Sanhedrin: Chapter III, Mishnah I

(1) Monetary cases [are judged] by three [judges]. One [litigant] selects one and the other selects one, and both select the additional one, these are the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say, the two judges choose the additional one. One [litigant] invalidates the judge of the other, and the other invalidates the judge of the one, these are the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say, when [may one party invalidate the judge selected by the other]? Only when evidence is brought that they are related [to the litigant] or otherwise invalid [may they be invalidated], but if they are acceptable or expert, they cannot be invalidated. One [litigant] invalidates the witness of the other, and the other invalidates the witness of the one, these are the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say, when [may one party invalidate the witness of the other]? Only when evidence is brought that they are related [to the litigant] or otherwise invalid [may they be invalidated], but if they are acceptable, they cannot be invalidated.

It means that one chooses a Beit Din which has three judges, and the other also chooses a Beit Din of three judges, and the two of these Beit Dins then choose a third (which makes 9 judges in total)

And each person Poseled the Beit Din of their friend, and doesn’t want to be judged before it

According to Rashi, the Gemara understands that there are nine. How is that? One of the litigants picks one Beis-Din - that makes three; the other one picks a Beis-Din - that makes six, and they both pick a third Beis-Din - that makes nine. Hence the Gemara asks that three will suffice?

But that is not correct - since that is not at all the implication. If it was, then the Gemara ought to have asked explicitly that there is a contradiction here between the Reisha, 'Dinei Mamonos bi'Sheloshah, implying three, and the Seifa, which requires nine.

It therefore seems that the Gemara new at the outset what it ultimately concludes - that each litigant is permitted to disqualify his opponent's Beis-Din, and that in the end, it is the third Beis-Din that actually judges (like the Metaretz answers); And the Kashya is on the Lashon of the Mishnah, which states 'This one picks ... and that one picks, as if it was obligatory for each one to do so. That is why the Gemara asks 'What does it mean "Zeh Borer Lo Echad ... "? Do they really have to do that?

And the Gemara answers that the Mishnah speaks when that is what they did, but does not mean that it is obligatory to do so.

The reason for what the Sages say, that the two judges should pick the third judge is that one judge will be more inclined to be on one side, and one judge will be more inclined to be on the other side, and the third will decide between the two of them and will not be on the side of one of the two litigants because neither of the litigants chose him. And the disagreement between R Yehuda and the Sages is not in the case of expert judges, but rather in the case of non-expert judges. For as Rabbi Meir says, when they are non expert judges there is the chance they would make a mistake and this would undercut their judgement (as they would easily be accused of not being impartial). And the sages say that as long as they are Kosher judges, they are as if they are experts, and therefore their judgement cannot be invalid.

The litigants must choose the judges, otherwise there will be doubt as to the validity of the judgement---this is the essence of the debate

What is an expert judge? That they are wise in Torah, they know the rest of Tanach, that they can take one thing out of another (that they can expound upon something)

They know the Torah B’chtav and B’al Peh

But I can explain this and point out an issue with this. I know these things, and everyone who is like this is able to judge, and even an individual,, even if they have not received permission from the secular authorities, but it just needs to be known that this person is like this. And this is the idea of an expert for the masses (ie people know about it). And if they aren’t an expert then their judgement doesn’t hold even if they come to the correct judgement. And even if they got permission from the house of the Reish Galuta/secular authorities, his judgement does not hold, because it only holds in the way we described before. But if they didn’t get permission from the Reish Galuta, then people may not accept their judgement (as perhaps it is not binding)

BUT—the EXPERT who also got AUTHORITY from the Resh Galuta---their judgement is always accepted

Witnesses case: If Reuven claims that Shimon has his money, and Reuven brings two witnesses to testify on his behalf, and then brings two more witnesses to back up the initial claim.

But then if Shimon claims that all four witnesses are Pasuk, Rabbi Meir says we listen to him, and that Reuven must bring proof that they are Kosher witnesses, because you wouldn’t normally bring extra witnesses unless you thought that its possible that one of them wasn’t Kosher for witnessing.

And we don’t know which of them are Pasul, if it’s the first ones or the second ones. But the sages say that someone didn’t bring extra witnesses because some of the witnesses are Pasul, but rather just to strengthen the case, and that we don’t listen to Shimon.

(1) If one of the litigants said let that man try my case, and the other said let that man try my case, the two men thus chosen, one to each litigant, jointly select a third person, and the three act as judges for both litigants, so that a correct verdict is likely to result.— —

(1) [If] one of the litigants said,¹e., if it so happened that this was the wish of the litigants. In other words, the present ruling is not meant to teach that such is the case in the first instance. For otherwise, three laymen or one authoritative Judge suffice — M.E. Cf. supra § 3, 1, notes. Furthermore, this ruling has reference only to a case where the litigants insist on resorting to law, but where they submit their case to arbitration, and each party chooses one Judge, the selected Judges cannot nominate a third Judge without the consent of the litigants, the reason being that arbitration does not require three — ShaK, N.B. cited in P.Tesh. Nowadays it is the accepted custom that even in a case of strict law the two litigants may choose the third Judge — A.H. 'Let So-and-so act as Judge for me,' and his fellow-litigant said,¹e., if it so happened that this was the wish of the litigants. In other words, the present ruling is not meant to teach that such is the case in the first instance. For otherwise, three laymen or one authoritative Judge suffice — M.E. Cf. supra § 3, 1, notes. Furthermore, this ruling has reference only to a case where the litigants insist on resorting to law, but where they submit their case to arbitration, and each party chooses one Judge, the selected Judges cannot nominate a third Judge without the consent of the litigants, the reason being that arbitration does not require three — ShaK, N.B. cited in P.Tesh. Nowadays it is the accepted custom that even in a case of strict law the two litigants may choose the third Judge — A.H. 'Let So-and-so act as Judge for me,' — then these two Judges each of whom were chosen respectively by the litigants nominate a third Judge;²Thus Yad, Sanhedrin VII, 1 according to reading of SeMaG (v. also Kesef Mishneh ibid.; B.Yos. a.l.). Derived from San. 23a in accord with the Sages. If the two chosen Judges are related to each other, the defendant has the advantage to compel the plaintiff to select another Judge (Isserles in Resp.) — R.A.Eger. and it is not necessary that the third Judge [should be nominated] with the consent of the litigants;³Thus Tur. Derived from San. ibid.: ‘No one disagrees that the (third) Judge must have the consent of his colleagues; they (R. Meir and the Sages) merely differ whether the consent of the litigants is (also) required. R. Meir holds that the consent of the litigants is also necessary; whereas the Sages maintain: only that of the Judges is necessary but not that of the litigants.’ The law follows the opinion of the Sages. Should the defendant agree that the selection of the third Judge should also be made with the consent of the litigants, it is permissible (v. Bertinoro San. ibid., and cf. comments of Tosaf. Yom Tob) — P.Tesh. And even according to Lebush that such a procedure will delay the execution of justice (עינוי הדין) for the defendant may always disagree with the plaintiff’s choice, — yet, if the plaintiff agrees that the third Judge be chosen with the consent of the contending parties, Lebush will also agree that it is permissible — P.Tesh. and all three of them [the Judges] try them [the litigants],⁴Yad ibid. in accord with San. ibid. that the meaning of the words, ‘Each party chooses one’ refers not to a Court of Law but to one Judge. Hence, each party chooses one Judge and they jointly nominate a third. for in this wise a true judgment will be rendered.⁵San. ibid.: ‘Since each litigant chooses a Judge and jointly they nominate a third, a true judgment will be rendered.’ Even if the one [Judge] whom the litigant chose was a distinguished and ordained scholar, he cannot compel his fellow-litigant that he [the latter] be tried by this [distinguished Judge], but he [the fellow-litigant] too, may choose whomever he desires [to act as Judge on his behalf].⁶Whether superior or inferior to the other in learning — M.E. The Judge must, however, be versed in law or must be a recognized Mumḥeh. Otherwise, he may be rejected (B.Yos. citing R. Yeruḥam) — ShaK. This ruling is derived from San. ibid.: ‘R. Papa stated: It has reference even to Mumḥin (i.e., the debtor or defendant may reject the Judge chosen by the creditor or plaintiff even if he is a Mumḥeh), e.g., the Courts of R. Huna and R. Ḥisda (their Courts were close to each other), for he (the defendant) can say: Am I troubling you?’ This applies where one litigant persuaded the Mumḥeh to act in the capacity of an ‘arbiter’ (בורר), but if he said to his fellow-litigant, ‘Come, let us have our case tried before the city Sage, the latter is not designated an ‘arbiter’ and is the Judge for both parties — M.E. Although the law is that an individual Mumḥeh may judge alone against the will of the defendant, it applies only where the latter refuses to appear for trial, but where he states, ‘I wish to select another Judge too, he is obeyed — BaḤ, ShaK contra M.E. Gloss: For since each party chooses a Judge, the litigants obey them, and the Judges, too, will each examine [points] in favour of the one who chose him whereever it is possible [to do so] from the legal point of view,⁷Thus Rashi San. ibid. s.v. יצא and Asheri. Cf. also Y. San. III, 1(21a): ‘Because he has chosen him as arbiter, he will advocate his (client’s) claim.’ Since they both feel that their rights are equally secure. and the third [Judge] hears the [legal] arguments of both of them [and compromises between them] and [thus together] they render a true verdict.⁸Tur — G. All the laws of Judges apply equally in the case of arbiters — P.Tesh. If they [the two Judges] cannot reach an agreement in nominating the third Judge, [then] the town leaders appoint for them a third [Judge]. And if there are no leaders in the town, [then] the plaintiff may go before three [Judges] and they compel the defendant to be tried before them.⁹Asheri to San. ibid. For just as in the case of a Court of three or one authoritative Judge, the law is that they may try cases even against the will of the defendant where he refuses to appear before the Court (cf. San. 5a, Tosaf. s.v. דן), so too, the leaders or the representatives of the town enjoy the same status (v. supra § 2 and notes). And likewise if the defendant deliberately selects a Judge who is unworthy in order that he sit in judgment with a worthy Judge, they may compel him to be tried before three Judges as has been explained supra § 3, [par. 4], or that he select a worthy Judge.¹⁰Tur — G. San. ibid.: ‘The pureminded of Jerusalem used to act thus … they would not sit in judgment unless they knew who was to sit with them.’ But if the plaintiff deliberately chooses an unworthy Judge, the defendant may say to him, ‘I will not answer your pleas until you choose a worthy Judge’ — M.E. However, if the two arbiters can reach an harmonious decision [in the case], some say that they are not required to nominate a third [Judge].¹¹MaHaRIW s. 11 — G. Since the parties accepted them, it is sufficient. And where the contesting parties agreed to be tried by them, the law is that even an unauthoritative Judge may try the case (v. San. 5a, Tosaf. s.v. דן). Cf. also San. 6a. Hence, it follows that even in the first instance where the Judge was accepted, his judgment is valid, and much more so where two Judges were accepted, each by one of the parties. Consequently, we assume that the intention of the litigants is that if the two selected Judges reach a harmonious decision, there is no need for them to choose a third Judge. TaZ (followed by A.H.) disagrees with this ruling. Some say that if the defendant states that he will select two [Judges] and [that] the plaintiff should likewise select two [Judges], and they [the selected Judges] will nominate a fifth [Judge], — he is permitted to do so, for as long as there is a greater number of Judges, a true judgment will be rendered.¹²N. to Deut. I, 12 — G. Cf. Y. San. III, 3(21a).