אחת דבר אלהים שתים זו שמעתי

(1)יהוה spoke to Moses, saying: (2) Speak to the Israelite people and say to them: I יהוה am your God. (3) You shall not copy the practices of the land of Egypt where you dwelt, or of the land of Canaan to which I am taking you; nor shall you follow their laws. (4) My rules alone shall you observe, and faithfully follow My laws: I יהוה am your God. (5) You shall keep My laws and My rules, by the pursuit of which human beings shall live: I am יהוה. (6) None of you men shall come near anyone of his own flesh to uncover nakedness: I am יהוה. (7) Your father’s nakedness, that is, the nakedness of your mother, you shall not uncover; she is your mother—you shall not uncover her nakedness. (8) Do not uncover the nakedness of your father’s wife; it is the nakedness of your father. (9) The nakedness of your sister—your father’s daughter or your mother’s, whether born into the household or outside—do not uncover their nakedness. (10) The nakedness of your son’s daughter, or of your daughter’s daughter—do not uncover their nakedness; for their nakedness is yours. (11) The nakedness of your father’s wife’s daughter, who was born into your father’s household—she is your sister; do not uncover her nakedness. (12) Do not uncover the nakedness of your father’s sister; she is your father’s flesh. (13) Do not uncover the nakedness of your mother’s sister; for she is your mother’s flesh. (14) Do not uncover the nakedness of your father’s brother: do not approach his wife; she is your aunt. (15) Do not uncover the nakedness of your daughter-in-law: she is your son’s wife; you shall not uncover her nakedness. (16) Do not uncover the nakedness of your brother’s wife; it is the nakedness of your brother. (17) Do not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; nor shall you take [into your household as a wife] her son’s daughter or her daughter’s daughter and uncover her nakedness: they are kindred; it is depravity. (18) Do not take [into your household as a wife] a woman as a rival to her sister and uncover her nakedness in the other’s lifetime. (19) Do not come near a woman during her menstrual period of impurity to uncover her nakedness. (20) Do not have carnal relations with your neighbor’s wife and defile yourself with her. (21) Do not allow any of your offspring to be offered up to Molech, and do not profane the name of your God: I am יהוה. (22) Do not lie with a male as one lies with a woman; it is an abhorrence. (23) Do not have carnal relations with any beast and defile yourself thereby. Likewise for a woman: she shall not lend herself to a beast to mate with it; it is perversion. (24) Do not defile yourselves in any of those ways, for it is by such that the nations that I am casting out before you defiled themselves. (25) Thus the land became defiled; and I called it to account for its iniquity, and the land spewed out its inhabitants. (26) But you must keep My laws and My rules, and you must not do any of those abhorrent things, neither the citizen nor the stranger who resides among you; (27) for all those abhorrent things were done by the people who were in the land before you, and the land became defiled. (28) So let not the land spew you out for defiling it, as it spewed out the nation that came before you. (29) All who do any of those abhorrent things—such persons shall be cut off from their people. (30) You shall keep My charge not to engage in any of the abhorrent practices that were carried on before you, and you shall not defile yourselves through them: I יהוה am your God.

THOU SHALT NOT UNCOVER THE NAKEDNESS OF THY BROTHER’S WIFE. This is explained in the Torah portion If brethren dwell together (Deut. 25:5).

When brothers dwell together and one of them dies and leaves no offspring, the wife of the deceased shall not become that of another party, outside the family. Her husband’s brother shall unite with her: he shall take her as his wife and perform the levir’s duty.

The nakedness of thy brother's wife thou shalt not dishonour in the life-time of thy brother, or after his death, if he have children; for it is the nakedness of thy brother.

§ Rather, the suggestion that other women with whom relations are usually forbidden might be permitted for levirate marriage was based on a different argument: It might enter your mind to say: Let this claim be derived by the hermeneutical principle of: What do we find with regard to, which is a principle of inductive reasoning involving a comparison between cases that include similar details. In other words, the halakha of all other women with whom relations are forbidden can be derived from that of a brother’s wife: Just as a brother’s wife enters levirate marriage, so too, a wife’s sister should enter into levirate marriage.

(Ibid. 20:8) "Remember the Sabbath day to sanctify it": "Remember" and "Keep" (the Sabbath day to sanctify it [Devarim 5:12]) were both stated in one pronouncement. (Exodus 31:14) "Its profaners shall be put to death" and (Numbers 28:9) "And on the Sabbath day, (sacrifice) two yearling lambs" were both stated in one pronouncement (Leviticus 18:16) "the nakedness of your brother's wife" and (Devarim 25:5) "Her yavam (levir, i.e., her brother-in-law) shall come upon her" were both stated in the same pronouncement. (Ibid. 22:11) "You shall not wear sha'atnez, wool and linen together" and (Ibid. 12) "Fringes (involving sha'atnez) shall you make for yourself" were both stated in the same pronouncement — something beyond the powers of a human being to say. As it is written (Psalms 62:12) "One thing has G–d spoken, these two have I heard." (Jeremiah 23:29) "Is My word not like fire, says the L–rd (and like a hammer shattering rock!")

The Gemara paraphrases the mishna from tractate Bekhorot: Initially, whenyevaminwould have intent for the sake of fulfilling the mitzva of consummating the levirate marriage, the mitzva of consummating the levirate marriage took precedence over the mitzva of performing ḥalitza. And now that they do not have intent for the sake of fulfilling the mitzva, the Sages say: The mitzva of performing ḥalitza takes precedence over the mitzva of consummating the levirate marriage.Rami bar Ḥama said that Rabbi Yitzḥak said: In later generations they went back to once again saying that the mitzva of consummating the levirate marriage takes precedence over the mitzva of performing ḥalitza. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to him in wonderment: Could it be that the later generations improved their spiritual level and now intend to consummate the levirate marriage solely for sake of fulfilling the mitzva? The Gemara explains that this does not mean that the later generations improved themselves; rather, initially they held in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul, and so the mitzva of performing ḥalitza took precedence, and in the end they held in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and so the mitzva of consummating the levirate marriage took precedence. As it is taught in a baraita: Abba Shaul says that one who consummates a levirate marriage with his yevama for the sake of her beauty, or for the sake of marital relations, or for the sake of another matter, e.g., he wishes to inherit her husband’s estate, it is considered as though he encountered a forbidden relation, and I am inclined to view the offspring born from such a union as a mamzer. Since the prohibition against engaging in relations with one’s brother’s wife is overridden only for the sake of fulfilling the mitzva of consummating the levirate marriage, when one does not have the intention to fulfill that mitzva, the baseline prohibition applies, and so any offspring from the union will be mamzerim. The Rabbis say: The Torah states: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5), which indicates that he should do so in any case, even if his intentions are not solely for the sake of fulfilling the mitzva.

If she died, what should be done with the money assured to her in her marriage contract by her deceased husband and with her property that enters and leaves the marriage with her, in which a husband only ever has a usufructuary interest? Beit Shammai say: The husband’s heirs, i.e., the yavam, who stands to inherit from the husband when he consummates the levirate marriage, should divide up the property together with her father’s heirs, i.e., the woman’s family. And Beit Hillel say: The property retains its previous ownership status. Therefore, money assured to her in her marriage contract remains in the possession of the husband’s heirs. Since it was to be paid from the husband’s own property, the money is retained by his estate and passes to his heirs. And her property that enters and leaves the marriage with her remains in the possession of the father’s heirs. Since those properties belonged to her, upon her death they are inherited by her father or his heirs. If the yavamconsummated the levirate marriage with her, then her legal status is that of his wife in every sense, and therefore the yavam has the same rights to her property as in a regular marriage. And the only exception to this is that her marriage contract will still be payable from the property of her first husband and not from the property of the yavam.

When a man marries his yevamah and then divorces her, he may remarry her if he so desires. She is considered to be his wife with regard to all matters. There remains no trace of the prohibition [that existed when she was] his brother's [wife], neither from Scriptural law nor from Rabbinic law.

The Gemara discusses the dispute alluded to in the previous paragraph. It was stated: With regard to one who performs ḥalitza with his yevama and went back and betrothed her, Reish Lakish said: The brother who earlier performed ḥalitzais not liable to receive karet for returning to the yevama who performed ḥalitza [ḥalutza]. She is no longer forbidden as a brother’s wife, although she is forbidden by a regular prohibition. And the brothers who did not actually perform the ḥalitzaare liable to receive karet for having relations with a ḥalutza. In their case, the woman retains her status as a forbidden brother’s wife even after the ḥalitza. With regard to the rival wife of the ḥalutza, although she too is released from the levirate bond, since the act of ḥalitza itself was not performed with her, both the brother who performed the ḥalitzaand the other brothers are liable to receive karet for having relations with the rival wife, as she retains her forbidden status as a brother’s wife. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Neither he nor the other brothers are liable to receive karet, neither for the ḥalutza nor for having relations with the rival wife. The Gemara explains: What is the rationale of Reish Lakish? The verse states with regard to one who performs ḥalitza with his yevama: “Who does not build up his brother’s house” (Deuteronomy 25:9), which teaches that since he did not build his brother’s house by entering into levirate marriage, opting instead for ḥalitza, he shall never build it again. This statement is understood not only as a negative description of events, but also as a prohibition against marrying this woman at any point in the future. However, it is the man who performed the act of ḥalitzawho stands liable to receive punishment for violating this prohibition of: Does not build up, i.e., the prohibition against marrying his ḥalutza. For him the prohibition involving karet has been replaced by the regular prohibition of: Who does not build up his brother’s house. However, with regard to his brothers, where they stood before, they stand now. In other words, just as before the mitzva of levirate marriage applied to them this woman was forbidden to them as a brother’s wife, once the obligation of levirate marriage has been removed they remain bound by the same prohibition. Consequently, she is forbidden to the brothers on pain of karet. And furthermore, only with regard to her, the ḥalutza, does he stand liable for: Does not build up, but as for the rival wife, who did not perform ḥalitza, where all the brothers stood before, they stand now. Just as before her rival wife performed ḥalitza she was forbidden on pain of karet, the same applies after the ḥalitza, both for the man who performed ḥalitza and his brothers. And Rabbi Yoḥanan claims: Is there anything of this kind in halakha? After all, at the outset, before the ḥalitza, if this brother wanted he could perform ḥalitza, and if that brother wanted he could perform ḥalitza, and if he wanted he could perform ḥalitza with this woman and if he wanted he could perform ḥalitza with that woman. All the deceased brother’s wives were included in the levirate obligation of marriage or ḥalitza, and therefore the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife was negated for all of them at that time. And now, after the ḥalitza, they stand to incur karet for having relations with her? How can the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife return after it was nullified by the death of the childless brother? Rather, he who performs ḥalitzaperforms the agency of the other brothers, and therefore he also releases her from the levirate bond of his brothers. Similarly, she who performs ḥalitzaperforms the agency of the rival wife, as the ḥalitza of one wife serves to release the other one as well. Consequently, it is as though all of the brothers released all of the wives, and there is no longer any prohibition that incurs karet.

MISHNA: When a man who has a brother dies childless, his widow [yevama] and one of his brothers [yavam] may perform a ritual through which she is freed of her levirate bonds [ḥalitza]. It is then considered, with regard to forbidden relationships, as though they had been married and divorced. Therefore, he is forbidden to her relatives, and she to his. However, with regard to one who performs ḥalitza with his yevama and then she is found to have been pregnant at the time of the ḥalitzaand she gave birth, in the event that the offspring is viable, the deceased husband has been survived by offspring and so there was never any levirate bond; consequently, the ḥalitza that was performed was entirely unnecessary and a meaningless act. As such, he remains permitted to her relatives and she remains permitted to his relatives. Furthermore, since the ḥalitza was meaningless, she is not afforded the status of a ḥalutza, i.e., a yevama who performed ḥalitza, a status akin to that of a divorcée. Therefore, the ḥalitzadoes not disqualify her from marrying into the priesthood.

HALAKHAH: “Fifteen [categories of] women free their co-wives”, etc. It is written “unleavened it must be eaten”. Since it was permitted and then forbidden, when it became permitted again should one think it returned to its prior permission? The verse states “unleavened it should be eaten” as commandment. Similarly, “her levir shall come upon her” as a commandment. Since she was permitted and then forbidden, when she became permitted again should one think she returned to her prior permission? The verse states “her levir shall come upon her” as commandment. Rebbi Yose explains the baraita: “Unleavened it must be eaten”. Since it was permitted before it was dedicated, if one wants to eat it, he eats, not to eat, he does not eat. When he dedicated it became forbidden. When the fistful was brought it became permitted again; should one think it returned to its prior permission? If he wants to eat it, he eats, not to eat, he does not eat? The verse states “unleavened it must be eaten” as commandment. Similarly, “her levir shall come upon her” as a commandment. Since she was permitted before she was married to his brother, if he wanted to bring her into his house, he could bring her, not to bring her into his house, he would not bring her. When she was married to his brother she became forbidden. When his brother died childless she became permitted again. Should one think she returned to her prior permission, if he wanted to bring her into his house, he could bring her, not to bring her into his house, he would not bring her? The verse states “her levir shall come upon her” as commandment. Rebbi Huna explains the baraita: “Unleavened it must be eaten”. Since it was permitted before it was dedicated, if one wants to eat it leavened, he eats it, unleavened, he eats it. The verse states “unleavened it should be eaten” as commandment. Similarly, “her brother-in-law shall come upon her” as commandment. Since she was permitted before she was married to his brother, if he wanted to bring her into his house because of her shapeliness, he could bring her, because of her money, he could bring her. When she was married to his brother she became forbidden. When his brother died childless she became permitted again. Should one think she returned to her prior permission, if he wanted to bring her into his house because of her shapeliness, he could bring her, because of her money, he could bring her? The verse states “her levir shall come upon her” as commandment. It turns out that Rebbi Ḥuna follows Abba Shaul, as we have stated: “Abba Shaul says, one who brings his sister-in-law into his house because of beauty or another reason commits intercourse of prostitution and the child is close to be a bastard.”