One of the more obscure areas of Judaism is Techiyat Hameisim, defined as the eventual reunion of the souls of the deceased with their bodies. The Rambam declares this a fundamental element of Jewish belief and the Mishna rules that one who denies resurrection, which includes the reawakening of the body, is an apikorus and forfeits their share in the World to Come (Olam Haba).
Despite stating this halacha, the Rambam rarely discusses Techiyat Hameisim in detail. Notably, he omits it from Melachim Chapter 12, his main chapter on the end of days. This omission led some to question whether he truly believed in Techiyat Hameisim. Some have argued that the Rambam only believed that Techiyat Hameisim is the idea that the soul is reawakened in the World to Come as its final reward.
To address these doubts, the Rambam wrote an essay publicly affirming his faith in Techiyat Hameisim. However, he did not elaborate on its details or purpose, explicitly stating that he had nothing new to add. He writes that stating a fact once is enough and its repetition does not make it more or less true. However, this attitude may reflect his philosophical reservations, as I will explain.
The Rambam accepts the Talmudic opinion (Ta’anit 7a) that Techiyat Hameisim is reserved for the righteous. He reasons that since evil people are considered “dead” even while alive, there is no reason to resurrect them. Furthermore, in his commentary on Pirkei Avot (4:17), the Rambam states that after death, a person has already earned or lost their share in Olam Haba forever. Thus, once a person dies, this world (Olam Hazeh) no longer serves them any purpose.
If Techiyat Hameisim is reserved for the righteous, it would seem to be a form of reward. However, the only advantage of Olam Hazeh over Olam Haba is the opportunity to perform mitzvot, and that opportunity ends with death. Therefore, resurrection cannot serve as a reward, which raises the question: what is its purpose?
I would like to propose an alternative view. Perhaps we should accept the dissenting opinion that everyone, not just the righteous, will be resurrected. This universal resurrection would serve the purpose of administering the ultimate judgment.
Why is resurrection necessary for the final judgment? The Gemara (Sanhedrin 91a) tells the story of a blind man and a lame man who conspired together to steal fruit from the king’s orchard. Individually, neither could have accomplished the theft, but by working together—one riding on the other’s shoulders—they succeeded. When caught, each tried to blame the other, but the king judged them together, recognizing their combined responsibility.
Similarly, the soul could claim that the body is at fault for sin, as the soul cannot act without the body. The body could argue that without the soul, it is lifeless and incapable of action. By resurrecting both, Hashem can judge them together, enabling proper administration of justice.
This understanding also clarifies a glaring omission by the Rambam in Melachim Chapter 12, where he writes that nothing supernatural will occur in the days of Mashiach. This seems to exclude resurrection from the Messianic era. According to my view, resurrection is not part of the era of Mashiach but rather a separate event at the end of days, specifically for final judgment.
In conclusion, I argue that Techiyat Hameisim is the planned resurrection of all people for the ultimate day of judgment, occurring at the end of time, long after the arrival of Mashiach. Its purpose is to allow for the fair administration of justice, which is central to the purpose of creation. This is why belief in resurrection is such a fundamental principle in Judaism: without it, the system of ultimate reward and punishment would be incomplete.