וְאִי מִיעַבְּרָא עַד אַרְבָּעִים מַיָּא בְּעָלְמָא הִיא
If she is pregnant, until forty days from conception the fetus is merely water. It is not yet considered a living being, and therefore it does not disqualify its mother from partaking of teruma.
How Exodus Revises the Laws of Hammurabi, Prof. David P. Wright
https://www.thetorah.com/article/how-exodus-revises-the-laws-of-hammurabi
Following the revelation of the Decalogue (20:1–14), Moses alone approaches YHWH on the mountain and receives a collection of laws (20:19–23:19), which scholars refer to as the Covenant Code or Covenant Collection (henceforth CC). Afterward, Moses presents these laws to the people in a covenant ceremony in which they agree to observe its precepts (Exod 24:3–8).
In 1901, archaeologists working in Susa uncovered a 7.5-foot basalt stone stela, upon which the sixth king of Old Babylon, Hammurabi (1792–1750 B.C.E.), had a set of laws carved. The Laws of Hammurabi (henceforth LH) were translated into French by Jean-Vincent Scheil (1858–1940) and published the following year. The similarities between many of these laws to CC in substance and style was so striking that scholars ever since have speculated about the relationship between the two.
Most contemporary scholars have concluded that LH and CC are only indirectly and distantly related. The texts either arose independently out of common parent legal traditions, or Mesopotamian legal traditions became part of scribal and legal traditions in Syria-Canaan and were eventually inherited by biblical scribes.
Nevertheless, CC’s correlations with LH are sufficiently numerous to suggest that the relationship is direct. Moreover, recent scholarship on inner-biblical exegesis and hermeneutical innovation in source-dependent texts shows that even the notable differences between CC and LH may arise out of intentional transformation. When compelling explanations can be provided that differences have come about through such a process, certain differences may actually become evidence for dependence.
The assault laws of Exodus 21:12–14, 18–32, especially the laws about miscarriage, talion (i.e., “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”) offer a strong demonstration of how intricately CC is dependent upon LH, even while adjusting its content and style.
The Laws of Hammurabi present two cases in which a man strikes a pregnant woman (209–210):
209 If a man strikes a daughter of a man (mārat awīlim) and he causes her to miscarry her fetus, he shall weigh out ten shekels of silver for her fetus.
210 If that woman dies, they shall kill his daughter.
According to this, if the pregnant woman survives the blow, the penalty is purely financial. If she does not, the assailant is punished vicariously, namely his daughter is killed. The CC has the same two cases, but it then moves in a different direction:
The Christian tradition reads this differently. In the Septuagint, the Greek translation of the Bible, the Hebrew word for "no harm follow" was replaced by the Greek for "her child to be born perfectly formed." This translation/interpretation brands the unborn child affected by this violence as fully formed and therefore sees the action against it as murder/manslaughter. The Jewish tradition followed Rashi as seeing the harm described about the woman and not the unborn child.
"22And if two men strive and smite a woman with child, and her child be born imperfectly formed, he shall be forced to pay a penalty: as the woman's husband may lay upon him, he shall pay with a valuation. 23But if it be perfectly formed, he shall give life for life,24eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, 25burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe."
היכי דמי אילימא דאיכא תשעה כותים ואחד ישראל ביניהן תיפוק ליה דרובא כותים נינהו אי נמי פלגא ופלגא ספק נפשות להקל לא צריכא דאיכא תשעה ישראל וכותי אחד ביניהן דהוה ליה כותי קבוע וכל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה דמי בשלמא לרבנן דאמרי נתכוון להרוג את זה והרג את זה חייב דכתיב (שמות כא, כב) וכי ינצו אנשים ונגפו אשה הרה ואמר רבי אלעזר במצות שבמיתה הכתוב מדבר דכתיב (שמות כא, כג) אם אסון יהיה ונתתה נפש תחת נפש אלא לר"ש האי ונתתה נפש תחת נפש מאי עביד ליה ממון וכדרבי דתניא רבי אומר ונתתה נפש תחת נפש ממון אתה אומר ממון או אינו אלא נפש ממש נאמרה נתינה למטה
The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the Rabbis, who say that if one intended to kill this individual and he killed that individual he is liable, there is support for their opinion from that which is written: “If men struggle and they hurt a pregnant woman so that her child departs from her, and there is no tragedy, he shall be punished, as the husband of the woman shall impose upon him, and he shall give as the judges determine” (Exodus 21:22). It can be inferred form the verse that if there is a tragedy, i.e., if the woman dies, there is no payment of restitution. And Rabbi Elazar says: It is with regard to a quarrel that involves the intent of each to cause the death of the other that the verse is speaking, as it is written: “But if there shall be a tragedy then you shall give a life for a life” (Exodus 21:23). This is proof that in a case where one intended to kill one individual and he killed a pregnant woman instead, he is liable to be executed, which is why he does not pay restitution. But according to Rabbi Shimon, this verse: “Then you shall give a life for a life,” what does he do with it? According to his opinion, the party to the quarrel is exempt from the punishment of execution in this case. The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Shimon, “a life for a life” is not referring to execution; rather, the reference is to monetary restitution. And this understanding is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that the phrase “then you shall give a life for a life” does not mean execution, but rather monetary restitution for the life that he took. Do you say that it means monetary restitution, or does it mean only the taking of an actual life? Based on the language employed in the verse, it can be determined that the reference is to monetary payment. In these verses, a term of giving is stated below: “And you shall give a life for a life” (Exodus 21:23).
Deathblows to a Pregnant Woman – What Restitution Was Required?
Dr. Sandra Jacobs
https://www.thetorah.com/article/deathblows-to-a-pregnant-woman-what-restitution-was-required
The talionic principle (often referred to by the Latin, ius talionis, based on its use in Roman law), appears in the Torah’s “wisdom laws” of מִּשְׁפָּטִים in the case of homicide, where a pregnant woman is accidentally killed in a fight. This scenario features also in the legal collections of the ancient Near East, where “a diversity of enforceable rules” existed to redress such losses.
The accidental injury of a pregnant woman in a public brawl was of particular significance in the monumental legal collections of Mesopotamia, where the life of a married women together with her unborn child, represented the highest single individual loss an average adult male householder could sustain, outside of his fixed assets.
As was the case elsewhere in biblical law such assaults were perceived as an infringement of male property rights, rather than an attack on the personhood of the woman.
"Mental health risk has been definitely equated to physical-health risk. This woman who is in danger of losing her mental health unless the pregnancy is interrupted, therefore, would accordingly qualify." (Responsum L'vushai Mord'khai, 1913)
"There is room to permit abortion for "great need"; as long as the birth process has not yet begun, even if the reason is not yet to save her life - even if only to save her from the "great pain" it causes her." (She'elat Ya'avetz, R. Jacob Emden, Hamburg, 18th C)
(מז) ולעניו הנשים שבזה"ז בעוה"ר איכא נשים דלא מעלי ורוצות להפיל העובר שבמעיהן הנה זה הוא אסור מאיסור רציחה ואסור לסייע בזה לא רק לישראלית אלא אף לנכרית משום שבני נח נמי אסורין ברציחה גם בעובר ובני נח חמורין בזה שגם נהרגין על רציחת עוברין שלכן אסור אף לסייע בזה וגם איכא משום לפני עור,
(מח) ואף כשאפשר לה להודע מרופאים שעושין זה גם מאחריני אין לסייע בזה אף לא לנכרית אף אם היה בזה חשש איבה, אבל בעצם ליכא חשש איבה כשיאמר שהוא אינו רוצה לעזור לדבר שהוא רציחת נפש, שהרי יודעות אף הנשים הנכריות שאין זה דבר נכון לעשות שהרי גם כמה מדינות אוסרין זה משום רציחה ויכול הרופא יר"ש לומר שהוא אינו רוצה להתערב בדבר רציחת עובר כשאין זה לרפואה דסכנת האם.
(47) In the last few years there has been a great increase in the number of abortions performed. Torah-observant physicians are forbidden to participate in any way in an abortion, whether the patient is Jewish or non-Jewish. The prohibition against abortion is a universal prohibition applying to Jew and non-Jew alike. The hospital and the patient will surely respect a stand taken by a religious physician that his moral and ethical commitments do not permit him to assist in any way in the abortion process because according to our religion abortion constitutes murder.
(48) The patient may then decide on her own to seek other help. This is not a case in which refusal to perform an abortion may incur the enmity of the non-Jewish world. The position that abortion is murder is held by many non-Jews as well, and indeed there are many countries in which abortion is illegal. The only time we may permit abortion is to save the life of the mother, because maternal life takes precedence over fetal life.