מתני׳ אחד דיני ממונות ואחד דיני נפשות בדרישה ובחקירה שנאמר (ויקרא כד, כב) משפט אחד יהיה לכם
MISHNA: Both cases of monetary law and cases of capital law are equal with regard to the requirement for inquiry and interrogation of the witnesses, as it is stated: “You shall have one manner of law” (Leviticus 24:22), meaning that all legal procedures must be uniform.
מה בין דיני ממונות לדיני נפשות דיני ממונות בשלשה ודיני נפשות בעשרים ושלשה דיני ממונות פותחין בין לזכות בין לחובה ודיני נפשות פותחין לזכות ואין פותחין לחובה
Having stated the essential similarity between the two, the mishna enumerates the differences between them. What are the differences between cases of monetary law and cases of capital law? Cases of monetary law are judged by a court of three judges, and cases of capital law are judged by a court of twenty-three judges. In cases of monetary law, the court opens the deliberations either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable. And in cases of capital law, the court opens the deliberations with a claim to acquit the accused, but it does not open the deliberations with a claim to find him liable.
דיני ממונות מטין על פי אחד בין לזכות בין לחובה ודיני נפשות מטין על פי אחד לזכות ועל פי שנים לחובה
In cases of monetary law, the court directs, i.e., issues, the ruling based on a majority of one judge, either to exempt, or to find liable. But in cases of capital law, the court directs the judgment based on a majority of one judge to acquit and based on a majority of two judges to find liable.
דיני ממונות מחזירין בין לזכות בין לחובה דיני נפשות מחזירין לזכות ואין מחזירין לחובה
In cases of monetary law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again with a claim to acquit him, but the court does not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable.
דיני ממונות הכל מלמדין זכות וחובה דיני נפשות הכל מלמדין זכות ואין הכל מלמדין חובה
In cases of monetary law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to exempt a litigant or to find him liable. In cases of capital law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to acquit the accused, but not all present may teach a reason to find him liable. Only the judges can teach a reason to find him liable.
דיני ממונות המלמד חובה מלמד זכות והמלמד זכות מלמד חובה דיני נפשות המלמד חובה מלמד זכות אבל המלמד זכות אין יכול לחזור וללמד חובה
In cases of monetary law, one who initially teaches a reason to find the accused liable may then teach a reason to exempt him, and one who initially teaches a reason to exempt him may then teach a reason to find him liable. In cases of capital law, one who initially teaches a reason to find him liable may then teach a reason to acquit, but one who initially teaches a reason to acquit may not return and teach a reason to find him liable.
דיני ממונות דנין ביום וגומרין בלילה דיני נפשות דנין ביום וגומרין ביום
In cases of monetary law, the court judges during the daytime, and may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even at night. In cases of capital law, the court judges during the daytime, and concludes the deliberations and issues the ruling only in the daytime.
דיני ממונות גומרין בו ביום בין לזכות בין לחובה דיני נפשות גומרין בו ביום לזכות וביום שלאחריו לחובה לפיכך אין דנין לא בערב שבת ולא בערב יום טוב
In cases of monetary law, the court may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even on that same day, whether to exempt the accused or to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even on that same day to acquit the accused, but must wait until the following day to find him liable. Therefore, since capital cases might continue for two days, the court does not judge cases of capital law on certain days, neither on the eve of Shabbat nor the eve of a Festival.
דיני ממונות הטמאות והטהרות מתחילין מן הגדול דיני נפשות מתחילין מן הצד
In cases of monetary law, and likewise in the cases of ritual impurity and purity, the judges commence expressing their opinions from the greatest of the judges. In cases of capital law, the judges commence issuing their opinions from the side, where the least significant judges sit.
הכל כשרין לדון דיני ממונות ואין הכל כשרין לדון דיני נפשות אלא כהנים לוים וישראלים המשיאין לכהונה:
All are fit to judge cases of monetary law. But not all are fit to judge cases of capital law; only priests, Levites, and Israelites who are of sufficiently fit lineage to marry their daughters to members of the priesthood are fit to judge cases of capital law.
גמ׳ דיני ממונות מי בעינן דרישה וחקירה ורמינהו שטר שזמנו כתוב באחד בניסן בשמיטה ובאו עדים ואמרו היאך אתם מעידין על שטר זה והלא ביום פלוני עמנו הייתם במקום פלוני שטר כשר ועדיו כשרין חיישינן שמא איחרוהו וכתבוהו
GEMARA: The mishna teaches that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation of the witnesses. The Gemara asks: Do we require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law? And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita (Tosefta, Makkot 1:2): With regard to a promissory note whose date is written on the first of Nisan of the Sabbatical Year, and witnesses came and said to the signatory witnesses: How is it that you are testifying concerning this promissory note? But is it not so that on such and such day on which the promissory note was written you were with us in such and such place? The promissory note is nevertheless valid, and its witnesses remain fit to bear witness. The reason they are not proven to have signed the promissory note falsely is that we are concerned that perhaps they delayed and wrote it, i.e., the loan was given on an earlier date, and the promissory note was postdated.
ואי סלקא דעתך בעינן דרישה וחקירה היכי חיישינן שמא איחרוהו וכתבוהו
The Gemara explains the contradiction: And if it enters your mind to say that we require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law, how are we concerned that perhaps they delayed and wrote it? The signatory witnesses would be asked on which day they signed the promissory note, and when that does not accord with what is written in the promissory note, their testimony would be disregarded.
וליטעמיך תיקשי לך מתני' שטרי חוב המוקדמין פסולים והמאוחרים כשרין ואי סלקא דעתך בעינן דרישה וחקירה מאוחרין אמאי כשרין
The Gemara counters: And according to your reasoning that we do not require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law, the mishna elsewhere should pose a difficulty for you as well. As mishnayot are more authoritative than baraitot, it is preferable to raise a contradiction between two mishnayot than to raise a contradiction from a baraita to a mishna. The mishna teaches (Shevi’it 10:5): Antedated promissory notes are not valid, but postdated promissory notes are valid. And if it enters your mind to say we require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law and that if there is a contradiction the testimony is not accepted, why are postdated promissory notes valid? The witnesses’ testimony does not accord with what is written in the document.
הא לא קשיא דעדיפא מינה קאמרינן דאפי' אחד בניסן בשמיטה דלא שכיחי אינשי דמוזפי דליכא למימר שמא איחרוהו וכתבוהו דלא מרע לשטריה אפ"ה כיון דשביעית סופה משמטת מכשרינן
The Gemara explains: This is not difficult. There is a reason why the contradiction was raised from the baraita, not from the mishna. We are saying a better, i.e., stronger, contradiction than the one from the mishna. As one sees in the baraita that even with regard to a promissory note written on the first of Nisan in the Sabbatical Year, when it is not common to find people to lend money, as all debts are canceled at the close of the Sabbatical Year, where it is not as reasonable to say that perhaps they delayed and wrote the promissory note, as one would not damage his promissory note by postdating it so close to the end of the Sabbatical Year; even so, since the Sabbatical Year cancels debts only at its close, we are concerned that the promissory note is postdated and we deem it valid. This is why the contradiction was raised from the baraita, not from the mishna.
מ"מ קשיא: סימן חרפ"ש:
The Gemara returns to its question: In any case, the contradiction between the mishna and the baraita is difficult. The Gemara presents a mnemonic device for the following discussion, with each letter representing the name of a Sage who suggests an answer: Ḥet, reish, peh, shin.
א"ר חנינא דבר תורה אחד דיני ממונות ואחד דיני נפשות בדרישה ובחקירה שנאמר משפט אחד יהיה לכם ומה טעם אמרו דיני ממונות לא בעינן דרישה וחקירה כדי שלא תנעול דלת בפני לוין
The Gemara cites the first answer. Rabbi Ḥanina says: By Torah law, both cases of monetary law and cases of capital law are equal with regard to inquiry and interrogation of witnesses, as it is stated: “You shall have one manner of law” (Leviticus 24:22). And what is the reason the Sages said that in cases of monetary law we do not need inquiry and interrogation? It is an ordinance instituted by the Sages so as not to lock the door in the face of potential borrowers. The Sages were concerned that intensive examination of the witnesses would often result in contradictory testimony and render it difficult for lenders to collect their debts. This could lead to people refraining from lending money.
אלא מעתה
The Gemara asks: If that is so that the Sages removed the requirement for inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law,
טעו לא ישלמו כל שכן שתנעול דלת בפני לווין
then if the judges erred they should not need to pay the party they wronged, as they can claim that they were prevented from examining the witnesses effectively. The Gemara answers: If that were to be the halakha, all the more so that this would lock the door in the face of potential borrowers. If people know that the courts are not responsible for an error in judgment, they will not be willing to lend money.
רבא אמר מתניתין דהכא בדיני קנסות ואידך בהודאות והלואות
Rava says: The ruling of the mishna here, that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation, is stated with regard to laws of fines, not standard cases of monetary law. And the other sources, i.e., the mishna in tractate Shevi’it and the baraita, which do not require inquiry and interrogation, are stated with regard to cases of admissions and loans, in which there is cause to relax the procedures of deliberation, as explained.
רב פפא אמר אידי ואידי בהודאה והלואה כאן בדין מרומה כאן בדין שאינו מרומה
Rav Pappa says: This and that, i.e., both the mishna here and the other sources, are stated with regard to cases of an admission and a loan. The distinction between them is that the mishna here, which rules that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation, is stated with regard to a possibly fraudulent trial, where the court suspects that one party is attempting to defraud the other party and have witnesses offer false testimony on his own behalf. There, in the baraita and in the mishna in tractate Shevi’it, which do not require inquiry and interrogation, the ruling is stated with regard to a trial that does not appear fraudulent.
כדריש לקיש דריש לקיש רמי כתיב (ויקרא יט, טו) בצדק תשפוט עמיתך וכתיב (דברים טז, כ) צדק צדק תרדף הא כיצד כאן בדין מרומה כאן בדין שאין מרומה
This distinction is in accordance with the statement of Reish Lakish, as Reish Lakish raises a contradiction between two verses: It is written in one verse: “In justice shall you judge your neighbor” (Leviticus 19:15), and it is written in another verse: “Justice, justice, shall you follow” (Deuteronomy 16:21), with the repetition indicating that it is not enough to merely judge with justice. He continues: How can these texts be reconciled? Here, this latter verse is stated with regard to a possibly fraudulent trial, where the court must take extra care to judge with justice; and there, that former verse is stated with regard to a trial that does not appear fraudulent.
רב אשי אמר מתני׳ כדשנין קראי אחד לדין וא' לפשרה
Rav Ashi says: The ruling of the mishna here, that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation, is as we answered, i.e., in accordance with any one of the answers offered by the other amora’im. And those verses were not stated with regard to fraudulent trials; rather, one is stated with regard to judgment, in which the court must pursue justice extensively, and one is stated with regard to compromise.
כדתניא צדק צדק תרדף אחד לדין ואחד לפשרה כיצד שתי ספינות עוברות בנהר ופגעו זה בזה אם עוברות שתיהן שתיהן טובעות בזה אחר זה שתיהן עוברות וכן שני גמלים שהיו עולים במעלות בית חורון ופגעו זה בזה אם עלו שניהן שניהן נופלין בזה אחר זה שניהן עולין
As it is taught in a baraita: When the verse states: “Justice, justice, shall you follow,” one mention of “justice” is stated with regard to judgment and one is stated with regard to compromise. How so? Where there are two boats traveling on the river and they encounter each other, if both of them attempt to pass, both of them sink, as the river is not wide enough for both to pass. If they pass one after the other, both of them pass. And similarly, where there are two camels who were ascending the ascent of Beit Ḥoron, where there is a narrow steep path, and they encounter each other, if both of them attempt to ascend, both of them fall. If they ascend one after the other, both of them ascend.
הא כיצד טעונה ושאינה טעונה תידחה שאינה טעונה מפני טעונה קרובה ושאינה קרובה תידחה קרובה מפני שאינה קרובה היו שתיהן קרובות שתיהן רחוקות הטל פשרה ביניהן ומעלות שכר זו לזו
How does one decide which of them should go first? If there is one boat that is laden and one boat that is not laden, the needs of the one that is not laden should be overridden due to the needs of the one that is laden. If there is one boat that is close to its destination and one boat that is not close to its destination, the needs of the one that is close should be overridden due to the needs of the one that is not close. If both of them were close to their destinations, or both of them were far from their destinations, impose a compromise between them to decide which goes first, and the owners of the boats pay a fee to one other, i.e., the owners of the first boat compensate the owner of the boat that waits, for any loss incurred.
פשרה/ביצוע ודין -- ו.(בסוף) תנו רבנן -ז. כיון דקם קם
תנו רבנן כשם שהדין בשלשה כך ביצוע בשלשה
§ The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 1:2–8): Just as judgment is performed by three judges, so too, mediation is performed by three judges.
נגמר הדין אי אתה רשאי לבצוע:
Once the verdict of the judgment has been issued, it is not permitted for you to mediate a dispute.
סרמ"ש בנק"ש סימן: ר"א בנו של רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר אסור לבצוע וכל הבוצע ה"ז חוטא וכל המברך את הבוצע הרי זה מנאץ ועל זה נאמר (תהלים י, ג) בוצע ברך נאץ ה'
The Gemara presents a mnemonic device alluding to the names of tanna’im in the coming discussion: Samekh, reish, mem, shin; beit, nun, kuf, shin. The Tosefta cites several statements of tanna’im related to compromise and the term botze’a. Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, says: It is prohibited to mediate a dispute; and anyone who mediates [habotze’a] a dispute is a sinner; and anyone who blesses the mediator is cursing God. And of this, it is stated: “And the covetous [botze’a] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord” (Psalms 10:3).
אלא יקוב הדין את ההר שנאמר (דברים א, יז) כי המשפט לאלהים הוא וכן משה היה אומר יקוב הדין את ההר אבל אהרן אוהב שלום ורודף שלום ומשים שלום בין אדם לחבירו שנאמר (מלאכי ב, ו) תורת אמת היתה בפיהו ועולה לא נמצא בשפתיו בשלום ובמישור הלך אתי ורבים השיב מעון
Rather, the judge must assure that the true judgment will prevail at all costs and metaphorically pierce the mountain, as it is stated: “For the judgment is God’s” (Deuteronomy 1:17). And similarly, Moses would say: Let the judgment pierce the mountain. But by contrast, Aaron, whose role was not that of a judge, was a lover of peace and a pursuer of peace, and he would apply peace between one person and the other, as it is stated: “The law of truth was in his mouth, and unrighteousness was not found in his lips; he walked with Me in peace and uprightness, and turned many away from iniquity” (Malachi 2:6).
ר' אליעזר אומר הרי שגזל סאה של חטים וטחנה ואפאה והפריש ממנה חלה כיצד מברך אין זה מברך אלא מנאץ ועל זה נאמר ובוצע ברך נאץ ה'
The Tosefta cites several other interpretations of the above-mentioned verse from Psalms. Rabbi Eliezer says: If one stole a se’a of wheat and ground it and baked it and separated ḥalla from it, i.e., separated the portion of the dough that must be given to the priests, how can he possibly recite the blessing on the mitzva of ḥalla? He is not blessing; rather, he is cursing God. And of this offense it is stated: “And the covetous [uvotze’a] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord,” interpreted homiletically as: And whoever blesses upon breaking [botze’a] the bread despises the Lord.
רבי מאיר אומר לא נאמר בוצע אלא כנגד יהודה שנאמר (בראשית לז, כו) ויאמר יהודה אל אחיו מה בצע כי נהרוג את אחינו וכל המברך את יהודה הרי זה מנאץ ועל זה נאמר ובוצע ברך נאץ ה'
Rabbi Meir says: The term botze’a employed in that verse was stated only with regard to Judah, as it is stated: “And Judah said to his brothers: What profit [betza] is it if we slay our brother and conceal his blood? Come, and let us sell him to the Ishmaelites” (Genesis 37:26–27). And consequently, anyone who blesses Judah for this act is cursing God, and of this it is stated: “And the covetous [uvotze’a] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord,” interpreted homiletically as: “And whoever blesses the profiteer [botze’a] despises the Lord.”
רבי יהושע בן קרחה אומר מצוה לבצוע שנאמר (זכריה ח, טז) אמת ומשפט שלום שפטו בשעריכם והלא במקום שיש משפט אין שלום ובמקום שיש שלום אין משפט אלא איזהו משפט שיש בו שלום הוי אומר זה ביצוע
Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: It is a mitzva to mediate a dispute, as it is stated: “Execute the judgment of truth and peace in your gates” (Zechariah 8:16). Is it not that in the place where there is strict judgment there is no true peace, and in a place where there is true peace, there is no strict judgment? Rather, which is the judgment that has peace within it? You must say: This is mediation, as both sides are satisfied with the result.
וכן בדוד הוא אומר (שמואל ב ח, טו) ויהי דוד עושה משפט וצדקה והלא כל מקום שיש משפט אין צדקה וצדקה אין משפט אלא איזהו משפט שיש בו צדקה הוי אומר זה ביצוע
And similarly, with regard to David, it says: “And David executed justice and charity to all his people” (II Samuel 8:15). And is it not that wherever there is strict justice, there is no charity, and wherever there is charity, there is no strict justice? Rather, which is the justice that has within it charity? You must say: This is mediation.
אתאן לת"ק דן את הדין זיכה את הזכאי וחייב את החייב וראה שנתחייב עני ממון ושלם לו מתוך ביתו זה משפט וצדקה
The Gemara cites an alternative interpretation of David’s method of judgment, in which we come to the opinion of the first tanna, i.e., Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that it is prohibited to mediate a dispute: If a judge adjudicated a case of monetary law, and he correctly exonerated the party who was exempt from payment and deemed liable the party who was liable to pay, if he then saw that due to his ruling a poor person became liable to pay an amount of money that is beyond his means and therefore the judge himself paid for him from his own house, this is justice and also charity.
משפט לזה וצדקה לזה משפט לזה שהחזיר לו ממון וצדקה לזה ששילם לו מתוך ביתו (וכן בדוד הוא אומר ויהי דוד עושה משפט וצדקה לכל עמו משפט לזה שהחזיר לו את ממונו וצדקה לזה ששילם לו מתוך ביתו)
The Gemara continues: It is justice for this one and charity for that one: It is justice for this one, because the judge restored his money to him; and it is charity for that poor person, because the judge paid for him from his own house. And similarly, with regard to David, it says: “And David executed justice and charity to all his people” (II Samuel 8:15). He executed justice for this one, because he restored his money to him, and charity for that one, because he paid for him from his own house.
קשיא ליה לרבי האי לכל עמו לעניים מיבעי ליה אלא (רבי אומר) אע"פ שלא שילם מתוך ביתו זהו משפט וצדקה משפט לזה וצדקה לזה משפט לזה שהחזיר לו ממונו וצדקה לזה שהוציא גזילה מתחת ידו
This interpretation of the verse is difficult for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. If the word “charity” is meant to demonstrate that David supported the poor defendants, this term: “To all his people,” is incorrect. If the interpretation is correct, it should have stated: Charity to the poor people. Rather, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Although he did not pay from his own house, it is still justice and charity. It is justice for this one and charity for that one. It is justice for this one, because the judge restored his money to him, and charity for that one, because the judge removed the stolen item from his possession. By adjudicating the case correctly and compelling the liable party to pay his debt, the judge thereby ensures that the liable party does not illegitimately maintain property to which he is not entitled.
רבי שמעון בן מנסיא אומר שנים שבאו לפניך לדין עד שלא תשמע דבריהן או משתשמע דבריהן ואי אתה יודע להיכן דין נוטה אתה רשאי לומר להן צאו ובצעו משתשמע דבריהן ואתה יודע להיכן הדין נוטה אי אתה רשאי לומר להן צאו ובצעו שנאמר (משלי יז, יד) פוטר מים ראשית מדון ולפני התגלע הריב נטוש קודם שנתגלע הריב אתה יכול לנטשו משנתגלע הריב אי אתה יכול יכול לנטשו
Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: If two litigants come before you for a judgment, before you hear their respective statements and claims; or after you hear their statements but you do not yet know where the judgment is leaning, meaning that it is not yet clear to the judge which party is in the right, you are permitted to say to them: Go out and mediate. But after you hear their statements and you know where the judgment is leaning, you are not permitted to say to them: Go out and mediate, as it is stated: “The beginning of strife is as when one releases water; therefore leave off contention before the quarrel breaks out” (Proverbs 17:14). Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya interprets the verse to mean: Before the resolution of the contention is revealed, you can cast it off. Once the resolution of the contention is revealed, you cannot cast it off.
(וריש לקיש) אמר שנים שבאו לדין אחד רך ואחד קשה עד שלא תשמע דבריהן או משתשמע דבריהן ואי אתה יודע להיכן דין נוטה אתה רשאי לומר להם אין אני נזקק לכם שמא נתחייב חזק ונמצא חזק רודפו משתשמע דבריהן ואתה יודע להיכן הדין נוטה אי אתה יכול לומר להן איני נזקק לכם שנא' (דברים א, יז) לא תגורו מפני איש
And Reish Lakish says: If two litigants come for a judgment, and one is flexible and agreeable and one is rigid and contentious, before you hear their respective statements, or after you hear their statements but you do not yet know where the judgment is leaning, it is permitted for you to say to them: I will not submit to your request to judge you. The judge may refuse the case out of fear that perhaps the strong and contentious one will be found liable, and it will turn out that the strong one will pursue the judge with intent to harm him. But once you hear their statements and you know where the judgment is leaning, you may not say to them: I will not submit to your request to judge you, as it is stated: “You shall not be afraid before any man” (Deuteronomy 1:17).
ר' יהושע בן קרחה אומר מניין לתלמיד שיושב לפני רבו וראה זכות לעני וחובה לעשיר מניין שלא ישתוק שנאמר לא תגורו מפני איש רבי חנין אומר לא תכניס דבריך מפני איש ויהו עדים יודעים את מי הן מעידין ולפני מי הן מעידין ומי עתיד ליפרע מהן שנא' (דברים יט, יז) ועמדו שני האנשים אשר להם הריב לפני ה'
Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: From where is it derived that a student who is sitting before his teacher and he sees a point of merit for a poor person or liability for a wealthy person, from where is it derived that he should not be silent? As it is stated: “You shall not be afraid before any man”; he should fear neither his teacher nor the wealthy litigant. Rabbi Ḥanin says: The verse intimates: Do not suppress your statement before any man. And the witnesses should know about whom they are testifying, and before Whom they are testifying, and Who will ultimately exact payment from them, as it is stated: “Then both the men, between whom the controversy is, shall stand before the Lord” (Deuteronomy 19:17).
ויהו הדיינין יודעין את מי הן דנין ולפני מי הן דנין ומי עתיד ליפרע מהן שנא' (תהלים פב, א) אלהים נצב בעדת אל וכן ביהושפט הוא אומר (דברי הימים ב יט, ו) ויאמר אל השופטים ראו מה אתם עושים כי לא לאדם תשפטו כי (אם) לה' שמא יאמר הדיין מה לי בצער הזה ת"ל עמכם בדבר משפט אין לו לדיין אלא מה שעיניו רואות
And the judges should know whom they are judging, and before Whom they are judging, and Who will ultimately exact payment from them, as it is stated: “God stands in the congregation of God” (Psalms 82:1). And similarly, with regard to Jehoshaphat it says: “And he said to the judges: Consider what you do; for you judge not for man, but for the Lord” (II Chronicles 19:6). And lest the judge say: What value is there for me with this suffering? Why should I engage in such a burdensome and difficult task? The verse states: “He is with you in giving judgment,” from which it is derived that in rendering his decision, a judge has only that which his eyes see. He is enjoined to render the best judgment possible based on the information he has available, and he is not accountable for anything else.
היכי דמי גמר דין אמר רב יהודה אמר רב איש פלוני אתה חייב איש פלוני אתה זכאי אמר רב הלכה כרבי יהושע בן קרחה איני והא רב הונא תלמידיה דרב הוה כי הוה אתו לקמיה דרב הונא אמר להו אי דינא בעיתו אי פשרה בעיתו מאי מצוה נמי דקאמר רבי יהושע בן קרחה
Earlier, the Tosefta stated that once the verdict has been issued, it is not permitted for the judge to arrange a compromise. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of a verdict, i.e., what is the formal action that signifies the conclusion of the case? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: It is when the judge says: So-and-so, you are liable; so-and-so, you are exonerated. Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, who said it is a mitzva to mediate a dispute. The Gemara asks: Is that so? And was it not that Rav Huna was a student of Rav, and when litigants would come before Rav Huna he would say to them: Do you want a strict judgment, or do you want a compromise? Evidently, Rav’s student Rav Huna did not hold that it is a mitzva to specifically arrange a compromise. The Gemara clarifies: What does Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa mean that he says it is a mitzva?
מצוה למימרא להו אי דינא בעיתו אי פשרה בעיתו היינו תנא קמא איכא בינייהו מצוה רבי יהושע בן קרחה סבר מצוה ת"ק סבר רשות
He means that it is a mitzva to say to them: Do you want a strict judgment, or do you want a compromise? The Gemara objects: Since this opinion is the same as that of the first tanna, who also allows compromise, it is redundant to teach it. The Gemara answers: There is a difference between them with regard to the question of whether it is a mitzva to arrange a compromise. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa holds that it is a mitzva to offer them the option of compromise, and the first tanna holds that it is merely permitted.
היינו דר"ש בן מנסיא איכא בינייהו משתשמע דבריהן ואתה יודע להיכן הדין נוטה אי אתה רשאי לומר להן צאו ובצעו
The Gemara objects: If so, the opinion of the first tanna is the same as that of Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya. The Gemara answers that there is a difference between them with regard to the principle: After you hear their statements and you know where the judgment is leaning, it is not permitted for you to say to them: Go out and mediate. In that instance, the first tanna holds that it is still not too late to suggest mediation.
ופליגא דרבי תנחום בר חנילאי דאמר רבי תנחום בר חנילאי לא נאמר מקרא זה אלא כנגד מעשה העגל שנאמר (שמות לב, ה) וירא אהרן ויבן מזבח לפניו מה ראה א"ר בנימין בר יפת א"ר אלעזר ראה חור שזבוח לפניו
§ And the various Sages who offered interpretations of the verse: “And the covetous blesses himself, though he despises the Lord” (Psalms 10:3), disagree with the explanation of Rabbi Tanḥum bar Ḥanilai. As Rabbi Tanḥum bar Ḥanilai says: This verse was stated only with regard to the incident of the Golden Calf, as it is stated: “And Aaron saw this, and he built [vayyiven] an altar [mizbe’aḥ] before it…and said: Tomorrow shall be a feast to the Lord” (Exodus 32:5). What did Aaron see? Rabbi Binyamin bar Yefet says that Rabbi Elazar says: He saw Hur, who had been appointed together with Aaron by Moses to lead the people during Moses’ absence (see Exodus 24:14), slaughtered before him, as he had protested the plan to fashion a calf and had been murdered by the people as a result. The verse is therefore interpreted not as: Aaron built an altar before the calf, but rather: He understood [vayyaven] from the slaughter [mizavuaḥ] before his own eyes; and he then called for a feast.
אמר אי לא שמענא להו השתא עבדו לי כדעבדו בחור ומיקיים בי (איכה ב, כ) אם יהרג במקדש ה' כהן ונביא ולא הויא להו תקנתא לעולם מוטב דליעבדו לעגל אפשר הויא להו תקנתא בתשובה
Aaron said to himself: If I do not listen to them now, they will do to me as they did to Hur, and the verse: “Shall the priest and the prophet be slain in the sanctuary of the Lord?” (Lamentations 2:20), will be fulfilled through me, and they will never have a remedy for such a sin. It is better for them to worship the calf, as it is possible they will have a remedy through repentance. Nevertheless, according to Rabbi Tanḥum bar Ḥanilai, whoever praises Aaron for this compromise is provoking God.
והני תנאי (משלי יז, יד) פוטר מים ראשית מדון מאי דרשי ביה כדרב המנונא דאמר רב המנונא אין תחילת דינו של אדם נידון אלא על דברי תורה שנאמר פוטר מים ראשית מדון אמר רב הונא האי תיגרא דמיא לצינורא דבידקא דמיא כיון דרווח רווח
And with regard to those tanna’im who did not interpret the verse: “The beginning of strife is as when one releases water” (Proverbs 17:14), with regard to compromise, what do they derive from this verse? They understand the verse in accordance with the opinion of Rav Hamnuna, as Rav Hamnuna says: The beginning of a person’s judgment after he dies is that he is judged only concerning matters of Torah, as it is stated: “The beginning of strife is as when one releases water.” Based on this verse, Rav Huna says: This quarrel between people is comparable to a split in a hose caused by a burst of water, emptying into a field; once the split in the hose widens, it widens even more and can no longer be repaired. To save the field, the hose must be repaired as soon as it splits. The same is true with regard to a quarrel; it must be stopped as soon as it begins.
אביי קשישא אמר דמי לגודא דגמלא כיון דקם קם:
Abaye the Elder makes a similar point with a different metaphor, and says: A quarrel is comparable to a board in a wooden bridge. Once it has stood in its place and been stabilized, it continues to stand and becomes ever more rigid and stable. Consequently, the best time to address and end the dispute is at the very beginning.
בן סורר ומורה- סח:משנה-"סמוך לגבורתו של איש"
מתני׳ בן סורר ומורה מאימתי נעשה בן סורר ומורה משיביא שתי שערות ועד שיקיף זקן התחתון ולא העליון אלא שדברו חכמים בלשון נקיה שנאמר (דברים כא, יח) כי יהיה לאיש בן בן ולא בת בן ולא איש קטן פטור שלא בא לכלל מצות:
MISHNA: The Torah describes the punishment given to a son who steals money from his parents to eat a gluttonous meal of meat and wine in the company of lowly men. If his parents bring him to court for this act, he is exhorted to desist and is punished with lashes. If he repeats the same misdeed and is again brought to court by his parents within the same three-month period, he is considered a stubborn and rebellious son [ben sorer umoreh]. He is liable to receive the death penalty, which in this case is execution by stoning. From when does a stubborn and rebellious son become liable to receive the death penalty imposed upon a stubborn and rebellious son? From when he grows two pubic hairs, which are a sign of puberty and from which time he is considered an adult, until he has grown a beard around. The reference here is to the lower beard surrounding his genitals, and not the upper beard, i.e., his facial hair, but the Sages spoke in euphemistic terms. As it is stated: “If a man has a stubborn and rebellious son” (Deuteronomy 21:18), which indicates that the penalty for rebelliousness is imposed upon a son, but not upon a daughter; and upon a son, but not upon a fully grown man. A minor under the age of thirteen is exempt from the penalty imposed upon a stubborn and rebellious son, because he has not yet reached the age of inclusion in mitzvot.
משיביא שתי שערות ועד שיקיף זקן התחתון ולא העליון אלא שדברו חכמים בלשון נקיה שנאמר (דברים כא, יח) כי יהיה לאיש בן בן ולא בת בן ולא איש קטן פטור שלא בא לכלל מצות:
From when he grows two pubic hairs, which are a sign of puberty and from which time he is considered an adult, until he has grown a beard around. The reference here is to the lower beard surrounding his genitals, and not the upper beard, i.e., his facial hair, but the Sages spoke in euphemistic terms. As it is stated: “If a man has a stubborn and rebellious son” (Deuteronomy 21:18), which indicates that the penalty for rebelliousness is imposed upon a son, but not upon a daughter; and upon a son, but not upon a fully grown man. A minor under the age of thirteen is exempt from the penalty imposed upon a stubborn and rebellious son, because he has not yet reached the age of inclusion in mitzvot.
גמ׳ קטן מנלן דפטור מנלן כדקתני טעמא שלא בא לכלל מצות ותו היכא אשכחן דענש הכתוב דהכא ליבעי קרא למיפטריה
GEMARA: The Gemara inquires about the source of the halakha taught in the mishna: From where do we derive that a minor is exempt from the punishment imposed upon a stubborn and rebellious son? The Gemara comments: This question is puzzling: From where do we derive this halakha? The reason is as is taught in the mishna: Because he has not yet reached the age of inclusion in mitzvot. And furthermore, where do we find that the verse punishes a minor, so that a special verse should be required here in order to exempt him?
אנן הכי קאמרינן אטו בן סורר ומורה על חטאו נהרג על שם סופו נהרג וכיון דעל שם סופו נהרג אפילו קטן נמי ועוד בן ולא איש קטן משמע
The Gemara clarifies: This is what we are saying: Is this to say that a stubborn and rebellious son is killed for a sin that he already committed? But, as will be explained (71b), he is killed for what he will become in the end. The Torah understands that since the boy has already embarked on an evil path, he will continue to be drawn after his natural tendencies and commit many offenses that are more severe. It is therefore preferable that he should be killed now so that he may die in relative innocence, rather than be put to death in the future bearing much more guilt. And since he is executed for what he will become in the end, one might have thought that even a minor as well can be sentenced to the death penalty as a stubborn and rebellious son. And furthermore, the exclusion: “A son,” but not a man, indicates that a minor is in fact included in the halakha, as he is not yet a man.
אמר רב יהודה אמר רב דאמר קרא וכי יהיה לאיש בן בן הסמוך לגבורתו של איש:
Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: A minor is exempt from the punishment imposed upon a stubborn and rebellious son, as the verse states: “If a man has a son” (Deuteronomy 21:18), which indicates that the halakha applies to a son who is close to the stage of having the strength of a man, i.e., close to full maturity, but not to a younger boy.
לא היה ולא עתיד להיות- עא. משנה "היה אביו רוצה"-"אבנים מנוגעות פינו לשם"
מתני׳ היה אביו רוצה ואמו אינה רוצה אביו אינו רוצה ואמו רוצה אינו נעשה בן סורר ומורה עד שיהו שניהם רוצין רבי יהודה אומר אם לא היתה אמו ראויה לאביו אינו נעשה בן סורר ומורה:
MISHNA: If his father wishes to have him punished but his mother does not wish that, or if his father does not wish to have him punished but his mother wishes that, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son, unless they both wish that he be punished. Rabbi Yehuda says: If his mother was not suited for his father, the two being an inappropriate match, as the Gemara will explain, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son.
גמ׳ מאי אינה ראויה אילימא חייבי כריתות וחייבי מיתות ב"ד סוף סוף אבוה אבוה נינהו ואמיה אמיה נינהו
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What does Rabbi Yehuda mean when he speaks of the mother as being not suited for the father? If we say that due to their union they are among those who are liable to receive karet, in which case the marriage does not take effect, and certainly if the union puts them in the category of those who are liable to receive one of the types of court-imposed death penalty, in which case the marriage also does not take effect, there is a difficulty: Why should it matter if they are not married? Ultimately, his father is still his father and his mother is still his mother, and the verses concerning the stubborn and rebellious son can be fulfilled.
אלא בשוה לאביו קאמר תניא נמי הכי רבי יהודה אומר אם לא היתה אמו שוה לאביו בקול ובמראה ובקומה אינו נעשה בן סורר ומורה מאי טעמא דאמר קרא איננו שומע בקלנו מדקול בעינן שוין מראה וקומה נמי בעינן שוין
Rather, Rabbi Yehuda is saying that the boy’s mother must be identical to his father in several aspects. The Gemara comments: This is also taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: If his mother was not identical to his father in voice, appearance, and height, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? As the verse states: “He will not obey our voices [kolenu]” (Deuteronomy 21:20), which indicates that they both have the same voice. And since we require that they be identical in voice, we also require that they be identical in appearance and height.
כמאן אזלא הא דתניא בן סורר ומורה לא היה ולא עתיד להיות ולמה נכתב דרוש וקבל שכר כמאן כרבי יהודה
The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in a baraita: There has never been a stubborn and rebellious son and there will never be one in the future, as it is impossible to fulfill all the requirements that must be met in order to apply this halakha. And why, then, was the passage relating to a stubborn and rebellious son written in the Torah? So that you may expound upon new understandings of the Torah and receive reward for your learning, this being an aspect of the Torah that has only theoretical value. In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who requires that the parents have certain identical characteristics, making it virtually impossible to apply the halakha.
איבעית אימא ר' שמעון היא דתניא אמר רבי שמעון וכי מפני שאכל זה תרטימר בשר ושתה חצי לוג יין האיטלקי אביו ואמו מוציאין אותו לסקלו אלא לא היה ולא עתיד להיות ולמה נכתב דרוש וקבל שכר אמר ר' יונתן אני ראיתיו וישבתי על קברו
If you wish, say instead that this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says: And is it simply due to the fact that the boy ate a tarteimar of meat and drank a half-log of Italian wine that his father and his mother shall take him out to stone him? Rather, there has never been a stubborn and rebellious son and there will never be one in the future. And why, then, was the passage relating to a stubborn and rebellious son written in the Torah? So that you may expound upon new understandings of the Torah and receive reward for your learning. Rabbi Yonatan says: This is not so, as I saw one. I was once in a place where a stubborn and rebellious son was condemned to death, and I even sat on his grave after he was executed.
כמאן אזלא הא דתניא עיר הנדחת לא היתה ולא עתידה להיות ולמה נכתבה דרוש וקבל שכר כמאן כר' אליעזר דתניא רבי אליעזר אומר כל עיר שיש בה אפילו מזוזה אחת אינה נעשית עיר הנדחת
The Gemara raises a similar question: In accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in a baraita: There has never been an idolatrous city and there will never be one in the future, as it is virtually impossible to fulfill all the requirements that must be met in order to apply this halakha. And why, then, was the passage relating to an idolatrous city written in the Torah? So that you may expound upon new understandings of the Torah and receive reward for your learning. In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: Any city that has even one mezuza or any other sacred scroll cannot become an idolatrous city. It is difficult to imagine an entire city without even one mezuza.
מאי טעמא אמר קרא (דברים יג, יז) ואת כל שללה תקבוץ אל תוך רחבה ושרפת באש וכיון דאי איכא מזוזה לא אפשר דכתיב (דברים יב, ד) לא תעשון כן לה' אלהיכם אמר רבי יונתן אני ראיתיה וישבתי על תילה
The Gemara asks: What is the reason that a city that has even one mezuza cannot become an idolatrous city? The Gemara answers: The verse states: “And you shall gather all the spoil of it into the midst of the open space of the city, and shall burn with fire both the city and the entire plunder taken in it” (Deuteronomy 13:17). And since if there is a mezuza there it is impossible to burn all the contents of the city, as it is written: “And you shall overthrow their altars, and break their pillars, and burn their asherim with fire…This you shall not do so to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:3–4). It is derived from this verse that it is prohibited to destroy a sacred item such as a mezuza. Therefore, in a city that has even one mezuza, it is impossible to fulfill the halakhot of an idolatrous city, as not all of its contents may be burned. Rabbi Yonatan says: This is not so, as I once saw an idolatrous city that was condemned to destruction, and I even sat on its ruins.
כמאן אזלא הא דתניא בית המנוגע לא היה ולא עתיד להיות ולמה נכתב דרוש וקבל שכר כמאן כר' אלעזר בר' שמעון דתנן ר' אלעזר ברבי שמעון אומר לעולם אין הבית טמא עד שיראה כשתי גריסין על שתי אבנים בשתי כתלים בקרן זוית ארכו כשני גריסין ורחבו כגריס
The Gemara asks another similar question: In accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in a baraita: There has never been a house afflicted with leprosy of the house and there will never be one in the future. And why, then, was the passage relating to leprosy of the house written in the Torah? So that you may expound upon new understandings of the Torah and receive reward for your learning. In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, as we learned in a mishna (Nega’im 12:3) that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: A house never becomes impure with leprosy until a mark about the size of two split beans is seen on two stones in two walls that form a corner between them, the mark being about two split beans in length and about one split bean in width. It is difficult to imagine that such a precise situation will ever occur.
מאי טעמא דר' אלעזר ברבי שמעון כתיב קיר וכתיב קירות איזהו קיר שהוא כקירות הוי אומר זה קרן זוית
The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, that a house does not become impure unless it has a mark precisely in the corner? The verse states: “And he shall look at the leprous mark, and, behold, if the leprous mark be in the walls of the house, in greenish or reddish depressions, which in sight are lower than the wall” (Leviticus 14:37). In one part of the verse it is written “wall,” and in another part of the verse it is written “walls.” Which wall is like two walls? You must say this is a corner.
תניא אמר רבי אליעזר בר' צדוק מקום היה בתחום עזה והיו קורין אותו חורבתא סגירתא אמר רבי שמעון איש כפר עכו פעם אחת הלכתי לגליל וראיתי מקום שמציינין אותו ואמרו אבנים מנוגעות פינו לשם:
It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: There was a place in the area of Gaza, and it was called the leprous ruin; that is to say, it was the ruin of a house that had been afflicted with leprosy. Apparently, then, leprosy of the house has existed. Rabbi Shimon of the village of Akko said: I once went to the Galilee and I saw a place that was being marked off as an impure place, and they said that stones afflicted with leprosy were cast there. This too indicates that a house afflicted with leprosy has existed.
הבא במחתרת- עב. משנה-עב: "לפקח עליו את הגל"
מתני׳ הבא במחתרת נידון על שם סופו היה בא במחתרת ושבר את החבית אם יש לו דמים חייב אם אין לו דמים פטור:
MISHNA: A burglar who is found breaking into a house may be killed by the owner of the house with impunity (see Exodus 22:1). He too is sentenced on account of his ultimate end, as it is presumed that if the owner of the house would resist the burglar, the burglar would kill the owner of the house. If the burglar was breaking into a house, and in the course of doing so he broke a barrel, if there is blood-guiltiness for killing him, i.e., if the homeowner would be liable for killing him, the burglar is liable to pay for the value of the barrel. An example of this is if a father broke into his son’s house, in which case it is presumed that even if the son resists his father, his father would never kill him, and therefore the son may not kill his father, and if he does so he is liable. If there is no blood-guiltiness for killing him, i.e., if the homeowner would be exempt from punishment for killing him, the burglar is exempt from paying for the barrel.
גמ׳ אמר רבא מאי טעמא דמחתרת חזקה אין אדם מעמיד עצמו על ממונו והאי מימר אמר אי אזילנא קאי לאפאי ולא שביק לי ואי קאי לאפאי קטילנא ליה והתורה אמרה אם בא להורגך השכם להורגו
GEMARA: Rava says: What is the reason for this halakha concerning a burglar who breaks into a house? He explains: There is a presumption that a person does not restrain himself when faced with losing his money, and therefore this burglar must have said to himself: If I go in and the owner sees me, he will rise against me and not allow me to steal from him, and if he rises against me, I will kill him. And the Torah stated a principle: If someone comes to kill you, rise and kill him first.
אמר רב הבא במחתרת ונטל כלים ויצא פטור מאי טעמא בדמים קננהו אמר רבא מסתברא מילתיה דרב בששיבר דליתנהו אבל נטל לא
Rav says: If a burglar broke into a house and took certain vessels, and he then left and was caught only afterward, he is exempt from the obligation to pay restitution for the vessels. What is the reason? He acquired the vessels with his blood. When he broke into the house, he risked his life, as the owner could have killed him. This grave risk that he took exempts him from any other more lenient punishments that could otherwise have been imposed upon him, including the obligation to pay restitution. Rava says: Rav’s statement is reasonable in a case where he broke the vessels in the course of robbing, so that they no longer exist, and the issue is only whether he has to pay for them. But if he took the vessels and they are still extant, Rav’s ruling does not apply.
והאלהים אמר רב אפילו נטל דהא יש לו דמים ונאנסו חייב אלמא ברשותיה קיימי הכא נמי ברשותיה קיימי
The Gemara comments: But by God! Rav states his ruling even with regard to a case where the burglar took the vessels and they are still extant. That is to say, Rav himself does not distinguish between the two cases, as in a case where there is blood-guiltiness for killing him, e.g., in a case where a father came to steal from his son, if an accident occurred to the vessels, the burglar is liable to pay for them. Apparently, the vessels are established in the burglar’s possession, and he must pay for any damage that occurs to them. Here also, then, where there is no blood-guiltiness, the vessels are established as being in the burglar’s possession and they are his.
ולא היא כי אוקמינא רחמנא ברשותיה לענין אונסין אבל לענין מקנא ברשותיה דמרייהו קיימי מידי דהוה אשואל
Rava explains: But this is not so, i.e., there is no proof from that case that can be applied to this one. One can claim that when the Merciful One established the vessels in the burglar’s possession, that was only concerning accidents, so he should be liable to pay for any damage that occurs to them. But as for ownership, they remain in the possession of their owner, just as it is in the case of a borrower. Even though a borrower is liable to pay for all the accidental damage caused to the item he borrowed, nevertheless the borrowed item does not become his property.
ת"ר (שמות כב, א) אין לו דמים אם זרחה השמש עליו וכי השמש עליו בלבד זרחה אלא אם ברור לך הדבר כשמש שאין לו שלום עמך הרגהו ואם לאו אל תהרגהו
§ Apropos a burglar who breaks into a house, the Sages taught in a baraita: The verses state: “If a burglar is found breaking in, and is smitten and dies, there shall not be blood shed on his account. If the sun is risen upon him, there shall be blood shed on his account” (Exodus 22:1–2). A question may be raised: But did the sun rise only upon him? Rather, these words must be understood in a metaphoric sense: If the matter is as clear to you as the sun that the burglar is not coming to you in peace, but rather his intention is to kill you, arise and kill him first. But if you are not sure about his intentions, do not kill him.
תניא אידך אם זרחה השמש עליו דמים לו וכי השמש עליו בלבד זרחה אלא אם ברור לך כשמש שיש לו שלום עמך אל תהרגהו ואם לאו הרגהו קשיא סתמא אסתמא
It is taught in another baraita: The verse states: “If the sun is risen upon him, there shall be blood shed on his account.” A question may be raised: But did the sun rise only upon him? Rather, these words must be understood as follows: If the matter is as clear to you as the sun that the burglar is coming to you in peace, do not kill him. But if you are not sure about his intentions, arise and kill him. The Gemara notes a difficulty: The halakha in the undetermined case as stated in the first baraita contradicts the halakha in the undetermined case as stated in the second baraita. The first baraita indicates that if the homeowner is unsure about the burglar’s intentions, he is prohibited from killing the burglar, whereas the second baraita indicates that in such a case, he is permitted to kill the burglar.
לא קשיא
The Gemara answers: This is not difficult.
כאן באב על הבן כאן בבן על האב
Here, where the baraita teaches that if one is unsure about the burglar’s intentions it is prohibited for him to kill him, it is referring to a father who comes to rob his son. A father has great compassion for his son, and therefore it may be presumed that he will not kill his son if he resists. Accordingly, the son is prohibited from killing his father unless he knows for certain that his father has the intention of killing him. There, where the baraita teaches that if one is unsure about the burglar’s intentions it is permitted for him to kill him, it is referring to a son who comes to rob his father. Since a son has less compassion for his father, it may be presumed that he would be ready to kill his father if he resists. Therefore, the father is permitted to kill his son unless he knows for certain that his son would never kill him.
אמר רב כל דאתי עלאי במחתרתא קטילנא ליה לבר מרב חנינא בר שילא מאי טעמא אילימא משום דצדיק הוא הא קאתי במחתרתא אלא משום דקים לי בגוויה דמרחם עלי כרחם אב על הבן
Rav says: With regard to anyone who breaks into my house, I would kill him, as I would presume that he is ready to kill me, except for Rav Ḥanina bar Sheila, whom I would not kill. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Rav excludes Rabbi Ḥanina bar Sheila? If we say that Rav trusts him because he is a righteous person, this is difficult, as the case is one where he broke into his house, which indicates that he is not a righteous person. Rather, it is because he would say: I am certain that he would have mercy upon me just like a father would have mercy on a son.
תנו רבנן (שמות כב, ב) דמים לו בין בחול בין בשבת אין לו דמים בין בחול בין בשבת
§ The Sages taught in a baraita: “If the sun is risen upon him, there shall be blood shed on his account” (Exodus 22:2), both during the week and on Shabbat. “If a burglar is found breaking in…there shall not be blood shed on his account” (Exodus 22:1), both during the week and on Shabbat.
בשלמא אין לו דמים בין בחול בין בשבת איצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא מידי דהוה אהרוגי בית דין דבשבת לא קטלינן קמ"ל דקטלינן אלא דמים לו בין בחול בין בשבת השתא בחול לא קטלינן ליה בשבת מבעיא
The Gemara clarifies this baraita: Granted that with regard to “there shall not be blood shed on his account,” it was necessary to say that this applies both during the week and on Shabbat, as it might enter your mind to say that this is just as it is in the case of those who are executed by the court, who are not executed on Shabbat. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that the burglar may be slain in self-defense even on Shabbat. But with regard to “there shall be blood shed on his account,” the statement that this applies both during the week and on Shabbat is puzzling. Now, if on a weekday he may not be slain, is it necessary to say that he may not be slain on Shabbat?
אמר רב ששת לא נצרכא אלא לפקח עליו את הגל
Rav Sheshet says: This ruling is necessary only to teach that if a building collapsed on the burglar on Shabbat, one is obligated to clear the pile of stones from on top of him and perform any action necessary to rescue him, even if it involves the desecration of Shabbat; one does not say that while he is not permitted to actively kill him, he is also not obligated to save him.
רודף ניתן להצילו בנפשו-
עג.משנה-עג. שורה #21 "אף רוצח ניתן להצילו בנפשו"
עב: "אמר ר הונא, קטן הרודף"-"דמשמיא קא רדפי לה"
עג.משנה-עג. שורה #21 "אף רוצח ניתן להצילו בנפשו"
עב: "אמר ר הונא, קטן הרודף"-"דמשמיא קא רדפי לה"
מתני׳ ואלו הן שמצילין אותן בנפשן הרודף אחר חבירו להרגו ואחר הזכר ואחר הנערה המאורסה אבל הרודף אחר בהמה והמחלל את השבת ועובד עבודת כוכבים אין מצילין אותן בנפשן:
MISHNA: And these are the ones who are saved from transgressing even at the cost of their lives; that is to say, these people may be killed so that they do not perform a transgression: One who pursues another to kill him, or pursues a male to sodomize him, or pursues a betrothed young woman to rape her. But with regard to one who pursues an animal to sodomize it, or one who seeks to desecrate Shabbat, or one who is going to engage in idol worship, they are not saved at the cost of their lives. Rather, they are forewarned not to transgress, and if they proceed to transgress after having been forewarned, they are brought to trial, and if they are found guilty, they are executed.
גמ׳ ת"ר מניין לרודף אחר חבירו להרגו שניתן להצילו בנפשו ת"ל (ויקרא יט, טז) לא תעמוד על דם רעך והא להכי הוא דאתא האי מיבעי ליה לכדתניא מניין לרואה את חבירו שהוא טובע בנהר או חיה גוררתו או לסטין באין עליו שהוא חייב להצילו ת"ל לא תעמוד על דם רעך אין ה"נ
GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that with regard to one who pursues another in order to kill him, the pursued party may be saved at the cost of the pursuer’s life? The verse states: “You shall not stand idly by the blood of another” (Leviticus 19:16); rather, you must save him from death. The Gemara asks: But does this verse really come to teach us this? This verse is required for that which is taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that one who sees another drowning in a river, or being dragged away by a wild animal, or being attacked by bandits [listin], is obligated to save him? The Torah states: “You shall not stand idly by the blood of another.” The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so that this verse relates to the obligation to save one whose life is in danger.
ואלא ניתן להצילו בנפשו מנלן אתיא בקל וחומר מנערה המאורסה מה נערה המאורסה שלא בא אלא לפוגמה אמרה תורה ניתן להצילה בנפשו רודף אחר חבירו להרגו על אחת כמה וכמה
The Gemara asks again: But from where do we derive that one may be saved at the cost of the pursuer’s life? The Gemara answers: It is derived by means of an a fortiori inference from the halakha governing a betrothed young woman who was assaulted by a rapist: If in the case of a betrothed young woman, whom the rapist comes only to degrade, i.e., the result of the rape will be that her status is lowered, the Torah said that she may be saved even at the cost of the rapist’s life, then in the case of one who pursues another person to kill him, all the more so should one say that he may be saved even at the cost of the pursuer’s life.
וכי עונשין מן הדין דבי רבי תנא הקישא הוא (דברים כב, כו) כי כאשר יקום איש על רעהו ורצחו נפש וכי מה למדנו מרוצח
The Gemara asks: But does the court administer punishment based on an a fortiori inference? The Gemara answers: A Sage of the school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught: This halakha is also derived from an analogy based on a juxtaposition. How so? With regard to the rape of a betrothed young woman it is written: “But you shall do nothing to the young woman; the young woman has committed no sin worthy of death; for as when a man rises against his neighbor, and slays him, so too with this matter” (Deuteronomy 22:26). But why would the verse mention murder in this context? But what do we learn here from a murderer?
מעתה הרי זה בא ללמד ונמצא למד מקיש רוצח לנערה המאורסה מה נערה המאורסה ניתן להצילה בנפשו אף רוצח ניתן להצילו בנפשו
Now, the mention of murder came in order to teach a halakha about the betrothed young woman, and it turns out that, in addition, it derives a halakha from that case. The Torah juxtaposes the case of a murderer to the case of a betrothed young woman to indicate that just as in the case of a betrothed young woman one may save her at the cost of the rapist’s life, so too, in the case of a murderer, one may save the potential victim at the cost of the murderer’s life.
אמר רב הונא קטן הרודף ניתן להצילו בנפשו קסבר רודף אינו צריך התראה לא שנא גדול ולא שנא קטן
§ Rav Huna says: If a minor was pursuing another person in order to kill him, the pursued party may be saved with the pursuer’s life. That is to say, one is permitted to save the pursued party by killing the minor who is pursuing him, and one does not say that since the minor lacks halakhic competence, he is not subject to punishment. The Gemara explains: Rav Huna maintains that a pursuer, in general, does not require forewarning, and there is no difference with regard to this matter between an adult and a minor. The essence of the matter is rescuing the pursued party from death, and therefore the pursuer’s liability to receive the death penalty is irrelevant.
איתיביה רב חסדא לרב הונא יצא ראשו אין נוגעין בו לפי שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש ואמאי רודף הוא שאני התם דמשמיא קא רדפי לה
Rav Ḥisda raised an objection to Rav Huna from a baraita: If a woman was giving birth and her life was being endangered by the fetus, the life of the fetus may be sacrificed in order to save the mother. But once his head has emerged during the birthing process, he may not be harmed in order to save the mother, because one life may not be pushed aside to save another life. If one is permitted to save the pursued party by killing the minor who is pursuing him, why is this so? The fetus is a pursuer who is endangering his mother’s life. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as it is different there, with regard to the woman giving birth, since she is being pursued by Heaven. Since the fetus is not acting of his own volition and endangering his mother of his own will, his life may not be taken in order to save his mother.
יהרג ואל יעבר- עד. "א"ר יוחנן משום ר"ש בן יהוצדק"-עד: "הכא נמי הנאת עצמן שאני"
א"ר יוחנן משום ר"ש בן יהוצדק נימנו וגמרו בעליית בית נתזה בלוד כל עבירות שבתורה אם אומרין לאדם עבור ואל תהרג יעבור ואל יהרג חוץ מעבודת כוכבים וגילוי עריות ושפיכות דמים
§ The Gemara now considers which prohibitions are permitted in times of mortal danger. Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: The Sages who discussed this issue counted the votes of those assembled and concluded in the upper story of the house of Nitza in the city of Lod: With regard to all other transgressions in the Torah, if a person is told: Transgress this prohibition and you will not be killed, he may transgress that prohibition and not be killed, because the preserving of his own life overrides all of the Torah’s prohibitions. This is the halakha concerning all prohibitions except for those of idol worship, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed. Concerning those prohibitions, one must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress them.
ועבודת כוכבים לא והא תניא א"ר ישמעאל מנין שאם אמרו לו לאדם עבוד עבודת כוכבים ואל תהרג מנין שיעבוד ואל יהרג ת"ל (ויקרא יח, ה) וחי בהם ולא שימות בהם
The Gemara asks: And should one not transgress the prohibition of idol worship to save his life? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael said: From where is it derived that if a person is told: Worship idols and you will not be killed, from where is it derived that he should worship the idol and not be killed? The verse states: “You shall keep My statutes and My judgments, which a person shall do, and he shall live by them” (Leviticus 18:5), thereby teaching that the mitzvot were given to provide life, but they were not given so that one will die due to their observance.
יכול אפילו בפרהסיא תלמוד לומר (ויקרא כב, לב) ולא תחללו את שם קדשי ונקדשתי
The baraita continues: One might have thought that it is permitted to worship the idol in this circumstance even in public, i.e., in the presence of many people. Therefore, the verse states: “Neither shall you profane My holy name; but I will be hallowed among the children of Israel: I am the Lord Who sanctifies you” (Leviticus 22:32). Evidently, one is not required to allow himself to be killed so as not to transgress the prohibition of idol worship when in private; but in public he must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress.
אינהו דאמור כר"א דתניא ר"א אומר (דברים ו, ה) ואהבת את ה' אלהיך בכל לבבך ובכל נפשך ובכל מאדך אם נאמר בכל נפשך למה נאמר בכל מאדך ואם נאמר בכל מאדך למה נאמר בכל נפשך
The Gemara answers: Those in the upper story of the house of Nitza stated their opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: It is stated: “And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your might” (Deuteronomy 6:5). If it is stated: “With all your soul,” why is it also stated: “With all your might,” which indicates with all your material possessions? And if it is stated: “With all your might,” why is it also stated: “With all your soul”? One of these clauses seems to be superfluous.
אם יש לך אדם שגופו חביב עליו מממונו לכך נאמר בכל נפשך ואם יש לך אדם שממונו חביב עליו מגופו לכך נאמר בכל מאדך
Rather, this serves to teach that if you have a person whose body is more precious to him than his property, it is therefore stated: “With all your soul.” That person must be willing to sacrifice even his life to sanctify God’s name. And if you have a person whose property is more precious to him than his body, it is therefore stated: “With all your might.” That person must even be prepared to sacrifice all his property for the love of God. According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, one must allow himself to be killed rather than worship an idol.
גילוי עריות ושפיכות דמים כדרבי דתניא רבי אומר (דברים כב, כו) כי כאשר יקום איש על רעהו ורצחו נפש כן הדבר הזה וכי מה למדנו מרוצח
From where is it derived that one must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress the prohibition of forbidden sexual relations and the prohibition of bloodshed? This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: With regard to the rape of a betrothed young woman it is written: “But you shall do nothing to the young woman; the young woman has committed no sin worthy of death; for as when a man rises against his neighbor, and slays him, so too with this matter” (Deuteronomy 22:26). But why would the verse mention murder in this context? But what do we learn here from a murderer?
מעתה הרי זה בא ללמד ונמצא למד מקיש רוצח לנערה המאורסה מה נערה המאורסה ניתן להצילו בנפשו אף רוצח ניתן להצילו בנפשו
Now, the mention of murder came in order to teach a halakha about the betrothed young woman, and it turns out that, in addition, it derives a halakha from that case. The Torah juxtaposes the case of a murderer to the case of a betrothed young woman to indicate that just as in the case of a betrothed young woman one may save her at the cost of the rapist’s life, so too, in the case of a murderer, one may save the potential victim at the cost of the murderer’s life.
ומקיש נערה המאורסה לרוצח מה רוצח יהרג ואל יעבור אף נערה המאורסה תהרג ואל תעבור
And conversely, the Torah juxtaposes a betrothed young woman to a murderer to indicate that just as with regard to a potential murderer, the halakha is that if one was ordered to murder another, he must be killed and not transgress the prohibition of bloodshed, so too, with regard to a betrothed young woman, if she is faced with rape, she must be killed and not transgress the prohibition of forbidden sexual relations.
רוצח גופיה מנא לן סברא הוא דההוא דאתא לקמיה דרבה ואמר ליה אמר לי מרי דוראי זיל קטליה לפלניא ואי לא קטלינא לך אמר ליה לקטלוך ולא תיקטול מי יימר דדמא דידך סומק טפי דילמא דמא דהוא גברא סומק טפי
The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha with regard to a murderer himself, that one must allow himself to be killed rather than commit murder? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning that one life is not preferable to another, and therefore there is no need for a verse to teach this halakha. The Gemara relates an incident to demonstrate this: As when a certain person came before Rabba and said to him: The lord of my place, a local official, said to me: Go kill so-and-so, and if not I will kill you, what shall I do? Rabba said to him: It is preferable that he should kill you and you should not kill. Who is to say that your blood is redder than his, that your life is worth more than the one he wants you to kill? Perhaps that man’s blood is redder. This logical reasoning is the basis for the halakha that one may not save his own life by killing another.
כי אתא רב דימי א"ר יוחנן לא שנו אלא שלא בשעת גזרת המלכות) אבל בשעת גזרת המלכות אפי' מצוה קלה יהרג ואל יעבור
§ When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The Sages taught that one is permitted to transgress prohibitions in the face of mortal danger only when it is not a time of religious persecution. But in a time of religious persecution, when the gentile authorities are trying to force Jews to violate their religion, even if they issued a decree about a minor mitzva, one must be killed and not transgress.
כי אתא רבין א"ר יוחנן אפי' שלא בשעת גזרת מלכות לא אמרו אלא בצינעא אבל בפרהסיא אפי' מצוה קלה יהרג ואל יעבור
When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even when it is not a time of religious persecution, the Sages said that one is permitted to transgress a prohibition in the face of mortal danger only when he was ordered to do so in private. But if he was ordered to commit a transgression in public, even if they threaten him with death if he does not transgress a minor mitzva, he must be killed and not transgress.
מאי מצוה קלה אמר רבא בר רב יצחק אמר רב
The Gemara asks: What is a minor mitzva for this purpose? Rava bar Yitzḥak says that Rav says:
אפילו לשנויי ערקתא דמסאנא
Even to change the strap of a sandal. There was a Jewish custom with regard to sandal straps. If the gentile authorities were to decree that Jews must change their practice and wear sandal straps like those worn by the gentiles, one would be obligated to give up his life rather than veer from the accepted custom.
וכמה פרהסיא אמר ר' יעקב אמר רבי יוחנן אין פרהסיא פחותה מעשרה בני אדם פשיטא ישראלים בעינן דכתיב (ויקרא כב, לב) ונקדשתי בתוך בני ישראל בעי רבי ירמיה תשעה ישראל ונכרי אחד מהו
The Gemara asks: And the presence of how many people is required so that it should be deemed a public act? Rabbi Ya’akov says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: An action is not considered a public act if it is performed in the presence of fewer than ten people. The Gemara clarifies this point: It is obvious that we require that these ten people be Jews, as it is written in the verse from which we derive the requirement of ten for the sanctification of God’s name: “And I shall be sanctified among the children of Israel” (Leviticus 22:32). Rabbi Yirmeya asks: What is the halakha if there were nine Jews and one gentile present?
תא שמע דתני רב ינאי אחוה דרבי חייא בר אבא אתיא תוך תוך כתיב הכא ונקדשתי בתוך בני ישראל וכתיב התם (במדבר טז, כא) הבדלו מתוך העדה הזאת מה להלן עשרה וכולהו ישראל אף כאן עשרה וכולהו ישראל
The Gemara answers: Come and hear an answer from what Rav Yannai, the brother of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, teaches in a baraita: This is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the word “among” written with regard to the sanctification of God’s name, and the word “among” written with regard to Korah and his assembly. Here, with regard to the sanctification of God’s name, it is written: “And I shall be sanctified among the children of Israel,” and there, with regard to Korah, it is written: “Separate yourselves from among this congregation” (Numbers 16:21). The meaning of the word “congregation” written with regard to Korah is derived by means of a verbal analogy to the word “congregation” written with regard to the spies sent out by Moses to scout the land: “How long shall I bear with this evil congregation” (Numbers 14:27). Just as there, the congregation of spies numbered ten, and all were Jews, so too here, concerning the sanctification of God, there must be ten, all of them being Jews.
והא אסתר פרהסיא הואי אמר אביי אסתר קרקע עולם היתה
The Gemara raises a difficulty: But wasn’t the incident involving Esther, i.e., her cohabitation with Ahasuerus, a public sin? Why then did Esther not surrender her life rather than engage in intercourse? The Gemara answers: Abaye says: Esther was merely like natural ground, i.e., she was a passive participant. The obligation to surrender one’s life rather than engage in forbidden sexual intercourse applies only to a man who transgresses the prohibition in an active manner. A woman who is passive and merely submits is not required to give up her life so that she not sin.
רבא אמר הנאת עצמן שאני
Rava says that there is another justification for Esther’s behavior: When gentiles order the transgression of a prohibition not in order to persecute the Jews or to make them abandon their religion, but for their own personal pleasure, it is different. In such a situation there is no obligation to sacrifice one’s life, even when the sin is committed in public.
דאי לא תימא הכי הני קוואקי ודימוניקי היכי יהבינן לה אלא הנאת עצמן שאני הכא נמי הנאת עצמן שאני
Rava explains: As if you do not say so, then how do we give them coal shovels [kevakei vedimonikei]? The Persian priests would take coal shovels from every house, fill them with coals, and use them to heat their temples on their festival days. Although this involved assisting idol worship in public, Jews would not sacrifice their lives in order not to do so. Rather, the reason they cooperated is certainly that a measure enacted for the gentiles’ personal pleasure is different. Here too, concerning Esther, Ahasuerus engaged in intercourse with her for his personal pleasure, and a measure enacted for a gentile’s personal pleasure is different, and there is no obligation to sacrifice one’s life to avoid it.