid, what is the halakha? Does the owner of the animal have to pay for this damage?

אליבא דמאן דאמר תחלתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס חייב לא תיבעי לך כי תיבעי לך אליבא דמאן דאמר תחלתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס פטור מאי

The Gemara clarifies Rabbi Yirmeya’s question: Do not raise the dilemma in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that one is liable in a case of damage that is initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, since in this case the owner was negligent in allowing the animal to enter another person’s courtyard, although the actual causing of the damage was ultimately by accident. When should you raise this dilemma? Raise it in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that one is exempt in a case that is initially through negligence and ultimately by accident. What is the halakha in this case?

מי אמרינן כיון דתחלתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס פטור או דלמא הכא כולה בפשיעה הוא דכיון דקא חזי דקריבה לה למילד איבעי ליה לנטורה

The two sides of the question are as follows: Do we say that, since this case is initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, he is exempt from liability? Or perhaps here, in this case, it is entirely due to his negligence; since he saw that the animal was close to giving birth, he should have safeguarded it adequately