Shevuot: Greatest Hits

§ And for the intentional defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, both the goat whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary on Yom Kippur, and Yom Kippur itself, atone. The mishna delineates how atonement is effected for other transgressions: For all other transgressions that are stated in the Torah, whether they are the minor ones or the major ones, whether they were intentional or unwitting, whether one became aware of them before Yom Kippur or did not become aware of them until after Yom Kippur, whether they involve a positive mitzva or a prohibition, whether the transgressors are subject to excision from the World-to-Come [karet] or to one of the court-imposed death penalties, the scapegoat sent to Azazel on Yom Kippur atones.

The mishna is referring to a case where the person did not repent and persists in his rebellion, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, that even for such a case Yom Kippur and the scapegoat will atone. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: For all transgressions that are stated in the Torah, whether one repented, or whether one did not repent, Yom Kippur atones, except for one who divests himself of the yoke of Heaven, by denying God’s existence, and one who reveals facets of the Torah that differ from its true meaning, and one who nullifies the covenant of circumcision of the flesh. For these, if one repented, Yom Kippur atones, and if not, Yom Kippur does not atone.

The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? It is as it is taught in a baraita in interpretation of the verse: “For he scorned the word of the Lord and nullified His commandment; that person will be cut off [hikkaret tikkaret], his sin is upon him” (Numbers 15:31): “For he scorned the word of the Lord”; this is referring to one who divests himself of the yoke of Heaven and one who reveals facets of the Torah that differ from its true meaning. “And nullified His commandment”; this is referring to one who nullified the covenant of circumcision of the flesh. The use of the double verb form hikkaret tikkaret teaches that he will be cut off, i.e., he is liable to receive karet, before Yom Kippur, and he will still be cut off after Yom Kippur, as Yom Kippur does not atone for him.

One might have thought that this applies even if he repented. To counter this, the verse states: “His sin is upon him,” by which God indicates: I said that Yom Kippur does not atone for these sins only when his sin is still upon him, as he did not repent. It is apparent from this baraita that it is only for the three sins mentioned that Yom Kippur does not atone without repentance, but Yom Kippur atones for other sins even if one did not repent.

And with regard to the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, how do they interpret the verse? If someone commits one of the three sins mentioned, then he is cut off [hikkaret] from life in this world, and he will be cut off [tikkaret] in the World-to-Come. The phrase “His sin is upon him” teaches that if he repented and died, his death cleanses him of his sin.

§ The mishna teaches concerning the consecration of an addition to the city of Jerusalem or the Temple courtyard: And with a song. The Sages taught in a baraita: They sang the song of thanksgiving, i.e., Psalms, chapter 100, which begins: “A psalm of thanksgiving,” accompanied by harps, lyres, and cymbals, at every corner and upon every large stone in Jerusalem. And they also recited Psalms, chapter 30, which begins: “I will extol You, O Lord, for You have lifted me up,” and the song of evil spirits, i.e., Psalms, chapter 91, which begins: “He that dwells in the secret place of the Most High.” And some say that this psalm is called the song of plagues. The reason of the one who says that it is called the song of plagues is that it is written: “Nor shall any plague come near your dwelling” (Psalms 91:10). And the reason of the one who says that it is called the song of evil spirits is that it is written: “A thousand shall fall at your side and ten thousand at your right hand; but it shall not come near you” (Psalms 91:7). And they recited the psalm from the verse: “He that dwells in the secret place of the Most High shall abide in the shadow of the Almighty” (Psalms 91:1), until they completed the verse: “Because You, O Lord, are my refuge; You have made the most High Your habitation” (Psalms 91:9). And they would then recite Psalms, chapter 3, which begins: “A psalm of David, when he fled from Absalom his son. Lord, how many are my enemies become,” until they reached the verse: “Salvation belongs to the Lord; Your blessing be upon Your people. Sela” (Psalms 3:9), which is the end of that psalm. It is related that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi would recite these verses to protect him from evil spirits during the night and fall asleep while saying them. The Gemara asks: How could he do that? But doesn’t Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi himself say: One is prohibited from healing himself with words of Torah? The Gemara answers: To protect oneself is different, as he recited these verses only to protect himself from evil spirits, and not to heal himself. The Gemara challenges: But rather, when Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said that this is prohibited, he was referring to a situation where there is already a wound and one recites these verses in order to heal himself. But if there is already a wound and he recites these verses over it, is only this prohibited, and nothing more? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Sanhedrin 90a), that one who whispers an incantation over a wound has no share in the World-to-Come? The Gemara answers: Wasn’t it stated with regard to that mishna that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The mishna was taught with regard to one who spits into the wound and then whispers these verses. And the reason for the severity of this action is that the name of Heaven must not be mentioned in connection with spitting, as doing so is a show of contempt for God.

Rava said: And we learn both of these matters for which he is liable to bring a sin-offering; we learn about entry, and we learn about withdrawal. Rava now clarifies the matter: We learn about withdrawal, as the mishna teaches: If a man was engaging in intercourse with a ritually pure woman, and during the course of their act of intercourse she experienced menstrual bleeding and said to him: I have become impure, and unwittingly he immediately withdrew from her, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman. Rava continues: We learn about entry in a mishna (Nidda 14a): If a spot of blood is found on his rag, i.e., the rag that he uses to wipe his penis after intercourse, then it is clear that this blood came from the woman during their act of intercourse. Consequently, both the man and the woman are impure and are liable to bring a sin-offering for their unwitting transgression. Rava explains: What, is it not the case that the mishna speaks here of one who engaged in intercourse with a woman near the expected date of her menstruation, and it teaches that he is liable to bring a sin-offering for his initial entry at that time? Rav Adda bar Mattana said to Rava: Actually, I could say to you that the mishna speaks here of one who engaged in intercourse with a woman not near the expected date of her menstruation, and he is liable to bring a sin-offering for his immediate withdrawal upon learning that she had experienced menstrual bleeding. And if you would say: Why do I need to be taught once again about withdrawal? Didn’t the tanna already teach this in the mishna here? One can respond: It was necessary to teach us this, i.e., the continuation of the mishna in tractate Nidda, which states: If a spot of blood is found on her rag, i.e., the rag that she uses to wipe herself after intercourse, they are impure only because of an uncertainty, as perhaps the bleeding commenced only after they completed their act of intercourse, and therefore they are exempt from bringing a sin-offering. And since the mishna had to teach the case where the blood was found on her rag, it also taught the case where it was found on his rag, even though there is no novel element in this ruling. Ravina said to Rav Adda: Can you really interpret that mishna as referring to a case where it was not near the expected date of the woman’s menstruation, and that he is liable to bring a sin-offering for his withdrawal? But isn’t it taught in that mishna: If blood is found on his rag? And these words indicate that the blood was found only afterward, after the man had already withdrawn from the woman. That is to say, only after he withdrew from the woman he learned that she had experienced menstrual bleeding. Ravina clarifies the difficulty: And if the mishna is referring to a case where he is liable for his withdrawal, at the outset, when he withdrew from the woman, it was from then that he had knowledge of her menstrual status, as he withdrew because she had informed him that she had experienced bleeding. Of what significance is his finding blood on his rag? Rava said to Rav Adda: Listen to what your teacher, Ravina, is saying, as he has explained the matter. Rav Adda said to Rava: How can I listen to his words and accept his explanation? As it is taught in a baraita with regard to this mishna concerning blood found on a rag: This is the positive mitzva with regard to a menstruating woman for which one is liable. Rav Adda explains: And if it is so that the mishna is referring to a case where the man is liable for his initial entry, this wording is difficult, as engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman is not the violation of a positive mitzva, but a prohibition. Rava said to him: If you learned this baraita in this manner, its wording is imprecise, as it is missing words, and you should teach it like this: When blood is found on the man’s rag, this is the prohibition with regard to a menstruating woman for which one is liable. And additionally, if a man was engaging in intercourse with a ritually pure woman, and during the course of their act of intercourse she experienced menstrual bleeding and said to him: I have become impure, and unwittingly he immediately withdrew from her, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for that act, and this is the positive mitzva for which one is liable with regard to a menstruating woman. § The Gemara resumes its discussion of the mishna: The Master said above in the mishna: If he immediately withdrew from the woman after having been informed that she had experienced menstrual bleeding, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman. The Gemara asks: What should one do in such a situation? Rav Huna said in the name of Rava: He should press his ten fingernails into the ground, i.e., the bed, and restrain himself and do nothing until his penis becomes flaccid, and only then should he withdraw from her, and it is good for him to do so. Rava said: That is to say, one who engages in intercourse, with a flaccid penis, with those with whom relations are forbidden is exempt. As if it enters your mind to say that he is liable, here, in the mishna, what is the reason that he is exempt if he waits and withdraws only later, after he has lost his erection? You might say that it is because he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control in that the woman experienced menstrual bleeding while he was in the middle of the act of intercourse, and not because he withdrew with a flaccid penis, as one who engages in intercourse with a flaccid penis is liable. But if he is exempt from liability because he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control, then even if he withdraws immediately, before losing his erection, he should also be exempt, for the same reason, that he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control. Abaye said to Rava: Actually, I could say to you that one who engages in intercourse, with a flaccid penis, with those with whom relations are forbidden is liable. And here, what is the reason that one who waits and withdraws only later, after he has lost his erection, is exempt? It is because he is considered a victim of circumstances beyond his control. And concerning that which you said: Why, then, is he liable if he withdrew immediately, i.e., when you said: He should also be exempt, it is because he should have withdrawn with a flaccid penis and experienced little pleasure, but instead he withdrew with an erect organ and experienced great pleasure.

§ Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosei ben Lakonya asked Rabbi Shimon ben Yosei ben Lakonya: From where in the Torah is the prohibition concerning one who engages in intercourse with a menstruating woman [nidda] derived? Rabbi Shimon ben Yosei ben Lakonya took a clod [kala] of earth and threw it at him in reproach and said to him: Is there a need to search the Torah for a derivation for the prohibition concerning one who engages in intercourse with a menstruating woman? The verse states: “And a woman who is impure by her uncleanness [nidda] you shall not approach, to uncover her nakedness” (Leviticus 18:19)? The Gemara explains the intent of the question of Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosei ben Lakonya: Rather, from where do we derive the prohibition with regard to the case in the mishna concerning one who was engaging in intercourse with a ritually pure woman, and she experienced menstrual bleeding and said to him: I have become impure, that he must not withdraw immediately? In response to this question Ḥizkiyya said: The verse states: “And if any man lies with her, and her menstrual flow shall be upon him” (Leviticus 15:24), teaching that even at any time when she is menstruating, the prohibition shall be upon him; therefore, he must not withdraw from her immediately. The Gemara asks: We found a source for a positive mitzva with regard to the manner in which one must withdraw from a menstruating woman; from where do we derive that immediate withdrawal is also subject to a prohibition? Rav Pappa said: The verse states: “And a woman who is impure by her uncleanness you shall not approach, to uncover her nakedness” (Leviticus 18:19). The Gemara explains: “You shall not approach [tikrav]” means also the opposite: You shall not withdraw, as it is written: “Those who say: Withdraw [kerav] to yourself, come not near to me, for I am holier than you” (Isaiah 65:5), where “kerav” means remove or withdraw.

Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: With regard to anyone who does not separate from his wife near the expected date of her menstruation, even if he has sons who are fit to be great and holy like the sons of Aaron, these sons will die due to his sin, as it is written: “And shall you separate the children of Israel from their uncleanness…this is the law…of her that is sick with her menstrual flow” (Leviticus 15:31–33), and it is stated near it: “After the death of the two sons of Aaron” (Leviticus 16:1).

Concerning this matter, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Anyone who separates himself from his wife near the expected date of her menstruation will have male children, as it is written: “To distinguish between the impure and the pure” (Leviticus 11:47), and it is stated near it: “If a woman conceive and bear a male child” (Leviticus 12:2). Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: He will have sons who are worthy of teaching halakha, as it is written: “To distinguish…between the impure and the pure, and to teach the children of Israel all the statutes” (Leviticus 10:10–11).

The Gemara continues to expound these verses: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Anyone who recites havdala over wine at the conclusion of Shabbatot, and not over some other beverage, will have male children, as it is written: “To distinguish between the holy and the unholy, and between the impure and the pure” (Leviticus 10:10), and it is written there once again: “To distinguish between the impure and the pure” (Leviticus 11:47), and it is stated near it: “If a woman conceive and bear a male child” (Leviticus 12:2). Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: Anyone who recites havdala over wine at the conclusion of Shabbatot will have sons who are worthy of teaching halakha, as it is written: “To distinguish between the holy and the unholy…and to teach” (Leviticus 10:10–11).

Rabbi Binyamin bar Yefet says that Rabbi Elazar says: Anyone who sanctifies himself with modest conduct while engaging in sexual intercourse will have male children, as it is stated: “You shall sanctify yourselves, and you shall be holy” (Leviticus 11:44), and it is stated near it: “If a woman conceive and bear a male child” (Leviticus 12:2).

§ When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he reported that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one takes an oath, saying: I will eat, or: I will not eat, relating to the future, and does not fulfill it, it is a false oath. And its prohibition in the Torah is from here: “And you shall not take an oath by My name falsely, so that you profane the name of your God; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 19:12). If one takes an oath, saying: I ate, or: I did not eat, relating to past actions, and it is a lie, it is an oath taken in vain, and its prohibition in the Torah is from here: “You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain; for the Lord will not absolve of guilt he that takes His name in vain” (Exodus 20:7). Rav Dimi continued: With regard to vows where one states that an item is forbidden like an offering [konamot], if he subsequently derives benefit from that item, one violates the prohibition: “When a man vows a vow to the Lord, or takes an oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break his word; he shall do according to all that proceeds out of his mouth” (Numbers 30:3). The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: The prohibitions against taking an oath in vain and taking a false oath are one. The Gemara suggests: What, is the baraita not teaching that if an oath taken in vain refers to the past, a false oath also refers to the past? Apparently, the statements: I ate, and: I did not eat, are both false oaths, contrary to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement that a false oath is one that relates to the future. The Gemara answers: Are the cases comparable? This case, of a false oath, is as it is and that case, of an oath taken in vain, is as it is. What, then, is the meaning of the assertion of the baraita that they are one? It is that both were spoken in a single utterance at the giving of the Torah, like that which is taught in a baraita: “Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy” (Exodus 20:8), and: “Observe the Sabbath day, to keep it holy” (Deuteronomy 5:12), were spoken in one utterance, in a manner that the human mouth cannot say and that the human ear cannot hear. The Gemara asks: Granted, there, “remember” and “observe” were spoken in a single utterance in order to teach the halakha that Rav Adda bar Ahava says; as Rav Adda bar Ahava says: Women are obligated to recite kiddush sanctifying the seventh day, by Torah law, even though it is a positive, time-bound mitzva, since the verses state: “Remember,” and: “Observe,” indicating that anyone who is obligated to observe, i.e., is prohibited from performing labor on Shabbat, is obligated to remember, by reciting kiddush. And these women, since they are obligated to observe, they also are obligated to remember. But here, with regard to the prohibitions against taking a false oath and taking an oath in vain, for what halakha is it necessary for them to have been spoken in a single utterance? The Gemara explains: Rather, the two prohibitions were spoken together to teach that just as one is flogged for taking an oath in vain, so is one also flogged for taking a false oath. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it the opposite [kelapei layya]? It is clear that one receives lashes for taking a false oath about the future, which one violates with an action, but an oath taken in vain about the past is merely a verbal pronouncement. Rather, say like this: Just as one is flogged for taking a false oath, i.e., violating one’s oath about the future, so is one also flogged for taking an oath in vain.

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Akiva said to the Rabbis: Where do we find one who speaks and is liable to bring an offering for it, as this oath taker merely speaks, i.e., takes an oath, and brings an offering for it? The Gemara asks: And do we not? But isn’t a blasphemer liable to bring an offering according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva (see Karetot 7a)? The Gemara answers: We are speaking of one who speaks and in doing so generates a prohibition. And this one, the blasphemer, is merely one who speaks and sins but does not bring an offering. The Gemara challenges: But doesn’t a nazirite render wine forbidden to himself through speech, by making a vow? And he does bring an offering. The Gemara answers: We are speaking of one who brings an offering specifically for his speaking, and this one, the nazirite, brings an offering at the end of his naziriteship in order to permit wine to himself. The Gemara challenges: But isn’t consecrated property a case where one renders an item forbidden via speech alone and brings an offering for its misuse? The Gemara answers: We are speaking of one who, by speaking, generates a prohibition for himself, and nevertheless brings an offering. And this one, who consecrates an item, generates a prohibition for the whole world. The Gemara challenges: Aren’t konamot an example of a case where one renders an item forbidden to himself by speech alone and brings an offering for using it? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva holds that there is no prohibition of misuse of consecrated property with regard to konamot.

MISHNA: If one takes an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva and he does not refrain, he is exempt from bringing an offering for an oath on an utterance. If he takes an oath to perform a mitzva and he does not perform it, he is also exempt, though it would have been fitting to claim that he is liable to bring the offering, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira. The mishna explains: Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira said: What? If, with regard to an oath concerning an optional matter, for which one is not under oath from Mount Sinai, he is liable for breaking it, then with regard to an oath about a mitzva, for which he is under oath from Mount Sinai, is it not logical that he would be liable for breaking it? The Rabbis said to him: No, if you said that one is liable for breaking an oath concerning an optional action, where the Torah rendered one liable for a negative oath not to perform it like for a positive oath to perform it, shall you also say one is liable with regard to breaking an oath concerning a mitzva, where the Torah did not render one liable for a negative oath like for a positive oath, since if one takes an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva and did not refrain, he is exempt.

Is that to say that gracious and compassionate are sacred names? The Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita: There are names of God that may be erased and there are names of God that may not be erased due to their inherent sanctity. These are names that may not be erased: For example, several variations of the name God [Elohim]: El, Elohekha with a second person singular suffix, Elohim, Eloheikhem with a second person plural suffix; I Shall Be As I Shall Be, alef dalet, yod heh, Almighty [Shaddai], Lord of Hosts [Tzevaot], these names may not be erased. But adjectives that describe the Holy One, Blessed be He, e.g., the Great, the Mighty, the Awesome, the Prodigious, the Powerful, the Courageous, the Strong, gracious, compassionate, slow to anger, or abounding in loving-kindness; these may be erased. Apparently, gracious and compassionate are adjectives and not actual names of God; how, then, does an oath or a curse in the name of gracious and compassionate take effect? Abaye said: In the mishna, it is with regard to one who administers an oath or curses in the name of He Who is Gracious, or in the name of He Who is compassionate, that the tanna is stating the halakha. Although gracious and compassionate are not names of God, the reference in the mishna is to an oath in the name of God. Rava said to Abaye: If so, in the case of one who administered the oath to the witnesses in the name of heaven and in the name of earth as well, say that it is with regard to an oath in the name of He for Whom the heaven and the earth are His that the tanna is stating the halakha. Why, then, does the mishna say that for an oath in the name of heaven and in the name of earth, these witnesses are exempt from liability? The Gemara rejects this: How can these cases be compared? There, since there is no other entity that is called gracious and compassionate, certainly it is in the name of He Who is gracious, and certainly it is in the name of He Who is compassionate that the tanna is speaking. By contrast, here, since there are heaven and earth that exist as independent entities, perhaps when he administers an oath in the name of heaven and in the name of earth, it is in the name of the actual heaven and in the name of the actual earth that he is speaking, and not in the name of He for Whom the heaven and the earth are His. § Apropos the names of God that may be erased and those that may not be erased, the Gemara discusses the details of the matter. The Sages taught: If one wrote the letters alef lamed from the name Elohim, or yod heh from the Tetragrammaton, this pair of letters and that pair of letters may not be erased. But if one wrote the letters shin dalet from Shaddai, or alef dalet from Adonai, or tzadi beit from Tzevaot, this may be erased. Rabbi Yosei says: The word tzevaot may be erased in its entirety, as God is called Tzevaot only in the context of the children of Israel, and it is not an independent name of God, as it is stated: “And I shall bring forth My hosts [tzivotai], My people the children of Israel, out of the land of Egypt” (Exodus 7:4). Shmuel says: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. The Sages taught: Any letters ancillary to the name of God, whether as a prefix preceding the name or as a suffix succeeding the name, this addition may be erased. Preceding it, how so? If one wrote the Tetragrammaton with the prefix lamed, meaning: To the Lord, the lamed may be erased; the Tetragrammaton with the prefix beit, meaning: By the Lord, the beit may be erased; the Tetragrammaton with the prefix vav, meaning: And the Lord, the vav may be erased; the Tetragrammaton with the prefix mem, meaning: From the Lord, the mem may be erased; the Tetragrammaton with the prefix shin, meaning: That the Lord, the shin may be erased; the Tetragrammaton with the prefix heh, meaning: Is the Lord, the heh may be erased; the Tetragrammaton with the prefix kaf, meaning: Like the Lord, the kaf may be erased. Succeeding it, how so? If one wrote Eloheinu, meaning: Our God, the nun vav suffix may be erased; Eloheihem, meaning: Their God, the heh mem suffix may be erased; Eloheikhem, meaning: Your God, second person plural, the kaf mem suffix may be erased. Aḥerim say: The suffix succeeding the name of God may not be erased as the name of God to which it is appended already sanctified it and it is considered as though it is part of the name. Rav Huna says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Aḥerim. § Abraham; who cursed Naboth; in Gibeah of Benjamin; Solomon; Daniel; this is a mnemonic for the halakhot that follow.

All names that could be understood as the name of God that are stated in the Torah with regard to Abraham are sacred and are referring to God, except for this name, which is non-sacred, as it is stated: “My lords, if I have found favor in your eyes” (Genesis 18:3). In that passage, Abraham is addressing the angels who appeared to him in the guise of men, not God. Ḥanina, son of the brother of Rabbi Yehoshua, and Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya in the name of Rabbi Elazar HaModa’i, say: This too is sacred. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which Rabbi Yehuda says that Rav says: Hospitality accorded to guests is greater than receiving the Divine Presence? In accordance with whose opinion is that statement? It is in accordance with the opinion of that pair of tanna’im, Ḥanina, son of the brother of Rabbi Yehoshua, and Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, who understood that Abraham was speaking to God. All names that could be understood as the name of God that are stated in the Torah with regard to Lot are non-sacred and are referring to angels, except for this one, which is sacred, as it is stated: “And Lot said to them: Please, not so Adonai. Behold your servant has found favor in your eyes, and you have magnified Your mercy that You have performed for me by saving my life” (Genesis 19:18–19). It is apparent from the context that Lot is addressing He Who has the capacity to kill and to vivify; that is the Holy One, Blessed be He.