Agree to Disagree: How To Get Along When The Other Person Is Wrong

(5) As 'ה had ordered him through Moses. It was to be a reminder to the Israelites, so that no outsider—one not of Aaron’s offspring—should presume to offer incense before 'ה and suffer the fate of Korah and his band.

“And Moses arose and went to Dathan and Abiram” (Numbers 16:25), Reish Lakish says: From here we derive that one may not perpetuate a dispute, as Rav says: Anyone who perpetuates a dispute violates a prohibition, as it is stated: “And he will not be like Korah and his assembly.

And even though we find a different expression in the Gemara in Sanhedrin (Sanhedrin 110a) - and that is their saying, "Anyone who maintains an argument, transgresses a negative commandment, as it is stated, 'and not be like Korach and like his congregation" - this is by way of an asmakhta (homiletic support), and not that their intention in this is the simple meaning of the verse.

“And not be like Korach and like his community” (Numbers 17:5). And our Rabbis, may their memory be blessed, said (Sanhedrin 110a), “Anyone who perpetuates a dispute violates a negative commandment, as it is stated ‘and not be like Korach and like his community.’” But it is permissible to say evil speech about disputatious people, as it is stated (I Kings 1:26), “But he did not invite me your servant, or the priest Zadok, etc.”

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says: Even a father and his son, or a rabbi and his student, who are engaged in Torah in one gate become enemies with each other. But they do not leave there until they love each other.

Every dispute that is for the sake of Heaven, will in the end endure; But one that is not for the sake of Heaven, will not endure. Which is the controversy that is for the sake of Heaven? Such was the controversy of Hillel and Shammai. And which is the controversy that is not for the sake of Heaven? Such was the controversy of Korah and all his congregation.

Every argument that is for [the sake of] heaven's name, it is destined (literally, its end is) to endure: That is to say that the [parties to] the argument are destined to endure and not perish, as with the argument between Hillel and Shammai, [whereby] neither the students of the School of Hillel nor the students of the School of Shammai perished. But Korach and his congregation perished. And I heard the explanation of “its end” is its purpose that is sought from its subject. And [with] the argument which is for the sake of Heaven, the purpose and aim that is sought from that argument is to arrive at the truth, and this endures; like that which they said, "From a dispute the truth will be clarified," and as it became elucidated from the argument between Hillel and Shammai - that the law was like the school of Hillel. And [with] argument which is not for the sake of Heaven, its desired purpose is to achieve power and the love of contention, and its end will not endure; as we found in the argument of Korach and his congregation - that their aim and ultimate intent was to achieve honor and power, and the opposite was [achieved].

THE DISPUTE OF KORACH AND HIS FOLLOWERS. The mishna does not mention the other party in the dispute—Moses and Aaron—as it does in the first section because in this case the two parties are not comparable, for Moses and Aaron acted for the sake of Heaven and had no other motives at all.

Rabbi Abba said that Shmuel said: For three years Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed. These said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion, and these said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion. Ultimately, a Divine Voice emerged and proclaimed: Both these and those are the words of the living God. However, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. The Gemara asks: Since both these and those are the words of the living God, why were Beit Hillel privileged to have the halakha established in accordance with their opinion? The reason is that they were agreeable and forbearing, showing restraint when affronted, and when they taught the halakha they would teach both their own statements and the statements of Beit Shammai. Moreover, when they formulated their teachings and cited a dispute, they prioritized the statements of Beit Shammai to their own statements, in deference to Beit Shammai.

A Sanhedrin of twenty-three was arranged in the same layout as half of a circular threshing floor, in order that all the judges will see one another and the witnesses. And two judges’ scribes stand before the court, one on the right and one on the left, and they write the statements of those who find the accused liable and the statements of those who acquit the accused. Rabbi Yehuda says: There were three scribes. One writes only the statements of those who acquit the accused, one writes only the statements of those who find him liable, and the third writes both the statements of those who acquit the accused and the statements of those who find him liable, so that if there is uncertainty concerning the precise wording that one of the scribes writes, it can be compared to the words of the third scribe.

§ Rav Kahana says: In a Sanhedrin where all the judges saw fit to convict the defendant in a case of capital law, they acquit him. The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning for this halakha? It is since it is learned as a tradition that suspension of the trial overnight is necessary in order to create a possibility of acquittal. The halakha is that they may not issue the guilty verdict on the same day the evidence was heard, as perhaps over the course of the night one of the judges will think of a reason to acquit the defendant. And as those judges all saw fit to convict him they will not see any further possibility to acquit him, because there will not be anyone arguing for such a verdict. Consequently, he cannot be convicted.

MISHNA: Cases of monetary law are adjudicated by three. They are chosen in the following manner: This litigant chooses one for himself and that litigant chooses one for himself, and the two of them choose one more for themselves; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The two judges that were chosen choose one more judge for themselves.

Rabbi Neḥunya also said: Nor did I ever allow the resentment caused by my fellow’s curse to go up with me upon my bed. This is referring to conduct such as that of Mar Zutra. When he would go to bed at night, he would first say: I forgive anyone who has vexed me.

Rava understood this verse differently and said: With regard to whoever forgoes his reckonings with others for injustices done to him, the heavenly court in turn forgoes punishment for all his sins, as it is stated: “He bears sin and forgives transgression” (Micah 7:18). Whose sins does He bear? The sins of one who forgoes his reckonings with others for injustices committed against him.

But the king said, “What has this to do with you, you sons of Zeruiah? He is abusing [me] only because GOD told him to abuse David; and who is to say, ‘Why did You do that?’”

You shall not hate your kinsfolk in your heart. Reprove your kin but incur no guilt on their account.