Ervah and tzniot

(1) A handsbreadth that is uncovered on a woman in a place where it is her practice (lit. way) to cover it, even if it his wife, if it forbidden to read the Shema in front of it. <rema> And some say that this is specifically with respect to his wife but with another woman even less than a handsbreadth is Erva (lit. nakedness). And it seems from the words of the Rosh that a handsbreadth on a woman is Erva even to another woman, except that by herself she is able to read [the Shema] even though she is naked like was said earlier in Siman 74.

(2) The hair of a woman that it is her practice (lit. way) to cover it, it is forbidden to read [the Shema] in front of it <rema> even his wife <rema>. But virgins that it is their practice to go with an uncovered head, it is permitted. <rema> And so too is the law with the hairs of women that regularly come out of their barriers and certainly foreign (detached) hair even if it is her practice to cover.

(3) One should refrain from hearing a woman's singing voice during the reading of the Shema. <rema> and even his wife. But the voice that is regular to him is not Erva (lit. nakedness).

(4) It is forbidden to read [the Shema] in front of Erva, even that of a non-Jew, and so too in front of the Erva of a child. And there are those that permit in front of the Erva of a child so long as he is not capable of intercourse. <rema> And that is the main opinion.

there is effectively an act of locking a door in front of her by withholding from her any possibility of rejoicing, but when he forbids her from going to a house of mourning, what locking of a door in front of her is there? He taught: In the future she too will die, and no person will eulogize her or take care of her, just as she did not do so for others. And some say: No person will value her or pay attention to her, since a person who does not visit the sick or console mourners cuts himself off from others. Similarly, it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Meir used to say: What is the meaning of that which is written: “It is better to go to a house of mourning than to go to a house of feasting, since that is the end of all men, and the living will take it to heart” (Ecclesiastes 7:2)? What does “and the living will take it to heart” mean? It means that they will take matters relating to death to heart, realizing that they too will eventually die. He who eulogizes others, people will eulogize him; he who buries someone, people will bury him; he who lifts others to bring them to burial, people will similarly lift him to bring him to burial; he who escorts others out for burial, people will similarly escort him; he who carries others, others will carry him. Therefore, one who does not come to a house of mourning to comfort the bereaved will himself not be treated with proper dignity when he dies. § The mishna stated: And if he claimed he forbade her due to something else, he is permitted to do so. The Gemara asks: What is meant by something else? Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: He claims he did so due to promiscuous individuals that are commonly found there, and he does not want his wife to be among them. Rav Ashi said: We said that he may forbid her only with regard to a case where a presumption has been established that promiscuous people frequent this location, but if no such presumption has been established, it is not in his power to say he is concerned about it. § The mishna stated: And if he said to her: The vow will be void on condition that you tell so-and-so what you told me, or what I told you, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. The Gemara asks: And let her say it. Why shouldn’t she simply comply with his wishes? Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is referring to degrading matters, meaning intimate conversations between husband and wife, which she is ashamed to relate in the presence of others. The mishna stated: Or he said the vow will be void on condition that she fill something up and pour it into the refuse. The Gemara asks: And let her do it. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The mishna’s intention is that he demanded that she fill herself up and then shake herself out. This is a euphemistic way of saying that the husband wants her to take measures to prevent herself from becoming pregnant, and she is permitted to protest this. It was taught in a baraita: The case is that he told her to fill up ten jugs of water and pour them into the refuse, a task that involves pointless effort and appears foolish. The Gemara asks: Granted that according to Shmuel, who explains that the mishna is referring to a case where the husband insists that she not become pregnant, due to that reason he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. But according to the baraita, which explains that he simply wants her to engage in pointless work, what difference does it make to her? Let her do it. Rabba bar bar Ḥanna said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Because she would appear insane if she were to perform pointless actions, she may therefore demand a divorce. Rav Kahana said: One who vows and obligates his wife not to borrow or not to lend utensils that people generally lend, such as a sifter, or a sieve, or a mill, or an oven, must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract, since by making such rules he causes her to develop a bad reputation among her neighbors, who will suspect her of stinginess or haughtiness. The Gemara notes: That opinion is also taught in a baraita: One who vows and obligates his wife not to borrow or not to lend a sifter, or a sieve, or a mill, or an oven, must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract, since he causes her to develop a bad reputation among her neighbors. And similarly, if it is she who vowed not to borrow or not to lend a sifter, or a sieve, or a mill, or an oven, or that she will not weave nice garments for his children, she may be divorced without payment of her marriage contract. This too is because she causes him to develop a bad reputation among his neighbors, as they will link her behavior to him and think that he instructed her to act this way. MISHNA: And these are examples of women who may be divorced without payment of their marriage contract: A woman who violates the precepts of Moses, i.e., halakha, or the precepts of Jewish women, i.e., custom. The Mishna explains: And who is categorized as a woman who violates the precepts of Moses? This includes cases such as when she feeds him food that has not been tithed, or she engages in sexual intercourse with him while she has the legal status of a menstruating woman, or she does not separate a portion of dough to be given to a priest [ḥalla], or she vows and does not fulfill her vows. And who is considered a woman who violates the precepts of Jewish women? One who, for example, goes out of her house, and her head, i.e., her hair, is uncovered; or she spins wool in the public marketplace; or she speaks with every man she encounters. Abba Shaul says: Also one who curses his, i.e., her husband’s, parents in his presence. Rabbi Tarfon says: Also a loud woman. And who is defined as a loud woman? When she speaks inside her house and her neighbors hear her voice. GEMARA: The mishna stated: She feeds him food that has not been tithed. The Gemara attempts to clarify: What are the circumstances of the case under discussion? If he knows that the food is untithed, he should abstain and not eat it. And if he does not know that the food is untithed, then how does he know that she in fact fed him such food, so that he can divorce her? The Gemara responds: No, it is necessary when she tells him: So-and-so the priest rectified the pile of grain for me by tithing it, and he then went and asked the priest whether he did so, and it was found to be a lie. It is therefore clear that she did not tithe the food before she served it to him. § The mishna stated: Or she engages in sexual intercourse with him while she has the status of a menstruating woman. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If he knows about her that she is a menstruating woman, he should abstain. And if he does not know, then he should rely on her. Because Rav Ḥinnana bar Kahana said that Shmuel said: From where is it derived that a menstruating woman can count the days for herself, and that she is trusted to testify that she did so? As it is stated: “Then she shall count to herself seven days” (Leviticus 15:28). “To herself” means by herself, and she may be trusted that she did so. If so, why can’t the husband trust his wife that she is not a menstruating woman? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary when she tells him: So-and-so the Sage purified the blood for me by ruling that it did not qualify as menstrual blood, and he went and asked him, and it was found that her claim was a lie. And if you wish, say instead that this is similar to that which Rav Yehuda said, as Rav Yehuda stated: If she is known by her neighbors to be a menstruating woman, her husband is flogged if he has relations with her, due to the prohibition against cohabiting with a menstruating woman. In this case, she was known by her neighbors to be a menstruating woman, but she had not told her husband. She then engaged in sexual intercourse with him, and he subsequently discovered her status from her neighbors. § The mishna stated: Or she does not separate ḥalla. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If he knows that she did not separate ḥalla, he should abstain. If he does not know, then how does he know about it afterward in order to divorce her? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary when she tells him: So-and-so the kneader rectified the dough for me by separating ḥalla, and he went and asked him, and it was found that her claim was a lie. § The mishna also stated: Or she vows and does not fulfill her vows. The Gemara clarifies the reason for this, as it is different from the other cases in the mishna, where she causes her husband to violate a prohibition. In this case it is only she who violates a prohibition. As the Master said: Due to the sin of unfulfilled vows, children die, as it is stated: “It is better not to vow than to vow and not pay. Do not allow your mouth to bring your flesh to sin…why should the Lord become angry at your voice and destroy the work of your hands?” (Ecclesiastes 5:4–5). And what is the work of a person’s hands? You must say it is referring to his sons and his daughters. Rav Naḥman said: A proof to the above idea may be brought from here: “In vain I smote your children” (Jeremiah 2:30). The phrase “in vain” means: For matters caused by vain words, meaning that you took a vow and did not fulfill it. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir used to say: Anyone who knows concerning his wife that she vows and does not fulfill her vows should return and vow to obligate her. The Gemara wonders: He should vow and obligate her? How will he rectify it for her by doing this? Rather, the intention is he should return and provoke her, so that she will vow in his presence and he can then nullify it for her. They said to him: This solution is not effective, because a person does not reside in a basket [kefifa], i.e., in close quarters, with a snake, since this is extremely dangerous. Similarly, he cannot constantly prevent her from taking vows, so it would be preferable that he divorce her. It is taught in a baraita similar to the previous one that Rabbi Yehuda used to say: Anyone who knows concerning his wife that she does not separate ḥalla for him should go back and separate it after she is finished. They said to him: This solution is not effective, since a person does not reside in a basket with a snake. The Gemara discusses the two applications of the idea that a husband should try to correct his wife’s misdeeds: He who teaches it with regard to this, the case of ḥalla, all the more so would teach it for that, the case of vows, which are not a daily occurrence. But he who teaches it with regard to that, i.e., the case of vows, teaches it only in that case, but in this case of ḥalla, sometimes he will happen to eat untithed produce; and Rabbi Meir holds that he cannot always be careful enough to ensure that ḥalla was taken. § The mishna stated: And who is considered a woman who violates the precepts of Jewish women? One who goes out and her head is uncovered. The Gemara asks: The prohibition against a woman going out with her head uncovered is not merely a custom of Jewish women. Rather, it is by Torah law, as it is written with regard to a woman suspected by her husband of having been unfaithful: “And he shall uncover the head of the woman” (Numbers 5:18). And the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: From here there is a warning to Jewish women not to go out with an uncovered head, since if the Torah states that a woman suspected of adultery must have her head uncovered, this indicates that a married woman must generally cover her head. The Gemara explains: By Torah law,

if she covers her head with her basket [kilta], it seems well and is sufficient. But by precepts of Jewish women, i.e., custom, even if her head is covered by her basket this is also prohibited; she requires a substantial head covering. Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If she covers her head with her basket, there is no violation of the prohibition against having an uncovered head. Rabbi Zeira discussed it: Where is the woman that Rabbi Yoḥanan is referring to? If we say he means that she appears this way in the marketplace, this is a violation of precepts of Jewish women, as explained previously. And if you say rather that he means she appears this way in her own courtyard, if so, you have not allowed any daughter of our father Abraham to remain with her husband, since most women are not careful to cover their heads completely inside their own courtyards. Abaye said, and some say that Rav Kahana said: Rabbi Yoḥanan is referring to when she walks from one courtyard to another courtyard or via an alleyway. Although these places are not considered public areas, strangers may still be present in them. § And the mishna stated that a woman violates Jewish custom if she spins wool in the marketplace. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: This means that she reveals her arms to people by raising her sleeves as she spins. Rav Ḥisda said that Avimi said: It is referring to when she spins with a red [vered] thread opposite her face to highlight her beauty, which entails an element of promiscuity. The mishna also stated another violation of Jewish custom: Or she speaks with every man she encounters. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: This means that she flirts with young men. Rabba bar bar Ḥanna said: One time I was walking behind Rav Ukva. I saw an Arab woman who was sitting, casting her spindle, and spinning a red thread opposite her face. Once she saw us, she tore the spindle from the thread and threw it down. She said to me: Young man, give me the spindle. Rav Ukva made a comment about her, noting that she provided an example of one of the types of promiscuity mentioned in the mishna. The Gemara asks: What did he say about her? Which one of the cases in the mishna did he mention? Ravina said: He said about her that she was an example of a woman who licentiously spins in the marketplace. The Rabbis said: He said about her that she was an example of a woman who licentiously speaks with every man. § The mishna stated: Abba Shaul says: Also a woman who curses her husband’s parents in his presence violates the precepts of Jewish women. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Even when she curses his parents in the presence of his children and not in his presence she is considered one who violates Jewish custom. And your mnemonic is “Ephraim and Manasseh will be to me like Reuben and Simeon” (Genesis 48:5), which teaches that grandchildren have the status of children. Cursing one’s husband’s parents in front of his children is tantamount to doing so in front of the husband himself. Rabba said: An example is that she said in the presence of her husband’s son: May a lion devour your grandfather. § The mishna stated: Rabbi Tarfon says: Also a loud woman. The Gemara asks: What is the definition of a loud woman? Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: She is considered loud when she raises her voice about matters relating to intercourse, i.e., she quarrels and fights with her husband about it loudly enough that the neighbors overhear, causing him embarrassment. It was taught in a baraita: When she engages in intercourse in this courtyard and she screams from pain, and therefore her voice is heard in another courtyard. The Gemara asks: But if so, then this should be taught together with the blemishes in the mishna at the end of the chapter, where it lists cases of women who may be divorced without payment of their marriage contract due to a physical blemish, as opposed to the mishna here, which discusses immodest conduct. Rather, it is clear as we initially answered, that a loud woman is so defined due to immodest behavior. MISHNA: In the case of one who betroths a woman on condition that there are no vows incumbent upon her, and it was subsequently discovered that there are vows incumbent upon her, she is not betrothed. This is because if the condition is not fulfilled, the betrothal is nullified. If he married her without specification and it was subsequently discovered that vows were incumbent upon her, she may be divorced without payment of her marriage contract, since he discovered a deficiency about which she had not initially informed him. However, this does not invalidate the betrothal, since he did not make any explicit condition. If he betrothed her on condition that she has no blemishes, and it was subsequently discovered that she did have blemishes, she is not betrothed. But if he married her without specification, and it was subsequently discovered that she had blemishes, she may be divorced without payment of her marriage contract. The mishna clarifies what qualifies as a blemish: All of the blemishes that are listed in tractate Bekhorot involving significant physical deformities that disqualify priests from service similarly disqualify betrothal of women, as a mistaken transaction. GEMARA: The Gemara comments: And we learned a mishna (Kiddushin 50a) also concerning betrothal just like this case. The mishna there is essentially identical to the mishna here, so why must it be repeated? The Gemara explains: Here, it was necessary for the tanna to mention these halakhot in the context of marriage contracts, which is the topic of this tractate. Therefore, he taught the halakha of betrothal due to the halakha of marriage contracts. There, in Kiddushin, it was necessary for him to mention the halakha of betrothal, so he taught about marriage contracts due to betrothal. Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: These are the vows they spoke about in the mishna that are considered grounds for divorce without payment of the marriage contract: A vow that she will not eat meat or that she will not drink wine or that she will not adorn herself with colored garments. That opinion is also taught in a baraita: These are the vows they spoke about: Matters that involve affliction, such as that she will not eat meat, or that she will not drink wine, or that she will not adorn herself with colored garments. Rav Pappa discussed it: To which statement in the mishna is this referring? If we say it is referring to the first clause of the mishna, where one betroths a woman on condition that there are no vows incumbent upon her, then since he demonstrated that he is particular about vows, even vows concerning any other matters, including insignificant ones, should also be included. Since he stipulated a condition and it was not fulfilled, the betrothal is invalid. Rather, one must conclude that it is referring to the latter clause of the mishna, about one who marries a woman without stipulation and then discovers that vows were incumbent upon her. In such a case the mishna says she may be divorced without payment of her marriage contract. However, it does not say this for all vows, but only for vows concerning matters of significant affliction. Rav Ashi said: Actually, one can explain that it is referring to the first clause of the mishna, where he stipulates that the marriage is conditional on the assumption that she has no vows incumbent upon her, and that the point is that for a vow concerning a matter about which people are ordinarily particular, his insistence is considered legitimate insistence, and is effective to invalidate the betrothal. But with regard to a vow concerning a matter about which people are generally not particular, his insistence is not considered insistence, and such a vow is not considered a violation of the condition. Consequently, the betrothal is valid. § It was stated that the Sages had a dispute concerning the following question: If he betrothed her conditionally, such as that she had no vows incumbent upon her, and he subsequently married her without specification, and then it was discovered that the condition had not been fulfilled, Rav said: Although he may divorce her without payment of her marriage contract, the betrothal is not nullified, and therefore she requires a bill of divorce from him. And Shmuel said: The betrothal was invalid from the outset, and therefore she does not require a bill of divorce from him. Abaye said:

(1) Anyone who sleeps with one of the forbidden relationships "by way of limbs", or who hugs and kisses in a sexual way and takes pleasure in physical intimacy, receives lashes for a d'Oraisa transgression, as it says (Leviticus 18:30) "do not do any of these abominable customs etc" and it says (Leviticus 18:6) "do not approach to uncover nakedness", which is to say do not approach things which will bring you to transgressing Arayos.

(2) One who engages in these behaviours is suspected of committing Arayos. And it's forbidden for a person to intimate with his hands or feet or to hint with his eyes to any of the Arayos or to laugh with her or to engage in light-headedness. And even to smell her perfume or to gaze at her beauty is forbidden. And one who engages in this deliberately receives lashes of rebelliousness. And one who gazes even at the little finger of a woman intending to derive sexual pleasure is comparable to one who looks at her genitalia. And even to hear the voice of an Ervah or to look at her hair is forbidden.

(3) These matters are [also] forbidden with regard to women with whom relations are forbidden on the basis of [merely] a negative commandment. It is permitted to look at the face of an unmarried woman and examine her [features] whether she is a virgin or has engaged in relations previously to see whether she is attractive in his eyes so that he may marry her. There is no prohibition in doing this. On the contrary, it is proper to do this. One should not, however, look in a licentious manner. Behold [Job 31:1] states: "I established a covenant with my eyes; I would not gaze at a maiden."

(4) A man is permitted to gaze at his wife when she is in the Niddah state although she is an Ervah [at that time]. Although his heart derives satisfaction from seeing her, since she will be permitted to him afterwards, he will not suffer a lapse. He should not, however, share mirth with her or act frivolously with her lest this lead to sin.

(5) It is forbidden for a man to have any woman- whether a minor or an adult, whether a servant or a freed woman- perform personal tasks for him, lest he come to lewd thoughts. Which tasks are referred to? Washing his face, his hands, or his feet, spreading his bed in his presence, and pouring him a cup. For these tasks are performed for a man only by his wife. [A man] should not send greetings to a woman at all, not even via a messenger.

(6) When a man embraces or kisses any of the women forbidden to him as arayot despite the fact that his heart does not disturb him concerning the matter, e.g. his adult sister, his mother's sister, or the like, it is very shameful. it is forbidden and it is foolish conduct. [This applies] even though he has no desire or pleasure at all. For one should not show closeness to a woman forbidden to him as an Ervah at all, whether an adult or a minor, except a woman to her son and a father to his daughter.

(12) Similarly, the sages forbade a man to have marital relations while thinking of another woman. Nor may he initiate sex while drunk, nor out of spite or hatred, nor may he rape her or initiate sex while she is afraid. Nor may they have sex while either of them are excommunicated nor after he has decided to divorce her. If [the husband] does any of those things, the children will not be proper [citizens] but brazen, rebellious [people] and criminals.

(1) A handsbreadth that is uncovered on a woman in a place where it is her practice (lit. way) to cover it, even if it his wife, if it forbidden to read the Shema in front of it. <rema> And some say that this is specifically with respect to his wife but with another woman even less than a handsbreadth is Erva (lit. nakedness). And it seems from the words of the Rosh that a handsbreadth on a woman is Erva even to another woman, except that by herself she is able to read [the Shema] even though she is naked like was said earlier in Siman 74.

(2) The hair of a woman that it is her practice (lit. way) to cover it, it is forbidden to read [the Shema] in front of it <rema> even his wife <rema>. But virgins that it is their practice to go with an uncovered head, it is permitted. <rema> And so too is the law with the hairs of women that regularly come out of their barriers and certainly foreign (detached) hair even if it is her practice to cover.

(3) One should refrain from hearing a woman's singing voice during the reading of the Shema. <rema> and even his wife. But the voice that is regular to him is not Erva (lit. nakedness).

(4) It is forbidden to read [the Shema] in front of Erva, even that of a non-Jew, and so too in front of the Erva of a child. And there are those that permit in front of the Erva of a child so long as he is not capable of intercourse. <rema> And that is the main opinion.

(1) And Dinah, the daughter of Leah, whom she had borne unto Jacob, went out (Gen. 34:1). May it please our master to teach us whether a woman is permitted to walk about on the Sabbath while adorned with jewelry (gold medallions)? Thus do our masters teach us: A woman is prohibited from walking about on the Sabbath with a gold medallion suspended about her neck, with a signet ring upon her finger, or wearing an eyeless hairpin in her hair. If she wears any of these adornments in the public thoroughfare, she must bring a sin offering. In the courtyard of her home, however, she is permitted to wear them.

(2) Our sages maintain that she is forbidden to wear them in public even on a weekday, for people would stare at her if she did so, and that is discreditable to a woman. Ornaments were given to woman to wear only inside her home. After all, if one must not tempt a righteous person, how much less should one not tempt a thief. R. Samuel the son of Nahmani said: Observe what is written concerning Job: I have made a covenant with my eyes; how then shall I look upon a maid? (Job 31:1). Here indeed is evidence of Job’s righteousness. If (he would not look at) an unmarried woman, whom a man is permitted to look at, as he might marry her himself or match her with his son or his brothers, (then) all the more so would Job not look at a married woman. Hence a woman must remain in her home and not promenade about in the street lest she sin herself and cause men to sin through tempting them to look at the wife of another man. R. Judah the son of Shalum said: You know this to be so, as well, from the scriptural verse: And God blessed them and said to them: “Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue her (Gen. 1:39). The word subdue her is written (without a vav) as a singular imperative, for it is the male that subdues the female, while the female does not subdue the male. Similarly, the male subdues the earth and the female does not. Hence, a woman must not meander about lest tragedy befall her. That is what happened to Dinah, Jacob’s daughter. She wandered about alone and was disgraced. Whence do we know this? We know it from what we read in the portion And Dinah went out.