QJAB Queer Torah: A Look at Our Ancestors and Modern Jewish Life

So often, when we think of "queer" characters in Tanach, we think of King David and Jonathan, Ruth and Naomi, and Joseph, but if we look at the texts of Bereshit, we can see some other queer themes in the stories.

This section comes from a source sheet titled Queering Our Mother Rebekah by Rabbi Miriam Hoffman. The verses brought here are the ones referenced in the text from Torah Queeries.

"The Rebecca that emerges from a close reading of the narrative in Genesis 24 is a complex amalgam of traits. As seen from the perspective of the servant, Rebecca is physically very attractive (verse 16), strong and muscular (capable of drawing hundreds of gallons of water — for all those camels — in a short time, verse 20); and socially capable of acting forward and independent (talking to a stranger, accepting his gifts and issuing invitations). In addition, the servant’s test seems designed to reveal certain character traits: Rebecca proves to be hospitable and sensitive to the needs of animals but her behavior also indicates a willingness to be servile and to put the needs of others, even complete strangers, first.

Of course, Rebecca is not a typical woman of the Bible, partly because of her “masculine” traits (physical strength, stamina, bold social behavior and independence). Through the eyes of the servant, the Biblical text itself seems to approve of the blending of stereotypically masculine and feminine traits. Might the character of Rebecca afford a more nuanced view of gender — one that extends beyond biological and social conventions? Perhaps. Though a far more radical view of Rebecca and gender emerges from a close reading of Genesis 24, not in the narrative per se but on the page itself.

Five times in this chapter, the text refers to Rebecca using a word made up of three Hebrew letters: nun-ayin-reysh (verses 14, 16, 28, 55, 57). Na’ar (the unvocalized three-letter word) refers to a young man. In printed versions of the Hebrew Bible, that word is printed in a smaller font and without vowels. Next to it, in the margins, is a “correction” — those same three letters but with the letter hay added at the end. The significance? Add a hay, to make it na’ar’ah, and you get a young woman.

This particular case of kree u’ketiv involves substituting the term for a young woman (na’ar’ah) for the word that is actually written in the text: na’ar (young man). Were the Masoretes correcting a scribal error? If so, why does it appear five times in a row, all in reference to Rebecca? Why were they so concerned, when the Biblical text itself seems not to be, that future readers be clear about Rebecca’s place within a rigid gender divide?"

1. Once might be a mistake, twice a coincidence. But five times??? What more information does this spelling error/intentional spelling give us about Rebecca?

2. Do you believe that this was a mistake, or is the author again trying to tell us something about Rebecca character?

In the following text, the bolded words are a direct translation and the unbolded words are added for better understanding.

This text from Masechet Nazir gives us the background understanding that women in the time of the Tanach were considered "in/of the tent."

The next text that goes with this is from an annotated version of the Chumash - The Kehot Chumash. The Kehot Chumash includes insertions based on the works of the Lubavitcher Rebbe. The bolded words are the direct translation.

1. What do these texts tell us about gender roles in the time of the Tanach?

2. How do Yaakov and and Dinah break these gender roles?

The following is from a source sheet titled (Gender)queering Joseph by Rabbi Danya Ruttenberg.

It begins even before Joseph is born; first, the Rabbis of the Talmud notice a strange phrasing in Genesis 30:21 and extrapolate that Dina’s sex must have changed in utero, and come up with the following midrash:

“Rav Joseph challenged [the previous statement, never mind what they were talking about, by raising this case]: “And afterwards she bore a daughter and called her name Dinah” (Gen. 30:21). What is meant by ‘afterwards’? Rav said: After Leah had passed judgment [dana din—a wordplay on Dina’s name] on herself, saying, ‘Twelve tribes are destined to issue from Jacob. Six have issued from me [already] and four from the enslaved-women [Bilhah and Zilpah], making ten. If this child will be a male, my sister Rachel will not be equal to one of the enslaved-women [in bearing sons]. Immediately the child was turned to a girl, as it says, ‘And she called her name Dinah!’” (Talmud Brachot 60a)

Another midrashic source, the Targum Pseudo-Jonathan, (Genesis 30:21) extends this midrash to suggest that Rachel was actually already pregnant at the same time, and, at this moment of Leah’s prayer, Joseph and Dina were switched in their mothers’ uteri:

Before God, Leah’s prayer was heard, and the fetuses were switched in their wombs; Joseph was placed in Rachel’s womb and Dinah in the womb of Leah.

This midrash then gets cited in Jewish legal responsa, like the late 19th/early 20 c. Responsa Tzur Yaakov from Rabbi Avraham Yaakov HaLevi Horowitz of Probizhna, Ukraine, which explains (ch. 28):

Certainly, this means that Joseph’s body in Leah’s womb was transformed into a female, while Dinah’s body in Rachel’s womb was transformed into a male, and their souls were transferred from each womb to the other.

1. What are the implications of this on modern Jewish life?

2. Do you feel like this makes sense? Does the combination of different texts enhance or detract from your understanding of Joseph and Dinah as queer characters?

What does it mean to be queer in modern Jewish life? Existing in a world of denominational Judaism and a broad understanding of the Queer Umbrella means we each have vastly different experiences being queer in Jewish community. Different denominations have had different answers, none being inherently more right than any other, but it does give us a lot to look at. In this section we will see sources from different Rabbis across many denominations and what they have to say. In this section we will discuss a few pieces from different Rabbis. They are all long, and we will not go through the entire thing, but each will be linked in their sections

Rabbi Jeffrey Fox is the Rosh Yeshiva of Yeshivat Maharat, a Open Orthodox yeshiva for women and serves as the first Orthodox institution to ordain women as Rabbis. As part of his work to bring Orthodoxy into modern Jewish life, Rabbi Fox wrote a teshuva on queer women in Orthodoxy and how to allow for same-sex relationships between women under strict observance of Halacha. The entire teshuva is quite long and we will not look at the whole thing, but we will see some key pieces that sum it up.

The teshuva, titled Nashim Mesolelot: A Teshuva brings in a few sources that are the commonly cited sources for the prohibition of homosexuality. Rabbi Fox sites from the Sifra on Acharei Mot and Vayikra Rabba, two midrashic works, multiple sugyot from the Talmud Bavli and multiple sugyot from the Talmud Yerushalmi, as well as medieval commentators. What I want us to note today is the last few paragraphs of the teshuva.

"Rabbi Eldad Sabag, shlita, in his commentary on the Rambam (Hil. Issurei Biah 21:8), באר המל analyzes both the nature of the physical act of mesolelot and the scope of the potential prohibition. He is among the first authors writing in a classic rabbinic idiom who displays awareness of the fact that there are women who are not attracted to men. There were certainly others who knew of gay women, but that knowledge does not appear in the literature. In trying to explain the strange position of the Rivan, Rabbi Sabag writes as a note in small print and square brackets:

It really was not until the end of the 20th -- and for some not until the beginning of the 21st -- century that poskim became aware of the reality of gay women. If we assume that the number of gay people as a percentage of the population has been consistent for some time, this means that for thousands of years, gay men and women were living in marriages that were physically unfulfilling or even repugnant to them. Only in the last 150 years has it even been possible for most people -- and certainly all rabbis -- to imagine living with a partner of the same sex in a committed monogamous relationship.

In most places in the world, for the vast majority of human history, the idea of two women living together publicly in a partnered relationship was unthinkable, illegal, or simply impossible. Obergefell v. Hodges, the landmark Supreme Court case that guarantees same-sex couples the right to marry, was decided in June of 2015, just a few years ago!

What can we reasonably expect from rabbis living at the turn of the third century CE or even in 18th-century Prague? Of course they could not have had a well-grounded opinion about two women who want to live together, keep a kosher home, be fully shomrot Shabbat and, with God’s help, start a family of their own. Such an image, until the last 20 to 30 years, was simply inconceivable to the rabbinic imagination.

I have been blessed to sit with dozens of frum queer women who are all seeking an answer to a very basic question: what does God want from them? For too long, and in some settings to this day, gay women have been told that it is their duty to marry men. The first step that I think all communities must take is to stop giving such hurtful and destructive advice. Before we ask any halakhic questions, this is a basic issue of human dignity. Would you want your daughter or sister in an unfulfilling relationship? Would you want your son in a relationship with a woman who was never going to be satisfied and would never welcome intimacy with him? Such counsel leads down a path filled with darkness.

Offering advice -- both halakhic advice and life advice -- in an area where we find a vacuum can be very difficult. For many years, people have been filling the vacuum left by Rav Moshe and the Aruch LaNer’s reading of Rashi and Tosafot with the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch. My claim is very simple. It is time to fill that vacuum with a new voice.

The reality of the LGBTQ+ community today is that there is still a lot of promiscuity. There may be good explanations for that behavior, given the history of repression and abuse, and the obstacles in the way of recognizing non-heteronormative monogamous relationships. For those who are trying to live within the Orthodox world, this is not really the case. However, halakha also makes claims on people who want to be part of the frum world. I agree with Rava that a woman married to a man who steps out on him is behaving inappropriately. When people “hook up” with each other and don’t think twice about the implications of that physical interaction, that really is pritzut. But when people behave in a way that does not implicate an unknowing spouse and that attempts to maintain halakha in all ways, that should no longer be viewed as pritzut.

C. Psak, Answer:

First, we begin with the understanding that, according to almost all poskim, the concern of two women engaging in intimate physical behavior with each other can only be considered a rabbinic violation. That prohibition was expanded by the Rambam, who represents a minority voice among the Rishonim.

Second, the majority position (Rashi, Tosafot, Ramban, Rashba, Ritva, Nimukei Yosef) does not cite maaseh Eretz Mitzrayim at all, nor do these authorities refer to the Rambam in any meaningful way. According to this approach, the only concerns, as clearly articulated in the Bavli, are marriageability to priests and licentiousness.

Third, even though the Shulchan Aruch codifies the Rambam’s approach, the changed reality of frum gay women serves as a push to return to the majority position of the Rishonim.

Finally, the majority position is read by a substantial group of Achronim as referring to a case when at least one of the women is married to a man.

Summary: The Gemara (Shabbat 65a, Yevamot 76a) twice quotes Rav Huna, who claims that mesolelot prohibits a woman from marrying a priest (or the high priest), with the express intent of rejecting that position. Rava intervenes and tells us that such behavior between two women -- when at least one of them is married to a man (Aruch LaNer, Ishei Yisrael) -- cannot really be prohibited but it is, nonetheless, pritzuta (licentious). When two women seek to build a Jewish home together, with love and commitment, this can no longer be called (even) pritzuta. Rather, given the vacuum left to be filled, this should be understood as tzniuta (modesty) and perhaps even kedushata (holiness).

https://www.yeshivatmaharat.org/_files/ugd/1ba6d3_45954ee114b24d88b669b88dfdfc88de.pdf

1. The majority of people in this room did not have an Orthodox upbringing or are Orthodox today, but that does not mean it is not important to our daily practice. Even if you personally do not care what Halacha says about being queer, I want you to imagine that you do. What does the answer Rabbi Fox comes to mean to you? What impact does this have on your day to day life?

The Conservative Movement's Committee on Jewish Law and Standards (CJLS) has released a few teshuvot over the years on homosexuality in Jewish practice. The teshuva that holds the majority opinion and is what is held by the Conservative Movement currently is titled, Homosexuality, Human Dignity, & Halakhah: A Combined Responsum for the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards. The teshuva was written by Rabbis Elliot Dorff, Daniel Nevins, and Avram Reisner and approved by the Committee on December 6, 2006. The teshuva discusses what it means to have human dignity and how to allow for leniencies in Halacha in order to provide said dignity.

Rabbi Elazar bar Zadok, who was a kohen, recalls, מתים של ארונות גבי על היינו מדלגין

ישראל מלכי לקראת” we used to go skipping across graves to greet the kings of Israel.” This would appear to place the dignity of

the human king higher than God’s dignity, represented by the biblical verse. Once again, the Talmud limits the impact of this

anecdote, stating that most graves are designed in a way that minimizes the transmission of impurity. Moreover, the Rabbis

gave great deference to the king, who represented the dignity of the entire nation.

Grammatically, Rabbi Elazar bar Zadok’s use of the past continuous היינו מדלגין indicates that this supersession of the

law based upon the demands of human dignity was “a continuous or repeated action.” This Talmudic example, together with

more recent halakhic applications of the principle of human dignity, refutes the claims of some that it functions only as an

emergency measure, and never as a permanent policy.

Returning to Brakhot, our general principle is now stated dramatically:

This passage establishes that the Sages waived their own dignity (i.e., the power of their precedents), but not the dignity of the

Torah, in deference to the dignity of other people. While the Sages traced their own authority to the verse from Deut. 17:11,

they still distinguished between the stature of their rulings and those of the Torah itself.

In the hierarchy of halakhic values, God’s dignity is highest, but human dignity is not far below, as Psalm 8:6 famously

Indeed, the final passage of this sugya in Brakhot 19b gives an example in which the clear biblical

command (Deut. 21:1) to return a lost object (in this case, a stray animal) is waived for an elder when the dignity of the finder

would be compromised by the obligation to lead the animal back to its owner. Here the maxim גָּדוֹל כְּבוֹד הַבְּרִיּוֹת שֶׁדּוֹחֶה [אֶת] לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה supersedes not only a rabbinic injunction, but even a biblical command, albeit via the passive mechanism of תעשה שב ואל,” sit and do not act.”

Yet in other Talmudic contexts, this principle is restricted to superseding rabbinic injunctions. For example, in Shabbat

81a-b, permission is granted to carry smooth stones up to a roof on Shabbat to be used for hygienic purposes. Here a form

of carrying prohibited by the rabbis, but not the Torah, is permitted in deference to human dignity. A similar case is brought

at Eiruvin 41b. Likewise in Shabbat 94b, Rav Nachman allowed the removal of a dead body from a house to a כרמלית on

Shabbat, out of deference to human dignity.

The next piece the teshuva quotes is from Tel Aviv University professor Delphine Haiun, who said:

"Kavod is the inner value that makes man a human being, that gives him/her identity as such; it constitutes a condition of human existence for him/her. This signification can slide into more institutional connotation, also present in the Bible. The kavod is, then, the social nature of a human being, his/her status, his/her importance, his/her value in society….Since the Middle Ages, the word kavod has represented the name of God. What makes us human beings is the divine part of us, the presence of God in us."

https://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/sites/default/files/teshuvot/1703225420_287.pdf?id=49867%20

1.What does the idea of human dignity mean to you?

2. How does the idea of human dignity relate to queerness in your life?

3. Do you think this makes sense?

Important to note a tesuva that was written for the CJLS but is not the majority opinion

https://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/sites/default/files/teshuvot/1703225420_294.pdf?id=49874%20

The Reform Movement has a lot to say about homosexuality, but the source we will look at has a surprising answer. This source is from 1981, and as such is not what the movement holds anymore, but it is fascinating to see.

"QUESTION: Should a congregation engage a known homosexual as a religious school teacher in the high school department? What should our attitude be toward engaging a known homosexual as Executive Secretary? Both of these individuals are quite open about their homosexuality.

ANSWER: The Central Conference of American Rabbis has concerned itself with the problems of homosexuals for a number of years. In 1977 the following resolution was adopted:

Whereas,the Central Conference of American Rabbis consistently supported civil rights and civil liberties for all people, especially for those from whom these rights and liberties have been withheld, and

Whereas,homosexuals have in our society long endured discrimination,

Be it thereforeresolved, that we encourage legislation which decriminalizes homosexual acts between consenting adults, and prohibits discrimination against them as persons, and

Be it further resolved,that our Reform Jewish religious organizations undertake programs in cooperation with the total Jewish community to implement the above stand.

We will not discuss the modern Jewish attitude toward homosexuals which has been shaped by two factors: (a) the attitude of tradition towards homosexuality, and (b) our contemporary understanding of homosexuality, which understands it as an illness, as a genetically based dysfunction, or as a sexual preference and lifestyle. There is disagreement whether homosexuality represents a willful act or a response to which the individual is driven.

The Biblical prohibition against homosexuality is absolutely clear, as seen in two sample verses: “Do not lie with a male as one lies with a woman; it is an abhorrence” (Leviticus 18:22); “If a man lies with a male as one lies with a woman, the two of them have done an abhorrent thing; they shall be put to death–their blood-guilt is upon them” (Leviticus 20:13). Other statements are equally clear. The Talmudic discussion of the matter makes no substantive changes and continues the prohibition. It deals with the question of minors, duress and various forms of the homosexual act (San. 53aff, Yev. 83b, Ker. 2aff, Ned. 5.1a, etc.). In the subsequent codes, the matter is briefly mentioned with the same conclusions (Yad, Hil. Isurei Bi-a 1.5, 22.2; Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Even Ha-ezer 24). There is very little material in the responsa literature which deals with homosexuality, as it does not seem to have been a major problem. The commentators to the above-mentioned section of the Shulchan Aruch felt that suspicion of homosexuality could not arise in their day, and so various preventive restrictions were superfluous. For example, Moses Rifkes (17th-century Poland) stated that this sin did not exist in his time (Be-er Hagola).Until the most recent modern period there has been no further discussion of this matter.

Let us turn to the question of the homosexual as a role model and begin by examining the status given to those in leadership positions by our tradition. Statements such as, “Whoever teaches the son of his fellowman is seen as having begotten him” (San. 19b), or “A teacher is given priority over the natural father in matters of honor” (B.M. 2, 11), demonstrate the high regard for persons in leadership positions. The commandment “Honor your father and your mother” was applied to teachers as well as parents (Bamidbar Rabba 15.17). The medieval codes provide a long list of duties which a student must fulfill in order to honor his teacher (Yad, Hil Talmud Torah 5.5-7; Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De-a 242.15, 16).

The highest personal and moral qualities were associated with these leaders of the community (M. Guedemann, Geschichte dei Erziehungswesens und der Kultur der abendlaendischen Juden, vol. 1, pp. 93ff, vol. 3, pp. 31ff). When accusations of impiety or improper behavior were brought against a rabbi, he could be removed from office if they were proven. Such problems were rarely mentioned in the responsa literature, and the authorities urged caution and rigorous investigation of the accusations and the motivation of the accusers (Moses Sofer, Responsa, Choshen Mishpat 162; Mordecai Schwadron, Responsa II, no. 56). There was more discussion about cantors and improper behavior. Their position was somewhat different as they were not primarily teachers, but were in the position of Sheliach Tsibur and, therefore, had to possess an absolutely proper moral character (Machzor Vitry 233 and 271), and among Ashkenazim they were sometimes dismissed on rumor alone (ibid. Isserles to Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 53.2). This was not to be taken lightly (Moses Sofer, Chatam Sofer, Orach Chayim 11.205). The Sephardic community was more lax in this regard (Maimonides, Responsa–Friemann, #18), but would also dismiss instantly if a charge was proven (R. Hai, Sha-arei Teshuva, #50). These standards referred to all kinds of overt improper sexual behavior, as well as to other unacceptable acts. I have found only one reference to an accusation of homosexual practices; although this was not proven, the cantor was dismissed as a preventative measure (Elijah Ibn Hayim, Responsa, #41). The community always sought leaders who were above reproach and continues to do so. Overt heterosexual behavior or overt homosexual behavior which is considered objectionable by the community disqualifies the person involved from leadership positions in the Jewish community. We reject this type of individual as a role model within that Jewish community. We cannot recommend such an individual as a role model nor should he/she be placed in a position of leadership or guidance for children of any age."

Today the reform movement holds that any person, regardless of sex, gender, or sexual orientation is welcome and encouraged to hold positions of leadership.

Note: Debbie Friedman was not admitted to the HUC Cantorial school due to her being a lesbian, but today the school is named after her.

https://www.ccarnet.org/ccar-responsa/arr-52-54/

1. Was this surprising to you? Why or why not?

2. How does this teshuva relate to the ones seen previously?